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Foreword:WhatNumbers Do
Numbers do things. They highlight and obscure. They integrate and
disaggregate. They mark and measure. They represent and intervene.
They tame and inflame. They structure people’s interactions. They create
new objects and new kinds of people. They possess a power that hides
itself. They are rhetoric that is anti-rhetorical. What all of these features
of numbers share is that they express a certain agency. They perform.
The agency of numbers is not the same as human agency. It is not
the creative human action that invents numbers and finds new uses and
contexts for them. But it is agency, nonetheless, because numbers order
and make possible specific kinds of cognition and action and preclude
others. For example, numbers make it almost impossible not to compare
the entities that share a scale. In doing so, numbers give rise to extraor-
dinary amounts and kinds of comparisons. Our understanding of what is
shared and what is unique requires comparison. Numbers make it possible
to reduce complex, diverse information into a ‘sense-able’ sequence. Once
we know a number, it is difficult not to think in terms of quantity, whether
this is time, distance, price, or some other unit (an exception constitute
phone numbers, or street addresses). Numbers produce hierarchy where
more is typically better than less. Difference is in degrees, not kind.
We form relationships through and to numbers. Those that took the
same standardized test now share a tie with one another, one that is
abstract but sometimes fateful. And people become invested in particular
numbers or even particular kinds of numbers. Witness the fixation on the
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country risk index in Argentina that de Santos (2009) describes. Or the
way that measures of sexual behavior shaped the gay rights movement in
the United States where the 10% became the widely accepted estimate of
the gay population (Espeland and Michaels 2018). Numbers dehumanize,
too, as the tattoos of Jews during the Holocaust attest. But they can also
humanize, as being counted in a national census offers a sense of inclusion
and potency (Rodríguez-Muñiz 2017).
This volume takes the agency of numbers seriously. In different
domains, the chapters it contains address how distinctive combinations
of human agency and the agentic properties of numbers give rise to
particular modes of coordination, administration and governance. Coor-
dination, the art of breaking down complex tasks into actionable (and
complementary) units, depends heavily on numbers. We use metrics to
synchronize our machines. We use accounting to assess what we have,
what is owed, and what worked in the past. We use numbers to project
ourselves into uncertain futures when we analyse risk. And we hold
leaders accountable with numbers: crime rates, budgets, votes, cost-
benefit ratios, rankings, economic indicators, and returns on investments.
As the seminal work of Miller and Rose (1990) established, numbers
permit states to govern from a distance. But exactly how this governing
happens in different institutional contexts is less established. This volume
helps to fill that empirical and theoretical gap.
Numbers are like any symbol in that they are a form that systematically
includes, excludes, and organizes information. What is distinctive about
numbers is how scrupulously they edit the world and the nature of their
authority. We associate numbers with precision, rigor, objectivity, and
rationality. Numbers are firm while words are malleable. We believe that
the rules for constructing measures are constraining such that numbers are
less easy to manipulate, less open to multiple interpretations, than other
kinds of information. The discipline needed to make numbers is enough
to tame the self-interest or politics that threaten their objectivity.
But numbers are rarely as innocent as they seem. They make possible
new forms of surveillance that inform and control. As Ota De Leonardis
demonstrates, the quantification of poverty translates inequalities into
distance, something which mutes discussions of political power. Similarly,
Ousmane Sidibé describes how the advent of benchmarking with perfor-
mance indicators has contributed to undermining public politics around
development in Africa. Tong Lam examines how with the advent of big
data, algorithms now construct profiles of individuals that informs their
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credit, their politics, and their consumption. Robert Salais shows how the
transformation to governance by numbers, with its emphasis on efficiency,
neglects the ‘fair balance’ between the state and its citizens.
But numbers can also constrain power. In times of political upheaval,
measurement has often been a pressing issue, bound up with issues of
equity and fairness. The Magna Carta, for example, declared that there
should be ‘one measure of wine throughout our whole realm, and one
measure of ale and one measure of corn […]’ in order to protect common
people from being cheated with the use of arbitrary measures. And the
French Revolution famously introduced the meter and the metric system
to the world (Alder 2002). Witold Kula (1986) sees conflict over measures
as a fundamental part of class struggle. Isabelle Bruno, Emmanuel Didier,
and Tommaso Vitale analyse forms of political action that mobilized statis-
tics in struggles of various kinds, which they term statactivism (Bruno
et al. 2014) (see also Boris Samuel’s contribution in this book).
It is easy to underestimate the work and infrastructure that is required
to produce numbers that others find credible. As Laurent Thévenot
shows, quantification depends on prior processes of formatting and codi-
fying, all of which require discipline and standardizing. For example,
coding, a process for turning disparate qualitative information into stan-
dardized ‘data’ is a complex intervention that requires often hundreds of
decisions about whether something is or isn’t an instance of some pre-
established category. Coding is governed by established, written proto-
cols that must be learned by those making the coding decisions. And all
this transformation takes resources, time, training, and imagination—in
other words, administrative capacity. Corine Eyraud describes the devel-
opmental stages of the indicators used to measure education in France
showing how these operate at different analytical levels. And Thomas
Amossé shows how France’s statistical infrastructure has shifted over time,
and how its representative household survey, biographical investigation,
and matched panel are statistical practices that articulate specific ways of
revealing the world, social science theory, methods and conceptions of
public action.
Particularly for English-speaking readers, this volume is a welcome
introduction to some of the most important theorists of quantification.
Together the original essays it contains offer sophisticated and detailed
analyses that reveal the administrative capacity that is required to make
and use numbers and their power to reshape our core institutions. They
allow us to see how decisions to make and use numbers set in motion
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consequences that were never envisioned. They reveal how numbers hide
their power. After reading this volume, it is impossible to take numbers at
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The New Politics of Numbers:
An Introduction
Andrea Mennicken and Robert Salais
The business of government is increasingly run with a calculator to hand.
Both policymaking activities and administrative control are increasingly
structured around calculations such as cost-benefit analyses, estimates of
social impacts and financial returns, measurements of performance and
risk, benchmarking, quantified impact assessments, ratings and rankings,
all of which provide information in the form of a numerical represen-
tation. Through quantification, public services and policies have experi-
enced a fundamental shifting from “government by democracy” towards
“governance by numbers”, with implications not just for our under-
standing of the nature of public administration itself, but also for wider
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debates about the nature of citizenship and democracy. This book scruti-
nizes the relationships between quantification, administrative capacity and
democracy across different policy sectors and countries. In so doing, it
seeks to offer unique cross-national and cross-sectoral insight into how
managerialist ideas and instruments of quantification have been adopted
and how they have come to matter.
More than thirty years ago, Alonso and Starr (1989) edited the by now
classic “The Politics of Numbers”, which was amongst the first books that
scrutinized relations between quantification and democratic government
in North America (but see also Cohen, 1982). Amongst other things,
Alonso and Starr’s collection of essays showed how government statistics
had become vital to pursuing essential goals of a democratic polity, such
as accountability and representation of diverse interests. The book also
highlighted that a nation’s number system creates new invisibilities (e.g.
of minorities). It showed how and to what extent political judgements
and bias are embedded in the statistical systems of the modern state, or
as Rose (1991, p. 675) put it, “how the domain of numbers is politically
composed and the domain of politics is made up numerically”.
In parallel, also European scholars had begun to question the rela-
tion between numbers and democracy, and between government and
numbers. In France, in particular Alain Desrosières and his colleagues,
including Robert Salais and Laurent Thévenot, who contributed to this
volume and at the time worked with Desrosières for the French National
Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE), interrogated the
conventions and classifications underpinning the production, use, and
consequences of statistics (e.g. Desrosières, 1987 [1983]; Desrosières,
1998 [1993]; Thévenot, 1979, 1981; Salais, 1986; for useful overviews
see also Diaz-Bone & Didier, 2016; Diaz-Bone & Salais, 2011). In the
UK, it was first and foremost Anthony Hopwood who triggered a critical-
reflexive turn in the study of numbers, focusing on the multifaceted roles
of accounting in representing and intervening in social and organizational
life (see e.g. Hopwood, 1983; Hopwood & Miller, 1994; S. Burchell
et al., 1980; but see also Miller, 1992; Miller & Rose, 1990). Further
important early works on the production, history and influence of statis-
tics were conducted by scholars with backgrounds in the history and
philosophy of science (Daston, 1988; Gigerenzer et al., 1989; Hacking,
1990; Krüger et al., 1987; Porter, 1986).
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Since then, particularly over the past fifteen years or so, there has
been an increased interest in, and surge of, articles and books on gover-
nance by numbers, albeit in different fields (for a review see Mennicken &
Espeland, 2019). In the field of public administration and public policy,
especially the rise of New Public Management led to heightened attention
to the roles of performance indicators in the governance of public services
(see also Bruno et al., 2016; Bruno & Didier, 2013; Supiot 2015). Here,
consideration has not only been given to problems of measurement (i.e.
the limits of performance measures to capture what matters), but also
gaming (Bevan & Hood, 2006; Strathern, 1997), reactivity (Espeland &
Sauder, 2007) and the “audit explosion”, characterized by the rise and
expansion of formal systems of performance evaluation and assessment
aimed at making elusive notions, such as quality, auditable (Power, 1997;
Strathern, 2000).
Bevan and Hood (2006) showed how governance by targets changed
the behaviour of individuals and organizations in the English National
Health System (NHS). They coined the famous phrase “hitting the target
and missing the point” (ibid., p. 521). Building on Goodhart’s epony-
mous law that “any observed statistical regularity will tend to collapse
once pressure is placed on it for control purposes” (Goodhart, 1984,
p. 94, cited in Bevan & Hood, 2006, p. 521), they queried to what
extent “governance by targets” subverts public service ethos, contributes
to output distortions and a general narrowing of quality definitions.
Also, Strathern showed for the case of the higher education sector in
the UK that “when a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good
measure” (Strathern, 1997, p. 308). More recently, Espeland and Sauder
(2007) investigated reflexive interactions between people and measures
by looking at the reactivity of US law school rankings. Amongst other
things, they showed that these rankings contributed to a proliferation
of gaming strategies, the redefinition of work and a redistribution of
resources (Espeland & Sauder, 2016; but see also Bruno et al., 2016).
Research has also drawn attention to new practices and strategies of
gaming and manipulation that have emerged in the academic world over
the past few years (Biagioli & Lippman, 2020a). These practices are
different from the predictable gaming of academic performance indica-
tors and may take the form of “massaging the definition what counts as
a ‘successful student’ in metrics about schools’ performance, or of what
counts as a ‘peer-reviewed’ paper in faculty evaluation protocols” (Biagioli
& Lippman, 2020b, p. 1).
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Rankings, ratings and other governance indicators, such as the Human
Development Index, Gender Inequality Index or Social Progress Index,
rest on multiple levels of aggregation (Mennicken & Espeland, 2019,
p. 232). They are seductive as they allow for easy comparison and ranking
of countries and organizations, which can lead to oversimplification and
homogenization if not grounded in qualitative, locally informed knowl-
edge production (Davis et al., 2012; Merry, 2016; Rottenburg et al.,
2015; Salais, 2006; Supiot, 2015; Thévenot, 2009). This and the rise
and proliferation of “governance by numbers” makes it all the more
important to understand how such numbers are produced, calculated and
aggregated, and with what consequences.
The essays collected in this volume interrogate what has changed in the
relation between numbers and democracy, and between government and
numbers, since the publication of “The Politics of Numbers” (Alonso &
Starr, 1989). What is “new” in the politics of numbers and our approach
to their study?
First, we observe an unprecedented expansion, acceleration and inten-
sification of quantification not only in political life but also in everyday
life. To a large extent such an expansion and intensification of quan-
tification has been aided by the rise of new computer technologies for
(big) data collection and data processing. Such new digital technolo-
gies, including machine learning algorithms, have changed how public
administrations deploy resources and make decisions. They promise new
possibilities of governing, as the contribution of Lam in this volume on
the rise of China’s social credit system shows (Chapter 3). They also
transform how we understand ourselves, what we attend to and consider
important, as Vormbusch’s study of the “quantified self” movement in
Germany in this volume demonstrates (Chapter 4).
Second, we witness an increasing decline in the “trust in numbers”
(Porter, 1995), an antipathy to government statistics, and a disillusion-
ment and tiredness with New Public Management’s “governance by
targets”. In the age of “post-truth” politics, many have come to believe
that numbers are manipulated. As Davies (2017) argues, many well-
recognized indicators have lost their legitimacy. He quotes a study from
the US that discovered that 68% of Trump supporters distrusted the
economic data published by the federal government. For the UK, Davies
highlights “that a research project by Cambridge University and YouGov
looking at conspiracy theories revealed that 55% of the population believes
that the government ‘is hiding the truth about the number of immigrants
1 THE NEW POLITICS OF NUMBERS: AN INTRODUCTION 5
living here’” (Davies, 2017). Such distrust in numbers is further fuelled
by the increasing distance between two objectives of public services and
policies that service users have experienced over the past two decades: an
increasing distance between attempts aimed at truly improving the situa-
tions of the people concerned, on the one hand, and the maximizing of
quantitative performance, on the other hand. To counteract such devel-
opments, in the UK, an independent regulatory body was established in
2016, the Office for Statistics Regulation, to safeguard the “trustworthi-
ness, quality and value of statistics” and to assure that “statistics serve
the public good” acknowledging that statistics should meet the needs of
a much wider range of users than public policy-makers and parliamen-
tarians (see https://osr.statisticsauthority.gov.uk/publication/osr-vision,
accessed 30 October 2020).
At the same time, and ironically, the presence of numbers in our lives
seems to have never been greater. Such an increase in quantification
can be the result of an “overproduction” of an administrative policy, a
reaction (or even overreaction) to crisis, cognitive bias and uncertainty
(Maor, 2018, 2019). As Miller points out in the Afterword to this book
(Chapter 14), numbers have acquired an unassailable power, particularly
in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic. As he writes, “the phrase ‘follow
the science’, and its numerical counterpart the ‘R’ number, has attained
an ascendancy that none of us could have imagined only a few months
ago”. The R number, and associated statistics, such as the 14-day or 7-day
notification rate of newly reported COVID-19 cases per 100,000 of the
population, have been used as devices to regulate our lives, to make deci-
sions about whether schools, shops, restaurants, and much else besides,
should be open or closed, whether, and in what constellation, one can
meet with others or not. Miller’s contribution to this volume also shows
that the R number is far from being a straightforward measure. It is not
only incredibly difficult to calculate, it can also be potentially misleading
or at least uninformative, because it does not necessarily tell you what is
happening in your local area.
The essays collected in this volume query the rise and spread, as well as
resistance to, and disappointment in, the tools of quantification that have
come to govern our lives. In so doing, they do not so much ask what
quantification is. Rather, they are interested in describing and analysing
what quantification does. This volume is concerned with the tracking and
unpacking of various practices of quantification and their manifold conse-
quences in different contexts of public and private life. Such a close-up
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focus on quantification practice, or “quantification in action” to para-
phrase Hopwood (1983), contributes to our understanding of the roles
of numbers in public policy and public administration, and scholarship on
quantification more generally, in at least four distinct ways.
First, it helps in developing a more nuanced understanding of the
capacities and roles of the various calculative practices that have come to
populate different domains. The contributions to this book highlight that
quantification does much more than provoke gaming and reactivity. They
offer valuable insights into the inner workings of (different) accountability
regimes, their changing nature and the emergence of new regulatory
spaces and practices.
Second, the contributions show how quantification is implicated in
dreams and schemes of doing things differently, of creating new worlds
and bettering society. In many respects, it appears now that the socialist
countries have been pioneers in the political use of numbers. In the
USSR, statistics played not only a key role in the operationalization of
central planning; statistics were also inextricably linked to the articulation
and specification of the “socialist dream” (see Mespoulet’s contribu-
tion, Chapter 2). Likewise, China’s current social credit system has to
be seen as part of a bigger, long-term commitment to creating “good”
citizens via the controlling power of numbers (see Lam’s contribution,
Chapter 3). It is often such dreams and schemes, or programmatic ambi-
tions, as Miller and Rose (1990) would put it, that animate the rise and
spread of numbers and need to be attended to, rather than (unintended)
behavioural effects, if we want to understand what keeps the machinery
of quantification running despite its continuous failings.
Third, the book is concerned with providing deeper insight into how
quantification travels. This book brings together works on governing by
numbers by leading and emerging French, German, Italian, British and
Anglo-American scholars. In so doing, the book makes not only French,
Italian and German works on quantification accessible to an English-
speaking audience. It also enhances understanding of the implication of
quantification in different modes of regulating and governing. It gives
insight into how different forms of quantification have been developed
and deployed in the public administrations of varied countries (China,
Mali, Guadeloupe, USSR, UK, France) as well as European institutions
in different historical periods. The contributions collected here examine
whether and how quantification—the shift from government by democ-
racy to governance by numbers—has given rise to a shift in demands
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on administrative capacities of public administrations (e.g. expectations
regarding analytical skills, regulatory capabilities, legal staff or finan-
cial resources). To what extent do tools of quantification advance the
capacities of public administrations, regulatory agencies, and other orga-
nizations across sectors and states in terms of being able to monitor and
steer?
Fourth, and finally, the book revisits the power of numbers, and the
changing relationship between numbers and democracy. It engages two
central programmatic strands of research in a critical dialogue with each
other: namely Foucault inspired studies of governmentality (see here
in particular the contributions by Miller, Guter-Sandu and Mennicken,
Vormbusch, Lam and De Leonardis), which first and foremost flourished
in the English-speaking world, and studies of state statistics and economic
conventions, which have their origins in France, in particular the INSEE
(Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques) (see here
the contributions by Thévenot and Salais, two of the founding fathers
of the economics of conventions approach, and the chapters by Samuel,
Mespoulet, Amossé, Didier and Eyraud). Such a critical dialogue helps
advance debates about the power of numbers and relations between quan-
tification and democracy, a topic that in our view is in need of renewed
discussion and theoretical reflection. For when quantification becomes a
“technology of government”, power may be understood, expressed and
resisted differently, depending also on the specific characteristics of the
instruments of quantification used and what these afford actors to do.
For numbers are not only a device of rational rule, public administra-
tion and domination. As the contributions by Thévenot (Chapter 7),
Samuel (Chapter 11) and Salais (Chapter 12) in this volume demonstrate,
they can also aid social mobilization and empowerment, a theme that
particularly more recently published works on quantification have often
overlooked (but see the recent French works on statactivism published by
Bruno et al., 2014).
While some recent literature, particularly social studies of finance, has
devoted a lot of attention to the technological infrastructures of calcula-
tion, it has tended to neglect or downplay the roles that political ideas,
programmes or myths play in articulating and mobilizing them. Foucault-
inspired studies of the governmentality of quantification (Miller, 1992,
2001; Miller & O’Leary, 1987; Miller & Rose, 1990) emphasize that
we need to attend to both instruments and ideas of calculation, and the
interplay between them, as it is through that interplay that each dimension
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finds its conditions of operation. Similarly, also the economics of conven-
tion approach (Desrosières, 1985; Diaz-Bone, 2016; Diaz-Bone & Salais,
2011; Eymard-Duvernay, 1989; Salais, 2016; Salais & Thévenot, 1986;
Thévenot, 2011) stresses the significance of ideas and conventions for
the shaping of practices of quantification, and it assumes a plurality of
possible ways in which numbers can come to govern. Yet, as Demor-
tain (2019) points out, whereas governmentality studies have tended
to approach quantification in terms of its (variable) political rationali-
ties and disciplinary effects, the economics of convention approach has
paid more attention to the collective mobilization capacities it offers (or
not). We argue that it is important to understand processes and conse-
quences of quantification from both angles. The contributions to this
volume show that it is important to look at quantification as both a “tech-
nology of government, that reproduces a power structure” and as “a tool
that can facilitate political action towards this structure, and its change”
(Demortain, 2019, p. 974).
In our view, the time is ripe for such a joined-up, historically and
contextually sensitive approach to get to grips with the multiplicity
of quantification and “governing by numbers”. This volume assembles
contributions from different disciplines and contexts to deepen our under-
standing of “quantification in action”. It is structured into three main
parts. The first (Part I), explores Quantification as Utopia. Here, contri-
butions scrutinize the implication of quantification in imaginaries of the
future, “the ideal city” or “imagined community” as Anderson (1983)
would say, that possesses highly desirable or nearly perfect qualities for
its citizens. Statistics and other forms of quantification offer the promise
of anchoring such ideals and imaginations in something tangible (Davies,
2017). But under what conditions and with what consequences?
The second part (Part II), revisits the roles of numbers in Politics of
Evidence. Here, contributions probe the facticity of numbers and interro-
gate to what extent evidence-based quantification is in itself utopian. The
third and final part (Part III, entitled Voicing for Democracy) scrutinizes
changes in the relation between quantification and democracy. Nowadays
democracy is less than ever a peaceful and established social activity. New
relationships of power have emerged that dissimulate themselves under
the cloak of technicalities which can lead to a weakening of democratic
rights. Contributions in this part query the implication of quantification
in the rise of what Crouch (2004) has termed “post-democratic soci-
ety”, a society “that continues to have and to use all the institutions of
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democracy, but in which they increasingly become a formal shell”. Yet, we
also ask what would be needed to disrupt this trend. Under what condi-
tions can the exercise of political voice be made possible in and through
quantification (see here in particular Samuel’s and Salais’ contributions,
Chapter 11 and Chapter 12, but see also the contribution by Guter-Sandu
and Mennicken, Chapter 10)?
In the following, we introduce each of these parts and the individual
contributions that make them up in more detail to help readers navi-
gate and comprehend the overall architecture of the book. We conclude
our overview with a return to the question of where the economics of
convention approach meets Foucault and Foucauldian studies of govern-
mentality and what such a joining up brings to the furthering of debates
about quantification and governing by numbers.
Quantification as Utopia
As Frank Manuel and Fritzie Manuel’s (1979) witty and erudite book
Utopian Thought in the Western World shows, imagining utopias has been
a long-term characteristic of the western world since the Ancient Greeks.
Yet, types, subjects, and political uses of utopia have changed over time
and place. Whereas in the seventeenth century “utopia came to denote
general programs and platforms for ideal society, codes and constitutions
that dispensed with fictional apparatus altogether” (Manuel & Manuel,
1979, p. 2), more rationalist, systematic utopias appeared around the end
of the eighteenth century. According to Manuel and Manuel (1979, p. 2),
“the means of reaching utopia was transformed from an adventure story
or a rite of passage to Elysium into a question of political action”. The
way of attaining the ideal city came to affect the very nature of the city
itself (Manuel & Manuel, 1979, p. 3). This is still the case today. Utopias
can reveal themselves as good or bad, but that is not our concern here.
We are interested in the different ways utopian thought has influenced,
and continues to influence, the building of the knowledge a society has
of itself; concepts of the common good; the making of policies and their
implementation; and the roles that come to be ascribed to citizens and
their formatting.
Utopias could be said to set forth a horizon of expectations that is
believed to open a new future viewed as enlarging and facilitating the
actions of those who form it, ultimately aimed at making them more
powerful. These can be scientists, philosophers, ideologues, managers,
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politicians, all people who more or less occupy the role of “conseillers du
prince” in government matters. Policy-driven quantification often carries
with it a utopian perspective. It is implicated in the promise and dream of
creating an infrastructure that can facilitate the making of a new (better)
order. In this respect, quantification is deeply ideational (Power, 2019;
Miller & Rose, 1990); and it is often utopian thought that motivates its
production and expansion.
Quantification is further sustained by beliefs in its own rationality.
Simply put, the belief that often motivates in the political domain the
recourse to quantification is the assumption that more equals better.
Qualities are reduced to quantities, and difference is transformed into
magnitude (Espeland & Stevens, 1998). As Espeland and Stevens (1998,
p. 316) have highlighted, this transformation “allows people to quickly
grasp, represent, and compare differences”. It offers “ways of constructing
proxies for uncertain and elusive qualities” (ibid.). For us the key issue
here is not so much of a technical nature (i.e. how this transformation is
achieved), but concerns the shift in cognition it entails. How can we be
sure that the resulting loss of information, the moving away from in-depth
and shared qualitative knowledge, will not affect the very way political
decisions are taken, the way political objectives are formulated, motivated
and legitimized? How is it conceivable not to worry about the claim of a
universal toolbox that is able to emancipate itself from all material, socio-
historically-built and nationally-rooted specificities whatever the domain
in which we are acting, as if such particularities should have no meaning
and impact?
For by their very nature utopias cannot be achieved. The political and
ethical prudence (Raynaud & Rials, 1992) should be to recognize this
impossibility of realization and to conceive of utopian thought in terms
of a series of markers that guide, but not determine, an endless prag-
matic progress towards something that can only be loosely referred to.
The problem with any utopia begins when the prince’s advisors and the
prince himself try to implement it as it is formulated, take it literally, as
a blueprint for action and to transform social reality and expectations so
that they come to strictly obey to the precepts of the utopia in question.
In that case, far from liberating, utopia comes to confine freedom and
initiative in a straitjacket, eventually destroying them and utopia itself.
In this volume, Martine Mespoulet (Chapter 2) examines how statis-
tics and national accounting came to be invested with dreams and schemes
aimed at creating a new socialist society and a new human being. Statistics
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should help symbolically construct the (new) Soviet social and economic
world, and reform collective spirit and behaviour. Mespoulet traces the
tensions and twists and turns this involved. She shows how statistical
debates were mingled with internal political rivalries and rifts. The new
Bolshevik state had inherited an already well advanced statistical apparatus
that had been developed in the Tsarist Empire in exchange with other
western European countries. How could such an apparatus be adapted
to the new political representations of society, where numbers were not
only an information and decision support tool, but also an instrument of
power designed to prove the soundness of state action?
The old guard of statisticians came to clash with the Bolsheviks. For
the Bolsheviks, the production of figures was to be controlled by their
immediate practical applicability, that is their usefulness in guiding actions
and decisions. The autonomy of statistics as an independent science was
thus questioned. The search for information became selective and had to
satisfy political choices rather than statistical laws. As Mespoulet writes,
“statistical law came to be perceived as contradicting the principle of polit-
ical action, as it portrayed social processes as fatalistic [random, added]
and the effects of political action on society as illusory”. A new quan-
tification language had to be invented which did not resort to statistical
theory as a resource (such as the law of large numbers and randomiza-
tion). Yet, although national accounting seemed to provide such a new
language (the accounting for input and output), statistics were never
abandoned, Mespoulet shows. Statisticians learned to adapt to the new
world. They “became a kind of ‘right hand’ providing the economistic
planners with statistics needed for elaborating the plan, for instance for
building blocks of flats, schools or leisure facilities”. Furthermore, a whole
new area of statistics developed, based on economic forecasting and the
construction of indexes. And especially from the 1950s onwards, Soviet
statistics began to increasingly resemble those used in capitalist coun-
tries. As Mespoulet remarks, “the Soviet socialist system […] had to
demonstrate its superiority in the same economic and social fields as the
capitalist countries, which meant that they tended to adopt the same tools,
while re-interpreting their uses”. What separated socialist statistics from
their western capitalist counterparts was thus far from clear. Such separa-
tion had to be actively forged, time and again and was often rooted in
similarity.
Also Tong Lam (Chapter 3) investigates the multifaceted roles of
numbers and calculative expertise in state-building, albeit of a different
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kind. He turns our attention to China’s new social credit system, a
national system that is currently being developed under Xi Jinping’s
administration as part of the project of “The Chinese Dream” aimed at
rejuvenating the Chinese nation. For long, China’s political and intellec-
tual elites have had the desire to create national citizens, motivated and
enlightened enough to participate in China becoming, as Lam puts it,
“a unified body politic to counter the encroachment of foreign coun-
tries”. More than one century later, the dream of engineering new
citizens is being drastically reformulated. Moving away from a paper-
based bureaucratic surveillance system that rests on the maintenance of
personal dossiers, Lam shows how the new social credit system seeks
to track, evaluate and modify the financial, moral, social and polit-
ical behaviour of citizens and companies with the help of new digital
“evaluative infrastructures” (Kornberger et al., 2017).
Lam highlights that this new system seeks to modulate behaviour
not via oppression, but gamification, individual responsibilization and
incentivization. Drawing on Foucault’s writings on governmentality, he
points out that this system is “a technology of subjectivity and citizen-
ship that seeks to calibrate and modify the behaviour of individuals and
groups, compelling them to align themselves with the desired social and
political order as defined by the state”. Power is thus exercised indi-
rectly through what Foucault referred to as “the conduct of conduct”
(Foucault, 1991 [1979]). Responsibility and self-regulation are instilled
through a credit-point based reward and punishment system that affects
career and promotion prospects, possibilities of travel and mobility, and
much else besides. The numerical reward system creates incentives not
to simply obey, but to maximize one’s score so as to enlarge one’s field
of possibilities. The new focus, Lam argues, “is no longer on ideological
purity for political purposes but on trustworthiness as a basic condition
for economic efficiency”. In this respect, Chinese policy thinkers have
come to share many of the assumptions of (Western) rational choice and
game theorists. Lam cautions us to be careful not to demonize China as
the foreign Other, as the social credit system looks “at once dystopian
and strangely familiar”. Despite the many differences that exist between
China and Western market democracies, Lam emphasizes that the two
sides converge significantly in how their corresponding surveillance infras-
tructures have produced a new governing paradigm that, according to
Zuboff, has replaced “the engineering of souls with the engineering of
behavior” (Zuboff, 2019, p. 376, quoted in Lam).
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Lam’s contribution prepares the ground for a number of questions
on which other chapters in this volume seek to shed light. First, we
should not forget that the effectiveness of the system relies on its ability to
adequately capture the behaviour it seeks to modify, which is by no means
a trivial (and often unattainable) task. Second, following the economics
of convention (Diaz-Bone and Salais, 2011) social coordination does not
necessarily obey to formal institutions, but is shaped by shared informal
conventions of appropriate conduct. Such conventions are much more
stable in the long run than the recourse to formal institutional rules.
Hence, governing via credit scores might be much more difficult to
achieve than envisaged, and we need to pay attention to the consequences
of such uncertainty. Relatedly, we should also not underestimate people’s
ability to game the system’s rules. Third, and finally, the chapter invites
us to critically revisit and unpack what neoliberal governing entails. It
reminds us of neoliberalism’s multiple manifestations and the increased
blurring of differences between East and West.
Uwe Vormbusch’s chapter (Chapter 4) transposes us from dreams and
schemes of national quantification to the Quantified Self (QS) move-
ment. Born in California, the movement aims to obtain self-knowledge
through self-tracking, using new digital mobile and wearable technolo-
gies. Self-tracking as such is not new (see e.g. the history of diaries and
bathroom scales). Yet, digitization and automation equip quantifications
of the self with new possibilities, allowing for ever more detailed and
accelerated measurement that can be shared, compared and circulated
on the web. Vormbusch explores how such quantifications bring forth
new “taxonomies of the self” drawing special attention to the diversity of
representational forms and moral conflicts contained in such taxonomies.
Combining a Foucauldian approach (e.g. Miller, 1992) with studies of
the economics of convention (Diaz-Bone & Salais, 2011; Boltanski &
Thévenot, 2006 [1991]), which have highlighted the practical capa-
bilities of individual actors enmeshed in conventions, he argues that
self-quantification emerges as a contemporary “institution of the self” that
does not displace but co-exists with other established “technologies of the
self” (Foucault, 1988), such as religious confession and therapeutic and
psychoanalytic approaches to identity and authenticity.
Following Foucault, Vormbusch considers power “as a productive
network which runs through the whole social body, much more than
as a negative instance whose function is repression” (Foucault, 1980,
pp. 118). He stresses that self-measurement does not only lead to an
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intensification of surveillance, coercion and self-discipline. It also opens
up new spaces for self-discovery and self-modulation. It is this tension
between autonomy and subordination that he is interested in further
exploring. Vormbusch shows that self-quantifiers are not necessarily using
new technologies and data uncritically. He portrays them as capable and
reflexive actors (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006 [1991]) who are actively
inventing and manipulating technology to explore who they are and could
become. To be sure, such use of technology is not without problems and
conflicts. Vormbusch shows how quantifying your self is as much about
coping with new forms of cultural incertitude and precariousness as well as
keeping oneself “fit” and adept to today’s neoliberal “flexible capitalism”
(Boltanski & Chiapello, 2007).
There is a striking proximity between the social utopias of the self-
quantifiers and the Chinese Dream of forging the body into a new object
of knowing and governing via digital tracking, although both are situated
at opposing ends of the spectrum of neoliberal governing. In the former
case, we are dealing with a network of supposedly autonomous individ-
uals who are seemingly free to choose what to measure and how to adjust
their behaviour accordingly; in the latter case, we are dealing with a highly
centralized apparatus of authoritarian control. Yet, both resort to bench-
marking as a key instrument of neoliberal, market-oriented governance
(Bruno & Didier, 2013).
The dream of the self-quantifiers is to make visible the self, to make
it comparable and manageable, which requires classification, scales of
evaluation, the decontextualization of observations and the application
of the same methodologies for all. How can one be sure not to lose
essential information about the self? The self-quantifiers Vormbusch inter-
viewed oscillate between confidence in numbers and worries, even despair,
about the numbers’ ability to grasp their (distinctive) selves. The metrics
introduce an irreducible distance between forms of objectified external
judgement and quests to learn more about ones’ (unique) self. Such
distance is also problematized in the contribution by Ota De Leonardis
(Chapter 5).
De Leonardis examines measurements of inequality and their implica-
tion in dreams of “indifferent power”. She shows how attempts aimed
at quantifying poverty and inequality were accompanied by a semantic
shift in which the meaning of inequality as a (historical) bond of
dominationand subjection was being obscured. Inequality as defined by
quantification, she argues, “tends to designate a distributive difference, a
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gap, a disparity: a distance, and no longer a tie”. It has no longer a rela-
tional meaning that refers to power relations between unequal people,
where a bond is recognized between the “high” and “low” that creates
for both sides obligations and claims. She focuses in her analysis on
the dispositif of the threshold, in particular poverty thresholds, and their
effects on redefining welfare policies in Europe (above all Italy).
She highlights that “threshold” is not only a quantitative measure but
also a spatial metaphor which shapes social spaces with divisions and sepa-
rations. It is aimed at “governing at a distance” as Miller and Rose (1990)
would say. De Leonardis distinguishes between space and territory (or
place), a distinction also developed by Supiot (2008). Space refers to
abstract geometries (distance, direction, size, shape, volume) detached
from any material, living, cultural and historical contents. De Leonardis
interrogates how a “spatialized” configuration of notions of inequality,
helped by measurement and the definition of quantitative poverty thresh-
olds, represents the negation of any relationship between privileged and
deprived people, and especially one of domination. As she writes, when
inequality is captured in a quantitative format, a poverty threshold,
the “vertical configuration, which anchored inequality to burning issues
of power, politics, and institutions, is being obfuscated”. Questions of
inequality are reduced to “a comparison between linear positions and
intended merely as a matter of plus or minus, more or less, yes or no,
according to a binary code”. De Leonardis emphasizes that quantitative
poverty thresholds render inequality relative, and no longer relational (see
here also Townsend’s definition of relative poverty from 1979, quoted
in De Leonardis). Inequality loses its “absolute” that is, its societal
and political, dimension, as Sen (1983) would put it. Such “flattening
effects” of quantification come also to light in other contributions to this
volume. Quantification is thus far more than an instrument to envisage
and realize a new, “better” world. Quantification technologies, such as
poverty measurements or social credit scores, reconstitute the very object
they are asked to help create (“the ideal city” or “the ideal citizen”). As
Espeland and Stevens (1998, p. 323) write, quantification “reconstructs
relations of authority, creates new political entities, and establishes new
interpretive frameworks”.
Part II of this volume, to which we now turn, takes a closer look at the
implication of quantification in “politics of evidence”—attempts aimed at
undergirding policies with an “undebatable truth” produced via numbers.
The creation of such truth is not only difficult and laborious. What counts
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as an undisputable fact, and the ways how such facts are produced, have
changed over time, and therewith also the very meaning of facticity itself.
The Politics of Evidence
Numbers have come to be integral to how democracy is justified and
operationalized (Rose, 1991). To paraphrase Rose (1991, p. 684), to
govern legitimately does no longer mean to govern at the mercy of
opinion and prejudice, but to govern in the light of quantifiable facts (see
also Porter, 1995). Although “evidence-based policy making” has a long
history that spans several centuries, it gained renewed popularity—partic-
ularly in the Anglo-Saxon world—with the rise and spread of New Public
Management. Evidence-based policy making is based on the assumption
that public policy decisions should be grounded in rigorously established
“objective evidence” (facts), rather than “common sense” or ideology.
To become fact, knowledge should be detached from both the context
of observation in which it was generated and contemporary theoretical
controversies (that are relegated to the rank of ideologies) (Salais, 2016).
Daston (1992) has coined such objectivity as “aperspectival”. Numbers
are often seen as a crucial element in realizing an aspiration to “escape
from perspective” (Daston, 1992) and to obtain a univocal, impersonal
interpretation of the phenomena around which political decisions come to
be framed (Samiolo, 2012). The objectivity of numbers, in turn, following
Porter (1992), is rooted in standardization, a process whereby decisions
are “linked to replicable calculative methodologies which are seen to tran-
scend individual subjectivity and deemed universally applicable” (Samiolo,
2012, p. 383). Yet, how the objectivity of numbers is generated, stabi-
lized or disrupted, is culturally contingent and context-specific (Fourcade,
2011; Samiolo, 2012).
Alain Desrosières’ works (see e.g. Desrosières, 1998 [1993], 2008)
as well as studies by the economics of convention (see e.g. Diaz-Bone,
2016; Salais 2016; Thévenot, 2001) have shown that the production of
objective quantitative evidence relies on conventions of measurement,
categories and classifications that are rooted in specific socio-historical
processes and projects of nation-building. These conventions, categories
and nomenclatures are historically and geographically contingent, as for
instance studies of changes in the measurement and categorization of
employment and unemployment or the professional occupations have
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demonstrated (Boltanski, 1987 [1982]; Desrosières & Thévenot, 1988;
Salais et al., 1986).
The Baconian dream of eliminating variation due to the specificity of
context and different theoretical foundations of debates—when trans-
posed to the social—is impossible to achieve. Evidence-based quantifi-
cation in itself is a utopia one might say. The contributions collected
in this part of the volume trace different aims and modes of interven-
tion that have come to be attached to quantification-based politics of
evidence over time and in different settings. Following the economics
of convention, they highlight, amongst other things, that it is important
to accept a plurality of positions and perspectives as valid in the search
for evidence. Amartya Sen referred in this context to “positional objec-
tivity” (that he distinguished from subjectivity) arguing that “the idea of
objectivity requires explicit acceptance and extensive use of variability of
observations with the position of the observer” (Sen, 1990, p. 114).
A key element of evidence-based politics are state statistics. In this
volume, Thomas Amossé (Chapter 6) traces the history of France’s public
statistical infrastructure aimed at knowing its population. The chapter
distinguishes between three different models of quantification that came
to sustain the relationship between the French State and its statistical
citizens since 1950. Although these models appeared successively, they
co-exist today. These are the “representative household survey” (which
emerged in the 1950s), the “biographical investigation” (which was
developed in the early 1980s) and “the matched panel” (which emerged
at the end of the 1990s). According to Amossé, “these models articulate,
each in a specific way, social science theories, statistical methodologies,
and public action conceptions”, and they correspond to three different
types of “statistical being” (homo statisticus)—subject, person and indi-
vidual—modelled on Supiot’s exploration of the development of the legal
subject (Supiot, 2007 [2005]).
Imported from the US in the 1950s, the representative household
survey sought to provide a snapshot of society. The surveys were aimed at
representing the entire population and became one of the most important
sources of social and demographic statistics. Their main variables (such as
age, gender, income and socio-professional categories) were primarily of
an administrative nature and assumed to be unanimously and uniformly
understood. Amossé shows that, today, such surveys have not disap-
peared, but they have become supplanted with other statistical tools.
Biographical investigations, born out of social scientific reflection and
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critique in the 1980s, gave less primacy to standardized, institutional cate-
gories and questions of statistical representativeness. They focused on the
tracking of a respondent’s individual trajectory (birth, move, promotion).
Grounded in interpretive sociology, they were based on the assumption
that the individual bears multiple identities which must be explored. Both
models (household surveys and biographical investigations) respected the
respondents as owners of a practical experience deemed valuable for the
formulation and implementation of public policies. In contrast, the third
form of statistical infrastructure (the matched panel) that Amossé explores
is of a very different nature.
It responds to a micro-causalist agenda, where the statistical infrastruc-
ture is not focused on individuals as persons or members of the collective
entities to which they belong (e.g. a household). Rather, the “statistical
beings” making up matched panels can be seen as “dividuals” (Appadurai,
2016; Moor & Lury, 2018) resulting from an assembling of matched
data, multiple data marks and imprints. As Amossé writes, matched panels
are based on “libraries of information which, for each respondent, store
a great number of fragmentary and heterogeneous pieces of a puzzle,
which are put back together once they have been re-aggregated to repre-
sent the targeted individuals”. In this form of statistical infrastructure,
the metrological objective is preeminent. The collected variables rarely, or
only secondarily, refer to practical experience or institutional categories.
Statistical data are “purified” and abstracted from context and convention.
The theme of abstraction is also of importance in the politics of
evidence examined by Laurent Thévenot (Chapter 7). Thévenot examines
sustainable palm oil certification as a new mode of global governing that
operates away from states. Voluntary governing schemes, such as that of
the Roundtable for Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), have gained legitimacy
through the implementation of multi-stakeholder governance. Thévenot
interrogates what such governance arrangements entail. He argues that
“governing by standards” has shifted the political debate about power,
legitimacy and the common good to questions of measurable certifi-
able characteristics of products and services that are to be chosen by
“autonomous opting individuals”. What kind of alternative to the rule
of law do certification standards offer? How do actors, including local
smallholders in developing economies, cope with the standards’ reliance
on measurable objectives? What does this format of governance, and the
liberal grammar underpinning it, do to voices of concern? These are some
of the central questions Thévenot explores.
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Building on his earlier research on the politics of statistics (Thévenot,
1990), economics of convention (Eymard-Duvernay et al., 2006), invest-
ments in form (Thévenot, 1984), orders of worth (Boltanski & Thévenot,
2006 [1991]) and the plurality of regimes of engagement (Thévenot,
2006, 2015), Thévenot studies governing by standards “in action”. This
demands close-up fieldwork, including following the most vulnerable
actors, from their daily life in remote rural areas to their participation
in the “open spaces” of the public roundtables that are a key element of
the certification process.
As Thévenot writes, each year the general assembly of the “Roundtable
on Sustainable Palm Oil” (RSPO) meets in a “convention” which votes
for resolutions and changes to the standard (of sustainable palm oil).
Thévenot describes the arrangements and procedures designed to allow
for wide participation in deliberations over the standard. These proce-
dures urge participants to formulate their voice in a particular manner—as
“engagement in a plan” and “in a format of individual choice between
optional plans”. Discussions are organized in an open space akin to a
marketplace, where participants shop for information and ideas. Scruti-
nizing the liberal grammar of the “open space technology”, Thévenot
shows how it transforms (and limits) participants’ (in this case a small-
holder and representative from a local community) ability to engage in
critique. The “open space technology” does not fit “grammars of practice
which support pluralist constructions of commonality and difference”.
Thévenot shows that to be truly heard and understood requires the
training of rhetoric abilities, the learning and use of the right language,
and concepts specific to the object.
The registration of a complaint with the RSPO (here a complaint that
the rules of the certification standard were not being properly imple-
mented by the corporation) demands its “right formatting” in accordance
with RSPO’s standards. “Local familiar” and “customary formats” of
evidence have to be translated into evidence legible by the organization
(in this case the RSPO)—quantifiable and auditable markers, which in
turn limit the very possibility to articulate dissent. For such transforma-
tion deprives the most vulnerable (local smallholders, communities and
NGOs) of their primary resource: practical knowledge.
Such “dogmas of universal competition” (Supiot, 2009) and standard-
ized “best practice” are also present in the case of implementation of
development aid in Mali, which Ousmane Ousmarou Sidibé studies in
this volume (Chapter 8). When writing his contribution, Sidibé was a
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senior civil servant of the Malian government. Hence, he speaks not only
as a researcher, but also as a participant.
In a quest to make development aid more efficient and effective—to
reduce waste and transaction costs and enhance accountability—govern-
mental and non-governmental organizations involved in the provision
and use of development signed on 2 March 2005 the Paris Declaration
on Aid Effectiveness which, amongst other things, commits donors and
recipients of aid to “management by results”, a shift from “project aid”
to “budget support”, increased coordination and mutual accountability.
Performance indicators have become a cornerstone in the implementation
of the declaration.
Sidibé explores how “management by indicators” contributed to the
undermining of public policies in Mali focusing on the cases of education
and public health. Amongst other things, he highlights that a national
indicator, by its very nature, does not reflect the conditions and results of
a public policy in distinct geographic areas. In Mali, there are large dispar-
ities between regions. Such regional differences are not captured by the
national indicators that average local results. Likewise, the public health
indicator stating the percentage of the population that lives within five
kilometres of a functional healthcare centre (56% in 2013) does not say
much about the actual accessibility of healthcare. Accessibility to health-
care is shaped by many more factors than geographical distance, such as
availability of appropriate medications, staffing levels, and staff’s exper-
tise. Another problem of performance-based management to which Sidibé
draws attention consists in the difficulty to reach consensus on targets.
As Sidibé states, “the aims of public policy are multiple, and sometimes
contradictory, so reaching consensus can be extremely laborious”.
How can under such circumstances a new social contract be devised,
which sets reciprocal obligations for families, communities, local author-
ities, civil society and the national government, Sidibé asks. According
to him, “performance indicators have become a formidable tool in the
hands of a few international experts, who insidiously impose far-reaching
public policy choices on states, in the absence of any real debate among
citizens”. Paradoxically, the states with the least institutional capacity to
handle the weighty apparatus of “management by indicators”, are often
those on whom donors impose the most stringent terms of conditionality,
because these states lack the capacity to negotiate. This does not mean
that management by indicators should be abandoned altogether. But
Sidibé warns against its blind, mechanical application. As he concludes:
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“An indicator should be just that, literally furnishing an indication of the
quality of governance, but not in itself a full appraisal of quality. From this
point of view, indicators can send a warning on the state of public policy,
and foster discussion, without issuing a judgement with no appeal, and
are much less a guilty sentence”.
Also Corine Eyraud examines a case of “management by indicators”
(Chapter 9). She turns our attention to the development of govern-
mental performance indicators for French universities. As a participant
observer, she followed the numbers from their birth through their
detailed construction to their concrete uses. The development of these
indicators began in France in 2001 with the “Loi organique relative aux
lois de finance” (LOLF) that took effect in 2006. This law sought to
bring New Public Management (NPM) ideas to France. One of its main
objectives was to make the government and the public services account-
able to parliament for the results of their actions. The law further sought
to give more power to parliament over budgetary policies and choices.
Lastly, it sought to reform the allocation of resources to administrations
and public services. Yet, from the three projected uses of “management
by indicators” only the third one was actually realized.
Eyraud shows that MPs did not pay much attention to numerically
based performance reports in budgetary debates. First, the LOLF did
not link performance to budgetary funding. Second, the MPs did not
find the indicators particularly meaningful in relation to public policy
making. They did not participate in their construction and found the
indicators too technical and too detached from their concerns. Yet, a
few years later, the performance indicators (e.g. number of publishing
academics, number of PhD degrees delivered, undergraduate success
rate, number of master degrees delivered, the rated research quality of a
research centre) became an essential element in a new system of university
resource allocation, called “Sympa”. From 2009 onwards, a university’s
performance became financially rewarded, while non-performance was
financially punished. This new way of funding introduced competition
amongst universities and lead to various forms of “reactivity” (Espeland
& Sauder, 2007), including gaming and the redirection of financial and
human resources from teaching towards research. Yet, at the same time,
Eyraud also describes how this system became contested, especially by
academics, and eventually abandoned under Hollande’s government in
2012.
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Eyraud highlights that the various policy reforms and implied quan-
tification instruments did not form a very integrated assemblage. The
changes that the performance measures were supposed to help bring
about were at the same time significant and very limited. Similar to Sidibé,
also Eyraud does not seek to argue against quantification per se. But,
she cautions, citing Supiot (2012), that one should not confuse measure-
ment with assessment. Furthermore, the setting of indicators should not
become “a way of surreptitiously encapsulating values and hierarchies”.
Rather, she pleads for the opening up of quantification, the setting and
use of performance indicators, to public debate and scrutiny, which brings
us to the third and final part of this volume, Part III, devoted to exploring
the changing relation between numbers and democracy.
Voicing for Democracy
In democratic political systems, the law guarantees citizens the freedom of
opinion and expression, including the right to demonstration and protest
(see here also Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights of the United Nations). How does the rise and spread of
“governance by numbers” (Miller, 2001; Supiot, 2015) affect individual
and collective capacities to exercise voice? Quantification may be moti-
vated by a democratizing ambition, the desire to hold to account, and
to counteract despotism and arbitrariness (Alonso & Starr, 1989; Cohen,
1982; Kurunmäki et al., 2016; Porter, 1995). Yet, numbers also change
how we perceive things, how decisions are framed and how concerns
become articulated. Numbers promise a “de-politicization” of politics.
But as Rose (1991, p. 676) remarks, “numbers do not merely inscribe
a pre-existing reality. They constitute it”. And with that new conduits of
power are brought into being (see also Miller & Rose, 1990). “Numbers
delineate fictive spaces for the operation of government” (Rose, 1991,
p. 676). In so doing, they generate new forms of visibility and invisibility.
They create new actors and new relations which might thwart political
engagement and participation.
Contributions assembled in this part interrogate possibilities for the
incorporation of voice in numbers. To paraphrase Morgan (2010), they
examine the ways in which quantification can (or cannot) express citi-
zens’ experience about political, economic, and social arrangements that
affect them. They also scrutinize the relationship between quantifica-
tion and public debate (Mennicken & Espeland, 2019, pp. 232–233),
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and investigate the role that numbers play in generating and framing
public discussions and deliberations, for example about public goods and
services, such as public security, fiscal policies or employment. Finally, they
query prospects for a pluralization of quantification (ibid.). They examine
how numbers can come to be unsettled, challenged and changed through
the development of alternative measures, “counter-quantifications”, as the
literature on “statactivism” has highlighted (Bruno et al., 2014).
Andrei Guter-Sandu and Andrea Mennicken (Chapter 10) use the
case of prison privatization in England and Wales to scrutinize what it
means to “economize the social” through numbers. Guter-Sandu and
Mennicken show how ratings and rankings of organizational entities, such
as hospitals, universities or prisons, are often closely linked to aspira-
tions aimed at facilitating competition and the establishment of (quasi)
markets in the public services. Further, they highlight that particularly
over the past fifteen years or so, we have witnessed an increase in quanti-
fied social impact assessments seeking to make the value of public sector
work knowable in financial terms not only for evaluation purposes but
also to attract (private) investment. Guter-Sandu and Mennicken analyse
this multiplicity of quantification and its implication in different processes
of economizing distinguishing between activities aimed at curtailing,
marketizing and financializing.
Tracing the history of quantification and performance measurement in
the HM Prison Service of England and Wales, they attend, first, to the
introduction of prison performance metrics in the 1990s which, amongst
other things, was stimulated by prison privatization and concerns with
the accountability of prison governors. They examine then the evolu-
tion of these metrics, including their translation into aggregated prison
ratings from the early 2000s onwards. Underlying the introduction of
the prison ratings, the authors argue, was a belief in the power of market
incentives and the aspiration to govern through competition. But the
chapter also shows that we need to be careful not to equate quantifi-
cation with economization. It describes how measures seeking to capture
the quality of prison life from a prisoner’s perspective were introduced to
“moralize” the prison ratings (Liebling, 2004). Of course, we need to be
cautious when labelling this as democratization. Nonetheless, the perfor-
mance measures served as an important platform for debate about prison
values and reform, not least because of the public attention and criticism
they attracted.
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Yet, these “moralized” measures were, in turn, destabilized in the
wake of the government’s austerity policies. Concerns with the measure-
ment and management of costs came to the fore which overruled the
Prison Service’s “balanced” performance measurement system. Ironically,
contracted-out private prisons were largely spared from these cuts, due
to the inflexible nature of the 15- or 25-year contracts under which
they were operating. Thus, they were largely shielded from economiza-
tion in the form of budgetary savings requests. This does not mean
that private prisons are not economized, but different mechanisms of
economization (and quantification) are at work here, which the authors
disentangle examining experimentations with Social Impact Bonds (SIBs).
These mechanisms of economizing relate first and foremost to processes
of financialization and a logic of (financial) “capitalization” (Muniesa,
2016; Muniesa et al., 2017) where prisons and prisoners come to be
viewed as (financial) assets, as vehicles for the generation of future returns.
Guter-Sandu and Mennicken conclude by cautioning us to be mindful of
the multiple ways in which quantification and financial concerns come to
be interlinked—reinforced, mitigated or undermined.
Subsequent chapters (see in particular Chapters 11 and 12) explore
in what ways and under what conditions quantification can be turned
against programmes of marketization, financialization and austerity. They
examine instances when quantification is subjected to scrutiny, debate
and critique; when forms of disruption are sought that go beyond
“gaming the numbers”; when numbers become (re)attached to dreams
and schemes of doing things differently.
Boris Samuel’s analysis (Chapter 11) focuses on the struggle against
high living costs in Guadeloupe in 2009. He investigates a case of “stat-
activism” (Bruno et al., 2014), where calculation and figures came to be
used as a “weapon” by a social and civic movement, led by local trade
unions, to fight what they identified as “pwofitasyon”. “Pwofitasyon” [in
French: profitation] is a Creole term that denotes the capturing of undue
profit resulting from the existence of excessive sales prices, particularly in
relation to basic consumer goods, such as food. Samuel shows how the
movement, called LKP [l’alliance contre la profitation], engaged in the
calculation and collection of data to revaluate purchasing power and chal-
lenge the setting and regulation of prices by the administrative authorities.
Samuel assesses to what extent “the statactivistic momentum” of the LKP
and other non-state actors was capable of shifting generally accepted price
measurement methods and, more generally, debates on price.
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His analysis shows that the struggles with numbers lead to unequal
outcomes, in which technical but also relational resources determined
the balance of power between the actors. The alternative calculations
(counter-quantifications) put forward by the LKP were effective in gener-
ating a public debate on “pwofitasyon”, yet, at the same time the
measurements came to be deemed as “too simplistic” to be considered
legitimate by the public authorities. Instead, a statistically more sophis-
ticated analysis of price differences between Guadeloupe and mainland
France undertaken by the INSEE (France’s Institute of Statistics and
Economic Studies) became an important reference point in the negotia-
tions. But here the reported price differences rested on averages, and the
reported average gap of approximately 15% made it impossible to expose
the abusive pricing of individual goods, for example chocolate powder or
yoghurt, where price differences could be as large as 100% and more.
The common and rigorous statistical methods used by the INSEE
were thus not socially acceptable and led to further controversy and
social unrest. Yet, the report formed the basis for the development of a
new strategy of communication on price differentials. This strategy repre-
sented prices no longer on the basis of average values, but focused on
the representation of particular extreme values which, in the end, came
to be considered a fairer representation of the inequitable situation lived
by many Guadeloupians. This strategy was supported by a report of the
Competition Authority which identified several violations of competition
law in the large-scale retail and import sectors. This report, Samuel writes,
“turned each price, as experienced by the consumers in their everyday life,
into an indication of abuse and injustice, deserving to be discussed and
publicly denounced”.
Samuel’s study helps gain a deeper understanding of the multiplicity of
price level measurement and the shifting legitimacies associated with it. It
also shows that the increased complexity and sophistication of statistical
techniques may reduce possibilities for public scrutiny and the utilization
of quantification as an emancipatory device. Further, Samuel’s analysis
raises important questions about what should count as “right and fair”
statistical proof in a democratic debate, and in what way statistical data
are, or should be, able to capture lived experience, a topic which also
Robert Salais’ contribution addresses (Chapter 12), to which we turn
next.
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Salais investigates the development and transformation of a social and
statistical category, namely that of unemployment, in three major Euro-
pean countries (France, Germany, Great Britain) and at European level
(Salais, 2007). In his analysis, Salais differentiates between statistics and
governance-driven quantification. He shows that both rely on quantifica-
tion, but differ with regards to the political status of social and cognitive
conventions. As he writes: “The purpose of statistics is to build general
knowledge ‘extracted’ from the plurality and variety of social conventions
people use in daily life to understand their world […]. The purpose of
governance-driven quantification is to find ways to rationally transform
social conventions toward some pre-given political objective, judged by
the centre as optimal”. According to Salais (but see also Desrosières,
1998 [1993]), in statistics, the establishment of facts logically precedes
the design and implementation of public policies. In governance-driven
quantification, the “fabrication” of facts is internal to public policies and
driven by the search of maximizing these policies’ quantitative perfor-
mance. Put differently, the ultimate outcome (or aim) of “governance
by numbers” is to modify the conventions upon which people rely as
landmarks to identify what can be their legitimate claims.
Rather than being rooted in collective deliberation, the informational
basis of governance-driven quantification is predetermined and imposed
by “the Centre”; it incorporates norms without discussion and directs
the decisional process towards prefixed political outcomes. These norms
are mostly incorporated into technicalities (e.g. definitions of operational
categories). All this creates a move towards what Salais terms an “a-
democratic regime” of quantification. According to Salais, “a-democracy”
is a political regime that maintains the formal procedures of democ-
racy, but impedes any effective participation of citizens and other actors
who could speak on their behalf (see here also Crouch’s definition of
post-democracy, 2004).
Salais shows how European employment policies came to be based
on such governance-driven quantification and “a-democracy”. European
authorities substituted the search of Keynesian full employment for the
maximizing of the rate of employment as their main target. In this new
regime, employment took on a very different meaning, encompassing any
job, regardless of wage, working conditions, duration, or type of labour
contract. Salais goes on to explore ways by which this turn could be
counter-acted and social justice expectations be brought back into quan-
tification processes so that another understanding of the collective issue
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to deal with can be developed. For him, producing and interpreting data
should thus be seen as a collective undertaking. Informants (e.g. people
who are asked to respond to a survey on employment) should be consid-
ered as active interpreters bringing with them valuable practical experience
and knowledge that should be used in defining the issue at hand (e.g.
helping to arrive at a collectively shared understanding of what should or
should not count as employment).
Quantification, in this context, has to become legitimate in terms
of both fairness and correctness of the data it helps produce. Drawing
on Amartya Sen’s concept of “the informational basis of judgement in
justice” (IBJJ) (Sen, 1990; but see also Salais, 2019), Salais argues that
a major aim of quantification should be the generation of an informa-
tional basis which has not only been produced with the help of rigorous
methodologies, but satisfies also accepted requirements of justice. This
informational basis is thus no longer merely objectified “aperspectival”
evidence reflecting reality; it is also elaborated by (lay) people through
the prism of their own feelings on what is or is not justice and injus-
tice, taking into account relevant features of their “factual territory”. Such
an understanding of quantification opens up the possibility of a plurality
of “data-makings” for the same situation. It also does not oppose qual-
itative and quantitative methodologies and, more importantly, has as its
foundation effective freedom.
Also the chapter by Emmanuel Didier (Chapter 13) problematizes
the divide between qualitative and quantitative methodologies. Exam-
ining the history of what is now called “qualitative sociology” in the US,
Didier asks how we can account for the political production of the border
of qualitative enclaves which exclude quantities. The founding fathers of
sociology never chose between quantification and non-quantification. So,
how did the conceptual pair “qualitative vs. quantitative” come to settle
within sociology?
Didier pays attention to both the epistemic and political forces that
participated in the production of the border between the qualitative and
quantitative in sociology. His analysis begins with a discussion of Herbert
Blumer’s Symbolic Interactionism, who located the social primarily in situ-
ations of interaction. Deeply influenced by American pragmatism, he
examined how a member’s action is guided and formed by a process
of interpretation. Blumer was against surveys (as e.g. conducted by Paul
Lazarsfeld at the time), but he was not against quantification per se. Next
to symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology, originally developed by
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Garfinkel in the mid-1950s, elaborated another criticism of statistics. As
Didier writes, ethnomethodology is aimed at developing “a generalized
social system built solely from the analysis of experience structures”. But
also ethnomethodological criticisms of quantification did not oppose all
and every quantification. Indeed, Garfinkel was probably the first to take
a sociological interest in examining the production of statistics, as early
as 1956, arguing that the process through which quantitative rates are
produced should be conceived as a socially organized activity.
Later, qualitative sociologists, such as Becker and Horowitz, labelled
as “the radicals” by Didier, became more defensive when trying to
fight the wave of quantitative scholarship that washed over their disci-
pline. Glaser and Strauss’s publication of The Discovery of Grounded
Theory consolidated the divide between the categories of “qualitative”
and “quantitative” further. Today, Didier shows, qualitative sociology has
become a category where two sets of “good examples” of published
papers he examined are in opposition. On the one hand, there are those
which belong to a “Lazarsfeldian” cluster where qualitative and quan-
titative are in a hierarchy and the former is serving the latter. On the
other hand, there are papers pertaining to an “interpretative” definition of
the qualitative which seeks to set itself apart from “quantitativist” uses of
qualitative information. Didier concludes by cautioning us not to forget
that such a divide had been produced over time, and that many of the
classical qualitative sociologists had criticized a certain method of quan-
tification (surveys and opinion polls), not the general use of quantities. It
is neither possible (nor desirable) to completely wipe out quantities from
an epistemic system. Rather, we ought to scrutinize their production.
In this respect, both ethnomethodology and symbolic interactionism
bear strong proximities with the economics of convention, an approach
which was developed in France in the 1980s, amongst other things,
by statisticians who at the time were working for the INSEE (France’s
National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies) (see also the
special issue of La Revue économique, March 1989 [edited by Dupuy
et al., 1989]). Now the approach has taken hold more widely in soci-
ology, socioeconomics and history (Desrosières, 2011; Diaz-Bone, 2018
[2015]; Salais et al., 2019). The developers of the economics of conven-
tions approach tried to converge American pragmatist sociology with
their own lived experience as state statisticians. This unique positioning
enabled them to move beyond “positivism” and “structuralism”, beyond
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a sterile division between qualitative and quantitative approaches, which
also Didier argues against.
In this context, it is also worthwhile to recall Alain Desrosières’
notion of the “convention of equivalence”, which has largely escaped
North-American sociology, including more recent (qualitative) studies
of quantification. Conventions of equivalence (commensurate scales as
Espeland & Stevens, 1998, would put it) allow the rise to generality, from
the singular (by essence qualitative) to the general (based on numbers).
They ensure continuity from the qualitative to the quantitative, instead
of separation, opposition or domination. Such a perspective considerably
enlarges the scope and ambition for the study of social life, including
practices of quantification.
Many of the contributions assembled in this volume draw on the
economics of convention in their study of quantification. Others, as we
have highlighted earlier, examine governing by numbers with reference to
Foucault, in particular Foucault’s works on governmentality. This volume
seeks to engage these two strands of research in a critical dialogue.
Where does the economics of convention approach meet Foucault? And
what does such a joining up bring to the furthering of debates about
quantification and the politics of numbers?
Quantification: Where the Economics
of Convention Approach Meets Foucault
Neither the economics of convention (EC) nor Foucauldian studies of
quantification represent coherent and unitary research programmes. As
Diaz-Bone (2019, p. 311) recalls, “EC was projected not as a coherent
paradigm, but as a scientific movement, organized around some core
concepts and methodological positions. EC has developed the concept of
conventions as logics of coordination”. Also Foucauldian studies of quan-
tification do not form a “school”. To borrow Colin Gordon’s (1991) apt
way of characterizing governmentality research three decades ago, studies
in this area amount to a “zone of research”, rather than a “fully formed
product” (Mennicken & Miller, 2012, p. 18).
Both the EC and Foucauldian studies of quantification are concerned
with relations between “quantified objectivity”, as Thévenot writes in this
volume (Chapter 7), “and modes of governing that make the world calcu-
lable”. Both seek to examine the various ways in which the administering
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or governing of lives in a wide range of settings has been made think-
able and practicable through quantification. Peter Miller, who laid the
foundations for governmentality studies of quantification with Nikolas
Rose in the early 1990s in the UK (Miller & Rose, 1990; Rose &
Miller, 1992; but see also Hopwood, 1992), highlighted that accounting
numbers have a distinctive capacity for “acting on the actions of others”,
one that goes far beyond the abstract injunctions of economic theory
(Miller, 1992; but see also Mennicken & Miller, 2012 for a review of
Foucauldian studies in accounting). Also Alain Desrosières, who initi-
ated a sociologically reflexive turn in the study of statistics in France
and was involved in the development of the economics of convention
approach, was interested in examining questions related to the governing
by numbers. He associated different modes of government with different
modes of quantification, distinguishing, amongst other things, between
five forms of state and associated (different) modes of quantification, the
neoliberal state being one amongst others (Desrosières, 2003) (but see
also Diaz-Bone & Didier, 2016, pp. 14–15).
Nonetheless, for long, both approaches did not take much note of each
other. Curiously enough, in France, the founders of the economics of
convention were aware of Foucault’s work on nomenclatures (Foucault,
1966), but they did not take cognizance of Foucault’s works on govern-
mentality (Diaz-Bone & Didier, 2016, pp. 14–15). One reason for this
might be the fact that these works became only widely available in French
in 2004 (see Foucault, 2004), whereas Foucault’s lecture on govern-
mentality delivered at the Collège de France was translated into English
as early as 1979 by Colin Gordon (Foucault, 1979), a British philoso-
pher who had attended Foucault’s lectures at the time. Some years later,
Gordon co-edited The Foucault Effect with Graham Burchell and Peter
Miller (G. Burchell et al., 1991), which contained further English trans-
lations of Foucault’s works and became a cornerstone in Anglo-Saxon
governmentality studies.
For the EC, statistics and other forms of calculative practice have to
be related to the foundational conventions of data production (measure-
ment) and data interpretation, modes of justification and orders of worth,
to be fully understood (see Thévenot in this volume, Chapter 7, but see
also Diaz-Bone, 2019). In contrast, Foucauldian analyses of quantifica-
tion draw attention to the inherently political character of calculation.
They highlight that accounting and other numbers, through their ability
to produce certain forms of visibility and transparency, both create
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and constrain subjectivity (Miller, 1992; Miller & O’Leary, 1987). This
creates distinctive possibilities for intervention while potentially displacing
others (see also Mennicken & Miller, 2012, p. 7). Yet, despite differ-
ences in theoretical heritage, in our view, and as the contributions to this
volume demonstrate, the EC and Foucauldian approaches converge in at
least three important respects.
First, both are concerned with the study of practices of quantifica-
tion. Instead of concentrating on the interests of politicians, scientists or
bureaucrats, both seek to investigate and unpack different stages in “the
statistical [or accounting, added] production chain” as Thévenot puts it
in this volume, from data collection, classification, codification, to the
processing of information and its effects on the “making up” (Hacking,
2002) of people and entities. As Diaz-Bone (2019, p. 309) writes, “both
have an anti-substantialist ontology: properties, qualities and valuations
of people, objects and actions are results of practices”. Such a focus
on practices of quantification helps to develop a more nuanced under-
standing of the different capacities and roles that numbers have come to
assume in political life. It helps generate insight into the inner workings
of accountability regimes, their changing nature, and the emergence of
new regulatory spaces and practices.
Second, both approaches are interested in examining the variable ways
in which the capacities and attributes of subjects are constituted, shaped
and changed, through quantification. Both do not “posit a universal form
for the human subject” (Mennicken & Miller, 2014, p. 15). See here,
for instance, Vormbusch’s study of the emergence of new taxonomies
of the self in this volume (Chapter 4) or Thévenot’s unfolding of
different regimes of engagement with standardization and quantification
(Chapter 7).
Third, as Thévenot highlights (Chapter 7), both seek to move beyond
“the state” and “the neoliberal” as an all-encompassing notion (see here
also the contributions by Mespoulet, Lam, De Leonardis, Guter-Sandu
and Mennicken, and Salais in this volume). Both are interested in devel-
oping what Raffnsøe et al. (2016) have termed a “dispositional analytic”
of quantification (see also Diaz-Bone, 2019). Both draw attention to
the implication of quantification in what Foucault termed “dispositif”
or “apparatus”, “a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of
discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, law,
administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and
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philanthropic proportions – in short: the said as much as the unsaid”
(Foucault, 1977, p. 299, quoted in Raffnsøe et al., 2016, p. 278).
In so doing, both approaches share a relational and processual under-
standing of power and the state. Power is not a property—something that
can be possessed. For what defines a relationship of power, according
to Foucault, “is that it is a mode of action that does not act directly
on others. Instead, it acts upon their actions, whether an existing action
or one that may arise in the future. And, the ‘other’ over whom power
is exercised remains resolutely a person who acts, who is faced with a
whole field of possible actions and reactions” (Foucault, 2001 [1982],
pp. 341–342, cited in Mennicken & Miller 2014, p. 15).
However, one concept that is absent from Foucauldian studies of quan-
tification which is central to the EC is the notion of “convention”. As
Thévenot points out in this volume, in the economics of convention,
activities of “in-forming, trans-forming and formatting through invested
conventional forms are central operations, because they sustain coordi-
nation power under uncertainty” (see also Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006
[1991]; Thévenot, 1984). Comparing France and USA, Storper & Salais
(1997) focus on the plurality of conventions of the state on what people
agree on the reciprocal roles and actions of citizens and state institu-
tions with regards to defining, quantifying and contributing to common
goods (see also Salais, 2015; Salais & Storper, 1993). The economics of
convention approach is interested in the pluralism of (different) modes
of evaluation (and quantification) constituted by conventions, orders of
worth, modes of coordination, worlds of production and regimes of
engagement (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006 [1991]; Eymard-Duvernay,
1986, 1989; Salais, 2006; Salais et al., 1986; Salais & Storper, 1993;
Storper & Salais, 1997; Thévenot, 2001, 2007).
Here, authors seek to break down policies and politics into a variety of
modes of coordination (e.g. market, industrial, civic) or worlds of produc-
tion (e.g. interpersonal, market, industrial, immaterial) (see the chapters
by Thévenot, Salais and Vormbusch). This allows the EC to account more
systematically for differing voices and evaluative orientations, conflict and
contestation. It also makes it possible to draw more explicitly attention to
the agency of participants and “their capacities of critique”, as Vormbusch
points out (see Chapter 4). Put differently, the EC makes us query to what
extent people “have a grip” (Bessy & Chateauraynaud, 2014 [1995])
on the specificity of the situation, are able to challenge and change its
definition, and the way in which numbers work.
1 THE NEW POLITICS OF NUMBERS: AN INTRODUCTION 33
Yet, in both approaches, human freedom is always present. How can
we then conceive the dynamics of socio-historical processes? How can
we draw renewed attention to the diverse arts of government, resistance
and freedom—to the conflicts and compromises that are the engine of
history? Foucault deeply acknowledged the contradictory and dialectic
(Grant, 2010) nature of historical processes and was always concerned
“with the multiple and dispersed surfaces of emergence of disparate and
often humble practices” (Miller & Napier, 1993, p. 633). Nonetheless,
as Raffnsøe et al. (2019, p. 162) highlight, a preoccupation of scholar-
ship with the image of “discipline as subjugation” led some to reinstate
the very dualism between power and freedom that Foucault’s notion of
power sought to overcome (see also Foucault, 2010, 2011) (for a critique
see Jameson, 1984).
The economics of convention approach seeks to overcome such
dualism by explicitly recognizing that coordination in real situations is
structured by a plurality of conventions (Diaz-Bone, 2018). In so doing,
it makes recourse to actors’ competencies to master and recognize the
plurality of conventions; to their ability to use different grammars for
interpreting the situation of coordination they face. Yet, under what
conditions and circumstances can such competence be assumed and
assured? This, in our view, is something that warrants further exploration,
also in relation to the production and use of numbers in economic and
political life.
We ought to acknowledge that “real situations” are often character-
ized by inequality and asymmetrical power relations. Inequalities exist, for
example, with regards to access to public life; the knowledge and expertise
participants possess; economic resources; control over conditions of work
(and life more generally); recognition and respect for cultural differences;
age; gender; class; race; and much else besides. Such inequalities shape
the capacity to exercise voice, including the capacity to exercise voice in
the production and use of numbers. Amartya Sen has developed the idea
that society should promote equality in the space of capabilities (see e.g.
Sen, 1992). We propose that both Foucauldian studies of quantification
and the economics of convention would benefit from making use of Sen’s
concept of capability (see also De Leonardis et al., 2012).
Sen acknowledges that persons are not similarly situated in their
capability to convert resources brought by the situation to freedom of
choice. Sen’s notion of capability captures both competency and effec-
tive freedom to act—the ability to choose the life one wants to live
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from amongst a wide variety of valued functionings to which one has
effective access (Sen, 1992, 1993). According to Sen, capabilities are
not only a function of fixed personal traits and divisible resources, but
also social relations, organizational and institutional environments, and
the practical configuration of situations, in short, what Foucault termed
“dispositif” (see also Salais’ chapter in this volume and Salais, 2011).
Struggling against inequalities in capabilities to understand numbers and
their production should be at the heart of concerns with effective democ-
racy, even more so today, where numbers have taken an unprecedented
rise in the governing of our lives.
In conclusion, we think it is time for a renewal of the study of the
politics of numbers. The two strands of scholarship brought together in
this volume move quantification scholarship beyond the tired dichotomies
between autonomy and discipline, compliance and resistance, power and
freedom by moving our attention to the processes of quantifying and
calculating, and the possibilities for action these open up or foreclose.
In so doing, they do not only provide in-depth empirical insight into
the multi-varied nature of governing by numbers and its consequences
in different sites. They also help more generally to rethink the study of
the politics of numbers, acknowledging plurality, contingency and “the
differential structuring of freedom, performative and indirect agency”
(Raffnsøe et al., 2019, p. 155).
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When the Bolshevik government came to power in October 1917, it
based the legitimacy of its action on the scientific nature of its decisions,
figures being one of the core elements thereof. Its leaders asserted the
ambition of building a state in which science would form the basis for
political decisions, for the well-being of everyone and fundamentally for
the fulfilment of the communist plan to create a new society and new
human being. From this perspective, statistics—an information and deci-
sion support tool—was also an instrument of power designed to prove
the soundness of state action. Statistics would help symbolically construct
the Soviet social and economic world. That notwithstanding, can one
discern specific forms of production of figures in such a state, that is
to say, as Alain Desrosières has conceptualized, a particular relationship
between concepts, methods, technical instruments, statistical institutions
and representations of the social and economic world, that could be
construed as characterizing the nature of such a state (Desrosières, 1985)?
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In particular, did certain tools take on a specific form in the USSR,
in a context of construction of a socialist society underpinned by central-
ized and planned management of the economy? If that is the case, how
were they adapted to new political representations of society, the economy
and the role of science in such a state? This newly developed form of
producing figures serving a new type of state and a new political plan
included the creation of a new central government statistics department
and an effort to formulate a new theory of statistics and design new
methods and new tools. Various attempts to that effect gave rise to
debates and tensions between leaders and statisticians, and between the
statisticians themselves. After trying to characterize some of them, we will
endeavour to underscore the specific nature of state statistics in the Soviet
Union.
Inventing a New Form of Statistics
for a New Model of Society
A New State Statistics Administration
The Bolshevik state’s new Central Statistics Administration, the TsSU
(Tsentral’noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie), was set up on 25 July 1918.
One can consider that it was the product of two plans tending towards
change, but plans in which the role of statistics was defined differently.
For the Bolshevik leaders, the production of figures had to play a key
information role for developing the plan and for managing the economy
and society. But for the TsSU’s statisticians, most of whom were formerly
employed by the statistical offices of the zemstva, local self-governed
authorities of the Tsarist state provinces founded in 1864, the challenge
consisted above all in creating the statistical institutions and tools of a
modern state, in line with the recommendations of the international statis-
tics congresses of the nineteenth century (Mespoulet, 2001; Mespoulet &
Blum, 2003; on statistical internationalism in the late nineteenth century,
see Brian, 1989).
So notwithstanding the political message conveyed by the Bolshevik
government, the TsSU was organized on the model of the statistical agen-
cies of late 19th-century European states, structured around a series of
departments reflecting the main divisions of statistics of the time, and
moreover constructed on the institutional and methodological bases of
regional statistics as practised by the zemstva. The texts regulating its
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foundation and missions adhered to the spirit of the debates and resolu-
tions of the international statistics congresses of the nineteenth century, as
asserted by its director, Pavel I. Popov, speaking at the national congress
of Russian statisticians held between 8 and 16 June 1918 (Popov, 1918).
Encouraged by the experience of the statisticians in the regional offices
of the zemstva, the Bolshevik state statistics administration was also
resolutely organized in line with statistical internationalism, its scientific
positions and organizational principles (on this point, see Brian, 1989).
This continuity with the pre-revolutionary period, relying also on
continuity of the staff, was simply the visible part of other forms of inher-
itance in the representation of statistical work, methods and observational
tools, and in the maintenance of certain administrative practices behind
the apparent institutional changes (see Mespoulet, 2001, chapters 5 and
7). This strong continuity of individuals and practices coexisting with a
disruptive political message was at the root of a great deal of tension
between statisticians and political leaders from the early 1920s (see Blum
& Mespoulet, 2003).
For the Bolsheviks, planned management, centralization and
accounting had to be the bedrock of the organization of produc-
tion in the future socialist state, and the statistics administration had
to serve this political plan. While in line with the new plan model
formulated by Lenin and the Bolsheviks prior to 1917, it should be
noted that this conception of a centralized and planned economy was
strengthened by the experiences of the First World War (see Holquist,
2002) and the civil war between 1918 and 1921 (Sapir, 1997), which
provided a breeding ground for formulating and experimenting with
a state-controlled economy (Stanziani, 1998), in particular to resolve
supply chain issues.
In such a context, it is hardly surprising that the statisticians in charge
of setting up the TsSU subscribed to this goal, in particular those who had
played a part in the management of public and economic affairs during
the war, in the Tsarist Ministry of Agriculture, or within the framework
of the All Russian Union of towns and of the zemstva, or in the Provi-
sional Government. However, such an endorsement of the Bolshevik plan
did not preclude tensions and clashes between leaders and statisticians
about the very definition of the role, methods and tools of state statistics.
What form of quantification should be adopted to construct a socialist
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economic and social model tending towards communism? The first chal-
lenge consisted in how to define the connection between accounting and
statistics.
A Complicated Demarcation Between Accounting and Statistics
The expression “socialist accounting” was used by Lenin as early as 1917
to describe the form of quantification aimed at providing figures to
construct a socialist economy and society. In his speech to the Petrograd
Soviet, Lenin said: “Socialism is accounting. If you want to record each
piece of iron and fabric in the books of account, then that is socialism”
(Lenin, 1955, vol. 26). Before the Revolution, he had already stressed
the key role of accounting in his book entitled The State and Revolu-
tion: “Accounting and control, these are the chief things necessary for
the organizing and correct functioning of the first phase of Communist
society” (Lenin, 1955, vol. 21).
Initially, and for reasons of efficiency, the production of figures was
to be controlled by their immediate practical applicability, that is their
usefulness in guiding actions and decisions. This conception tended to
strengthen the comparison of statistics with accounting, regarding it as a
set of tools rather than a science. This demarcation of the role of statistics
clearly comes across in the letter Lenin sent to the TsSU’s director on 16
August 1921: “For practical work, we need to have figures, and the TsSU
should have them before anyone else. But we will defer the verification of
the accuracy of the figures, the estimated percentage errors, etc., to a later
period” (Lenin, quoted in Iastremskii & Khotimskii, 1936, pp. 14–15).
Lenin does not provide a precise distinction between accounting and
statistics. Rather, he differentiates between statistics as a “bourgeois
science” inherited from the nineteenth century, and a newly emerging
field of (socialist) statistical practice, accounting, which he sees as a prac-
tice of factual recording and counting, which does not involve any analysis
or interpretation of reality, contrary to what, in his view, (bourgeois)
statisticians did when producing their data. For Lenin, it was accounting
which was needed for the construction of a communist economy and
society. In his eyes, this construction project was an urgent undertaking
and the “academic” efforts of (bourgeois) statisticians a waste of valuable
time, standing in the way of proceeding with it as quickly as possible.
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Economic and political urgency justified paying less attention to the
use of statistical theory to verify the accuracy of figures, which led statis-
ticians to restrain their scientific ambitions. The scope of statistics had to
relate above all to the need to plan economic activity, which demanded a
state statistics administration totally dedicated to this task:
The central administration of statistics must not be an “academic” and
“independent” body, which it currently is, for 9/10ths following old
bourgeois habits, but one for constructing socialism, for verifying and
controlling the accounts of what the socialist state needs to know now,
today. (Lenin, 1955, vol. 28)
These Lenin quotes are not provided merely for form’s sake. For it was in
the name of his own vision of the role of statistical surveys in the manage-
ment of Soviet economy and society that he regularly intervened in the
TsSU’s affairs until his death in January 1924 (see Kotz & Seneta, 1990).
Then, at the 13th Congress of the Party in May 1924, Stalin in turn
linked statistics back to accounting, while remaining very vague about
the nature of the connection between them:
No construction work, no work for the state and no planning is imaginable
without correct accounting. But accounting is inconceivable without statis-
tics. Accounting without statistics will not make a single step forward.1
The link between statistics and accounting was clearly reaffirmed in the
early 1930s and symbolized by the TsSU being taken over by the State
Planning Commission Gosplan in 1930. In the reference manual of statis-
tics published that year under the direction of B. I. Iastremski and V. I.
Khotimski (1931),2 the authors reiterated the tasks Lenin had assigned
to the TsSU in the introduction: statistics had to be associated with
accounting, even in the study of social phenomena. In such a concep-
tion, the attention paid to the tools was essential. To better understand
the decisions made for their development and use, we need to recall the
definition of the scientific nature of statistics given in the 1930s, a key
period in the formation of the Soviet system under Stalin.
In fact, just like scientists or professional specialists in other fields,
the statisticians had to justify the status of statistics as a science in the
early 1920s (on the status of science in the USSR, see Graham, 1993;
Krementsov, 1997). They strove to develop an analytical framework for
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social and economic phenomena adapted to the plan to construct a
socialist economy and society, setting themselves apart from the writings
of European statisticians, described as “bourgeois” by the Soviet political
leaders.
In this task of revision and reinterpretation, the Soviet statisticians were
faced with a profound contradiction. Though rooted in an intellectual
tradition inherited from the nineteenth century, which regarded statis-
tics as a science on a par with chemistry or mathematics, during various
conflicts they were forced to justify the socialist nature of their work and
its conformity with the political plan to construct a new state, and its
economy and its society. But for these statisticians, who associated figures
with objectivity and scientific truth, all science sought to establish was
a truth that could not be imposed by political leaders (on the notion
of objectivity, see Porter, 1995). The TsSU’s statisticians were subjected
to various forms of political pressure that they nonetheless had to come
to terms with, at times under duress, and that drove them to work out
a theory in conformity with the Bolshevik political message about the
construction of a socialist economy and society. How much of their theo-
retical constructs were based on compromise? In the initial stages, they
embarked on a task of theoretical deconstruction.
A Task of Theoretical Deconstruction
In reality, it was rather a hollow definition of Soviet state statistics that was
produced, as opposed to the statistics qualified as “bourgeois” to describe
the theories developed in the nineteenth century. The manual published
by B. S. Iastremskii and V. I. Khotimskii in the early 1930s begins with a
denunciation of the latter:
Like any science, statistics is a science of class. The whole system of
statistics in capitalist countries is constructed to serve the interests of the
ruling classes. Bourgeois statistics does not just serve to significantly reduce
income tax of different capitalist groups, it also hides the actual amounts
of military spending. Furthermore, bourgeois statistics gives a false picture
of the situation of the capitalist economy by embellishing it and attesting
to the absence of antagonisms. (Iastremskii & Khotimskii, 1931, p. 6)
The production of statistics in capitalist countries is presented as an
undertaking of falsification serving a non-egalitarian state. Accordingly,
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its fundamentals cannot be used in a state that plans to achieve equality
between all human beings. On that basis, the authors of the manual are
led to refute certain theoretical contributions of the pre-revolutionary
period by associating them with the fundamentals of statistics as used by
the bourgeoisie of capitalist countries:
Bourgeois statistics as practised is based on the bourgeois theory of statis-
tics, which is organically connected to the whole system of bourgeois
political economy and philosophy. The authors and theorists of the bour-
geois science of statistics (Süssmilch, Quetelet, Lexis, Bortkiewicz, Pearson,
Mittchell, Bowley, Moore, Chuprov, the fascists Pareto and Gini, and
others) give arguments, with the aid of statistical constructs, extolling the
“unshakeable” and “eternal” nature of the capitalist system. (Iastremskii &
Khotimskii, 1931, p. 6)
The authors discredit the statistical reasoning developed in the nine-
teenth century (on statistics in the nineteenth century, see Porter, 1986),
accusing it of encouraging the status quo and of curbing economic and
social progress by basing natural and unchanging laws on the “regular
stability of statistical figures”:
In the first half of the 18th century, pastor Süssmilch spoke of “the divine
order” that manifested itself in the regular stability of statistical figures.
In the 19th century, Quetelet, who admittedly said so without referring
to God, spoke of a natural order that found expression through statistical
figures, of an “average man” having a specific number of crimes, good
deeds, etc. (Iastremskii & Khotimskii, 1931, p. 6)
This accusation (nineteenth-century statistics being a curb on progress)
led to the plan to construct a system of “socialist accounting” serving a
political programme of figures being used by the people:
Lenin on many occasions said that accounting would become the business
of the masses only after the overthrow of capitalism. But such accounting
is impossible without statistics, which is also essential for the good of the
masses. “In capitalist society, statistics was the exclusive reserve of ‘people
of the state’ or narrow-minded specialists; we have to bring it to the masses,
popularize it so that workers can gradually learn to understand themselves
and see how and how much they have to work, how and how much they
can rest…” (Lenin, 1955, vol. 21). The essential nature of disseminating
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socialist accounting among the people requires maximum simplification of
its technique. (Iastremskii & Khotimskii, 1931, p. 13)
The production of figures in a socialist state thus becomes a tool for the
people, one that the people must appropriate, which requires the contents
of statistics to be reduced primarily to technical mechanisms, assumed
to be accessible to the greatest number. However, the link between
accounting and statistics is not broken, even though it is not clarified.
Such a conception gave rise to numerous discussions between political
leaders and statisticians and among the statisticians themselves.
Debates and Tensions
Surrounding Statistical Theory
Scientific debates were mingled with internal political rivalries (see Maksi-
mova, 1996). These discussions were all the more heated when statisti-
cians trained in Marxism in the new Soviet higher education institutions,
such as the Plekhanov Institute for the National Economy3 or the Insti-
tute of Red Professors,4 started being recruited by the TsSU. The rifts
between statisticians keen to maintain theoretical mathematical statistics
and those who preferred more descriptive statistics based on surveys were
reinterpreted during their controversies. The interpretation of the mean
and of the law of large numbers, as well as the use of probabilities in
statistics, were in particular the subject of heated debate.
Tension Surrounding the Mean and the Law of Large Numbers
As already mentioned earlier, the interpretation of the mean by Quetelet
was accused of leading to moral fatalism, which negated the freedom of
individualwill, and facilitated a form of social fatalism whereby society
depended on superior laws that one could not combat (on Quetelet and
the mean, see Desrosières, 1988; Porter, 1986, ch. 2 and 4; Thévenot,
1994). The fact is that these conceptions were in contradiction with the
Bolsheviks’ Promethean transformation plan.
The law of large numbers, which was one of the essential factors legit-
imizing statistics as a science serving the measurement of social facts,
was condemned for the same reasons from the early 1920s. The Marxist
theorists emphasized the fact that observed trends were not inevitable,
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and that such a concept led to putting the state’s action into perspec-
tive. In their view, this statistical law contradicted the principle of political
action, as it portrayed social processes as fatalistic and the effects of polit-
ical action on society as illusory. Moreover, it helped to justify the idea of
stability of capitalism and thus its unchanging dimension.
On the other hand, for the TsSU statisticians, statistics could not exist
without the law of large numbers. Consequently, they strove to present
a use of the said law that did not challenge its theoretical foundation
while at the same time taking into account the attacks on it. In 1936,
Vladimir N. Starovskii, head of the Central Statistics Administration,5
proposed a wording full of stylistic acrobatics in a work published that
year (Starovskii, 1936). True to Marxist thinking, he did not question
the existence of laws that transcend individuals when having to deal with
large populations, but he challenged the ineluctable nature of phenomena
that appeared to him to be suggested behind the statistical regularities and
the lack of references to history. He presented as essential the reference
to the historicity of these laws, which he presented as specific to a given
social and political system. That being the case, the state could transform
the said laws and replace them with others. Human and political action
was no longer at risk of being powerless. But a socialist use of the law of
large numbers and the mean still had to be defined.
In fact, as they failed to establish the theoretical foundations of a
form of statistics that could be described as socialist, the statisticians in
charge of this task of reinterpretation endeavoured first of all to clarify
what statistics should not be. Their reasoning consisted in calling into
question the purportedly erroneous interpretations inherited from the
pre-revolutionary past rather than in elaborating a new set of concepts
adapted to a socialist economy and society. On the substance, it was
therefore more a political debate on the use of the tools than disagree-
ments on their theoretical foundations. Beyond the views and reasoning
of convenience, the statisticians were forced to think about the interpre-
tation of the tools they used and the creation or use of other tools better
suited to the context of the moment. The tension around the concept of
randomness and the use of probabilities is one such example.
Tensions Around the Shift to the Random Model
In 1917, Russia had already acquired extensive experience in the field
of sample surveys. The first tests of surveys on a “part of the whole”
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probably took place in the 1870s. The period from 1885 to 1917 was
marked by numerous efforts to perfect sampling methods, and by serious
thinking by the Russian statisticians in this respect (Mespoulet, 2002).
From 1895, they had the same discussions between themselves as their
colleagues in other European countries about the shift from an exhaustive
count to a partial survey, then about the shift from a sample constructed
in a reasoned manner, based on the use of type, to a random sample
based on calculated probabilities (on the history of sampling methods
and sampling surveys, see Desrosières, 2002; Gigerenzer et al., 1989;
Stigler, 1986). At the European level, the two questions of represen-
tativeness and confidence raised by a survey of “a part of the whole”
were at the heart of a debate that started with Kiær’s first communication
at the Congress of the International Institute of Statistics (IIS) in 1895
and ended in 1925 at the IIS Congress in Rome, where both sampling
methods—reasoned selection, also called purposive selection, and random
selection—were accepted after heated discussions about their respective
merits (on the debates during the period 1895–1925, see Desrosières,
1998 [1993], ch. 7; Kruskal & Mosteller, 1980).
The exuberant production of statistics in the USSR in the early 1920s
created particularly favourable conditions for the rapid spread of sample
surveys in the country (Mespoulet, 2002). Intensive use of such surveys
from 1919 onwards stimulated thinking about sampling methods. After
1925, such thinking indeed developed much more as a logical extension
to the questions raised by the already long-standing practice of Russian
statisticians in this field than in relation to the questions discussed at the
Congress of Rome, even though a summary on this subject was drawn up
by the TsSU.
However, the shift to the random model took particular forms from
the 1930s, in a country where the political leaders propounded a repre-
sentation of society in which the collective prevailed over the individual,
and in which an average collective behaviour was preferred to individual—
and therefore diverse and dispersed—forms of expression. Moreover, the
Bolsheviks’ purposeful plan to construct a new state and their Promethean
representation of human action on the environment gave a new dimen-
sion to the debates about the adoption of random sampling: what place
could chance have in a planned world, in which there was precisely no
place for uncertainty, and in which the unpredictable nature of individual
behaviour and the variability of individual cases could not be factored in?
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Planning concerns influenced the thinking about statistical represen-
tation and uncertainty, and consequently the forms of recourse to the
calculation of probabilities. The treatment of statistical dispersion and of
the mean, on the one hand, and the construction of sampling methods
for sample surveys, on the other hand, depended on the status of the
individual in society. The way of considering the question of confidence
in the method for constructing samples influenced the forms of the shift
to random sampling in the USSR.
Random selection, the product of the law of randomness, could
only be considered within the bounds of a prior breakdown of reality
controlled by human reason, in accordance with the Marxist concept
of the primacy of human action over the economy and society. Chance
could only operate if confined within a framework demarcated by human
reasoning and compliant with political choices and directives. From that
stemmed the basic Soviet statistical sampling method, developed in the
1930s, subsequently modified in the early 1950s. Whether under the
name “random stratified sample” (raionirovannyi sluchainyi otbor) or
“typical stratification” (tipicheskoe raionirovanie), the method for creating
a sample based on a combination between the demarcation of “typ-
ical groups”, firstly, and random selection, secondly, addressed the need
to perform a prior breakdown of social reality into classified categories
deemed relevant for analysing class structure or different types of agri-
cultural or industrial production structures. This way of combining use
of type and a specific interpretation of randomness characterized Soviet
statistics from the 1930s to the early 1990s.
Mechanical selection was preferred to probabilistic random selection
in the strict sense. The former was considered to provide more accurate
results than random sampling, in the strictly random sense of the term,
inasmuch as it guaranteed regular distribution of the sample’s units over
the entire set. In actual fact what was called mechanical selection was a
systematic selection (1/5 or 1/10 for example) without replacement. This
preference for mechanical selection was also a constant of Soviet statistics
until 1991.
This form of constructing samples combines the two symbolic char-
acteristics of the preference for typical stratified sampling: attachment to
territory as the basis for division into typical groups, which dates back to
the association between territory and type of the nineteenth century, and
the principle of an a priori breakdown of observed reality into classifica-
tions. Random selection could only occur subsequently. From the 1930s,
56 M. MESPOULET
the classifications developed served to form “typical groups” based on
an economic breakdown of reality into branches of production. In the
process, they resulted in excluding a part of the population of the samples
used in budget surveys for instance, casting out to an unknown world all
those who were not counted in the productive sphere, pensioners among
others. They thus departed from the principle of representativeness in
relation to the population as a whole. This way of focusing statistics on
groups or entities that mattered economically, socially and politically in
the eyes of the leaders can be explained by the priority given to targets.
This appears no less in contradiction with the desire to know everything,
which is often ascribed to the Soviet leaders. In this case, the search
for information appears to have been selective, satisfying political choices
rather than statistical laws.
At the end of the 1960s, A. Boiarskii clearly addressed the problems
raised by this sampling method:
A sample formed on the basis of production is obviously a sample of
individuals who work, and in that case the rest of the population is only
included in the field of view inasmuch as it has a connection with those
who work. However much we then adjust and correct the results, this
sample will never replace a sample of another kind of population. With
this sampling process, observation is still based on the habitual recourse
to administrations and companies. But from data concerning all companies
one cannot obtain an appropriate reflection of the life of all the population,
all socialist society in its entirety. (Boiarskii, 1968, p. 16)
This tension between a realistic conception of statistics, which produces
figures “reflecting” reality and was defended by the statisticians, and
a representation of the figures, treated as one of the instruments for
constructing a socialist reality and preferred by the political leaders, is
regarded as one of the main components of Soviet statistics. In such a
situation, the statisticians had to make efforts to adapt to the require-
ments of the moment; this took various forms according to the period
and the circumstances. A. Boiarskii’s remark implies moreover that the
adjustments and corrections of results may in certain cases have resulted
from this effort aimed at better matching the data with reality, despite the
choices of methods or techniques that resulted in ignoring or masking
certain aspects or dimensions thereof.
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What Form of Statistics
for Constructing a New Order?
The Soviet state was founded on a system of representations of manage-
ment of the country predominated by the image of a stable universe,
in which a planned economy was based on an organizational method
designed to lead to an increase in general living standards and to an
egalitarian society. Figures occupied a central position, being a tool for
information and action, a tool for evaluating results and an instrument for
proving the rightfulness of the measures taken. Central to such a system
of administration of the economy and society, quantification was a basis
for legitimizing the state and power. Accounting seemed to be the new
language that the Soviet Union needed to construct a system of quantifi-
cation serving the construction of socialism in the economy and society.
But that also needed new categories of classification to be constructed
to characterize the composition of society and to redefine the criteria on
which confidence in the data produced by state statistics was based.
The Relationship Between Statistics and Accounting
In 1932 Valerian V. Osinskii, then head of the Central Directorate of
Accounting for the National Economy (TsUNKhU),6 defined the role of
statistics in relation to accounting:
During the transition towards socialism, accounting must encompass all
spheres of economic and social life, and must penetrate all its links, even
the smallest.
[…] As the remains of capitalism were being swept from the economy
and the consciousness of people, statistics was increasingly superseded
by national accounting itself. The former TsSU did not become the
TsUNKhU by accident. This change in name did not happen by accident,
it characterizes the transformed orientation of activity of the system as a
whole. (Osinskii, 1932)
V. V. Osinskii regarded statistics as a relic of capitalism. Henceforth
serving the plan, statistics had to be transformed into accounting to draw
up the national accounts. This unified form of accounting, from initial
recognition to centralized processing, had to ensure uniform auditing and
processing both of demographic and social phenomena and of economic
activity, and guarantee continuity between companies’ accounts and the
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national accounts. This idea of a unified accounting system was not exclu-
sive to the USSR. It is found with variants, after the Second World War,
in European countries that set up their own system of national accounting
(see Studenski, 1958; Vanoli, 2002). In the USSR, it was intensified by
bureaucratic management at different levels, from the basic department of
a company to the central planning bureau of the Gosplan (Kornai, 1996,
pp. 141–164).
Was accounting destined to replace statistics? The answer to this ques-
tion remained ambivalent until the end of the 1930s, reflecting the
difficulty in inventing a new quantification language centred primarily on
accounting devices without resorting to statistical theory as a resource.
So Stalin’s formulation, at the 16th Party Congress in 1930, of the idea
that “there can be no accounting without statistics” then gave rise to
much prevarication and many changes in attitude in the definition of the
connection between statistics and planning through accounting.
One such example is provided by the fate of the theory of the decline
of statistics formulated by Osinskii in 1932 and subsequently denounced
at his trial in 1937. The idea that statistics had to be transformed into
accounting to serve the preparation of the national accounts was put to
the test. This prompts one to put into perspective the formulations made
during the 1930s about the conception of the scientific role of statistics,
as the use of ideas for political ends was standard practice at the time.
However, even if the role of statistics was once again officially recognized
at the end of the 1930s, it was not at all well-defined. In reality, it was
only in 1948 that statistics was fully restored as a field in its own right,
when the TsSU regained institutional independence from the Gosplan, the
figures of which it was tasked to audit. Its rehabilitation was completed
in 1960 when Starovskii, then director of the TsSU, gave himself up to
a form of self-criticism on the occasion of the publication of his work on
the history of statistics in the USSR:
In economic literature, all sorts of leftist ‘theories’ were formulated, for
instance the ‘theory’ of the decline of money under socialism or the ‘the-
ory’ of the decline of statistics under socialism (the transformation of
statistics into accounting, which appeared for the first time in the articles of
academic V.V. Osinskii) [...]. The author of this article, in his works, in the
period 1932-1935, also asserted this ‘theory’. Life has clearly demonstrated
the pointless and erroneous nature of these ‘theories’, which distracted
the attention of scientific managers from current questions surrounding
statistical theory. (Starovskii, 1960, p. 16)
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Nevertheless, the asserted integration of statistics into accounting had
far-reaching consequences on the forms of the use of statistics and the
tools used. Firstly, the period 1930–1955 was marked by the virtual
disappearance of social statistics. The scientific and universalist ambition
of nineteenth century statisticians, defended by the early heads of the
TsSU, was supplanted by an immediate use of figures for accounting
purposes to provide the Gosplan with the data needed to work out and
evaluate five-year plans. The social figures produced between 1930 and
1955 were mainly demographic in nature. Statisticians became a kind of
“right hand” providing the economistic planners with statistics needed for
elaborating the plan, for instance for building blocks of flats, schools or
leisure facilities.
On the other hand, a whole new area of statistics developed, based
on economic forecasting and the construction of indexes. The statis-
ticians elaborated new approaches directed at constructing a national
accounting system, the reflections of which are already evident in the
manuals published in the 1930s (see in particular Iastremskii & Khotim-
skii, 1936). The chapters dealing with “relative magnitudes” and indexes
occupied a more important place in them, helping steer practices towards
a purely accounting use of statistical techniques.
When the Methodological Council of the Central Directorate of
Accounting examined the training programme on corporate accounting
techniques and statistical theory in 1934, it stressed the need to limit
statistical theory to what it described as the purpose of statistics: catego-
rization, the calculations of averages, indexes and the sampling method.7
The construction of indexes, for instance, was based on ratios aimed to
compare two quantities, for example industrial production to agricultural
production. The indexes were built for planning purposes and for the
evaluation of the plan objectives. However, not by any means unbiased,
categorization brought into play considerations that were much more
than merely technical, namely social and political issues, in particular
when it was a matter of constructing other tools, such as classifications
of population censuses.
Categorization of the Population and Censuses
The work of constructing occupational classifications used for censuses
combined the desire of the statisticians to reflect reality as closely as
possible and the classification models officially accepted by the Party.
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The tension between a “realistic” conception of statistics, which produces
figures ‘reflecting’ reality defended by the statisticians, and an under-
standing that treated statistics as one of the instruments for constructing
a socialist reality, which was preferred by the political leaders, can be
regarded as a key feature of Soviet statistics.
Each census involved a confrontation between the desired construction
of a socialist reality and forms of resistance to transformation of society or
the economy, and it was important for the results to provide a snapshot
of the volume and structure of the population. The census, which had to
confirm the successful construction of a socialist society, was the central
link in the statistical tools for constructing reality. From the mid-1920s, its
production was subjected to increasingly frequent attempts at intrusion by
the Party at various different data collection, processing and publication
stages.
While as in any country the elaboration of classification categories for
the individuals and phenomena under study was the subject of negoti-
ation between various administrations or institutions, it raised particular
issues in the USSR, where the administration of society was based on
a classification of the population into categories defined by the Party.
The TsSU’s statisticians had to find the adaptations needed to match
the bill of materials with, among other things, the structure of the social
classes adopted by the Party or the official list of nationalities (on the
classification of nationalities in the censuses, see Cadiot, 2007; Hirsch,
1997). This work of adjustment, which varied according to period, the
political views and priorities of the moment, was a source of tensions
between statisticians and political leaders and calls to order from the
latter to the former. The example of the definition of occupational cate-
gories in the 1920s and 1930s clarifies certain forms of adjustment. In
the 1926 census, the category “occupation” replaced “profession”, which
had been used by choice in the 1920 census, but which created diffi-
culties for constituting the main social groups defined in the theoretical
Marxist social analysis model(Mespoulet, 2008). Subsequently, behind a
simplified classification into major social groups, called “classes” at certain
periods, there remained a very detailed classification of “occupations” that
reflected social diversity.
The purges of statisticians following the 1937 census halted the TsSU
statisticians’ efforts to reflect such diversity through censuses (on the
Great Purges in the Soviet state statistical administration, see Blum &
Mespoulet, 2003). From the 1939 census onwards, a stable image of
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social structure dominated through a classification of social groups that
remained broadly unchanged until 1989. This virtual stability of the
classification, which can be an advantage for comparisons over time,
nonetheless resulted in obscuring some of the diversity of the social situ-
ations of individuals from the 1960s onwards. Generally speaking, the
model of stable social aggregates, based on major groups, overlooked
changes affecting small groups of individuals, regarding them as residual
or marginal phenomena. In the process, it left blind spots with regard
to the actual state of Soviet society and failed to spotlight its underlying
transformations that broke out after the perestroika.
What room was left for the social in this model where the collective
prevailed over the individual? In reality, social phenomena were studied
mainly when they could be reduced to economic management. Further-
more, reflecting on how social matters were taken into consideration
raises another question, namely the confidence one has in the data on
society collected by the statisticians and in what the respondents say.
Confidence in the Data and the Status of the Statistician
As already mentioned, the question of how much confidence we can have
in statistics explains the reservations one can have about using a random
selection in the sample surveys method practiced in the USSR. This ques-
tion is also expressed in a number of ways in connection with the collected
data and the processing of individuals’ responses to the surveys. How
much confidence can one have in what respondents say, and thus in the
data based on their responses? Beyond that, this point also raised the
question of confidence in the work carried out by the statistician.
From the end of the nineteenth century, surveys were considered a
social situation in their own right, in which the effects of interaction
between interviewer and respondent played their part (Mespoulet, 2008).
However, whereas this thinking had helped to consolidate the role of the
professional statistician in conducting field surveys up to the early 1920,
in particular in questioning individuals, it went in quite another direction
from the early 1930s. The effects induced by the leeway respondents had
in responding made them suspect in the eyes of the authorities, and the
Party started intervening in the organization of data collection operations,
more particularly by controlling recruitment and the work of local census
takers.
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In areas other than state statistics, in the early 1960s, the local Soviets
and trade unions appointed “civic controllers and engineers” to audit
certain stages of statistics work at a local level (see Anisimov, 1968;
Sbeglov, 1967). In the late 1970s, an article in Vestnik statistiki, the
TsSU’s journal, pointed out: “The state’s statistics bodies, with the active
help of the Party, Soviet organizations and trade unions, do their work by
recruiting civic activists on a large scale to audit the accounts, adminis-
trative registers and the authenticity of the data in the registers” (Vestnik
statistiki, 1978, p. 67). This auditing of statistics by the citizens, in reality
by social activists, presupposes a careful choice of those hired to do
the work, who were also known as “civic inspectors of state statistics”:
“They were selected and confirmed nationwide by branch, according to
worker qualification, and also according to the possibility of combining
an inspector’s obshchestvennaia rabota with his main job” (Vestnik statis-
tiki, 1978, p. 67). Who were these inspectors, also called obshchestvenniki,
civic activists?
In principle, the most experienced specialists in the various branches of the
national economy were recommended as civic inspectors of state statistics,
and the nature of each district is also taken into account. These inspec-
tors are accountants, economists, engineers in factories, administrations,
organizations and kolkhozes (collective farms), workers in the plan and
financial bodies. Applications are put forward with the agreement of the
managers of the companies and organizations where the applicants work.
They are examined with the leaders of the Party and the trade unions in
the workplace, and only after that are they confirmed by the local execu-
tive committee of the district or town, the soviets of the people’s deputies.
(Vestnik statistiki, 1978, p. 67)
What precise tasks were expected of these inspectors? First and
foremost, their function entitled them to demand that the managers
of factories, work sites, government departments, organizations and
kolkhozes disclose their accounting records and work registers for inspec-
tion purposes. This consisted in auditing accounts and figures in factories
and other workplaces, by examining the original documents. On that basis
and with the aid of the managers of these establishments, the inspectors
could take measures in situ aimed at eliminating the defects brought to
light, and also ask for the collectives of workers subject to this inspection
process to be convened in order to discuss the results thereof.
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In 1978, there were nearly 30,000 inspectors covering most of the
districts of the Soviet republics, half of whom were in the Federal Republic
of Russia (Vestnik statistiki, 1978, p. 68). Most of them had a secondary
school or higher level of educational attainment, and many of them were
members of the Party or candidates for Party membership.
Whether it be a control of the data provided by factories or admin-
istration registers, by censuses or budget surveys, this inclusion of data
collection operations in the sphere of civic activities demonstrates a special
way of treating interaction between interviewers and respondents in an
authoritarian state such as the USSR. The question of the degree of
confidence one can have in the information provided by the respon-
dents, a subject of discussion for Russian statisticians from the 1880s
onwards, remained an important factor in Soviet statistics, but the way
it was resolved took on a different form. Before 1917, Russian statisti-
cians shared the idea that it was up to the interviewer himself to behave
in such a way as to gain the trust of the respondents and thereby elicit
more accurate and comprehensive responses from them. After 1917, the
Party had a quite different view of the way of handling trust in relations
with respondents.
In the censuses of 1919 and 1920, against a backdrop of grain requi-
sition campaigns, the Bolsheviks suspected the peasants of holding back
information, especially about their harvests and stocks of grain produc-
tion. So they were considered guilty in principle. This suspicion of the
leaders vis-à-vis the peasants was a constant in the 1920s and 1930s.
So, an assessment of the confidence one would have in the informa-
tion provided by the respondents was not left solely to the statisticians,
suspected in principle of possibly colluding with the respondents. The
degree of confidence one could have in the collected information there-
fore had to be handled differently, both by the Party and its social
organizations. The control of the statistics would be done by new forms
of social and political control. The census preparation and collection oper-
ations in the various districts were controlled by Party bodies and social
organizations until 1989.
The intrusion of the Party and the social organizations in the conduct
of field survey operations, both for censuses and for surveys of family
budgets, socialized this moment of statistical work while at the same time
divesting part of the statistician’s professional competence.
In that light, Lenin’s statements regarding the need to “popularize”
statistics, in the sense of making it accessible to the people, take on a
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particular relevance. The ambition of the Soviet regime was to create a
“new human being”. At the centre of this project, all aspects of social
life were deemed susceptible to control by the mass organizations repre-
senting the people. Who better than the collectors of the people’s data
to control the statements of citizens subject to survey? The verification
of the reliability of the gathered information compared with reality took
the form of social control. Such inclusion of certain statistical opera-
tions in the sphere of civic activity restricted the statistician even more
to a primarily technical role, cutting him off from the very source of the
information he had to process.
What Statistical Tools for a New Order?
Up to the 1950s, the management tool aspect of statistics was regarded as
the main one in the apparatus of state statistics and was closely linked to
planning. However, surveys of family budgets, which were precisely at the
point where statistics and planning intersected, offer a good example of a
technical mechanism that in certain cases could also be used as a tool for
acquiring knowledge about society, which Boiarskii, then Director of the
TsSU Research Institute, himself acknowledged in 1968 when, following
new directives from the 1967 Party Congress aimed at developing the
social sciences, the TsSU had to “intensify the statistical study of social
phenomena” (Boiarskii, 1968). For Boiarskii, surveys of family budgets
were the preferred tool for assessing what he included in the subjects of
study of social statistics: problems at work, wages, consumption, services,
housing, everyday life. Apart from that, health, the composition and
movements of the population and the family structure were in his view
in the realm of demography, which also encompassed social statistics. In
fact, the demarcation of the latter was dictated by an imperative: all these
questions had to be studied as “a reflection of the economy’s effects on
all other phenomena of social life” (Boiarskii, 1968, p. 14).
In reality, from the 1950s, and even more so from the 1960s, many of
the tools and mechanisms used in Soviet social statistics resembled those
used in capitalist countries (Elisseeva, 2003). The difference was not so
much in the type of tools used but rather in the way they were used,
which Boiarskii himself pointed out, for instance in connection with the
methods of sample surveys conducted by Soviet sociologists in the late
1960s:
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We cannot compare our surveys with those of bourgeois sociologists
without due consideration, on the basis of specific criteria. The main differ-
ence lies in the fact that their programme (both of observation and of
processing) is constructed in such a way that by expressing itself in a
manner full of imagery one can’t see the wood for the trees. Their specific
nature does not stem from the fact that one proceeds by conducting sample
surveys or by conducting a survey, but rather from the fact that the whole
construction of these surveys is not designed to bring to light what matters
most: the role of relations of production that, all things considered, in
reality determine all these processes. (Boiarskii, 1968, p. 17)
Much more so than the tools as such, and the statistical theory under-
pinning them, the difference resided in the approach and the model for
interpreting the reality in the framework of which they were used:
Our sample surveys are constructed on quite different bases and principles
– the principle of the historical materialism of sociology, in our Soviet,
Marxist conception of the word. It is precisely in that, and not in the
technical question, that resides the dividing line between the surveys of
sociologists in socialist countries and those of bourgeois sociologists. The
very forms of the work may be similar. (Boiarskii, 1968, p. 17)
National accounts, demographic censuses, budget surveys, all these
tools were used for a similar purpose in different European countries
after the Second World War, whether to measure production levels or
living standards or to analyse trade circuits for the purpose of macroeco-
nomic regulation and increasing material well-being in a country. In the
case of the USSR, victory against the United States to claim the title of
superpower also depended on success in the economic competition. The
Soviet socialist system thus had to demonstrate its superiority in the same
economic and social fields as the capitalist countries, which meant that
they tended to adopt the same tools, while re-interpreting their uses.
Conclusion
Quantification can be analysed as a way of legitimizing a fragile and young
power, if one considers the USSR of the 1920s and 1930s, but it can
be said that this was still true in the 1950s and 1960s, in the period
of confrontation with the capitalist states. Adam Tooze has shown how
statistics have been used to boost the legitimacy of the German state
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under the Weimar Republic (Tooze, 2001). In his view, statistics offered
the Weimar Republic a new, attractive and credible language for govern-
ment. Theodore Porter for his part has shown how the use of quantitative
language also goes hand in hand with a transformation in the bases of
authority of the expert, in this instance the statistician (Porter, 1995). To
what extent can one speak of socialist statistics in the case of the USSR?
At first sight, what is striking is the difficulty that political leaders
and managers of the TsSU had in defining a new conceptual framework
specific to state statistics, both in the 1920s and 1930s (the period of
formation of the Soviet system) and subsequently. Marking a break with
the pre-revolutionary economic management systems, planning had to
have a quantitative language and new tools, radically different from those
of statistics nourished by 19th century scientific representations and the
bourgeoisie.
Accounting seemed to provide this new language that Soviet Russia
needed to construct a quantification system serving the construction of
communism. In reality, statistics was never abandoned, even if its exis-
tence was hotly contested in the period of formation of the Soviet system.
The expression “socialist statistics” was used to refer to a different way of
producing figures from the way that capitalist countries produced them.
However, although we can speak of socialist statistics, it is not so much to
refer to a specific theory, concepts and tools, but rather to a set of uses of
them, which, depending on the period, were reinterpreted and adjusted
to the objectives set by the political plan of the leaders of the Soviet state.
Against this backdrop, the Soviet statistician was caught between two
poles: heroes of science, or engineers of figures in the service of the
authorities. A way of resolving this dichotomy consisted in the state
restricting the role of the statistician to a primarily technical role in a
Directorate of Statistics or a computational centre, without any expecta-
tion of a scientific role, which was entrusted to various research institutes
(on the Soviet organizational system of science after the Second World
War, see Graham, 1993; Krementsov, 1997). This transformation of the
status of the statistician is inseparable from a conception of quantifica-
tion adapted to a planning model, but also a form of state where power
was exercised in an authoritarian manner and figures were considered a
propaganda tool.
The authority of the expert statistician was no longer based on his
independence vis-à-vis the political leaders. On the contrary, the compo-
nents of his professionalism were defined by the latter. The expert was
kept at arm’s length from the authorities, but at their disposal. The part
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of his work that was closest to the population, such as data collection for
censuses or household budget surveys, was until the 1970s placed under
the political control of the Party, being included in the sphere of civic
activities.
Notes
1. Source: XIII s’’ezd VKP (b), Stenograficheskii ochet (XIIIth Congress of the
Communist Bolshevik Party of Russia (b), Shorthand report), p. 130.
2. A new copy of this handbook was edited each year from 1930 to 1936.
One of its editors, Boris S. Iastremskii (1877–1962) was a mathemati-
cian specialized in the field of probability calculation. From 1918 to 1933
he headed the Department of Statistical Methodology of the TsSU. He
became a member of the Party in 1931. The other editor, Valentin I.
Khotimskii (1892–1939), was a former student of Aleksandr A. Chuprov
and was specialized in the field of the probabilities. Although he was
close to the Party he never became a member. After teaching mathe-
matics from 1924 to 1927 at the Plekhanov National Institute for the
National Economy, he became a researcher in the mathematical section
of the Communist Academy. He directed it until 1932 and then was
appointed at the head of the controlling sector of the Gosplan for Russia.
In 1935 he was appointed at the direction of the Statistics Department
for Population and Health of the Directorate Accounting for the National
Economy (TsUNKhU), that was in charge of the organization of the 1937
and 1939 demographic censuses. The TsUNKhU had replaced the TsSU
in 1930. V. I. Khotimskii was arrested in 1937 during the Great Purges.
Most statisticians taking part in the organization of the 1937 census were
arrested and put in prison. V. I. Khotimskii died in 1939.
3. The Plekhanov Institute for the National Economy was re-formed in 1924
in Moscow. It had a Department of Statistics.
4. The Institute of Red Professors was created in 1921 in Moscow. It was
placed under the authority of the Central Committee of the Party.
5. Vladimir N. Starovskii (1905–1975), was recruited as a statistician to the
TsSU in 1925. He became a member of the Party in 1939 and was
appointed to the direction of the 1939 demographic census after Stalin had
rendered void the results of the 1937 census. After being Deputy Director
of the TsUNKhU in 1939 and 1940, he was appointed to the direction
of the new TsSU when it was re-formed in October 1940. He remained
in this function until he died in 1975. From March 1941 he was also vice
president of Gosplan.
6. The TsUNkhU replaced the TsSU in 1930. Valerian V. Osinskii (1887–
1938) was a member of the Bolshevik Party since 1907. Immediately after
October 1917 he was director of the State Central Bank and president of
68 M. MESPOULET
The Supreme Council for the National Economy. After 1918 he fulfilled
various leading functions. In 1926 he was appointed head of the TsSU to
give a new political direction to the Central Statistics Administration. He
was replaced in this function in 1928. A few years later he was appointed
head of the new TsUNkhU. He was arrested in 1937 during the Great
Purges and executed in 1938.
7. See RGAE, f. 1562, op. 1, d. 749, ll. 138–154.
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CHAPTER 3
The People’s Algorithms: Social Credits
and the Rise of China’s Big (Br)other
Tong Lam
In 2013, just a few months after Chairman Xi Jingping came into power
in China, the government declared that the country was entering a new
era and launched a project called “the Chinese Dream” (Zhongguo meng).
In order to realize this dream of “national rejuvenation”, the Central
Committee of the Communist Party issued a set of guidelines aiming
at the cultivation of what it referred to as “core socialist values” that it
divided into three respective categories: national goals (prosperity, democ-
racy, civility and harmony), social goals (freedom, equality, justice and
the rule of law), and individual values (patriotism, dedication, integrity
and friendship) (Gow, 2017). The making of state-defined “civilized”
(wenming) and “high quality” (gao sushi) political subjects for the newly
enounced social and economic order, in short, is an integral part of the
so-called Chinese Dream.
Almost immediately, propaganda slogans began popping up every-
where, from giant LED billboards on main avenues to the pages of
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school textbooks. Predictably, Western observers immediately contrasted
the Chinese Dream with the American Dream, pointing out that while the
Chinese version might have borrowed a concept from the United States,
it focuses on collectivism rather than individualism (Kai, 2014). Implicit
in their argument is not only just a criticism of authoritarianism’s and
nationalism’s suppression of individual aspirations but also an embrace of
a certain belief in the ability of the autonomous individual to exercise
reason that is thought to be fundamental to the operations of the market
and democracy. China, in their estimate, needs to unleash that potential
if it is to fully align itself with the Western economic and political order
and become a true global leader.
This narrative deploys a certain moral filter to make sense of the world
and human behaviour and has a long genealogy traceable to the Enlight-
enment. And in spite of the recent financial crisis and repeated electoral
catastrophes in liberal democracies on both sides of the Atlantic, the
foundation of that moral conviction has remained largely unshaken. The
recent critique of fake news, alternative facts and misinformation (all of
which have been made possible by the deployment of politically motivated
computer algorithms and analytics) is heavily grounded in the insistence
on the importance of real facts and the human capacity to reason.1 Yet
in the face of popularist political division and even violence fed by data-
driven technology and the feedback loop in our post-truth world, it has
become clear that the notion of self-determination and self-governance of
the autonomous individual is being called into question (Rahwan, 2018).
This essay equally questions the adequacy of this view of human
capacity, especially in the contemporary digital landscape, by exam-
ining the recent introduction of the social credit (shehui xinyong) rating
system in China. As a new technology of governance, the social credit
system is intended to track and calculate the social credit scores of every
Chinese citizen and organization based on their activities and perfor-
mance. Significantly, this government-mandated big data and surveillance
project involves more than just the mining and processing of data by the
state and corporations; it also seeks to compel individuals and groups to
regulate themselves tirelessly based on the social and ethical order sanc-
tioned by the state. Under such practices of state-led neoliberalism, the
government uses social engineering interventions—the idea of the social
credit in this case—to promote the ideas of marketization, social harmony,
innovation, entrepreneurship, the rule of law, and other state-defined
“core socialist values”. By subjugating the everyday to neoliberal logics
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and normalizing its citizens through self-regulation, postsocialist China is
moving away from the older socialist system of surveillance. In doing so,
it has also given up on the dream of creating enlightened and critical citi-
zens once cherished by Chinese intellectuals and revolutionary vanguards
a century ago. Instead, it edges towards a posthuman world where citizens
are fast becoming calculable and mouldable data subjects.2
Of course, Chinese citizens are not alone in their subjugation to sophis-
ticated digital surveillance, as it has been demonstrated by Shoshana
Zuboff’s (2019) study of surveillance capitalism in market democracies.
Yet the ubiquitous and conspicuous way in which the everyday activities of
the individual are being tracked and regulated by a single party-state with
an explicit agenda of behaviour modification is unprecedented. Moreover,
whereas surveillance capitalism focuses primarily on capital accumulation,
the Chinese social credit system also includes a political and ideological
dimension that cannot be subsumed completely under the logic of capital.
As such, Big Other—the “instrumentarian power” enabled by the vast
surveillance infrastructure for herding and moulding society as suggested
by Zuboff (2019)—is even bigger in China. Given the resilience and
strengthening of the authoritarian party-state, one can even refer it to
as Big (Br)other.3
The Earlier Chinese Dream
The desire to reform the thought of the individual is at least partially
rooted in China’s looming existential crisis at the beginning of the twen-
tieth century. When the multi-ethnic Qing empire led by the Manchu
ethnic group (1644–1912) repeatedly suffered major military defeats
and setbacks in political and institutional reforms in its final decades,
many Han Chinese intellectuals came to believe that the failure of
the empire was due to its inability to create a unified body politic to
counter the encroachment of foreign powers. The prominent intellectual
Liang Qichao (1873–1929), for example, argued that the Chinese nation
emerging out of the crumbling empire was in dire need of an organic
society. According to him, the prerequisite to forming such a society was
to create national citizens who were motivated and enlightened. Those
who led the top-down revolution that ultimately toppled the dynasty also
shared this view. Sun Yatsen, the revolutionary leader and “father of the
republic”, also famously castigated the disorganized and disunited state of
the Chinese nation (Lam, 2011, p. 9). Underlying this line of reasoning
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was a fundamental shift in the political logics of the state from that of the
Manchu-led dynastic empire to the Chinese nation. Political legitimacy,
similarly, was now derived from the people rather than from the imperial
lineage and divine sources.
When the new republic disintegrated soon after its establishment, most
intellectuals blamed the top-down approach to political change. They
further emphasized that if China wanted to institute a modern polit-
ical order, creating a functional society with politically awakened citizens
was critical. Thus, during the 1910s and 1920s, many Chinese intellec-
tuals spoke of the need to create a “new culture” based on science and
democracy. They vernacularized language for the masses and carried an
education campaign to the countryside with the hope of turning the
nation’s mass population into new citizens, making this period a sort of
Chinese enlightenment (Lam, 2011, pp. 38–45; Schwarcz, 1986). Yet,
owing to the political imperative of the time, the idea of turning individ-
uals into enlightened citizens quickly gave way to the idea of producing a
people who would adhere to the newly declared social and political order
that was seen as vital to the survival of the nation. Being politically aware,
in this new context, was to acknowledge the priority of the collective over
the individual.4
Immediately after the Second World War, unsurprisingly, officials and
academics of the Nationalist government also began to contemplate how
to put the population under surveillance as part of the national recon-
struction project. Nevertheless, it was only after the founding of the
People’s Republic in 1949 that the dream of engineering the new citizen
on a large scale became possible. Among other things, a system of house-
hold registration was put in place, subjugating individuals, workplaces,
schools, neighbourhoods and so forth, to a new administrative order
legible to the surveillance state. While such a system was no doubt
partially drawn from practices used in the Soviet Union and the Eastern
Bloc, scholars have also noted that the Chinese population was put under
surveillance in the imperial era (Lu & Perry, 1997). The social surveil-
lance system in twentieth-century China can thus be seen as a case of the
modern bureaucratic state appropriating both native and foreign ideas for
its state-building needs. This essay takes up one aspect of this vast surveil-
lance network, the personal file or dossier system (renshi dangan or geren
dangan), as it offers a meaningful departure point for understanding the
significance of the new social credit system in the era of big data.
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Personal Dossiers
In many ways, the specific idea of putting the behaviour and thought
of the individual under constant surveillance followed directly from the
way in which party cadres were managed within both the Commu-
nist Party and the Chinese Nationalist Party (Huang, 2002). After the
founding of the People’s Republic in 1949, ideology was seen as key
to the Communist Party’s consolidation of its control of the govern-
ment and the country. In 1956, the Party issued a set of guidelines
regarding the management of the personal files of its cadres (Huang,
2002). Soon, the system was expanded to cover all urban residents. At
a time when Communists were struggling to bring the country under
their firm control amid heightening Cold War anxiety, one main purpose
of the more elaborated surveillance system was to identify and eradicate
the so-called class enemies and foreign spies. Thus, seeking more than to
just discipline the docile bodies of the people in order to prepare them
to mobilize for war and economic production, the state now also strove
to monitor and reform their minds in order to secure the revolution. In
other words, as China transformed into a “dossier society”, it departed
further from the aspirations of creating the free-thinking new citizens the
intellectuals of the turn of the twentieth century had hoped for.
Generally, the personal dossier for urban residents is created when a
child enters the school system and tracks his or her character, attitudes,
performance and social relationships. Although Chinese citizens have no
direct access to these files themselves, these dossiers literally follow them
throughout their lives, leaving no temporal and spatial gaps. During
the socialist era when a large segment of the Chinese society was orga-
nized into work units (danwei), the local unit was responsible for the
updating and storage of the dossiers. In schools, for example, student
dossiers were kept up-to-date by teachers. Likewise, in workplaces, indi-
viduals were evaluated periodically by supervisors and peers. To a certain
extent, the Chinese socialist dossier system was similar but not identical
to its counterparts in the Eastern Bloc. For instance, in East Germany,
unlike in China, information about targeted individuals was collected
by recruited informants and secret state agents, and those records were
centrally managed by the Ministry of State Security commonly known as
the Stasi.5
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The Chinese dossier system was a central pillar in the social surveillance
system of the party-state, as it allowed the state to monitor the moral char-
acter, work ethic, ideological leanings and social relationships of its urban
citizens, workers, students, not to mention its own cadres.6 Furthermore,
the content of these dossiers was often an important factor in determining
the individual’s eligibility for opportunities and benefits such as transfer-
ring to a better school, promotion, better housing or admission to the
party.7
In short, even if the tracking of the individual through the dossier
was only part of the larger surveillance infrastructure, it was an important
one.8 And the idea of having a dossier trailing the life of a citizen like
a shadow, deciding his or her individual fate based on past behaviours
and attitudes, certainly invokes the menacing imagery of Big Brother.
Still, this sort of imagery may have overlooked the nuances, failures and
contradictions of the system in practice. Not only were most rural citizens
or the so-called peasants not subjected to the dossier system, but calling
in personal favours, exacting revenge and seeking leniency were conceiv-
ably always part of the game for those who were. In the film The Lives of
Others (Das Leben der Anderen) that depicts the surveillance programme
in former East Germany, for instance, the Stasi agent assigned to monitor
a subversive writer ends up empathizing with his subject and eventually
refuses to properly report his illegal activities. In postsocialist China, ideo-
logical control is more relaxed and so the ability of the system to keep
track of individual citizens’ thoughts and behaviours has probably become
even less effective.9
Indeed, the end of the socialist era in 1978 and the subsequent intro-
duction of a mixed economy have produced new challenges for the
dossier system. Since the 1980s, a growing portion of the population
has not been employed by traditional work units, such as govern-
ment or state enterprises. The non-government workforce has become
even bigger since the 1990s due to intense privatization. In order to
address the changing social and economic order, talent exchange centres
(rencai jiaoliu zhongxin) with field offices in cities all over China were
created. Among their many functions, these government-run centres are
responsible for keeping files on urban residents who do not work for state-
assigned work units. Under this new system, urban residents outside of
the state employment system, along with their employers, such as private
or foreign corporations, are required to make sure that their files are
properly maintained by the relevant local field offices.
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When these field offices first opened in the early- to mid-1980s, they
only served a relatively small number of workers who were in high
demand—normally experts or workers with foreign language skills—who
worked for foreign companies or were part of Sino-foreign joint ventures.
However, because more and more workers are no longer working for
the government or state enterprises, these talent exchange offices have
evolved into general employment centres for the public. Meanwhile, the
dossiers maintained by these offices have begun to function as a kind of
resume for school and employment and even as evidence when it comes
to individuals’ entitlements to social insurance and social security benefits
(Wang, 2011, p. 27).
How does a surveillance programme that was initially designed to
enable political and ideological control interact with the country’s
emerging new social and economic order? This is a central question that
Chinese officials and policy thinkers have been grappling with (Edin,
2003). As relocation, job changes, business closures and restructuring
have become common occurrences, so too has the misplacement and
loss of dossiers, filing errors and other management mishaps. Since such
occurrences have direct impacts on the livelihoods of affected individ-
uals, disputes over the accuracy of the information in the dossiers have
been on the rise. Policy thinkers are unsure whether they should classify
these as labour disputes, administrative mishaps or civic disputes, as each
of these categories has different legal ramifications (Wang, 2011, pp. 27–
28). The stakes are certainly high, since any mishandling of these cases
could contribute to social discontent and political instability.
Social Credit
Although the rise of the social credit system is not directly linked to the
erosion of the original function of the personal dossier system, it does
represent the latest attempt to create new citizens by the state. In fact, the
idea of placing the moral character of each citizen under surveillance jibes
with neoliberalism. The new focus, however, is no longer on ideological
purity for political purposes but on trustworthiness as a basic condition
for economic efficiency, because trustworthiness is thought to be vital
to minimizing economic risks and facilitating transactions. Chinese policy
thinkers share the belief of advocates of rational choice and game theory
that economic development proceeds apace with the level of social trust
(Liu, 2016, pp. 30–39; Zak & Knack, 2001). In this context, trust is
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more than an emotional or psychological issue; it is also an important
economic variable. The key question then is how to turn trust into social
capital, and how to turn social capital into quantifiable and calculable
social credit. And it is in the light of this imperative of converting trust-
worthiness into creditworthiness that the constant surveillance of the
moral character of the individual is thought to be highly relevant and even
critical in establishing and maintaining the neoliberal social and economic
order (Zhongguo Guowuyuan, 2014, 2015).
The social credit idea first began to circulate around 2000. Prior to that
time, this concept was only mentioned rarely, even though the experiment
with marketization had accelerated in the 1990s. Since 2000, however,
thousands of articles mentioning this concept have appeared in maga-
zines and academic journals, mostly in finance-related fields but also in
governance.10 Nevertheless, it was not until 2014 that a detailed outline
of the new system, called the “Planning Outline for the Construction of a
Social Credit System”, first came to light (Zhongguo Guowuyuan, 2014).
Jointly released by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist
Party (the highest administrative body of the Party) and the Chinese
State Council (Zhongguo Guowuyuan) (the highest administrative body
of the central government), the document reveals a central initiative
of the government’s ongoing effort to “strengthen and innovate social
management” (Zhongguo Guowuyuan, 2014). As part of the proposed
thirteenth five-year plan (2016–2020), the planning outline stipulates in
no ambiguous terms that credit is the foundation of all market operations
and that a market economy is essentially a credit economy. Moreover,
it further argues that the social credit system is vital to the functioning
of the socialist market economy and to social governance. In so doing,
it lays out the rationale for radically economizing and financializing the
social world in an unprecedented way.
Needless to say, the idea of using quantifiable data to rate the cred-
itworthiness of an individual or an organization is neither new nor
unique in China or elsewhere. Yet unlike in countries with well-established
credit infrastructures, Chinese credit rating agencies often have difficulty
tracking rural residents, migrant workers and students. Moreover, while
the cash economy is increasingly replaced by app-based direct transfer
and payment platforms such as WeChat and Alipay (Liu, 2016, p. 169),
these methods of payment do not contribute to establishing credit in
the conventional sense. Therefore, as the planning outline points out,
the existing credit rating system in China is sporadic and fragmented
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at best. From the perspective of the government, the system misses the
opportunity to piece together different databases and the different plat-
forms consumers use to construct a fuller picture of individual citizens,
organizations and society at large.
With this in mind, the newly introduced social credit system is designed
to deliver an aggregated, albeit not necessarily total, information system
that emphasizes uniformity, consistency, comprehensiveness, accuracy,
efficiency and up-to-dateness. It tracks the creditworthiness of citizens,
enterprises, institutions and even government agencies using a uniform
framework. In order to facilitate the implementation of the new system,
the government has also started to introduce new laws, regulations and
standards for the social credit system that were intended to be fully imple-
mented by 2020 (Zhongguo Guowuyuan, 2014, 2015). Just months
after the outline was published, the development of a system of national
unified social credit codes was named a top government priority. These
codes, not to be confused with credit ratings themselves, are standard-
ized identification numbers assigned to all citizens and organizations.
Such a nationwide system of standardized credit codes is to facilitate
the sharing and exchanging of credit information among governmental
agencies, enterprises and social organizations.
Significantly, even if the installation of a social credit system for tracking
individuals meticulously and constantly may sound like an Orwellian
nightmare, the rationale of the system is generally not articulated in
negative and repressive terms. More often than not, it highlights the
importance of generating incentives to reward good behaviour. The
language of the planning outline echoes that of the media’s and Chinese
social scientists in their frequent comments about the lack of morality
in Chinese society, revealing anxiety about how a lack of morality and
trust will harm the market economy and social stability (W. Zhang & Ke,
2003). The goal of the social credit system is, according to the planning
outline, to “build mechanisms to incentivize the keeping of trust and to
punish the breaking of trust” (Zhongguo Guowuyuan, 2014). An ideal
social credit environment, in other words, will “encourage people to be
sincere, keep trust, promote morality and uphold courtesy”. Therefore, in
line with previous attempts to cultivate moral and “civilized” citizens for
the nation, social credit is meant to promote civic virtue and patriotism
in order to foster a “harmonic society” (hexie shehui), which has been a
state slogan for the past decade.
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A central concept underlying the emerging incentive structure is
the so-called natural person (ziran ren) that appears multiple times in
the document (Zhongguo Guowuyuan, 2014). While the concept is
certainly linked to the rights discourse of the Enlightenment, its imme-
diate context is actually game theory in economics, which is paradoxically
predicated on a dark vision of humankind, namely, that the individual
is nothing but calculating, distrustful, suspicious and so forth (Brown,
2015). Still, despite this negative view, in modern economics, the natural
person is nonetheless adorned as a “rational” being who makes “self-
interested” decisions based on incentives. This conception of the human
being informs public choice theory, which uses economic theories to
address social and political problems. Under this logic, the purpose of
governing is to provide incentives to reward individuals who behave in
ways consistent with the objectives of the state and punish those who
don’t.
Economists have long argued that a sound credit system promotes the
smooth functioning of the market (Bartels, 1964). In a way, the Chinese
social credit system takes the idea of credit rating to a new level. By
evaluating and establishing the creditworthiness of all citizens, businesses
and organizations, the system is trying to make individuals and groups
accountable for their actions by subjugating their behaviours to calcu-
lable economic and financial logic. In so doing, the government hopes
to rein in the perceived growing culture of fraud, selfishness and callous-
ness that are regarded as the most prominent problems of the postsocialist
era. The social credit system is regarded as a way to help safeguard social
order and build “social sincerity” and a “sincerity culture” (Zhongguo
Guowuyuan, 2014). Once the social credit system and the national social
credit codes are in place, the official newspaper China Daily predicts,
it will “let credit weigh in for malfeasances and lawbreaking” (Shehui
xinyong daima [Social Credit Codes], 2015).
In addition to emphasizing the construction of credit for the “natural
person”, the planning outline also discusses the importance of including
businesses, institutions and government agencies in the same social credit
system. Just like individual citizens and consumers, businesses, social orga-
nizations and government agencies must also be evaluated by people and
other organizations in order gain respect and credibility. As if the invis-
ible hand of the market will magically solve all problems, the planning
outline specifies that the construction of the credit infrastructure will help
to strengthen healthcare services, lead to better hygiene and birth control,
3 THE PEOPLE’S ALGORITHMS: SOCIAL CREDITS … 81
deliver safer food, reinforce scientific and technological development,
generate stronger environmental protection and bring improvements in
many other sectors. Above all, it will help to construct and maintain social
and political stability. This is like a form of credit fundamentalism, similar
to free market fundamentalism, that believes an omniscient credit system
will save China from social discontent, instability and other perils.
It is also important to point out that as much as the government is
trying to use the social credit system to instil the so-called socialist core
values, such as a “harmonic society”, “Chinese virtue” and “socialism
with Chinese characteristics”, it is not promoting a brand of Chinese
exceptionalism. Among the keywords, such as “sincerity”, “trustworthy”,
“amity” and “patriotism”, that can be found throughout the planning
document, there are also explicit references to the desire to integrate
the so-called Chinese “socialist market economy” with the global market
economy. For instance, it maintains that a positive credit infrastructure
will promote corporate responsibility, a productive and efficient work-
force, and a transparent and accountable government, all of which, it
maintains, are crucial for China’s global competitiveness (Zhongguo
Guowuyuan, 2014). After all, at the most fundamental level, the logic of
economizing society through quantification is to break down and replace
the old order with a self-proclaimed universal order that can be rendered
in numerical and deeply statistical terms (Asad, 1994).
The Total Information System
The dream of establishing a total information system, of amassing data
and acting on this data, is not without precedent. In 1965, for example,
a group of US social scientists and statisticians proposed establishing
a national data centre in order to facilitate the storage, sharing and
processing of large datasets owned by the government for use in carrying
out research, designing social programmes and making policy decisions.
However, the proposal was not adopted as it was vigorously opposed
by the public and the US Congress precisely on account of the fear
that this would lead to the infringement of privacy and the creation
of an Orwellian dossier society (Kraus, 2013). Similarly, in the mid-
1950s, some anthropologists and psychologists came up with the idea
of a “database of dreams”, where everyday human dreams, life stories and
wandering thoughts could be stored and then made available for analysis
(Lemov, 2015). In the end, the idea of totality in all these proposed and
82 T. LAM
imaginary projects is more like a fantasy, and that fantasy has long been
replaced by the more effective idea of networked information, which is
explicitly manifested in the design of the internet that emerged during
the Cold War. Driven by the fear of a nuclear apocalypse, architects of
the system emphasized not just the importance of constant and real-time
communications that the information network made possible, but also
the necessity of its decentralization so that the entire system could not be
incapacitated by a single strike (Naughton, 2016).
In his analysis of the decentralizing nature of networked surveillance,
Roger Clarke (1988) has characterized such practice as “dataveillance”.
Writing long before the rise of the social media, he argues that the kind of
surveillance based on the mining of data linked by networked information
technologies is far more powerful than the Orwellian totalitarian state,
since the monitoring and analysis of the data trails take place constantly in
linked and automated local processes. By now, obviously, the phenomena
observed by Clarke has already saturated our everyday life. In fact, it is
not an exaggeration to say that tech giants today, such as Amazon, Google
and Facebook, know many of us better than we ourselves and that they
are in some respect more powerful than the government.
The traditional sense of surveillance or the ubiquitous Big Brother
trope is therefore no longer adequate to describe the digital landscape
of the twenty-first century. In his discussion of the rise of the “expos-
itory society”, Bernard Harcourt (2015) argues that it is not just that
our physical and online activities are being tracked constantly. It is also
that we have become very eager to share our information in exchange for
convenience, security and social belonging. To put this in lay terms, we
are constantly posting and liking on social media in order to be liked and
stay relevant. Similarly, we give out our most private information from
secret login questions to biometric data in exchange for security. In this
brave new world, we need to check in with the surveillance machine inces-
santly, and we have to constantly turn ourselves into spectacles for others
to consume. In our desire to exhibit ourselves, we are like the incarcer-
ated subject in Jeremy Bentham’s classic panopticon who wants to be
seen rather than just watched (Harcourt, 2015; Horne & Maly, 2014,
pp. 110–142). In essence, we are both watching Big Brother and wanting
to be watched.
If big data in the neoliberal age has altered our sociality in fundamental
ways, it has equally transformed our practice of knowledge. In particular,
the implication of the total information system is far more consequential
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than that of the total archive. Whereas “archive fever”, as Jacques Derrida
(1998) puts it, is driven by the desire to collect and hoard in anticipa-
tion of the future in a vague sense, the modus operandi of surveillance
capitalism is not simply to collect but also to calculate, analyse and act
on those data in or near real time for capital accumulation, which, among
other things, has the effect of creating infinite behavioural feedback loops.
We may know nothing about computer algorithms and learning machines
that we are helping to train, but they know us. Moreover, they guide and
shape us in the process.
The Chinese dream of creating a standardized and aggregated, if not
total, information system of its population is no different in this regard.
Arguably, this dream is readily shared by both the government and tech
conglomerates even if their interests are different. For tech giants, this is
surveillance capitalism par excellence as mining data of the everyday will
allow them to reach a much larger segment of the population that is not
covered by traditional credit rating organizations (Chai, 2015). For the
one-party security state, the potential access to these otherwise dispersed
and unconnected databases provides a new capacity to govern that has
been unthinkable until now.
Indeed, even at this moment, the degree of Chinese internet compa-
nies’ penetration into the everyday is already more pronounced than
that of their non-Chinese counterparts. The messaging and payment app
WeChat is the ultimate example that offers a glimpse into the future
that is now. Introduced in 2011 by Tencent, China’s largest internet
company, WeChat developed the first cross-platform instant messaging
service. It has since evolved into an app that functions as a clearinghouse
for a wide range of online activities, including shopping, travel, banking,
messaging and much more. In a way, it is like the combination of What-
sApp, Facebook, Google, Amazon, eBay, Expedia, Uber and a dozen of
other commonly used platforms in a single app. In 2016, WeChat alone
had at least 700 million subscribers, over 90% of which were in China
(The New York Times, 2016). These days, as China becomes increasingly
cashless, urban and even rural citizens cannot conduct most of their daily
activities smoothly without using the app. In theory at least, the infor-
mation collected by Tencent along with Alibaba, Baidu and other major
online platforms together can provide a detailed picture of their users,
including their movement, finances, reading habits, health conditions,
social networks and so forth.
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Critics of surveillance capitalism are deeply concerned about the
erosion of freedom, democracy and privacy that has resulted from big
corporations’ amassing of data of their users with little transparency and
government supervision. In China, however, criticism of this sort is gener-
ally muted because heavy-handed state surveillance has always been the
norm, and that the boundaries between the private and public domains
have always been blurry. In short, even though there is no evidence yet
that the government is planning to incorporate commercial databases for
its social credit calculation, there is no doubt the potential is tremen-
dous and tempting. Furthermore, despite their occasional reluctance,
most Chinese citizens, especially Han Chinese who are educated, urban
based and affluent, are supportive of the initiative because they believe
that social credits will bring them security, convenience and prosperity
(Kostka, 2019; Lee, 2019). All in all, while the social credit system is not
a total information system, it is a system that seeks to deepen the recon-
ceptualization the human and the everyday in the hegemonic economic
and financial order.
The Future Now
In late 2016, more than two years after the Chinese State Council
published its planning outline on the implementation of the social credit
system, the British science fiction anthology series Black Mirror premiered
an episode called “Nosedive”, which tells the story of a woman who was
not allowed to board a plane due to her recently reduced social credit
score. Somewhat predictably, the spiralling narrative ends with tragedy.11
Although there is no indication that the dystopic science fiction was
inspired by China’s emerging new reality, and that the two cases have
some crucial differences, the parallels are still uncanny.
Many media reports have noted the resemblance between China’s
social credit system and Black Mirror ’s dystopia. Unsurprisingly, the
undertone of some of these observations is built on a long history of
viewing China as an exotic and fearsome Other. In response to this
renewed Cold War rhetoric, some critics (including some of those who
had initially contributed to the sensational reporting mentioned above)
have started to offer new “corrective” views, emphasizing that the official
intention of the system is to guide morality, promote trust and facili-
tate law enforcement. In short, they contend that this is just a Chinese
version of data-governance, and therefore the hysteria about the coming
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dystopia is unwarranted (Develle, 2019; Matsakis, 2019). Some have
further pointed to the fact that the implemented system so far is only
local, fragmentary and partially digital (Horsley, 2018). Lost in the back
and forth between the persistent Sinophobia and the insistence on evalu-
ating China’s situation in its own terms, however, is a recognition of the
growing convergence between postsocialist China and market democra-
cies in spite of their many differences. All nuances and differences aside,
the logic of financialization, capital and the security state are actually the
shared underpinning of today’s expanding surveillance infrastructures in
various nations.
That the future as fantasized by a British science fiction should so
closely resemble the emerging everyday reality in contemporary China is
therefore astonishing and yet unsurprising. After all, the “unimaginable”
is able to appear in the science fiction precisely because it is imagin-
able and even desired in certain contexts. Already in early 2015, just
months after the State Council had issued its comprehensive guidelines
for constructing the social credit system by 2020, the financial wing of
the tech giant Alibaba introduced the beta version of its own personal
credit rating system, Sesame Credit (Zhima Credit ). In 2020, Tencent
has also launched its own credit scoring system based on WeChat trans-
actions, even though the system so far is more like a loyalty reward
programme (Hu & Guo, 2020). Meanwhile, with at least four hundred
million users across the various platforms maintained by its subsidiaries,
the Sesame Credit programme has been quick to collect participants’
information such as personal identity, credit history, contractual reliability,
behaviours and social relationships. Based on this information, partici-
pating users are assigned with social credit scores that are visible to others
(Shu, 2014). Some users even see the advantages of displaying high social
credit scores in their dating profiles. Users with high credit scores are also
offered perks, such as faster loan approvals and faster check-in at some
airports (Hatton, 2015; Kostka, 2019).12 In short, the social credit plat-
forms introduced by tech giants have been gamified with rewards that are
designed to modify behaviour.
These commercial social credit platforms are not related to the system
implemented by the government, however (Daum, 2017). And it remains
unclear whether or how commercial social credit platforms are linked to
the larger surveillance state (Ahmed, 2019). But even if commercial plat-
forms such as Sesame Credit and Tencent Credit remain unconnected to
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the government’s system and even if user participation remains volun-
tary, the story for the government-run social credit system is entirely
different. Soon after the planning outline had been announced, authori-
ties at every level started to develop and implement their corresponding
social credit infrastructure. For instance, in Chongqing municipality, local
districts drew up blacklists of individuals and organizations whose conduct
they regarded as “seriously untrustworthy”, lists that they intended to
share with all other government agencies at least within the munici-
pality (Cqnews.net, 2017). Similarly, major transportation services, such
as China Rail and many Chinese airlines, have reportedly created their
own blacklists, leaving millions of individuals no longer eligible to use
some of their services (Chin & Wong, 2016; He, 2019). Social credit
scores have crept into many other aspects of life—for instance, people
who switch jobs too often as well as people who do not visit their elderly
parents often enough have lower scores (P. Wood, 2018; Zhang, 2019).
Although local implementation of the social credit programme has been
rather uneven, one wonders when and how far the central government
will further standardize and centralize the social credit system at the
national level.13
For now at least, unlike the Black Mirror story, national social credit
scores do not exist, and there is also no indication that social credit scores
will become viewable by the general public like those gamified social
credits run by tech conglomerates. Yet, ultimately, a “loyalty programme”
run by the state, especially an authoritarian state, will certainly lead
to rewards (and punishments) that are far more consequential. More-
over, as decentralized practices of dataveillance, social credit programmes
managed by local governments and tech giants have together substan-
tially economized and financialized Chinese society by making citizens
and consumers credit conscious, as well as turning them into mouldable
data subjects.
Bigger Than Big Other
The social credit system is a technology of subjectivity and citizen-
ship that seeks to calibrate and modify the behaviour of individuals and
groups, compelling them to align themselves with the state-sanctioned
social, economic and political order. At one level, by using reward and
punishment to instil responsibility and self-regulation, the government is
exercising its power through what Foucault refers to as “the conduct of
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conduct” (Gordon, 1991, p. 48). As Foucault argues, “to ‘conduct’ is
at the same time to ‘lead’ others (according to mechanisms of coercion
which are, to varying degrees, strict) and a way of behaving within a more
or less open field of possibilities. The exercise of power consists in guiding
the possibility of conduct and putting in order the possible outcome”
(Foucault, 1982, p. 789). No wonder so many Chinese citizens, espe-
cially middle-class Han Chinese who have benefited tremendously from
China’s uneven but rapid economic growth, are willing to accept or even
embrace the idea of social credit as a way to ensure their economic pros-
perity. For them, high social credit scores are their tokens to become
“civilized” and “high quality” citizens as defined by the state (Tomba,
2009).
Moreover, the Chinese social credit system is part and parcel of a
state-led neoliberal model of development and governance. After all,
neoliberalism is never just a set of laissez-faire practices. Behind the facade
of the free market is always a political and legal structure created and guar-
anteed by state power.14 In China, that very market ecology is maintained
by a strong party-state that prioritizes economic growth and political
stability. The emerging social credit system that seeks to economize and
financialize the social world is therefore a political instrument as much
as an economic one. In particular, using governing algorithms, predictive
analytics, big data profiling and so on, the system meticulously tracks,
archives, calculates and moulds the activities of all citizens and organiza-
tions. If the dossier society of the socialist era saw China moving away
from its earlier dream of cultivating critical and enlightened citizens, the
mandatory social credit infrastructure in the postsocialist era takes it even
further away from that dream by producing calculating individuals who
are nothing but normalized and optimized for the state-defined order.
Politics and security are therefore equally central to China’s social
credit system. By design or not, the social credit infrastructure has been
unfolding together with an array of mass surveillance technologies with
profound political and security ramifications. Driven by the imperatives
of one-party rule, domestic stability, geopolitical ambitions, nationalism
and capital accumulation, the party-state has introduced unprecedented
technological measures to manage its population (BBC, 2019). Such
technologies include an all-encompassing CCTV network with growing
facial and gesture recognition capabilities, the collection of genetic and
biometric information especially in the ethnic minorities areas, and the
monitoring of online activities, as well as other forms of mass surveillance
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and censorship (Churchill & Delaney, 2019; Leibold, 2020). Granted that
many of these practices can also be found in liberal democracies, as in
the controversial cases of dataveillance linked to the National Security
Agency (NSA), Cambridge Analytica and Palantir that have come to light
in recent years, the totality of them and the aggressive way through which
they have been weaponized in China is still far more menacing (Burke,
2020; Cadwalladr & Graham-Harrison, 2018; Steinberger, 2020).
With social credit systems of various kinds operating at all levels,
China’s Big (Br)other is indisputably more overt, ubiquitous and
powerful. Even at this initial stage, what makes these social credit
systems particularly ominous is that the practice has already amplified the
existing systematic state violence against vulnerable individuals such as the
poor, non-Han minorities and political dissidents by subjecting them to
additional scrutiny and discrimination. As such, “dispossession by surveil-
lance” as described by Zuboff (2019) has taken on yet another layer of
meaning.
Nonetheless, to highlight the differences in scale and intensity between
China and market democracies is not to demonize China as the Other by
returning to Cold War rhetoric. In fact, if the idea of everyday surveil-
lance by the government and tech giants as implicated by China’s rising
social credit ecology feels dystopian and yet strangely familiar, it is only
because we have already seen and experienced fragmentary versions of
it. From Brexit to Trumpism, mass surveillance and behaviour modifica-
tion through digital infrastructures operated by corporations and states
has been a vital force in disrupting the old liberal order, unleashing a
new wave of popularist and extremist politics that is heavily driven by
algorithm-generated disinformation and misinformation. The old sense
of the autonomous political subject has thus become increasingly limited
if not altogether antiquated. Similarly, instead of creating politically aware
citizens, the Chinese one-party security state has now resorted to the
production of data subjects susceptible to digital control and manipu-
lation based on pre-inputted parameters and algorithms. Thus, in spite
of the many differences between China and market democracies, the two
sides converge significantly in how their corresponding surveillance infras-
tructures have produced a new mode of governing paradigm that, as
Zuboff argues, replaces “the engineering of souls with the engineering
of behavior” (Zuboff, 2019, p. 376). In short, as human behaviours are
increasingly shaped by computer algorithms and feedback loops, we drift
toward becoming essentially posthuman (Hayles, 1999; Käll, 2017). If
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this trend continues, then we may indeed finally (and tragically) reach the
end of history.
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Notes
1. In critiquing of the “real” fact as an unqualified concept, I do not mean
to promote nihilism or to suggest that reality does not exist but rather
to emphasize that facts are always mediated. For a discussion why facts
remain important in this context, see Bruno Latour (2004).
2. According to the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), a
data subject is a person whose personal data is subjected to be collected,
stored and processed by digital technologies. See Käll’s (2017) discussion,
especially in the posthuman context.
3. Zuboff also argues that instrumentarianism and totalitarianism are like
“two species of power” (2019, chap. 12). While pointing out the cultural,
political and institutional differences between China and the West, she
nonetheless concludes that the technological trajectories of both are strik-
ingly similar. While I agree that these are two sides of the same coin, my
contention is that the Chinese state, which represents a brand of authori-
tarian neoliberalism with growing global geopolitical ambitions, seems to
occupy a space in between these two modes of power. China’s Big Other
(see Zuboff, 2019, chap. 13), therefore, could be characterized as Big
(Br)other.
4. In a sense, it was as if the impulse of liberal governmentality had taken an
authoritarian turn. According to Mitchell Dean, “authoritarian govern-
mentality differs from liberalism in that it regards its subjects’ capacity
for action as subordinate to the expectation of obedience” (Dean, 1999,
p. 209).
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5. The scope of Stasi’s surveillance was nonetheless vast. At the time of
the collapse of East Germany in 1989, the agency employed approxi-
mately 91,000 full-time staff and 300,000 informants, and it had over
six million personal files. See https://wikileaks.org/wiki/Stasi_still_in_cha
rge_of_Stasi_files, accessed 1 October 2016.
6. However, it is worth noting that given the way these dossiers were
managed in socialist China, the vast rural population who did not work
in factories or collectivized farms were generally neglected by the system.
7. Despite the prevalence of these dossiers, very little is known about the
operations behind them in the socialist era, and there has not been any
in-depth scholarly analysis of them. Nonetheless, some individual dossiers,
including high profile ones, have been leaked. Those of high profile indi-
viduals provide a glimpse of what was recorded when an individual in
question was under intense scrutiny. For example, see Duo (2007).
8. For example, these dossiers were also used by the Public Security Bureau
(PSB) for its household registration programme, known as the hukou
system, which restricted the mobility of citizens. Household registration
determined where individuals were allowed to live or work or attend
school, and the dossiers on Chinese citizens contained information that
could be used to support or deny any request for transfer and relocation.
9. For example, whereas personal files in the earlier period tried to document
the individual’s “thought” meticulously, reform-era personal files often
contain only simple and generic statements, making differences between
individuals indiscernible and hence the files unusable (see Sun, 1994,
p. 88).
10. A quick search of the term “social credit” in China Academic Journals,
the most prominent and comprehensive database of Chinese publications,
is revealing. Throughout the 1990s, there were only about two dozen
essays, mostly on the subject of finance, that mentioned the concept of
social credit in passing. In 2000 alone, however, there were more than
forty articles that did. Moreover, for the first time, social credit appeared
in the titles of six articles, suggesting that more in-depth discussions of
social credit had begun to emerge. Since then, social credit has become a
frequent topic, with several hundred articles either focusing or mentioning
the concept each year. Moreover, starting in 2014, there are over a thou-
sand such articles published each year. Many of them were direct responses
to the publication of the central government’s planning outline.
11. “Nosedive”, which is based on a story by Charlie Brooker, was directed by
Joe Wright. It was first screened at the Toronto International Film Festival
in September 2016 and premiered on Netflix on 21 October 2016, as the
first episode of the third season of Black Mirror. See Black Mirror https://
www.netflix.com/ca/title/70264888, accessed 5 June 2020.
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12. Much has been written about our willingness to feed details of our lives
to big data projects. For example, see the discussion of the idea of the
quantified self in Swan (2013) and Simanowski (2016).
13. Needless to say, there is no doubt that the system will continue to
evolve beyond 2020 based on new requirements and technology. See
www.chinalawtranslate.com/en, www.chinalawtranslate.com/social-credit-
mou-breakdown-beta, and www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/credit-regula
tion. Accessed 10 June 2020.
14. As David Harvey (2005) has observed, the so-called market reform started
in 1978 under the late paramount leader Deng Xiaoping has to be
understood in the context of the global advance of neoliberalism.
References
Ahmed, S. (2019, May 1). The messy truth about social credit. https://logicmag.
io/china/the-messy-truth-about-social-credit/. Accessed 25 October 2020.
Asad, T. (1994). Ethnographic representation, statistics and modern power.
Social Research, 61(1), 55–88.
Bartels, R. (1964). Credit management as a market function. Journal of
Marketing, 28(3), 59–61.
BBC. (2019, May 2). China’s Xinjiang citizens monitored with police app,
says rights group. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-48130048.
Accessed 5 May 2019.
Brown, W. (2015). Undoing the Demos. Zone Books.
Burke, C. (2020). Digital sousveillance: A network analysis of the US surveillant
assemblage. Surveillance and Society, 18(1), 74–89.
Cadwalladr, C., & Graham-Harrison, C. (2018, March 17). Revealed: 50
million Facebook profiles harvested for Cambridge Analytica in major breach.
Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-
analytica-facebook-influence-us-election. Accessed 10 April 2019.
Chai, H. (2015, June 9). Mainland credit-rating network takes shape. China
Daily. http://www.chinadailyasia.com/business/2015-06/09/content_1527
4221.html. Accessed 1 July 2015.
Chin, J., & Wong, G. (2016, November 28). China’s new tool for social
control: A credit rating for everything. Wall Stree Journal. https://www.
wsj.com/articles/chinas-new-tool-for-social-control-a-credit-rating-for-everyt
hing-1480351590. Accessed 1 May 2017.
Churchill, O., & Delaney, R. (2019, July 16). How WeChat users unwittingly
aid censorship. https://www.inkstonenews.com/tech/how-unwitting-users-
wechat-aid-chinese-messaging-apps-blacklisting-sensitive-messages/article/
3018830. Accessed 20 December 2019.
92 T. LAM
Clarke, R. (1988). Information technology and dataveillance. Communications
of the ACM, 31, 498–512.
Cqnews.net. (2017, June 17). A social credit system network is under construction
in Chongqing in 2017 . http://cq.cqnews.net/html/2017-06/14/content_4
1933782.htm. Accessed 10 June 2018.
Daum, J. (2017, December 24). China through a glass, darkly. https://www.chi
nalawtranslate.com/en/china-social-credit-score/. Accessed 23 April 2019.
Dean, M. (1999). Governmentality: Power and rule in modern society. Sage.
Derrida, J. (1998). Archive Fever: A Freudian impression. University of Chicago
Press.
Develle, Y. (2019, May 28). Time to stop comparing China’s social credit to Black
Mirror. https://medium.com/wonk-bridge/time-to-stop-comparing-chinas-
social-credit-to-black-mirror-6e54dc98cec8. Accessed 25 October 2020.
Duo, G. (2007). Youjian yi ce yiluo di dangan [The surfacing of yet another
missing personal file]. http://mjlsh.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/book.aspx?cid=6&tid=
157&pid=2989. Accessed 1 October 2016.
Edin, M. (2003). State capacity and local agent control in China: CCP cadre
management from a township perspective. The China Quarterly, 173, 35–52.
Foucault, M. (1982). The subject and power. Critical Inquiry, 8(4), 777–795.
Gordon, C. (1991). Governmental rationality: An introduction. In G. Burchell,
C. Gordon, & P. Miller (Eds.), The Foucault effect: Studies in governmentality
(pp. 1–51). The University of Chicago Press.
Gow, M. (2017). The core socialist values of the Chinese dream: Towards a
Chinese integral state. Critical Asian Studies, 49(1), 92–116.
Harcourt, B. E. (2015). Exposed: Desire and disobedience in the digital age.
Harvard University Press.
Harvey, D. (2005). A brief history of neoliberalism. Oxford University Press.
Hatton, C. (2015, October 26). China ‘Social Credit’: Beijing sets up huge
system. BBC News. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-34592186.
Accessed 10 May 2017.
Hayles, N. K. (1999). How we became posthuman: Virtual bodies in cybernetics,
literature, and informatics. University of Chicago Press.
He, H. (2019, February 18). China’s social credit system shows its teeth,
banning millions from taking flights, trains. South China Morning Post.
https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/2186606/chi
nas-social-credit-system-shows-its-teeth-banning-millions. Accessed 10 April
2019.
Horne, E., & Maly, T. (2014). The inspection house: An impertinent field guide
to modern surveillance. Coach House Books.
Horsley, J. (2018, November 16). China’s Orwellian social credit isn’t real.
Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/11/16/chinas-orwellian-soc
ial-credit-score-isnt-real. Accessed 25 October 2020.
3 THE PEOPLE’S ALGORITHMS: SOCIAL CREDITS … 93
Hu, Y., & Guo, Y. (2020, June 8). Tencent launches credit scoring system based
on WeChat purchases. https://www.caixinglobal.com/2020-06-08/tencent-
launches-credit-scoring-system-based-on-wechat-purchases-101564336.html.
Accessed 25 October 2020.
Huang, X. (2002). The birth and development of personal file [Kexue guifan
de Zhongguo gongchandang ren de renshi dangan gongzuo]. Journal of
Changsha University, 16(1), 93–94.
Kai, J. (2014, September 20). The China dream vs. The American dream.
The Diplomat. http://thediplomat.com/2014/2009/the-china-dream-vs-
the-american-dream/. Accessed 2020 May 2015.
Käll, J. (2017). A posthuman data subject? The right to be forgotten and beyond.
German Law Journal, 18(5), 1145–1162.
Kostka, G. (2019). China’s social credit systems and public opinion: Explaining
high levels of approval. New Media and Society, 21(7), 1565–1593.
Kraus, R. S. (2013). Statistical déjà vu: The National Data Center proposal of
1965 and its descendants. Journal of Privacy and Confidentiality, 5(1), 1–37.
Lam, T. (2011). A passion for facts: Social surveys and the construction of the
Chinese nation state, 1900–1949. University of California Press.
Latour, B. (2004). Why has critique run out of steam? From matters of fact to
matters of concern. Critical Inquiry, 30(2), 225–248.
Lee, C. S. (2019). Datafication, dataveillance, and the social credit system as
China’s new normal. Online Information Review, 43(6), 952–970.
Leibold, J. (2020). Surveillance in China’s Xinjiang region: Ethnic sorting,
coercion, and inducement. Journal of Contemporary China, 29(121), 46–60.
Lemov, R. (2015). Database of dreams: The lost quest to catalog humanity. Yale
University Press.
Liu, X. (2016). Woguo shehui xinyong tixi jianshe wenti yanjiu [A study of China’s
social credit system]. Zhishi chanquan chubanshe.
Lu, X., & Perry, E. J. (Eds.). (1997). The Danwei: Changing Chinese workplace
in historical and comparative perspective. M. E. Sharpe.
Matsakis, L. (2019, July 29). How the West got China’s social credit system wrong.
https://www.wired.com/story/china-social-credit-score-system/. Accessed
25 October 2019.
Naughton, J. (2016). The evolution of the internet: From military experiment
to General Purpose Technology. Journal of Cyber Policy, 1(1), 5–28.
Rahwan, I. (2018). Society-in-the-loop: Programming the algorithmic social
contact. Ethics and Information Technology, 20(1), 5–14.
Schwarcz, V. (1986). The Chinese enlightenment: Intellectuals and the legacy of
the May Fourth Movement of 1919. University of California Press.
Shehui xinyong daima [Social Credit Codes]. (2015, March 13). China
Daily. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2015-03/13/content_1980
1380.htm. Accessed 4 June 2017.
94 T. LAM
Shu, C. (2014). Data from Alibaba’s e-commerce sites is now powering
a credit-scoring service. http://techcrunch.com/2015/01/27/data-from-ali
babas-e-commerce-sites-is-now-powering-a-credit-scoring-service/. Accessed
10 December 2016.
Simanowski, R. (2016). Data love: The seduction and betrayal of digital technolo-
gies. Columbia University Press.
Steinberger, M. (2020, October 21). Does Palantir see too much? New York
Times Magazine. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/2010/2021/
magazine/palantir-alex-karp.html. Accessed 2025 October 2020.
Sun, L. (1994). Qianlun gaigekaifang xingshi xia de renshi dangan guanli
gongzuo. Tianfu xinlun, 5.
Swan, M. (2013). The quantified self: Fundamental disruption in big data science
and biological discovery. Big Data, 1(2), 85–99.
The New York Times. (2016, August 6). China, not Silicon Valley, is cutting edge
in mobile tech. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/03/technology/china-
mobile-tech-innovation-silicon-valley.html. Accessed 1 May 2017.
Tomba, L. (2009). Of quality, harmony, and community: Civilization and the
Middle Class in Urban China. Positions: Asia Critique, 17 (3), 591–616.
Wang, L. (2011). Laodong zhengyi caisu biaozhun yu guifan [Standards for labour
dispute arbitration]. Renmin chuban she.
Wood, M. (2018, August 28). In China, your credit could depend on how
often you visit your parents. https://www.marketplace.org/2018/08/20/
china-your-credit-could-depend-how-often-you-visit-your-parents/. Accessed
10 April 2019.
Zak, P. J., & Knack, S. (2001). Trust and growth. The Economic Journal,
111(470), 295–321.
Zhang, P. (2019, April 4). Chinese workers could lose social credit for switching
jobs too often. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/news/
china/society/article/3004704/chinese-workers-could-lose-social-credit-swi
tching-jobs-too. Accessed 10 April 2019.
Zhang, W., & Ke, R. (2003). Trust in China: A cross-regional analysis. William
Davidson Institute Working Paper No. 586 (p. 22).
Zhongguo Guowuyuan. (2014, June 14). Guowuyuan guanyu yinfa shehui
xinyong tixi jianshe guihua gangyao (2014–2020 nian) de tongzhi [Planning
outline for the construction of a social credit system (2014–2020)]. http://
www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2014-06/27/content_8913.htm. Accessed 4
June 2015.
Zhongguo Guowuyuan. (2015, June 11). Guowuyuan guanyu pizhuan
fazhangaigewei deng bumen faren he qita zuzhi tongyi sheihui xinyong daima
zhidujianshe zongti fangan de tongzhi [The state council’s approval of the
development and reform commission and other departments on the overall
plan for the establishment of a unified system of social credit codes on
3 THE PEOPLE’S ALGORITHMS: SOCIAL CREDITS … 95
legal persons and other organizations]. http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/con
tent/2015-06/17/content_9858.htm. Accessed 1 April 2017.
Zuboff, S. (2019). The age of surveillance capitalism: The fight for a human future
at the new frontier of power. Public Affairs.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction
in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original
author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the
chapter’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line
to the material. If material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons
license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds
the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright
holder.
CHAPTER 4
Accounting forWhoWe Are and Could Be:
Inventing Taxonomies of the Self in an Age
of Uncertainty
Uwe Vormbusch
Over the last decades, we have witnessed a further advance in quantifi-
cation. In particular, the rise and spread of digital self-quantification,
indicates new taxonomies of the self which (re)frame the human body,
everyday practices, emotions and desires. During earlier waves of quan-
tification, particularly from the nineteenth century onwards, accounting
and an accompanying “trust in numbers” (Porter, 1995) proliferated at
the heart of the economy, the sciences and the state. During the neoliberal
era, numbers and calculation have come to fundamentally reframe public
services, altering established norms of the common good, “corrupting”
the intentions and knowledge of professional actors (Crouch, 2016).
Since the 1980s, calculative tools associated with New Public Manage-
ment—international educational comparisons (such as PISA), and other
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forms of performance measurement, ranking and rating—have gradually
expanded into not yet economized fields of public life, such as education
and health, transforming not only the way these work, but also the very
objectives they are pursuing. The human body and mind have not been
exempted from these developments. Quite to the contrary: these have
been a privileged object of quantification from the very beginnings of
modern science, most notably in medicine (Foucault, 1973) and statistics.
The early Foucault (1975 [1995]) placed the body centre stage in his
studies of power—see here, for instance, Foucault’s analysis of Bentham’s
Panopticon as well as his writings on disciplinary society more gener-
ally. Later, Foucault revised the somewhat hierarchical notion of discipline
by drawing attention to the interplay of power, knowledge and the self,
focusing on “technologies of the self” (Foucault, 1988b). Since newly
emerging forms of (digital) self-quantification rely on a quantified self -
observation far more than earlier practices of self-observation (see for
instance diary writing), they seem to be a good case in point for the study
of new advances in quantification.
This is not to say that earlier instrumentations from the clinical gaze
to statistical classifications and incentive pay systems are not related
to subjectification processes and identity politics (see e.g. Espeland &
Stevens, 1998). Nevertheless, the new movement in self-quantification
indicates a considerable shift in agency. A growing part of the population
in western capitalist societies is beginning to engage in new practices of
quantified self-observation, thereby moving quantification beyond early
aspirations, for instance aspirations aimed at putting a value on humans’
competencies through marking (e.g. Hoskin & Macve, 1994).
From the measurement of sleep behaviour, physical and sexual activity,
the evaluation of changing moods and labour productivity to the sharing
of these data on the Internet, a wide range of calculative self-practices
have emerged, validating Miller’s (1992) early dictum that accounting
as a mode of governing is as much about the calculated, as the actively
calculating self. In this context, the Quantified Self movement (in the
following: QS) is the most commonly known network of self-trackers
and self-quantifiers. The official objective of QS “is to help people get
meaning out of their personal data” (http://quantifiedself.com/about/,
Accessed 16 July 2019). Patterns and orders of the self are to be discov-
ered, which hitherto have been hidden within the muddy waters of
everyday practice. Thereby, the self shall become aware of the hidden
undercurrents of everyday practice, precisely those regularities which are
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governing life without being visible for somebody living in a state of
unquestioned familiarity with oneself. The self is called to reconstruct
these undercurrents from the aggregated data obtained by systemati-
cally observing his or her everyday activities and whereabouts. Lupton
(2016, p. 49) rightfully notices that the normative literature about
self-quantification and self-tracking is above all pointing to the “eth-
ical responsibility to achieve this authentic self”, which “involves delving
beneath the surface in order to uncover the hidden desires, drives and
motivations that the psyche harbours”.
In a first approach, self-quantification can be understood as the attempt
to free ineffable corporeal experiences from the sphere of pre-reflexive
and pre-predicative knowledge by formally representing and articu-
lating them—in charts, numbers and algorithms, which can be shared,
compared, publicly discussed and, eventually, optimized. Therefore, self-
quantification presupposes the invention of specific taxonomies targeting
body and life: inner sensations bound up with the living body as well as
external circumstances and activities that have to be recorded and written
down in order to reflect and act upon them. What is more, it is not just
individual numbers and calculations that are thereby created. Individual
datasets can be, and actually are, linked to other people’s datasets, giving
birth to entire systems of calculation, or rather “taxonomies of the self”.
This chapter explores these taxonomies in the making drawing partic-
ular attention to the diversity of representational forms and moral conflicts
involved. Digging into exploratory variety, playfulness and ambiguities are
important in order not to misunderstand this emerging form of governing
the self as a ‘juridical’ form of power. For what makes power powerful:
[…] is simply the fact that it doesn’t only weigh on us as a force that says
no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms
knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive
network which runs through the whole social body, much more than as a
negative instance whose function is repression. (Foucault, 1980, pp. 118–
119)
Therefore, the chapter’s main focus is on the motives, practices and
desires as well as the emerging instrumentation in the field. Showing
how something as manifold, ambiguous and unique as the self might
have a specific empirical worth requires certain agreements about how
to measure and formally represent it, a process commonly dubbed as
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“commensuration” within the sociology of valuation and evaluation (see
Espeland & Stevens, 2008; Fourcade, 2011; Lamont, 2012). From here,
some general conclusions about self-quantification and contemporary
capitalism are drawn. In doing so, the chapter intends to keep a balance
between the economic, cultural and moral dimensions of quantifying
the self. This implies a theoretical approach, which is equally sensi-
tive to Foucauldian studies of accounting and governing as well as a
more practice-oriented approach related to the “sociology of critique”
(Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006 [1991]). In this respect, this chapter might
be considered an attempt to simultaneously apply exactly those two
research perspectives on quantification that are giving this volume its
theoretical appeal. We should not forget that the sociology of quantifi-
cation always had its roots in both sides of the Channel.
While British critical accounting research, from the 1980s onwards,
often followed a Foucauldian trajectory, French conventionalists were
simultaneously leaving Bourdieu and Foucault behind by highlighting
the practical capabilities of individual actors enmeshed in conventions
(Desrosières 2011; Diaz-Bone & Salais, 2011; Diaz-Bone & Didier,
2016; Thévenot in this volume). At the intersection of these two frame-
works, self-quantification emerges as a contemporary “institution of the
self”, not displacing but co-existing with established technologies of
the self, such as religious confession, therapeutic and psychoanalytic
approaches to identity and authenticity (Noji & Vormbusch, 2018).
Consequently, self-quantification is as much a reaction to economic uncer-
tainties and the ambiguities of individual worth as it is a cultural and
ethical revolution, offering new foundations for a self which is more or less
missing internal principles for action and orientation (see already Riesman,
1950).
While much research quite rightfully stresses the new potential for
surveillance that QS-tracking offers (Whitson, 2013) and draws attention
to accompanying forms of coercion, alienation and social-psychological
pathologies (e.g. King et al., 2018; Lupton, 2015, 2016; Rucken-
stein & Pantzar, 2017), it is also worthwhile to consider the ambiva-
lences, ambiguities and contradictions associated with the practice of
self-quantification. Sharon, for example, criticizes the polarized nature
of the debate about self-tracking for health and asks how following a
practice-based approach to self-tracking “can open up new spaces for
the enactment of solidarity” (Sharon, 2017, p. 117). Likewise, Nafus
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and Sherman (2014) stress the systematic tension between autonomy and
subordination within the Quantified-Self movement:
QS also does not escape the constructs of healthiness embodied in the
devices that they use, inasmuch as those are the dominant constructs with
which participants must wrestle. But wrestle they do. […] They interact
with algorithms not as blind, mindless dupes, but as active participants in a
dialogue that moves between data as an externalization of self and internal,
subjective, qualitative understandings of what the data means. (Nafus &
Sherman, 2014, p. 1793).
In this perspective, self-quantifiers, at least the early adopters within
the QS movement, are not uncritically adopting new technologies and
data. Instead, they appear to be capable and reflexive actors, deliberately
inventing and manipulating technology in order to explore who they are
and could become. This sheds light on a more general point highlighted
by Diaz-Bone and Didier (2016). Reconstructing the influence of Michel
Foucault on the sociology of quantification, they argue that Foucault “did
not see that there are actually different statistical techniques and that it
makes a difference. He linked statistics, all statistics, mainly to neoliberal
Governmentality” (Diaz-Bone & Didier, 2016, p. 15). Alain Desrosières,
to the contrary, was very aware “that different modes of quantification
are associated with different modes of government” (ibid.), meaning that
specific compromises regarding quantification, and thus “investment in
forms” (Thévenot, 1984), solidifying the quantitative opportunities as
well as related social power relations, would make a difference.
Corporeal Accounting
Within Immaterial Capitalism
The QS movement gained considerable public attention in the U.S. for
the first time around 2007. At that time, this movement could be called
a kind of “grassroots quantification” movement. Obviously, there must
have been more than just new technologies, such as mobile phones
and the Internet to let self-quantification as an assemblage of practices
unfold. Indeed, the emergence of self-quantification draws heavily on
long-established discourses, such as discourses on the “sovereign self”
(Miller, 1992) and liberal forms of governing (Foucault, 1981 [1976]),
on economic transformations, such as the emergence of the network
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economy and the rise and spread of self-employment, both closely linked
to new orders of justification, such as the “project city” (Boltanski
& Chiapello, 2007), and radical political reforms commonly dubbed
“neo-liberalism”, all of them preceding the QS movement by decades.
Therefore, to understand the emergence of self-quantification, we have
to take several interlinked processes into account.
Self-quantification is of great interest to the analysis of contemporary
capitalism, because it is in this context that the individuals themselves are
beginning to transform their body, their idiosyncrasies, their biographical
experiences and—particularly important—their imagined futures in terms
of quantified and comparable assets. By inventing the very categories and
technologies by which an individual’s manifoldness is made comparable
and measurable, self-quantification constitutes nevertheless an indetermi-
nate and malleable relay between the culture and economy of new forms
of capitalism, be it “flexible” (Sennett, 1998), “cognitive” (Boutang,
2012), “emotional” (Hochschild, 1983; Illouz, 2007; Neckel, 2005a,
2005b), “corporeal” (Moore & Robinson, 2016; Smith & Lee, 2015) or
“immaterial” (Vormbusch, 2008, 2009, 2012) capitalism. In these new
forms of capitalism, immaterial capabilities are the most relevant source
for competitiveness and profit, yet, there is still no agreement about
how to commensurate subjectivities, let alone reliable methods to empir-
ically measure and evaluate them. Both the economics of conventions as
well as actor-network theory (ANT) share the idea that such commen-
suration requires an active “investment in forms” (Thévenot, 1984) in
order to make things common and commensurable. Callon (1998, p. 6)
complements this point by asking:
In order to become calculative, agencies do indeed need to be equipped.
But this equipment is neither all in the brains of human beings nor all in
their socio-cultural frames or their institutions. What is it then?
For Callon, this equipment can be found in the prostheses rendering
actants into calculable and calculating agencies. Some of those pros-
theses equipping the modern self with calculative powers are outlined
later in this chapter. But actor-network theory’s assessment might be
judged unsatisfactory when it comes to the moral dimension of the “fin-
ishing process” by which humans are being made into subjects. If we
view contemporary capitalism not only as an economic system but as
a life-form, we have to take into account the moral conflicts that arise
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when human agency is being made up by powerful inscriptions, such as
new “taxonomies of the self” provided by practices of self-quantification.
Later, we will analyse these conflicts as moral conflicts, rather than merely
as conflicts of interest.
Examining the cultural significance of such “corporeal accounting”
(Vormbusch, 2015) goes beyond traditional approaches to the study of
accounting which have “largely focused on aspects of calculative prac-
tices subject to formal organization” (Vollmer et al., 2009, p. 2). It
mirrors Didier’s interest in “social spheres pretending to remain free from
numbers” and in presenting this as a myth no longer suitable within
modernity (see Didier’s contribution to this volume). In doing so, we
have to look for an accompanying shift in agency, since such practices
of valuation seem to rely (even) more on the active engagement of the
self than others. Whereas accounting in organizations has above all been
analysed in its subjectifying capacities (see e.g. Miller & O’Leary, 1994;
Mennicken & Miller, 2014), allowing formal organizations to control
and to mobilize subjectivity in their favour, self-quantification, at least at
its beginnings, has been driven by actors outside the context of formal
organization, in their life-world and in the public sphere. One of the
constitutive aspects of the QS movement, in particular, is its members’
belief in the empowering capacity of self-quantification. As far as I can see,
the claim of being recognized as unique as opposed to the way the self is
treated within established social institutions (health care is one frequently
cited example in this context) is fundamental for the QS movement,
leading to the movement’s critique of modern institutions as alienating,
dispassionate and overall inappropriate for the demands of highly individ-
ualized actors within late modernity. Consequently, measuring oneself as
being unique (“N=1” is one paramount element of discourse here, indi-
cating that the only relevant reference point for measurement should be
the individual) is one crucial promise within the QS movement.
In an unexpected turn in how quantification is regarded by the individ-
uals themselves, it no longer appears to be a threat to how individuality is
socially understood, constructed and experienced (such a critique would
be in line with classical critical theory). Rather than threatening the
integrity and incommensurability of the self, quantification is now warmly
embraced as its central source. But it may well turn out that applying
metrics to core attributes of one’s (and everybody else’s) self might as well
erode the uniqueness and incommensurability of those who are striving
for precisely that. The QS movement may just as well manifest itself as a
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governor’s dream: the dream in which subjects are striving to invent the
very categories by which they can be best sorted, managed, activated and
moulded in whatever way imaginable. In this sense, the QS may emerge
as an exceedingly malleable self; a self always falling short; an unsatisfied
self, striving for a better version of him—or herself through calculative
means. On the other hand, the subjects engaging in self-quantification are
motivated and mobilized by dreams that are just the reverse: namely to
evade dispassionate and distorting social institutions which are perceived
as being ignorant of and negating these subjects’ concrete individuality.
This chapter analyses practices of self-assessment and self-optimization,
which have previously been limited to small circles of “self-trackers”
and “self-quantifiers” and are currently gaining currency within wider
society, last not least, due to the increasing popularity of wearables, the
Internet of Things and an ever more digitally connected lifestyle. The
initial consideration for our empirical research was that self-quantifiers are,
above all, confronted and required to cope with new forms of economic
and cultural uncertainty—two fundamental traits of contemporary capi-
talism.1 Coping with uncertainty in this context means the calculative
quest for discovering the very categories by which the plurality of indi-
vidual skills and capabilities as well as the plurality of the cultural forms of
living can be inscribed into common registers of worth, thereby offering
a specific answer to the complexities and ambiguities of life in late moder-
nity (Vormbusch, 2016). The chapter seeks to shed light on some of
the contradictions and ambivalences of these new taxonomies of the self:
on the one hand, self-inspection through self-quantification might offer
new possibilities for self-knowledge, control and emancipation, and could
therefore be considered as a form of “enabling accounting”. On the
other hand, self-quantification threatens to subjugate ever more aspects
of individual life by extending instrumental rationality to hitherto incom-
mensurable and incalculable entities: the living body, the self, emotions
and desires.
Calculation and the Living Body
It is not the first time that the body becomes the focus of technolo-
gies of the self. Social forces acting upon and through the body are
evident at least since the works of Norbert Elias, Michel Foucault and
Pierre Bourdieu. In a nutshell, notions of the “civilized body” (Elias),
the “disciplined body” (Foucault) or the “body as capital” (Bourdieu)
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highlight its relevance within historically variable regimes of social domi-
nation. In contrast, in early phenomenological thought (Merleau-Ponty,
1962) the “living” or “fleshly” body as belonging exclusively to oneself
was perceived to be the only possible approach to the world. Here, the
analytical priority is shifted from the body as product and mediator of
social practices to the body as the only possible foundation of perception
and action. The living body relates my-self to everybody and everything
else, and simultaneously discerns my-self from everybody else, it is “my
point of view upon the world” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 70). It is due
to my living body that every possible experience in the world is related
to my specific position within this world. The living body is the origi-
nator for any possible lived experience and remembrance. It is actively
performing, processing and shaping our experiences. In phenomenology
the living body is the unavoidable precondition of self-perception as well
as the perception of others (Alloa et al., 2012).
Obviously, there is a strong contrast between the concepts of the
living body and embodied experience, on the one hand, and the domi-
nant view of calculation as an objectified body of knowledge, on the
other. Quantification is intimately related to the instrumental domina-
tion of nature and the social world, an observation, which Adorno and
Horkheimer (2002 [1944]), drawing on Max Weber, pointedly expressed,
and which was later reformulated by poststructuralism. The opposite pole
of possible experiential reality represents—at least within the phenomeno-
logical school of thought—our living body as “the bearer of the zero
point of orientation”, as a fundamental way of being in the world. In this
perspective, the living body, as the mediator of every possible percep-
tion, is impossible to objectify. It cannot be measured and calculated
in the same way that other “things” are being measured—not without
losing its inherent qualities as an experiencing and experienced living
body. The differentiation between “being a living body” and “having a
body” (Plessner, 1970) therefore points to the limits of social rationaliza-
tion. That which cannot be measured, which is always something unique
and incommensurable, cannot become the object of formal optimization
and instrumental rationality. At least not until now. The current explo-
sion of technically mediated practices of self-quantification points to the
historical variability of such a differentiation. It reveals that the distinc-
tion between body and living body is nothing ontological as in classical
phenomenology, but socially malleable.
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Whereas phenomenological thought is built upon the idea that no
cognitive representations are possible without the living body actively
performing affects, postures and body-environment schemes, the QS
movement seems to rely on calculative forms objectively representing the
body as a system of determinants. Whereas phenomenological thought
regards inner sensations such as emotions, pain and hunger as being
without extension, even without any dimension (Schmitz, 2009, p. 71),
in the field of QS, measures and measurement procedures are invented
for recording, articulating and “writing” them. What has been enclosed
within the body shall be formally represented and made operable. But
a multitude of transformations must be performed before these can be
attributed to the living body. Keeping this in mind and referring back
to the seminal works of Elias, Foucault and Bourdieu, the key question
that arises is how such a “calculated living body” (a contradiction in itself
from a phenomenological point of view) can be brought into existence
at all; and how it is related to forms of governing within contempo-
rary society. In what ways is the calculation of the living body making
up specific subjects? And, conversely, what does this tell us about our
contemporary societies?
The Quantified Self
The QS movement is a global network of self-trackers, self-quantifiers,
entrepreneurs, developers and users of mobile and internet-based tech-
nologies of self-inspection. It consists of individuals, collective meetings,
websites for comparing data and developing metrics, small start-ups and
big corporate players from the telecommunications, sports and health
industries. It also consists of specific objects that are shaped and intro-
duced into the field by various actors. These objects include material
devices, such as mobile phones and wearable sensors and computers, as
well as immaterial objects, such as algorithms, apps, and data connections.
The self-ascribed motto within the field reads “self-knowledge through
numbers” (http://quantifiedself.com/about/, Accessed 16 July 2019).
By systematically quantifying their self-observations, individual users
are striving for new insights regarding their bodily, mental, psycholog-
ical or social status. This includes health data, food records, records of
emotional ups and downs, including depressive episodes, sleep behaviour,
digestive and sexual habits, the menstrual cycle as well as everyday
patterns of movements and whereabouts more generally. Through
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measurement, the quantified self is exploring his or her possibilities
in new ways, opening up new perspectives on who one could be and
how to get there: thus, the quantified self is, at least to a large extent,
an epistemic self (Noji & Vormbusch, 2018). QS meet-ups are region-
ally concentrated in western capitalist metropoles (located in the U.S.,
Western Europe, Australia and New Zealand). Its protagonists—based
on our observations, since no reliable data exist—often share a similar
educational background and habitus (they are academically educated,
technologically apt, prevailingly male, in their twenties and thirties).
Whereas the latest numbers show the active membership of QS (as
a social movement and a community of practice) to be somewhere
around 40,000 people worldwide, market surveys, such as the study by
Grieger (2016), conclude that about 21% of the population in Germany
is tracking at least one aspect of their lives on a regular basis. Whereas
the latter figure might exaggerate the actual extent of the phenomenon,
the first figure is equally misleading, because the social relevance of self-
quantification reaches far beyond the inner circle of expert users who
actively participate in a global community and who were the primary
target group of our research.
Two aspects must be considered here: first, the social relevance of
QS is not based on its widespread incidence, but on its character as a
global laboratory for inventing new lifestyles and forms of ethics based
on technologies and new taxonomies to live them. QS reflects as well as
transcends contemporary capitalism by criticizing it. In this sense, today’s
practices of self-quantification might very well echo the metamorphosis
of the Parisian Bohemia at the turn of the century: once despised by
bourgeois morality, nowadays a blueprint for the “new spirit of capital-
ism” (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2007). Second, and directly associated with
this, we can already observe a profound transformation of QS from an
early “community of practice” (Wenger, 1998) to a mass-market popu-
lated by consumers, start-ups and the giant enterprises of the consumer,
sports, and telecommunication industries. Self-quantification is on its way
to becoming a constitutive part of the digital economy. This latest devel-
opment is not the focus of this chapter; rather, it is the invention of the
taxonomies that preceded it.
For QS-activists, quantification is their method of choice to unveil
the undercurrents of corporeal experience and everyday practice. Florian
Schumacher, one of the protagonists within the QS movement in
Germany, summarizes the main aspects as follows:
108 U. VORMBUSCH
We are prevented from monitoring ourselves in a neutral way by
protective mechanisms which evolved in the course of our evolution.
Therefore, keeping a record of themselves serves for many people
the purpose of observing changes or maintaining the motivation to
achieve self-defined goals. The externalization of relevant information
and its impact on our awareness evolves into a sixth sense allowing
us to discover things lying hidden. (Interview with Die Welt, 12
October 2013, see http://www.welt.de/gesundheit/article120826726/
Ein-sechster-Sinn-um-Verborgenes-zu-erkennen.html, translated by the
author)
This is how one of our interviewees put it:
[…] Having the feedback cycle was really important. Having something to
indicate you are stressed at the exact moment when my body was feeling
stressed allowed me to see and make connections that I was never able to
make before.
Making intangible emotional states visible (“allowed me to see”) which
are normally hidden to the self implies performative effects, meaning that
the represented feeling may to a certain degree be an effect of the repre-
sentational device or procedures themselves. This is suggested by the
following quote from another interviewee, although this chapter will not
elaborate on the discussion of performativity any further (but see Callon,
1998):
What I really need is a stress alert system. I need something to tell me
when I’m feeling stressed. […] Another thing that was pretty neat about
setting up the stress alert system is: I started to learn how my body felt
when that light was red.
Self-Quantification relies on technical artefacts, such as activity wrist-
bands, body sensors, smartphones and internet-based diagnosis algo-
rithms. Particularly within sports, the hardware sales of sensors, “smart”
(connected) shoes, are on their way to becoming mass-market prod-
ucts and most producers are trying to establish a proprietary world of
experience around this form of “connected sport” (see e.g. Nikeplus).
Increasingly, practices of self-quantification are affiliated with gamifica-
tion applications—partly to address motivational issues, partly in the
course of establishing new products and markets. Some observers point
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to the close relation between gamification applications and surveillance
(Whitson, 2013). The integration of self-quantification into larger systems
marks a clear break with the original intentions of QS, which surfaced as
a form of reflexive monitoring of the self with the objective of healing
oneself from chronic diseases and obtaining knowledge about one’s own
emotions and activities. From the beginning, one of the main topics of
the QS movement was the care for the self and the living body.
A large number of the show-and-tell presentations on the global
as well as local QS-conferences (https://quantifiedself.com/show-and-
tell/) give an account of how people were experiencing long-term
suffering without their suffering being institutionally recognized, let alone
cured within the established medical system. QS at this stage represented
an effort to radically switch from the established procedures of being
classified and observed as an object within conventional medicine, where
corporeal experiences are residuals or even disturbing variables to techni-
cally mediated practices of observation and treatment. The QS presenters,
in this context, report healing from diseases commonly considered incur-
able, such as Crohn’s disease. These healings are attributed to an often
makeshift kind of self-observation based on numbers and quantification,
leading to self-medication and radical redirection of nutrition and other
living habits. From a rigorous methodological viewpoint, we are talking
not about “big” but rather “dirty data” here: often there is no consis-
tent control of how data are obtained and processed leading to a lack of
validity and reliability and a kind of “makeshift-quantification”. Never-
theless, these achievements have led to a systematic critique of how
people are treated within the established medical systems and to increased
calls for including personalized data into the diagnostic process as well
as medical treatment (see for example http://quantifiedself.com/2012/
04/talking-data-with-your-doc-the-doctors/).
The perceived objectivity and neutrality of calculation (Miller, 1992)
as opposed to ineffable corporeal states play an important, even if not
uncontested, role in this context:
And to comprehend myself […] you can no longer trust yourself; there
actually are so many scientific studies such as the Dunning-Kruger-effect
from 1999, proving […] you are having a systematic bias when assessing
yourself. That is, one cannot rely on one’s feeling any more in different
cases. […] For me, it is beside my subjective sense, I am interested in
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an objective perception toward myself, namely facts. There are quantifi-
able values and I can compare them and I can interpret and judge this
completely decoupled from my personal feeling.
Various aspects of what Boltanski and Chiapello (2007) called the
“New Spirit of Capitalism”—for instance, autonomy, authenticity, self-
realization and networking—are pronounced characteristics of the field.
QS in this respect may well be interpreted as being related to a “net-
worked capitalism” built upon flexible networks of auto-entrepreneurs,
who are competing and cooperating simultaneously. It is tied up with
specific practices of making oneself visible through the web-based sharing
of personal, intimate and performance data. It represents a field, which
when encompassing the “community of early adopters” had the charac-
teristics of a pioneering network. Meanwhile, there has been an intensified
collaboration between users and developers of such self-quantifying tech-
nologies. Start-ups, industrial conglomerates and transnationals such as
Google, Apple and the likes are investing and building networks in order
to create new products and markets, thereby transforming the field.
In the following, we will describe the new taxonomies that are
emerging, linking corporeal action and bodily enclosed experiences to
accounting procedures. Thereby, the living body as the sensually given,
pivotal point of being within the world (Merleau-Ponty, 1962) is being
(re)framed and transformed.
Well-Being, Performance and Emotions as Core
Issues of Leibschreiben (Writing the Body)
How is self-tracking actually performed and what effects does it have
on individuals’ self-perceptions? In stark contrast to the natural sciences,
particularly medical science, the emerging forms of representing the self
are to a considerable degree produced by lay actors outside of formal
organizations.2 The emergence of innovative bodynotations3 indicates an
entirely new operative scripture for writing the body. We are calling these
emerging forms of representing the body Leibschreiben (Vormbusch &
Kappler, 2018), hereby adapting the basic idea of accounting as a “writing
of value” (Hoskin & Macve, 1986) to a certain degree. Alas, within post-
structuralist accounting research a resilient concept of the embodied self
as well as a concept of human reflexivity is lacking. Unlike poststruc-
turalism, our approach tries to account for both: the sensations of the
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living body as experienced by concrete individuals, on the one hand, and
the emergence of an operative scripture as a form of writing the body
related to social discourses, on the other hand. Furthermore, the justi-
fication practices constitutive of the actors involved are regarded as a
missing link between these two levels of analysis, necessarily preceding
the establishment and institutionalization of any operative scripture.
The Foucauldian strand of accounting research (for an overview see
Roslender, 1992) investigated how established forms of reading and
writing underwent fundamental transformations from the twelfth century
onwards. Double-entry bookkeeping in this regard represented one
major manifestation of the transformation of writing more generally;
more specifically, it represented the “capital form of writing” (Hoskin
& Macve, 1986). If we consider accounting as a specific technology
within the broader transformation of writing and representing, then self-
quantification can be regarded as one form of accounting for the self, as a
form of “writing the self”, reflecting the above-mentioned changes within
contemporary capitalism.
Empirically, there is a wide variety of motives, techniques, programmes,
apps, suppliers and objects assembled in the field. We encountered
people who are measuring nutrition, physical activity and sleep, depressive
periods as well as all kinds of emotional sensations they had throughout
the day, some of them tracking their dreams, some of them stressing
the importance of sharing their data, some opposing exactly this. As can
be expected, there is a fishbowl of narratives, from the empowerment
discourse (health as a personal “activity” and a “competence”) to the new
spirit of capitalism (sharing data to “connect to people”; sharing as the
“new normal” of a new imagined society). In a first step of our analysis
at least three distinct discursive and practice-fields within QS emerged:
well-being, performance, and emotions (see Kappler & Vormbusch, 2014;
Vormbusch & Kappler, 2018).
Well-being refers to the very beginnings of the QS-movement and
smoothly connects to contemporary discourses of patient empowerment,
public health and, more generally, the “wellness syndrome” (Cederström
& Spicer, 2015; Davies, 2015). Many early self-quantifiers were person-
ally affected by chronic diseases, and the public presentation and sharing
of their experiences and calculative cure still is a much-appreciated part
of every QS gathering. A fundamental critique towards the established
medical institutions, types of treatment and forms of knowledge (as expert
knowledge distinct from the lived experiences and circumstances of sick
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people) went along with this. One of the main triggers underlying the
movement therefore was a specific approach towards the “care of the self”
(Foucault, 1988a) and the search for self-determined ways of healing on
the basis of buried linkages between everyday practices and experiences,
on the one hand, and the evolution of one’s illness, on the other.
The second dimension, performance, refers to the ongoing transfor-
mation of work, particularly the “delimitation of work” within neoliberal
work regimes, its deregulation and subjectification (Bröckling, 2002;
Pongratz & Voß, 2003). From this point of view, quantifying the self
might be interpreted as a form of subjectifying self-improvement of indi-
vidual capabilities and human assets with regards to the market and
the unrestrained performance requirements that exist within organiza-
tions and markets. In this dimension, self-quantifiers are exploring in
what specific ways their capabilities might conform to market demands,
including moulding themselves with regard to these perceived demands.
Critics of these developments have argued that such a delimitation of
work is associated with pathological forms of character formation within
late modernity, with a tendency of getting “lost in perfection” (King et al.,
2018).
The third dimension, emotions , refers to several processes within the
social world which have been labelled either in terms of a shift of values
from material to “postmodern” immaterial values, such as autonomy,
self-realization and participation (Inglehart, 1971), or in terms of an
“experience society” (Schulze, 1995), or in reference to the “commercial-
ization” of emotions within emotional work (Hochschild, 1983). Neckel
(2005b) argues that the modern subject is engaged in a specific form
of boundary work caught up between conflicting social requirements:
“social discipline”, on the one hand, and “social informalization”, on
the other. Within the field of QS, emotions are not only an important
reference point for increased self-awareness, but also a central element
in self-presentations (“show and tell!”). Within contemporary capitalism,
the awareness and management of emotions has become a major part of
these subjects’ cultural capital.
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The Emerging Taxonomies of the Self
Inventing Representational Forms
Self-quantifiers are exploring a wide variety of different techniques,
representational formats and devices for rendering their selves visible,
comparable and manageable. These include narrative formats, such as
diaries shared on the web, fully manual or semi-automated forms of
measurement and personal feedback, ordinal and metric measures, formal
representations and artistically interpreted data (such as graphs4 or even
paintings based on aggregated calculations). In particular, emotions are
crucial for self-quantifiers, but only loosely coupled to conventions of how
to formally represent them. In contrast to the established fields of writing
value (corporate reporting, state statistics, bookkeeping, accounting) the
representational forms in the field of Leibschreiben are still variable,
malleable and non-standardized.
This is why apps such as Mood Track Diary, T2 Mood Tracker or Worry
Watch, all of them easily available on Google Play Store or iTunes, are
using quite different ways of “writing” emotions, some of them relying
more on graphs, some on colour, some emphasizing the particular context
in which specific emotions occur. Currently, the writing of emotions
still relies on highly experimental networks of objects, calculations, visu-
alizations and narrations. Following a social-constructivist approach to
technology studies (Bijker et al., 1987), we can see that there are quite
a lot of social groups participating in the creation of relevant techniques,
and there is an equally high interpretative flexibility with regard to these
techniques and the objectives of measuring. Similarly, one can also see
a wide range of representational practices—starting with simple excel-
sheets through the very popular diet apps right up to sophisticated apps
demanding agency of their own as to whether and when the human actor
is to give data input. In the latter case, the shift in agency from the human
subject to internet-based applications is justified by two objectives: first,
the elimination of subjective distortions during measuring (particularly a
tendency of “measuring only when feeling good”), second, an increase in
convenience and a resulting perpetuation of the individuals’ motivation
for measuring in the course of everyday life.
For example, the application mood 24/7 (https://www.mood247.
com) requires a periodical input of how a person feels by sending him
or her an automated message as a call to action, inquiring: “On a scale of
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1 to 10 what was your average mood today?” The accumulated longitu-
dinal data are then visualized in a chart which can be shared with other
users as well as medical doctors (mood 24/7 was initially developed in
the context of the treatment of depression). Therefore, the application is
serving the two-fold goal of objectifying data as well as furthering perpet-
uation by shifting agency towards the device. Similarly, but more detailed,
the application Track Your Happiness (https://www.trackyourhappiness.
org/) is sending different questions several times a day. Preferably, the
individual shall answer to these at once:
[…] so you get a text and then you go to a little app on the phone and
there you have a slider board, with a zero to hundred happiness scale. And
then usually they start off with how happy you are, and then it lasts until
you answered a series of additional questions. Questions like whether you
are inside or not, whether you have to do something, or you want to do
it, your actual activity on what you are doing, we have a lot of categories,
and then and so on. And so, you do it fifty times now, and you set the
parameter to about three or four times a day, minimum. And you are
supposed to go through that as responsibly as possible.
Apps such as Mood 24/7 or Track Your Happiness are trying to objec-
tify the measurement of mood and emotions by putting the app in control
of the time of measurement and by standardizing stimulus and response.
Thereby, the measurement of mood shall be made independent of the
mood of the responding person and the context in which this person
is located at the time of measurement. But objectification and better
comparability have downsides as well:
I was planning to get rid of all the stuff because I am working and
this programme pops up and I think "aaaawww", sometimes I am really
annoyed by my own programme, yeah, so sometimes I don’t mind and
sometimes when you are really into something, but sometimes, if I do not
feel like, I don’t fill it in.
The obvious problem is that the average answer’s quality deteriorates
depending on whether the situation seems inappropriate for giving input
(such as having lunch with colleagues) or the subject “not feeling like
it”. As a consequence, devices automatically measuring the emotional
state are being developed, such as the FaceReader (http://www.noldus.
com/human-behavior-research/products/facereader). The FaceReader is
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able to “read” and subsequently write facial expressions using seven
basic emotional states. The current combination of these emotional
states is entered into a two-dimensional grid, wherein the horizontal
axis represents a continuum of emotional valuing, running from pleasant
to unpleasant, whereas the vertical axis represents an activity dimension
(active to inactive).
Generally, there is substantial disagreement in the field about how to
represent the hidden inner state of emotional affairs, hitherto inaccessible
to standardized measuring and quantification. The applied representa-
tional forms vary to a great degree, combining elements of text with
numbers and graphs. The respective advantages and disadvantages are the
topic of controversial discussion. Sticking to the topic of emotions, here is
a quote from a self-quantifier trying to measure “happiness” and writing
a kind of fortune diary which he shares with others on the web:
[…] I also feel very reductionist if I would do it by numbers, so if I would
score it. So I am just curious if other people have experiences with things
that are a bit more elaborated than a number, but not as free flow as words
or things.
The structure does not help you with emotions, because it is a structure,
you do not need a structure but a flow.
In contrast to institutionalized fields of measuring, the absence of a
structure is seen here as an advantage for measuring happiness. On the
one hand, there obviously is a reluctance to “score” emotions; on the
other hand, the interviewee is looking for a kind of middle ground: repre-
sentational formats not as free as the “free flow of words”, but “more
elaborated than a number”. On the one hand, self-quantifiers are striving
for formal knowledge about their emotional experiences and quite often
mistrust their own emotional sensations; on the other hand, some of them
feel reluctant to formalize it too rigidly. Whatever they are experiencing,
it should not be “reduced” or corrupted by the use of numbers. Analyti-
cally, emotions within cultural capitalism have to be rationally cultivated.
From a participant’s perspective, they shall not be simply subsumed to the
logic and rigidity of measurement and thereby stripped of their complexity
and richness. Such contradictions are well known from other fields of
measuring, but they are more pronounced and more difficult to address
when it comes to measuring inner state of affairs of the living body which
have neither dimension nor extension.
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Fortune diaries are another, more text-based approach for representing
experiences and emotions. They can be shared via twitter, Facebook or
other social media, thereby adding new possibilities of ordering and repre-
senting emotions, such as peak moments of happiness or sadness, which
are built into the respective platforms:
[…] then wound up with a lot of private twitter accounts, that has kind of
become the closest thing I am doing to journaling now. [...] I had it since
spring 2008 and I was doing a twitter study, and I had this whole archive
and it was really interesting because the things in the sidebar contains all
the years and stuff, it has got little bars of how many tweets there were in
each month, and the peaks were [...] when something really sudden was
about to happen [...]. And the other peaks were like things that were awful
and very sad [...]. And the peaks were when it worsened and when there
were changes. And so there is this weird thing it ended up with being
a very graphy, mood graph thing, I didn’t realize that I was creating it
as I did it. It just came out of my user statistics, and it came out of my
journaling.
Sometimes, new and innovative forms of representing emotions
emerge as an unintended bricolage, composed of different actor-actants
(in this case, the user and twitter as a platform providing a graphic repre-
sentation that was not initially directed towards emotions) and different
symbolic systems (narrations as well as graphical representations for the
measurement of “peaks” and “changes”). One could argue that QS as
a network of post-traditional communities (Hitzler et al., 2008) explores
possible ways of measuring and writing health, happiness and performance
and thereby forms a global laboratory for doing so. Currently, the most
common level of quantification for writing happiness is the use of ordinal
scales. Often, for this purpose not only numbers are used, rather these
are supplemented by graphical symbols and emoticons such as smileys
or visual arguments such as colouration (indicating specific feelings such
as red for warmth and tenderness, etc.). The following quote demon-
strates that the use of these symbols should not be reduced to a mere
assisting function. Quite to the contrary, they are a key means for the
inner approval of feelings:
[…] and then I have this slider, which goes from zero to... I think it is
actually divided in the middle, so you get five points to the left and then
that is the best mood, for example, and to the right, and it is a good
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mood. And I also have this little smiley feedback. So, I put the slider and
then I can see the smiley and [it] helps me to adjust, I think "No, not
that happy, or...", you know, so that gives me kind of feedback to see, if
I scored right on the scale. […] it is just on the continuum happy versus
not happy.
Above all, the visualization of an emotion (the smiley) can evoke a
sense of coherence between measurement and corporeal experience. In
this case, a culturally codified symbol of feeling is serving as a medi-
ator between the inner state of affairs and a metric scale, bridging the
missing points of contact between these two. Obviously, this is pointing to
questions regarding the epistemological relations between ordinal/metric
values and iconic representations (“…No, not that happy”) as being
built into the programme and thereby decontextualized and fixed. While
the contribution of formal representations such as graphs and icons to
the production of knowledge is an important strand of research within
the field of science and technology studies (Jones & Galison, 1998;
Latour, 1998; Lynch & Woolgar, 1988), the relationship between formal
representations and emotions has not yet been equally explored.
Moral Conflicts in Quantifying the Self
The tentative exploration of the self within QS involves deep moral uncer-
tainties. Drawing on an example of a woman trying to quantify her baby’s
well-being, the ethical cleavages of self-quantification become apparent.
Not entirely convinced by the belief held by some quantifiers that corpo-
real knowledge compared to quantified metrics should be regarded as
inferior knowledge, this person is in an inextricable conflict. She is in
deep worry for her baby. She is worried that he might not be sleeping
enough (“He must sleep more and that is why I am using this app”).
She is worried that she might not be there for him sufficiently (“that he
is not getting enough of me”). And she is worried that he may not get
enough food (“and when he slept in the meantime, then I know that
it CANNOT BE hunger”). Therefore, she began using Babytracker, an
application that can be downloaded via itunes. Babytracker is marketed
for “busy parents” allowing them to “track everything from your baby’s
last feeding to that first smile”. Parents get various screens showing a
summary of events and activities directed toward the baby, in addition
to several further screens with personal analytics regarding sleeping and
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feeding patterns, time-weight graphs, etc., including the possibility to
share these data with other parents either via a company-run database
or other cloud solutions like Dropbox or iCloud.
Being aware of her concerns, the mother is trying to calm herself
down by saying: “Children are self-adjusting somehow”. She qualifies her
quantifying of the baby quite drastically:
Such an app is the exact opposite. It is not ‘live and let live’, trusting
that things are just fine and that he will be sleeping and that he is getting
enough of me in any case, but it [using the app, added] is above all to
control.
Later in the interview she adds:
In the end everything is getting much more complicated [by measuring
it, added]. And much more stressful and it doesn’t help you at all. And
therefore ... because it gives you the impression you can control it … but
a baby’s sleep cannot be controlled.
Despite this latter statement the interviewee continues to give her account
about how she is feeling by saying:
And I hope that when having another baby, I think I will use this [the app,
added] definitely again, because there have always been those moments
when I was feeling helpless.
On the one hand, the interviewee is acknowledging a baby’s general
self-sufficient condition by expressing that “a baby’s sleep cannot be
controlled”. With these words, she is referring not only to her child but
rather to any baby’s sleep or even more to the point: she is referring
first and foremost to “any baby’s sleep” and this should at least in theory
include her own. On the other hand, she is drawn to the suggestion of
control implied by measuring when saying:
Data really help next to nothing. It’s above all to know, okay, I am in
control now and for example, okay, he isn’t sleeping throughout the night
anymore and he isn’t sleeping enough during the day either … now I am
going to take some steps … yes there is an idea, my plan has just begun
… He must sleep more and that is why I am using this app.
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On the one hand, the self-sufficient condition of babies and their prac-
tical routines do have a major moral significance for the interviewee. Her
statement “a baby’s sleep cannot be controlled” does not only tell the
obvious; it is not only an observation of a baby’s external condition and
behaviours. It is also a moral statement about how things ought to be
in general. That is why she is not addressing her own baby here, but
rather every baby in the world. Her firm belief points to a state of affairs
that should normally not be touched. On the other hand, her troubles
caused by not being able to control what is going on are strong enough
to override this feeling and to insert a new kind of device into the situa-
tion by measuring, thereby scraping the incommensurability (Espeland &
Stevens, 1998) of her baby and her baby’s sleep.
Obviously, this is not to say that she does not love her baby as a
unique being and hers. But in the course of quantifying new possibil-
ities for evaluating her baby in comparison with other babies (whose
parents are also using Babytracker or similar devices) emerge, for example
assessing his sleep, food intake, and attention. In this, as well as in the
case of measuring moods, moral conflicts about if, when and how to
measure qualities hitherto unquantified are emerging. The reluctance to
score emotions (to “feel very reductionist if I would do it by numbers”,
see above) and the fear to corrupt one’s authentic corporeal sensations as
well as the anxiety to interfere with the autonomy of other living beings
(as in the last case) are exemplary for what is at stake here. Drawing
a line between commensuration and the still incommensurable for self-
quantifiers in some crucial areas therefore arises not only as a technical
problem, but rather as an everyday moral challenge.
Quantifying Performance: Alternative Measures, Rational Planning
and the Deficiency of Corporeal Sensations
Another example draws on the quantification experiments of a passionate
triathlete and is situated in the field of performance. Here, we find
a variety of measures regarding physical performance. Moreover, this
example shows the relationship of these key performance indicators
with strategies for not only performing, but rather rationalizing sports
performances, in this case triathlon:
And this is interesting with triathlon. There is … sounds a little casual, but
if you know this threshold value and the distance, you can just as well say,
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I am having a Watt-device here. I am adjusting as if having an autopilot. I
would like to wind this exact capacity, then you simply wind one, two or
five hours this capacity and you know that you are not losing too much
power to reasonably finish the competition.
In a previous section of the interview, the interviewee already char-
acterized the taking of his pulse as being much too imprecise for his
purposes. Unlike taking your pulse, Watt values can simply and directly be
recorded at the bicycle’s spindle. In contrast to the generally delayed pulse
values, Watt measurement therefore results in a kind of “instant feed-
back”. In combination with the given distance it is possible to perform
cycling as if being on “autopilot”. It is only so that he can “reasonably
finish the competition”. Even more than the Watt-value, another perfor-
mance indicator (VO2max) is allowing him to measure his physical fitness
comprehensively and to make projections, thereby introducing notions of
the time value of performance:
And what it [a ‘smart’ running watch from one of the main manufacturers,
added] also can do, it aggregates everything I do into one measure or key
performance indicator, one KPI and this is the VO2max. This means okay
how much oxygen can my body process per minute and per kilogram, and
this really is the core measure for performance in the field of running.
And what is really cool, you are provided with projections, straight from
the watch: okay, how fast can I run this Marathon now and this is quite
precise. … Thus, how fast I can run is depending on my lung volume.
To summarize, the interviewee is objectifying his bodily experiences
and his sense of effort by framing it, firstly, in terms of the expended Watt-
value during a competition, which, secondly, relies on VO2max as the key
performance indicator aggregating relevant parameters into one master-
measure. This objectified bodily experience is the basis for the reframing
of the body as a rational and improvable machine and for the development
of related rationalization and optimization strategies.
In the following example, another notion commonly held by self-
quantifiers becomes apparent: the notion of the deficiency of embodied
experience.
What really is absolutely interesting: when I wake up in the morning and
I feel absolutely whacked and I am about to give up and get me a sick
leave, I don’t feel like working and I don’t feel like anything. Then the
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device says I shall really take off today and then I am stepping outside and
start running and really after some rounds I realize: This is really going to
work, the body is really there. But the mind is saying otherwise.
Similar to the above sketched experimental forms of representing
emotions, the performative capacity of representing the inner state of
bodily affairs is obvious: only by “doing otherwise”, that is by ignoring
the sensations of his living body, the interviewee arrives at a state of
affairs in accordance with the performance projections based on the
measurement and evaluation of the collected data. Here, a second line of
transformation of inner sensations by calculative means is observable; one
that has been discussed above and concerns the translation of inner sensa-
tions into numbers and figures in order to formally represent them: the
emphasis was on finding adequate, that is at the same time “exact” as well
as “rich” and therefore necessarily blurry, indicators for bodily sensations.
In the case just discussed the approach is shifting towards an “objectifica-
tion” by framing the emotional state with the help of calculations which
are then taken for granted. At the very least, these calculations are being
given more credibility than the interviewee’s experienced feelings. The
interviewee is following an attitude quite popular with self-quantifiers:
that numbers and data are “true” in a deeper way than bodily sensations
and feelings. This is also expressed by another interviewee:
There is a measurable value and I can compare this value and I can interpret
and assess this value completely decoupled from my personal feelings.
Such a fundamental “trust in numbers” (Porter, 1995) corresponds
with the feeling that “sometimes my body is playing a trick on me”. This
way, bodily sensations are framed as uncertain and unreliable–in contrast
to the capacity of calculations to unequivocally represent and project the
true state of affairs. Obviously, there is a great potential for alienation
here: the starting point is not to delicately draw out how to translate inner
sensations without corrupting them (as in the case of mood tracking),
but rather to accredit to numbers and calculations a higher significance
when it comes to the most intimate thing humans are made of: their
living body. Admittedly, this rather orthodox approach relying on the
“mechanical objectivity” of numbers and calculations (Daston & Galison,
2007) is not uncontested within the self-tracking community.
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Conclusions
It is not at all by chance that new forms of calculating and valuing
the self are emerging today. Rather, it can be considered a response to
the experience of an increasing uncertainty in the culture and economy
of advanced capitalist societies. Quantifying the self is as much about
the self as a subject competing in markets, as it is about the cultural
indeterminacy of today’s forms of living. Both aspects are nourishing a
comprehensive incertitude. Almost a century ago, Frank Knight (1964
[1921])—assuming that in a dynamic economy there is a great deal
of imperfect knowledge of the future–distinguished between “risk” and
“uncertainty”. The former he reserved for situations where the prob-
abilities for specific outcomes are, at least in principle, calculable. The
latter describes “true uncertainty” within settings “not susceptible to
measurement” (Knight 1964 [1921], p. 232). Knight, as an economist,
believed that only true uncertainty “accounts for the peculiar income
of the entrepreneur” (ibid.). Today, in a world where the realm of the
calculable and the realm of the incalculable are simultaneously expanding,
true uncertainty spreads, not only “ontologically”, but empirically. Lifted
into public consciousness with the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the
2008 world financial crisis more recently, it might even be the most
fundamental experience for a significant fraction of today’s global popu-
lation, forming their relation to the world, contributing to the rise of
anti-modernist movements and political parties, thereby posing existen-
tial threats to democratic governing. Against this backdrop, quantifying
your self seems to promise one possible answer to the challenges humans
are facing today. It is not a random one, but one connecting the social
incertitude triggered by Knightean “true uncertainty” with the calculative
means provided by classical modernity.
Cultural uncertainty, to be more exact, is related to the principal
openness and plurality of forms of living that require ongoing assessments
with regard to who I am. Rosa (2016, p. 43) argues that individuals
are not able to determine the inner core of their identity, since it has
always been elusive. This seems to be even more so under the condi-
tions of an accelerated, permanently shifting modernity. Paradoxically,
these ever-shifting conditions solidify into a fairly constant pressure to
carve out an authentic and socially recognizable identity. Consequently,
we are observing a kind of identity squeeze: the more the foundations
4 ACCOUNTING FOR WHO … 123
of a robust identity erode, the more the subjects are occupied with the
conditions for establishing it. On “slippery slopes” (Rosa, 2016, p. 691)
the self is confronted with the urge not only to be oneself (that is, to be
authentic), but also to discover ever more—fundamental and hidden—
aspects of oneself in order to carve out what is essential and valuable
about oneself.
Thévenot (in this volume) points out that calculation is about
the “linkage between counting and counting on”. In this sense self-
quantification is about the individuals’ concerns about what is left to
count on when external pillars of the self are deteriorating. Obviously,
it is less about what can be found as about how the inner pillars of the
self can be negotiated and stabilized. It is about establishing a calcula-
tive truth about oneself which is only true in relation to a world which
itself is constituted by numbers (see Salais, 2012, pp. 58–60, on the posi-
tion of a constructivist realism). Therefore, QS can be seen as a datafied
and technically mediated exploration process, whereby individuals try
to give meaning to their life under the condition of losing touch with
what Berger and Luckmann (1967) called a “natural attitude” towards
themselves.
In exactly this sense, self-quantification represents a historically novel
“institution of the self” (Hahn, 1982; Noji & Vormbusch, 2018) in the
context of an extensive de-naturalization of the familiar world. It supple-
ments established ways of reflecting on and caring for the self, such
as the diary, the autobiography, and later various shades of therapeutic
intervention. Certainly, its appeal is to be consistent with, if not the
logical extension of, the evaluative cultures of contemporary capitalism
and modernity itself. Measured and mediated by epistemic objects (see
Knorr Cetina, 1999, 2007) such as smartphones, algorithms and apps,
ever new angles on the living body and its everyday course of action
are created. This ongoing exploration process is not a mere reflex of the
actors’ social positions and habitus, as could be argued in line with Pierre
Bourdieu’s sociology. And it would be just as incomplete and misleading
to reduce self-quantification to self-optimization, since in many ways there
is no fixed relation between ends and means. What self-quantification is
for its participants has to be carved out in social practices and is (as of
today) open for multiple meanings.
Self-quantification is as much about the actors’ position in the social
space as it is about defining who they are and who they ought to
be. Nevertheless, it is not only about cultural uncertainty within late
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modernity, but as much about economic transformations within modern
capitalism. It is about the growing importance of self-employment,
unfettered and “delimited” work requirements; deregulated and often
precarious forms of work, project work and “work on demand”. In brief,
it is about the deterioration of supporting institutions which had assured
long-term security for citizens in Fordist societies. A feeling of economic
insecurity has become relevant also for the highly qualified and educated
fractions of the workforce—precisely the group investing in new forms
of quantifying their selves. “Real” uncertainty in this context manifests
itself in particular as uncertainty about the worth of one’s immaterial
capital, and even more fundamentally about the notion of worth applicable
to immaterial capabilities.
Institutionalized forms of calculating value in the economy are increas-
ingly undermined by the emergence of so-called immaterial values
(Eustace, 2000, 2003), and regular financial crises demonstrate the
performative quality of value which is progressively detached from its
material basis. This increasing uncertainty concerning the “value of
goods” (Beckert & Aspers, 2011) can be regarded as the manifestation
of a fundamental shift in the value basis of contemporary capitalism. As
knowledge moves to the centre stage of today’s economies (as different
scholars as Peter F. Drucker and André Gorz argue), and as the “flexible
self” (Sennett, 1998), the “enterprising self” (Bröckling, 2002) and the
“manpower entrepreneur” (Pongratz & Voß, 2003) are becoming the
foundation for competition and profit-making, from a functionalist view-
point, new taxonomies are needed that are able to frame and calculate
living subjectivity.
In earlier works I have argued that the valuation of immaterial capital
bound up with the self is performed as a form of quantification that simul-
taneously relies on objectification as well as subjectification (Vormbusch,
2012). In other words, in order to get a grip on immaterial forms of
capital (such as communicative skills, motivation and aspiration) the form
of calculation itself has to change. Human Resource Management’s latest
incarnation, “people analytics” (see Goodell King, 2016; Rasmussen &
Ulrich, 2015) and the QS movement have one thing in common: the
quest for universally applicable orders of worth for subjectively bound
and bodily enclosed forms of capital. It is only by inventing mundane and
often conflicting forms of categorization on a micro-level that such new
regimes of worth may solidify, and which might then, eventually, traverse
the boundaries between the familiar world and the economy.
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This is not to say that individuals are consciously striving to make
their immaterial capital measurable and correspondingly valuable, or that
there is a direct link to “objective” capitalist needs for value realization.
This would be functionalist thinking. It is rather argued that a specific
social disquiet in advanced capitalism evokes two interlinked exploration
problems: explorations regarding the market relevance of the subjects’
immaterial capital as well as explorations regarding the hidden undercur-
rents of their identity. Promising a specific answer to the complexities
and contradictions of life in late modernity therefore relates closely to the
invention of those registers of worth that capitalism functionally relies on.
In this sense, self-quantification is an emerging form dealing with the
social incertitude constitutive of modern societies. It is about the quest
for those qualities of the self, which are regarded as important within
the economy and culture of contemporary societies and which cannot
be derived from orthodox notions of value. QS therefore is a multifar-
ious social praxis, creating new meaning, which punctuates and shifts the
margins of, and boundaries between, economy and culture, and economic
and cultural value.
Obviously, this does not simply mean the discovery of subjective
qualities already present (and only hidden), but the creation of new
forms of representing (and thereby generating) these qualities by creating
the context, the observation apparatus (taxonomies) and the normative
anchoring which brings them to light as new entities. Making things
accountable is bringing them into existence in new ways, and this applies
to corporeal accounting, too. In this sense, QS may be seen as a gigantic,
globally dispersed laboratory wherein people are investing in new forms,
by which the plurality of their individual skills and capabilities, their
concrete diversity of living, their uniqueness and incommensurability are
being made common and comparable.
Through self-quantification, the human body emerges as a new social
entity. Since the turn of the millennium, the living body took centre stage
as an object of technological malleability, epistemological deconstruction
and social visions to exceed the established boundaries of the human. The
living body, far from having ever been something given and uncontested
(see the works of Elias, Foucault and Bourdieu), since then became quite
a new recipient for questioning, evaluation and improvement. Currently,
there is quite a momentum of forging the body into a new object of
knowing, as well as the body being one of the core relays for social utopias
(see the relevant debates from genetic engineering to transhumanism, see
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also Lam’s contribution to this volume). From a Foucauldian perspective
this can be understood as the formation of a new proliferating field of
force, suggesting new possibilities for the constitution of a productive
subjectivity well suited for the new capitalism—and cutting off others.
Here is not the place to discuss in detail the adequacy of a Foucauldian
framework when it comes to self-quantification. Obviously, this article is
only selectively leaning on such a framework, trying to bypass some of its
problems.
Particularly, in order to avoid the equation of discourse and praxis this
contribution is drawing more heavily on a participant perspective than
Foucault normally did (see also Reckwitz, 2002). In accordance with
the sociology of critique (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006 [1991]), self-
quantification can be seen as a deliberative praxis of competent actors.
Exploring the cultural and economic qualities of the self by creating an
abstract space to compare them, and at the same time extending the
margins of accounting in this way, necessarily includes moral conflicts and
justifications. Particularly, extending these margins of accounting (Miller,
1998) beyond the hitherto incalculable implies “ethical consequences that
are often neglected” (Espeland & Yung, 2019, p. 239). Moreover, judge-
ments about how to do things “right”—or to criticize them as being
done the “wrong” way—not only refer to discourses but also to tech-
nologies, instrumentations, calculative schemes, formal representations,
material (e.g. food) or immaterial (e.g. apps, algorithms, icons) things
simultaneously. In this sense, actors are indeed “equipped” (Callon, 1998,
p. 6), but this equipment and its practical deployment are in no way
normatively neutral.
Both the Foucauldian and the pragmatist approaches have been criti-
cized regarding their stance towards power and domination. Foucault has
been accused of ignoring human agency; the sociology of critique has
been criticized for ignoring the historically specific restrictions limiting
the very possibility for critique (e.g. Celikates, 2006, 2009). We regard
QS as an investigative praxis by which new forms of how people relate to
each other and new meanings are created without neglecting hegemonic
discourses (such as empowerment and the hailing of individuality as part
of a neoliberal notion of freedom, or activity and connectionism as part
of a “network city”). It is only when shifting the analytical angle towards
the participants’ agency and their capacities of critique that the diversity
of their responses to the growing economic and normative uncertainty
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in today’s societies can be acknowledged. By criticizing the shortcom-
ings of how individuals are treated within the established institutions
of contemporary societies, and simultaneously embracing some of their
central discourses, self-quantifiers are still bringing something new to
these societies, hereby confirming the fundamentally dynamic properties
of contemporary capitalism (see Boltanski & Chiapello, 2007). Summing
up our fieldwork, what kind of critique is then articulated within the QS
network of early adopters?
Regarding the epistemic order, any form of subjective knowledge is
rejected, be it bound up with the living body or obscured within the
muddy waters of everyday life. Regarding self-trackers’ psychological
disposition, every form of cognitive abstinence, apathy or naïve familiarity
with oneself is rejected. In this regard, self-quantifiers are turning the
“project city’s” social activity imperative (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2007)
inwards, relentlessly exploring what is going on with them. Any idleness
and unexamined “business as usual” is dismissed. Above all, a person’s
worthiness is related to the truthfulness and sincerity one has towards
him- or herself, towards the meaning of one’s personal data, and the
consistency with which data are transformed into action, even if this leads
to discomfort and considerable strain. The underlying ontology is best
described in terms of a cybernetic world, within which various entities,
be it humans or machines, are connected through feedback loops which
are objectified, permanent, preferably immediate, and quantitative.
Self-quantification operates as a relay between the institutional
dynamics of capitalist change, on the one hand, and cultural dynamics,
on the other. It is varied in its particular empirical shape but consis-
tent in connecting the individuals with newly emerging orders of worth,
evaluating their performative, emotional and practical capabilities by
establishing new taxonomies of the self. “Accounting for who we could
be” surely is no new motive within modern societies’ institutional frame-
work. But self-quantification deserves its designation as “accounting”
more than the casual “skinny jeans” tracking, or Benjamin Franklin’s
crude moral bookkeeping. It is deepening the everyday and therefore inti-
mate joints between the economic and the cultural dynamics of modern
capitalist societies, highlighting the importance of new forms of creative
calculation for capitalist dynamics. As of today, self-quantification is still
made up of a diversity of actors, devices, instrumentations and discourses
about the self. Considering the growing investments of corporate actors,
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start-ups and state agencies, it is not unlikely to turn out as a social inno-
vation “through which something that stands normally outside market
exchange comes to be attributed an economic (monetary) value” (Four-
cade, 2011, p. 1723). But quantifying, economizing and marketizing are
quite different technologies (Kurunmäki et al., 2016) with quite different
outcomes regarding participation and democracy. And self-quantification,
as has been shown, is more than just plain economizing. A lot will
depend on if and how “voicing concern and difference” (Thévenot, 2014)
from a plurality of positions will remain relevant when self-quantification
becomes a major component of emerging digital capitalism.
Notes
1. The article draws on the findings of the research project “Taxonomies of
the Self” (http://www.fernuni-hagen.de/soziologie/lg2/Forschung_Eng
lish.shtml) funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG). The
project follows the methodological principles of Grounded Theory (Strauss,
1987) and has been conducted by Karolin Kappler, Eryk Noji and Uwe
Vormbusch. In total, more than 100 different datasets have been collected
and analysed, from qualitative interviews and participatory observations up
to group discussions with self-quantifiers, software engineers and start-ups.
2. This holds true at least for the active participants of the QS-movement this
article is focusing on. However, the balance between professionalized lay
actors and formal organizations is just about to tip in favour of the latter.
3. The term notation originally refers to varying codifications of how to
transcribe utterances and gestures of interviewees in the field of qualita-
tive research. In our context, it indicates the various experimental forms
by which inner sensations as well as physical reactions are “transcribed”,
written down and formally represented by the actors in the field.
4. See, for instance, Alberto Frigo’s website: http://2004-2040.com/25_ar.
htm, Accessed 19 July 2019.
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Politics to the Dream of an Indifferent Power
Ota De Leonardis
Inequality is a subject that is being talked about a great deal these days.
Large quantities of data and figures provide us with unequivocal evidence
of the huge disparities—in income, wealth, and so on—that characterize
contemporary global capitalism. This trend towards polarization is all the
more evident when we view it from a historical perspective, as Thomas
Piketty (2014) has so masterfully done. The figures speak eloquently,
but what do they refer to? What do we mean exactly, by “measuring
inequality”?
It is a well-known fact that over the course of modern Western
history in general, and of capitalism (and anti-capitalism) in particular,
the notion of inequality has acquired a relational meaning that refers
to power relations between unequal people. It could be argued that
the history of the construction of this meaning began with the long
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struggle against the “high/low” dualism of the mediaeval Christian tradi-
tion through the process of secularization.1 And in this process we might
recognize a crucial turn in the “symbolic form” of the Modern Perspec-
tive, which provided the cognitive tools for linking the “high” and the
“low” together and endowed this link with a political character, through
Machiavelli and then Hobbes especially.2 The French Revolution, which
reciprocally gave equality a political status, also represents an important
moment. Then, of course, Hegel’s Herr und Knecht Verhältnis (Master–
Slave Dialectic) shaped the framework within which inequality meant a
bond of domination constituting both the dominator and the dominated,
that conferred an intrinsic dynamism on the social order. There followed
the rise of capitalism, from Marx onwards. The capital/labour relation-
ship came to be the main point of reference for inequality, associated as it
was with exploitation and the private appropriation of socially produced
wealth. For more than a century, inequality became the central crit-
ical issue in the labour movement and in the anti-capitalist—and indeed
anti-imperialist—conflicts.
My aim in this chapter is to show the shift in the semantic field of
inequality that has taken place over the last forty years or so. Owing to this
shift, the meaning of inequality as a (historical) bond of dominationand
subjection is being obscured. In the current discourse on inequality and
its magnitude, the (political) reference to power relations has become
weaker and weaker, and inequality as defined by quantification now tends
to designate a distributive difference, a gap, a disparity: a distance, and no
longer a tie.
To this end, I will, in the following, identify some crucial steps in this
semantic shift within the changes that have affected the vocabulary of
welfare in Italy (but under pressure from Europe) over the course of some
forty years. I will dwell in particular on the dispositif of the threshold—
first of all the poverty threshold—and on the multiplication of thresholds
in the field of welfare. I will look at the influence that the syntax of the
threshold has exerted on the reconfiguration of this field, and draw some
conclusions regarding the effects on the semantics of inequality—two in
particular.
In the first place, “threshold” is a spatial metaphor which particularly
shapes social spaces with divisions and separations. This made me focus
on space and analyse the spread of space-based technologies of separa-
tion in the current governance instrumentation at both local and global
levels. Here, I will identify the dynamics of inscriptions of inequality
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in space, and the emergence of a “spatialized” configuration of the
term. “Inequality translates into distance”, as Richard Sennett (2006,
p. 55) argued. Once inscribed in space, this distance, especially the one
between privileged and deprived people, represents the negation of any
relationship between them, and all the more so one of domination.
Furthermore, the syntax of thresholds is fundamentally numerical,
quantitative, and calculistic. Distances correlate to measurements: they
acquire reality to the extent that they are measured. My investigation
into the semantic shift from inequality to distance involves numbers.
Inequality, being shaped by quantification and measurements, designates
the alignment of unequal positions along a linear sequence. Being flat-
tened out, it loses its political significance. Paradoxically, the spotlight
on quantitative data illuminates in the tiniest detail how enormous the
imbalances are, but the quantitative format reduces inequality to a linear
variance, and obscures vertical power relations.
On the way, quantification will emerge as a part, albeit a salient one, of
a wider process of symbolic change in which inequality is being recon-
figured as distance. In this process, as we will see, words and spatial
choreographies come into play together with numbers, as well as inter-
weavings, assonances, and interdependencies amongst these symbolic
registers. This perspective on quantification involves two choices of a
methodological nature. Here, firstly, I will look at quantification through
the influence that it exercises when conferring meanings to the issues it
applies to, that is, by analysing numbers as a language—a (situated and
historical) “langage du rapport à la réalité”, as Desrosières has put it
(Desrosières, 2008, ch. 2). Secondly, quantification is framed within a
broader context in which various other languages are at work, so that an
investigation can be made of its role (its format and uses) in the symbolic
institution of society in a given historical-social context: as part of a
“thought style”, to use Mary Douglas’s (and Ludwig Fleck’s) expression.3
When seen from the—indirect, and from the outside, so to speak—
perspective adopted here, quantification acquires a significance that is as
expressive as it is instrumental: together with tools for knowledge and
action, it appears to provide visions as well.
In my conclusions I shall propose some hypothetical remarks about the
visions implied by the quantification of inequality, as they seem to express
the dream of a domination free from any link with the dominated, morally
indifferent and cognitively ignorant towards her/him.
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Words: The Semantics of Poverty
and the Syntax of the Threshold
The political history of inequality to which I referred above culminated in
the development of the welfare states in Europe in the aftermath of the
Second World War. They were the expression of the commitment to rein-
forcing the social bases of democracy after the devastating experiences of
totalitarianism, world wars and mass slaughter, as Alain Supiot has shown
in his masterly reconstruction (2010; in a similar vein see also Ken Loach’s
movie “The Spirit of ‘45”). Moreover, this development was also stimu-
lated by the challenge posed to European countries by the Soviet Union’s
collectivist model. Thus labour regulations and systems of social protec-
tion were instituted, through different institutional architectures and to
different degrees, in the period known as the “Trente glorieuses”. The
welfare state emerged as a political compromise—a deal—between capital
and labour (as was still being argued in the literature of the 1970s, for
example by Ian Gough [1979]). And the issue of inequality developed
within a framework of collective responsibility that called for a redis-
tribution—firstly in relation to labour—not only of goods but also of
powers.
The “crisis of the welfare state”, officially announced in Italy in the
early 1980s, opened a period of welfare restructuring (which is still under
way, whether presented as “reforms” or as “modernization”). At that
time, my theoretical interests focused on the forms and conditions of
institutional change, which I investigated in relation to both the cogni-
tive and normative dimensions, and my main area of research was welfare
institutions and policies. It was in this field, therefore, that I began to look
more closely at the changes in the vocabulary of welfare used in Italy at
both local and national level, from the 1980s onwards, and broadening
my focus to include the European Union’s social programmes as a crucial
source (De Leonardis, 1998, 2000).4
Shifting Words
I pointed out that certain words had fallen out of use in the current
language of the welfare arenas, whilst new ones were being adopted
without encountering any significant resistance. After all, the new words
expressed good intentions: “the fight against social exclusion”, for
instance—how could anyone object to that? As I explored these shifts, I
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noted (1) the speed of the change and the apparent self-evidence of many
of the terms in circulation, with no need for explanation or justification;
(2) the sappy rhetoric that dominated discussion; and (3) the reiteration
of certain lines of argument that were virtually identical in the various
contexts, one highly authoritative source of this being Europe (the Euro-
pean New-speak). This suggested to me that the welfare arena had been
subjected to a massive investment in language whilst at the same time
“conflicts over the vocabulary” (Fraser, 1989) had attenuated.5
We do things with words, as John Austin reminds us: all the more so
when they are being used in the official language of a policy or a regula-
tory system, and therefore have normative force. From this perspective, I
focused on the emerging words related to the semantic field of inequality
that redefined welfare problems and goals and accompanying discussions
on the institutional architecture of welfare (see Fig. 5.1).






rights and voices  needs and means 
  deservingness 
responsibility 
 Those affected:  
protesters  victims 
 An issue for:  
contentious  politics 
antagonism 
 humanitarian engagement 
tolerance 
 Inequality versus:  
Equality  fairness 
parity  
proximity 
Fig. 5.1 Examined semantic shifts
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The map (see Fig. 5.1) sums up in an impressionistic fashion the
semantic shifts I noted.6 I paid special attention to the term “poverty”.
After its eclipse in the golden age of the welfare state, where the term
denoted a residual phenomenon, “poverty” reappeared in Italy as a
category during the 1980s and acquired a central position in the vocabu-
lary—at least as much as in reality. As I pointed out then, “as the subject
of poverty acquires increasing significance in welfare policies, it triggers
a change in their vocabulary […] [P]overty becomes the central frame-
work that shapes policy choices […] no less than scientific research” (De
Leonardis, 2000).
In the semantics of poverty, “needs” replace “rights” as the main refer-
ents to identify persons vis-à-vis institutions and policies. Indeed, as the
issue of poverty came to the fore, references to rights as essential attributes
of (social) citizenship dwindled away, and virtually disappeared from the
discourse. The term “needs” took their place, and was aligned with
the “means” to satisfy them (and the relative “means tests”) provoking
an overall reconfiguration of the semantic field of welfare. Moralization
and quantification were emerging together as the main drivers of this
reconfiguration.
Moralization
As regards moralization, it could be noted that the needs/means pairing
was leading to defining and evaluating welfare issues more in moral than
in political terms, more in the vocabulary of judgement on personal
responsibility than in that of the law regarding the rights one is enti-
tled to. After all, we already know that this is the role that the category
of poverty has played in the moral order of capitalism in general and in
the history of labour regulations in particular, since the “primitive accu-
mulation” laws against vagrancy, and then recurrently. The moralizing
significance of the poverty issue came into play, for instance, in relation
to the urban plebs of Haussmann’s and Hugo’s Paris representing the
“question sociale”. Poverty was seen as being associated with moral degra-
dation, criminality and vice, and approached as the matrix of the “classes
dangereuses” (Castel, 1995, quoting Chevaliers). The moralizing mark
of poverty crops up again and again in the labour movement’s battles
for social rights, and particularly when the category of the “unemployed
worker” was being constructed. Looking at Britain in the early 1930s and
1940s, Noel Whiteside (Whiteside, 2015; but see also Salais et al., 1986)
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accurately identified the place occupied by “the opprobrium heaped onto
the idle poor”, whose “demoralization” was assumed to threaten Britain’s
economic performance (Whiteside, 2015, p. 153). Together with “[…]
free enterprise and […] the efficacy of financial instruments to address
risk”, this moral stigma constitutes that liberal “collective faith” which
is implied in the moral order of capitalism. “All features”, Whiteside
(2015, p. 153) opportunely adds, “that have proved extremely durable”,
as shown by the moralizing process of welfare in Italy promoted by the
poverty issue from the 1980s onwards. Once again, at its core lies the
great divide between the deserving and the undeserving poor, making
access to welfare benefits dependent upon assessment of the recipients’
deservingness.
It is precisely here, in the assessment operations, that the complemen-
tary drive of quantification comes into play in the semantics of poverty
reconfiguring welfare matters, values and policies. The deservingness prin-
ciple operates a division between claimants, which must be justified on
scientific grounds promising objectivity. The (moral) judgement on the
claimant’s deservingness requires scientific evidence grounded on proofs
and tests.7
The Threshold
The key tool for scientific assessment and measurement of poverty is the
threshold, the poverty line dividing the poor and the not-poor. The scien-
tific division it establishes intersects with the moral division between the
deserving and undeserving poor. Fixing the threshold is an integral part
of the very definition of poverty, as well as of the policy instrumenta-
tion in this area. In the widespread debate on the definition of poverty
that developed during the 1970s, issues concerning the categorization
of poverty were bound up with both measurement and justice issues,
concerning criteria and choices: What indicators are pertinent? Indicators
related to income, consumer baskets, or “necessities” taking up Rown-
tree’s budgetary approach again? What components should be included,
with what scales of equivalence? Whether and how should temporal vari-
ations be considered, or the size of the household, or poverty perception,
and so on? Discussions hinged on what criteria and what tools should be
adopted for determining the poverty threshold, in other words how and
where the line should be drawn, how to determine the standard below
which life is lived in a condition of poverty.
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Of special interest in this respect is the distinction between an “abso-
lute” and a “relative” notion of poverty, which opposed Amartya Sen to
Peter Townsend, both key figures in this debate.8 It was Townsend who,
basing the determination and measurement of poverty on the notion of
“relative deprivation”, dictated the terms of the issue, also in the vocab-
ulary of Europe.9 Sen has criticized the “relative” definition of poverty
arguing that “ultimately poverty must be seen to be primarily an absolute
notion” (Sen, 1983, p. 158). There is, says Sen, an “irreducible abso-
lutist core in the idea of poverty” (Sen, 1983, p. 159), which becomes
visible from the perspective of capabilities. Capabilities themselves are
absolute, if we mean by this term the universal value of the eminently
human quality of agency they assess: what constitutes “a derived and vari-
able element” are, instead, the commodities necessary for this quality to
flourish. In other words, the determination of poverty based on capabili-
ties raises a question of universal absolutes, whilst taking “a relative form
in the space of commodities” (Sen, 1983, p. 161). “Even with exactly
the same absolute shortfall […] a person may be thought to be ‘poorer’
if the other poor have shortfalls smaller than his. […] Quantification of
poverty would seem to need the marrying of considerations of absolute
and relative deprivation even after a set of minimum needs and a poverty
line have been fixed” (Sen, 1979, p. 293).
This argument underpins the proposal of compromise Sen advances
(Sen, 1983, p. 161): “There is no conflict between the irreducible abso-
lutist element in the notion of poverty (relating to capabilities and the
standard of living) and the ‘thoroughgoing relativity’ to which Peter
Townsend refers, if the latter is interpreted as applying to commodi-
ties and resources”. This proposal, which was rejected by Townsend
at the time, was eventually taken up again in an operation that closed
the controversy: The Copenhagen Declaration, emerging from the 1995
UN Summit, where Townsend was again a protagonist, makes room for
the “absolute poverty” sustained by Sen, and interprets the compromise
he proposes by establishing a “two-levels definition”. Does this mean
everything is settled? Not really. The fact is that in this outcome, the
term “absolute” has changed meaning and consequently the compro-
mise in question does not fully correspond to Sen’s intentions and
reasoning. Here, the term “absolute” defines the manifestation of poverty
in extreme forms consisting in “severe deprivation of basic human needs”
(UN, 1995, para. 19). “Absolute” has become a synonym of “severe”.
Assuming the existence of an “absolute poverty” has made it possible, in
5 QUANTIFYING INEQUALITY FROM CONTENTIOUS … 143
this official context, to take into account Sen’s perspective on poverty in
cross-national measurements and comparisons. At the price, however, of
a banalization that makes it equivalent to the lowest level on the scale of
poverty, that of subsistence.10 It should, however, be remembered that
Sen himself was perfectly clear:
The characteristic feature of ‘absoluteness’ is neither constancy over time,
nor invariance between different societies, nor concentration merely on
food and nutrition. It is an approach of judging a person’s deprivation
in absolute terms... rather than in purely relative terms vis-à-vis the levels
enjoyed by others in the society. (Sen, 1985, p. 673; first emphasis added;
second emphasis in original)
Thus, absoluteness defines not so much a type or degree of poverty but
an approach, and specifically an approach that does not consider compar-
isons to be exhaustive for the purpose of defining poverty. Which is
precisely the claim of a relativist approach.11 The “absolutist” core Sen
insists on has nothing to do with its comparative aspect: it is politi-
cally determined. The “absolute” opposed to the “relative” by Sen in
this definition calls into play a third term to which the relativities of
the comparisons are anchored: terms of reference fixed through political
compromises on conflictual issues about ends and values. In the compara-
tive perspective on poverty, the terms of reference are instead determined
from within, and emerge from the comparisons themselves. The accept-
able level of poverty—expressed in the poverty line—is established by
means of comparisons between the poorer and the less poor.
Even absolute poverty, banalized as we have seen, has become
congruent with this comparative logic. In the end, it is the relative
approach that has prevailed, and fixed a comparative frame for the whole
set of categorizing, research, measurements, rankings etc. for determining
poverty, which meanwhile has continued to develop. This, then, is the
format for knowledge that condenses into the figure of the threshold
and constitutes it as the central informational basis—Sen’s “informational
basis of judgement in justice”12—on which policy choices in the field of
poverty and welfare are based.
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Visibility and Obfuscation
Framed by the threshold, attention is focused on what is happening
around the borders, and on how to measure marginal differences, vari-
ations, transitions, and suchlike, with important consequences for the
definition and treatment of poverty. Here, we draw once again on
Sen, who discussed this in his latest book co-authored with Drèze on
India (Drèze & Sen, 2013, see specifically ch. 7). On the one hand,
attention focusing on thresholds entails a bias towards targeted, differ-
ential responses to poverty or inequality issues, which tend to fuel
“extremely divisive” effects, segmentation, and dynamics of “exclusion
and divisiveness” (Drèze & Sen, 2013, p. 191).
On the other hand, in this way attention is diverted from the substance
of the issues, from what is happening below, beyond the poverty line.
Concerning the poverty line that was officially established in 2011 in
India, Sen and Drèze (2013, p. 189) point out that the ensuing public
debate has concentrated on the threshold and the dire level that was estab-
lished, whilst “missing the main point”: The fact that, “even with this low
benchmark, so many people are below it – a full 30% of the population,
or more than 350 million people” (Drèze & Sen, 2013, p. 190). In other
words, “the terrifying yet hidden nature of mass poverty – its enormous
size – has been quite lost” (ibid.), and, as a result, completely ignored.
The threshold is a device that fixes a measurement of poverty. And this
measurement, a number in fact, whilst giving poverty great public visi-
bility and attention, equally seems to produce effects of obfuscation. From
studies on quantification, we are already aware of this type of effect and,
in general, of the selective nature of numbers in giving an account of the
phenomena they measure. In the case in question, the measure of poverty
shaped by the threshold obscures other crucial information on poverty
itself—including, of course, other quantitative data (amongst which the
percentage of people who do not have a toilet available: around 50%).
From Drèze and Sen’s arguments in the following chapters, the impres-
sion is given that what is obfuscated and neutralized, is “the grip” of
the inequality between “the privileged and the rest” in India today, its
enormity, its “outrageousness” (Drèze & Sen, 2013, p. 279). And “the
dominance of the privileged” in terms of voice in public reasoning (Drèze
& Sen, 2013, ch. 9) is fortified by a systematically diverted attention
creating “blind spots” on social failures that are as invisible as they are
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serious, like the blind spots that are indeed created when attention is
focused on the poverty line.
The threshold constitutes a key device for responding to the need,
mentioned above, to give scientific grounds to the definition of poverty.
By providing measurement criteria and the resulting standards it makes
such definition a correlation of its measurement (specifically in compar-
ative terms, as we have seen). As I noted at the time, when reasoning
on the growing popularity of this category in the field of welfare, “the
bureaucratic passion for categorisation […] is being replaced by a compu-
tational passion that translates all the issues into terms of measurement”
(De Leonardis, 2000, p. 95). I shall now add that the poverty line appears
to be a central syntactical element for this translation, precisely because
it is a line that establishes a binary code—in/out, above/below, yes/no,
1/0—as a basic frame for public knowledge and action. In this way the
poverty line aligns the category of poverty—both in its cognitive and
normative values, both as a public issue and as the object of policies at
all levels of governance—with its quantitative format.
We shall return later to the paths opened up by this investigation,
in order to examine the role played by quantification in reconfiguring
inequality. To conclude here the argument on the semantics of poverty,
we must look back again at the association between the quantitative
format established by the threshold and the equally powerful drive of
moralization. And we must emphasize the fact that dynamics of divi-
sion are triggered by both the moral divide between the deserving and
the undeserving poor, and the numerical separation enacted by the line’s
binary code. All in all, the semantics of poverty, when observed at close
quarters, implicitly denies the promise that had justified the centrality of
the “poverty issue” in the welfare field in Italy. Poverty supposed to be
an all-encompassing notion overcoming the—widely criticized—category-
based welfare system, was as such surrounded by a universalistic aura,
whereas a non-universalistic regime of justice was starting to be estab-
lished just through the category of poverty. A justice which, according
to the quantitative parameter of poverty, subjects the welfare claimant to
judgement, weighing up needs and means, selecting and awarding prizes
and punishments. In the tangle of moralization and quantification a sort
of “bookkeeping justice” is to be glimpsed, weighting the benefits granted
against the contributions that people make to society understood as a
“shared venture”.13
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Spatial Choreographies:
From Inequality to Distance
The figure of the threshold encourages us to follow another line of inves-
tigation into the semantic change in inequality and the role played by
quantification: “Threshold” is clearly a metaphor, and a spatial one as it
draws a dividing line—in/out, above/below, etc.—according to a binary
code. Coming across a spatial metaphor at the heart of the knowledge
infrastructure on poverty might not be so important, were it not for its
assonance with a more general trend towards forms of “spatialization” in
the governance of social issues. All the more so since dividing and sepa-
rating—as the poverty line does—appear to be, as we shall see, a quite
common tendency enacted by these forms.
On the subject of space, space and power, and space as a fundamental
lever of governance, a vast body of research is available. Accumulated
throughout the history of the disciplines devoted to it,14 this patrimony
has extended its ramifications into the whole corpus of the social sciences.
And from Foucault onwards it has been re-investigated and amplified.
Because of its symbolic power shaping social organization and confer-
ring an order on it, space emblematically represents a technology of
governance that acts indirectly and “at a distance” (Miller & Rose, 1990).
What we learn first and foremost from this background is the basic,
preliminary indication that “space” is not “place”, as Gieryn (2000,
p. 489) has noted. Space is to be “more properly conceived as abstract
geometries (distance, direction, size, shape, volume) detached from mate-
rial form and cultural interpretation […]. Space is what place becomes
when the unique gathering of things, meanings, and values are sucked
out” (Gieryn, 2000, p. 465).15 We should therefore consider firstly that
the generative potential of space operates on the territory in the same way,
that is by abstraction, as a map does; and secondly that the language of
this abstraction is a mathematical, or more precisely geometrical language,
once again the language of numbers. As I anticipated, this must be taken
into account first and foremost when investigating the current processes
of “spatialization”, i.e. the diffusion of spatial frames in addressing social
matters, in both cognitive and normative terms, and the growing recourse
to space-based technologies in governance at both global and local (city)
level.16
Well in advance Foucault (2001) noted these trends postulating that
whilst, “[T]he great obsession of the nineteenth century was, as we know,
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history […] The present epoch will perhaps be above all the epoch of
space. We are in the epoch of simultaneity: we are in the epoch of juxtapo-
sition, the epoch of the near and far, of the side-by-side, of the dispersed.
We are at a moment, I believe, when our experience of the world is
less that of a long life developing through time than that of a network
that connects points and intersects with its own skein” (Foucault, 2001,
p. 1571).
The “network society”, investigated and outlined as an emerging social
order by Manuel Castells, is the most meaningful expression of spatializa-
tion. The network is indeed a geometric figure, the abstract space of a
collection of points with its own mathematical laws, which is character-
ized, Castells maintains, “by the preeminence of social morphology over
social action” (Castells, 1996, p. 469). Thus, in my investigation of the
semantic changes in “inequality” I will now look at space, spatialization
and space-based governance instruments, shifting the focus from words to
symbolic artefacts of a spatial nature. My aim is to explore what meanings
these artefacts confer on inequality. The analytical background I shall use
as a basis comes from research on urban policies, territorial governance,
and the transformations that are affecting European cities, mainly.
Cities, which are obviously the preferred environment for space-based
policy instruments (first and foremost those based on architecture and
urban planning) appear to be affected by two opposing and simultaneous
spatial drives. On the one hand, as Françoise Choay argued in her studies
of history and anthropology in architecture (Choay, 2006, p. 10), spatial-
ization driven by globalization constitutes an expansive drive that acts
upon the extension of the city and produces urban sprawl and thus its
disarticulation (and its replacement with the urbain). On the other hand,
the opposite move towards concentration, which insists on circumscribing
the local—the neighbourhoods, typically, in order to control them or
increase their value—equally tends to fuel separation, segmentation and
disarticulation in a different form.
It is this latter shift that is of interest here. It has its origins in and is
fuelled by the issue of “urban (in)security”, whose vocabulary of motives
was provided by the “fear of the Other”. This issue reached Italy (from
the Anglo-Saxon world) during the 1990s, establishing itself in public
discourse. It marked the beginning of the intense season of policies for
urban security, which since then have become a major lever of gover-
nance in cities, not only in Italy, and are constantly updated (today
also due to the terrorism alert). It has also been noted that in this
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way problems and solutions are reframed, with attention being shifted
from the “social” issue of security, an issue to do with welfare, to its
“civil” significance, an issue to do with law and order, and from social
protection to police protection.17 In this frame, whether it is a matter
of managing a deprived urban area, of fighting “degradation” by means
of “urban décor”18 interventions, or of preventing social disorder and
criminal behaviour by means of surveillance devices, all these policies
operate through space-management and space-based instruments. Secu-
rity is above all territorial, being translated into “securitized territories”.
And, in its turn, the territory, its borders and identity are increasingly
marked by the question of security as the crux of the relationship between
citizens and institutions. In the governance of the city (and not only)
“territory” becomes a keyword which, whilst giving recognition to the
everyday life contexts of people and to local communities, transfers on
them the semantic density that the term has accumulated in reference
to state sovereignty and its inner security issue.19 It is in the territory
that governance operates by means of area-based instruments, borders,
partitions, “quadrillage” (grids), and so forth, and thus it is there that
clues are to be found to the processes of spatialization, which also affect
inequality.
In fact, there is much talk of “territorialization”, particularly following
in Foucault’s footsteps and revealing how powerful it is in the digital and
globalized world, just when the virtual is being freed from any spatial
bond (see for instance Paul Hirst, 2005, part 3). Anyway, territory and
territorialization have become a common yardstick for all policies on social
matters—including welfare (Bifulco, 2014), in line with the emphasis
placed on the “local” by European policies and programmes. And it is
above all in relation to places and spaces, areas, zones, districts, and the
like, that policy issues are defined. Even the people’s status as citizens—
and possibly citizenship itself as a status—is now more directly anchored
in their own (local) territory, so that the model of citizen is now provided
by the “inhabitant” active in his or her own neighbourhood, as was noted
in France by Cathérine Neveu (2011) and Jacques Donzelot (2009).
Territory and territorialization contain the promise of a governance
that is closer to the citizens, the promise of a privileged arena for
enhancing political participation and democracy. There are experiences
and some evidence that give credit to this promise,20 but these are far
from questioning the “territory’s” prevalent semantic frame I have just
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outlined, its intrinsic link to the theme of security and the spatial sepa-
ration it activates. All in all, on observing forms of territorial governance
globally, it can clearly be seen that they tend to produce “exclusion” or
“expulsion” (Hirst, 2005; Sassen, 2006, respectively), by making wide
use of borders and separations. And we are well aware, with reference
to the local scale of governance, that relating people to a given terri-
tory may equally be a source of stigma and denied citizenship, as, in the
case of France, the young banlieusards perfectly know.21 In our cities22
the signs by which the territory is marked, consisting of borders and
separations, may be slight, yet the well-known phenomena of “relega-
tion”, “urban segregation”, and the like are important signals and allow
us to glimpse drives towards a spatial concentration of homogeneous
populations in distinct urban areas. In many of the world’s big cities actu-
ally, these trends are much stronger, and give rise to spatial concretions
of the polarization between privileged and deprived urban populations,
such as gated residential communities or luxury areas, on the one hand,
and “difficult areas” or slums, on the other. In these forms of spatial
inscription of unequal populations significant traces of a “spatialization”
of inequality may be detected (Bricocoli & De Leonardis, 2015). Of the
space-based technologies employed by territorial governance, many bear
the same marks: barriers, enclosures, sensors, checkpoints, (also private)
armed police, off-limits areas, fences, walls and, yes, moats. Open spaces,
such as public green areas, should also be included in this list when they
are designed to create a buffer zone that protects a middle-class residential
area from the disorder of the city, and so should the “by-pass roads” that
make it possible to skip areas of urban misery, ignore them, and live sepa-
rate lives. These dynamics of division that slice the city into segments tend
to eliminate places, opportunities and reasons for meeting and exchange,
and for conflict between unequal populations.
The binary logic of separation finds its most drastic expression in
the “walls” that have started to proliferate everywhere, especially as the
preferred solution to the threat posed by migratory flows in our global-
ized and hyper-connected world. The barrier between Mexico and US is
the most famous and the longest, and the Israeli “Wall” separating Pales-
tinian people is considered a prototype (Weizman, 2007). In Europe, too,
migrants are kept outside its boundaries, as we have had to recognize,
and—at its Southern boundary—the armed Mediterranean Sea is now
performing a similar function, paradoxically. Starting from Wendy Brown
(2009) who first gave an account of the phenomenon, the literature has
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emphasized several features of this device.23 Although it is adopted as
a quick and easy tool of governance, a ready-made solution, its effec-
tiveness has already proved to be highly dubious. Such barriers perform
more of a “theatrical function” (Brown, 2009, p. 122), and what they
stage is, in fact, separation. Whilst the walls of total institutions (such as
asylums or prisons) which have been familiar in our modern landscape
for so long, segregate people for taking charge of, and treating—re-
educating, punishing, etc.—them, these new walls produce a separation
only, by enacting a spatial division on a territory into two abstract spaces,
without any people being taken into charge whatsoever. Through and
around these “walls of separation”, the powers exercised and the opera-
tions performed are directed towards impeding, driving away, rejecting,
turning back, establishing a distance, avoiding encounters and denying
recognition.24
Walls set up a powerful choreography for global inequality. Through
spatialization, inequality no longer designates a bond between unequal
people, but rather a distance that suspends or denies any relationship
between them. “Inequality translates into distance”: it is appropriate to
recall here what Richard Sennett (2006) argues when discussing how
the chain of command changes in the “new capitalism”, and observing
the enormity of the distances between top managers and workers in
the globalized company. “There is nothing like a relationship between
a Thai shoe-sticker and a Milanese fashionista; they transact, […] rather
than relate” (Sennett, 2006, p. 55). The translation of inequality into
distance, says Sennett, goes hand in hand with the “divorce between
command and accountability” (Sennett, 2006, p. 57). To this power,
being expressed in a denied bond, and therefore de-responsibilized, corre-
sponds the form of subjection that Sennett himself had described as “the
bond of autonomy” (Sennett, 1980). This form of domination consists in
the denial of any bond whatsoever with the dominated, resulting in both
cognitive ignorance and moral indifference to him/her.
Numbers: Measuring Inequality
What “distance” is—that is the length of a line between two points—
may be known and recognized by measuring it. Here we finally focus on
the role played by numbers, intended as a language, in the reconfigura-
tion of inequality. As I stressed at the beginning of my discussion, this
is the language by which inequality is mostly represented nowadays. In
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the meantime, however, somewhere along the analytical path followed
up to now, the innocence of an objective, neutral description of the
phenomenon attached to its measurement has evaporated. We have traced
the spread of quantification that goes along with changes in the lexicon
of welfare and the grip of the quantitative format on the basic cogni-
tive tools for defining issues and governing them. The measurements of
inequality now appear to be involved in a more general reframing, in
which inequality is being translated into distance. In which numbers,
like words, acquire relevance and demand to be observed for what is
made with them, i.e. their performative potential in fabricating a reality.
They are “an engine, not a camera” (MacKenzie, 2006), to take up a
meaningful image summing up a crucial interpretative key in studies on
quantification.25 And it is in this perspective that we shall proceed to
investigate the role of numbers in resignifying inequality, and observe how
their virtues are exploited.
Numbers provide the synthesis of a plurality of components, factors
and aspects of inequality. Thanks to their parsimony, and the econo-
mizing function numbers perform in describing (and assessing), it is
simply by means of a few well-constructed figures that the quantitative
format provides a precise account of the magnitude of a phenomenon.
At the same time, thanks to the related standardization, many qualifi-
cations may be translated into figures. And the issue may be split and
multiplied into a plurality of inequalities referring to the widest possible
variety of assets—inequality in income, wealth, education, health, access
to the internet, etc.—and placing one next to another in a linear sequence,
from life expectancy at birth to the freedom to choose how one dies.
Nonetheless, we first have to consider that within this multiplicity
the same cognitive format is reproduced, made up of quantification,
measurements, comparisons, ratings and rankings. As far as inequality
is concerned, figures tell us a great deal about variations, distances and
unevenness between different positions, but very little about power rela-
tions between them. Numbers enact a binary logic, as we have already
seen, and are directed to making (horizontal) comparisons rather than
talking about (vertical) conflicts. More importantly, it should be consid-
ered that the economizing function of numbers is primarily performed
on words, qualifications and arguments.26 And we must ask ourselves
what effects this parsimony has on the density of the semantic reper-
toires that noun “inequality” has accumulated and sedimented, and on
its inner contentious meaning. Quantitative data save on qualification and
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argument, on plural interpretations and representations, on voices and
conflicts over vocabulary.
The quantification that establishes what is to be considered relevant
knowledge with regard to inequality guides a process of abstraction
which—in the same way as space acts on place—“sucks out” plurality,
contingency and subjectivity, impoverishing the symbolic repertoire for
expressing modes and reasons in talking about inequality. The figures
on inequality—so precise and well-founded on the authority of science—
efficiently carry out their task of conferring objectivity, the “mechanical
objectivity” grounded on calculus and expressed in a “matter-of-fact”
format. And of course these are very important results. Nonetheless, when
objectivation is exerted on the issue of inequality it comes with high
costs. The great variety of other forms of knowledge about inequality
is absorbed or replaced by numbers and ends up being neutralized. Costs
are high in terms of the naturalization of the inequality issue, with the risk
that “an ontological naturalness or essentialism […] takes up residence
in our understandings and explanations” concerning this issue (Brown,
2006, p. 15). As far as it is framed by measurements, inequality also
becomes exposed to the effects of their performative potential I have
just recalled, when these are taken as a metric for rating operations
and assessing performances. This is an aspect that deserves investigation,
remembering the research on rankings and the reactivity (or feedback)
they produce in the field they measure and order, and more in general
the way these types of quantitative instruments function in the “gover-
nance by numbers”.27 Indeed, with figures on inequality, their descriptive
function may end up being replaced by, or incorporate performance indi-
cators. This is plain to see especially in the area of statistics, comparisons
and rankings between countries, as when inequality figures are included
in the set of indicators used to evaluate the performances of a country
targeted for aid programmes.
In Ousmane Sidibé’s contribution on the subject in this volume, the
country is Mali, and the indicators to be improved concern inequality in
education. The example shows that, under the pressure of ranking (and
the incentives correlated to it) an enormous effort is made to raise the
rates of education, attaining a numerical objective which, however, obfus-
cates substantial quality issues of education itself. This is a case in point for
the “governance by numbers” where one can see how the inequality issue
is being treated within a management by objectives system, formatted by
the latter’s instrumentation and dynamics, and how widespread practices
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are for “pushing up the numbers”, even by cheating.28 The outcome in
terms of a real reduction of educational inequality is, to say the least,
dubious. In any case, the issue of inequality, as it is incorporated into
the set of global governance control tools to produce “adjustments”
and “alignments”, undergoes distortion. Not only is its meaning set as
a problem of disparity, a quantitative gap, a distance between positions
aligned along a distribution curve, hence losing its relational grounds,
its reference to power relations, but it may also happen that inequality
itself, as expressed by numbers, becomes a tool for control, discipline and
subjection.
The lesson I draw from this case concerns another aspect of the
more general reconfiguration of inequality. This paradoxical twist in the
meaning of inequality has been made possible by its reshaping and treat-
ment as a matter for management, in accordance with the managerial style
of dealing with problems. More precisely, inequality appears to fall within
the category of problems that are there to be “managed” instead of being
“solved”, which Sheldon Wolin identifies as a salient trait of the “managed
democracy” (and its “domestication”, Wolin, 2008).
However, we also know that numbers may well provide people with
strong arguments against power. In the case of inequality figures, too,
numbers give phenomena visibility, a visibility grounded on scientific
evidence. Inequality, being expressed in the measurement of distances,
looks like a “matter-of-fact” issue, and it is in this format that it acquires
visibility. It is thanks to this visibility they confer on situations being
measured, that quantitative data, their construction and use have often
been, and still are, crucial matters at stake in claims for recognition, in
political struggles, and in the making of “collectives”.29 Can we say that
the same thing is happening today with the figures on inequality?
In a way, yes, it does seem that here, too, figures provide arguments for
denouncing disparity and representing a collective, particularly around the
polarization they make visible: typically, the “our 99%” against the richest
“1%”, is a main argument of the “Occupy” movement. The quantitative
framework does help denounce an imbalance of power that has grown
to the limits of disproportion, giving rise to public protest and collec-
tive action. Nonetheless, this power imbalance that numbers highlight
appears, in its very disproportion, to be simplified to the extreme, and
void of qualification. That 99% remains an aggregate as vast as it is inde-
terminate, corresponding to, following Robert Castel’s (2003) metaphor,
a “collection of individuals” sharing a statistical position only, rather than
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a “collective” of political subjectivities. Whilst attention is focused on
the disproportion, the question of what connects the two poles remains
obscured. Here again, the issue of inequality is represented more in the
form of a gap than of a bond. And as far as domination is concerned,
it appears to be a matter of unbalanced quantities. Even when polariza-
tion is critically traced back to the new capitalism—as done by Piketty in
“Capital in the Twenty-First Century” (Piketty, 2014)—the tendency is
to forget Marx’s famous warning on how easy it is to pass off capital “as
a thing” rather than as the “social relationship” it really is.
Conclusions: The Dream of an Indifferent Power
As scholars of semiotics well know, and as Koselleck’s Begriffsgeschichte
(2007) also teaches us, the meaning of a word has a history that can only
be investigated in relation to other words. Inequality is no exception, as it
immediately recalls a dense constellation of words and related meanings.30
Of this constellation, the portion analysed here, however limited in time
and place, has provided several leads to explore how the meaning of the
word “inequality” has been changing—in a nutshell, it is being translated
into “distance”—and what role has been played by quantification, or more
precisely by the language of numbers. During this investigation the latter,
as a langage du rapport à la realité, has come into play together with
the language of words and that of spatial artefacts. And I have shown
how these languages contribute to reconfiguring inequality as a distance
“from”, instead of a tie “between”.
As far as it is framed as a question of distances and measurements,
inequality is captured in a quantitative format. Within this format the
vertical configuration, which anchored inequality to burning issues of
power, politics, and institutions, is being obfuscated, and inequality
appears in the normalized format of a quantitative variance flattening
out along a horizontal line. It is established by a comparison between
linear positions and intended merely as a matter of plus or minus, more
or less, yes or no, according to a binary code. Even though figures
can be multiplied, cross-compared and updated in real time, the picture
remains flattened out on a one single level. Figures only relate to other
figures, whilst the third term that links them tends to disappear. We
might say that, because it is only acknowledged as relative, and not as
relational, inequality has lost its absolute—that is, its societal and polit-
ical—dimension (much like Sen’s “absolute poverty”). It is worth noting
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that similar flattening effects of quantification come to light in the making
of the “new calculable global world” that Laurent Thévenot discusses
in his contribution to this volume, by analysing certification standard
setting concerning palm oil. His account, from the perspective of the
“smallholders”—farmers and rural communities—involved in the “partic-
ipative” procedure, vividly shows how in this latter the arguments are
both formatted for making things calculable and expressed in a hori-
zontal arena that conceals the (rather obvious) “power imbalance between
parties”. Any third term between these parties is lacking, aside from
the so-called “third parties”, whose impartiality appears highly dubious.
In that case, too, Thévenot argues, domination bonds get obscured by
the “juxtaposition of ‘stakes’ in a horizontal dialogue around the round
table”.31
In any case, those flattening effects are the mark left by quantifica-
tion on the semantic field of inequality. However, we should also reverse
our view and look at what mark is left on quantification by its involve-
ment in this field and in the more general resignification process affecting
inequality. As we have seen, from the vantage point of the inequality issue,
quantification is being highlighted in relation to ruling powers, especially
those powers that are expressed, since Hobbes, in naming, as well as,
obviously enough, in counting. “Depoliticization” may be a first inter-
pretative key when considering that, in quantifying inequality we have
seen a power engaged in fabricating a reality without seeming to do so.
Of course, as I have already recalled, quantification can also keep political
struggle alive, both when it is a matter of constructing data and when
these data coagulate political arenas and subjectivities. But the case of
inequality bears a quite different mark, as we have seen, which suggests
placing quantification amongst the drivers of the depoliticization of polit-
ical choices characterizing, according to Wendy Brown (2006, 2015) the
neoliberal discourse.
Indeed, the issue of inequality, which has for a long time been the crux
of political struggles and compromises on the social order, appears to be
caught in the grip of the “discourse of depoliticization” as intended (see
Brown, 2006, ch. 1) as a discourse that “eschews power and history in
the representation of its subject” (Brown, 2006, p. 15),32 emptying it
of political significance. In the end, inequality is transformed, as we have
seen, into a problem to be “managed”, a terrain on which to apply a
managerial logic. “Inequality becomes normal, even normative” (Brown,
2015, p. 38). According to this interpretation, numbers are involved in
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depoliticization since they provide a language for the economic metric
which is at the core of the neoliberal spirit, and for generalizing it
within “spheres and activities heretofore governed by other tables of
values” (Brown, 2015, p. 21). By providing the “dissimulation of the
normative work they do” (Brown, 2015, p. 135), numbers contribute
to vanquishing “the already anemic homo politicus”, being replaced by
“homo oeconomicus” (Brown, 2015, ch. 3).33
Our focus on the inequality issue confirms that the quantitative format
can be extremely efficient in eschewing power matters in the issues
it shapes. But what kind of power operates through the dissimulation
provided by numbers in the case in point? As we have already seen
the translation of inequality into distance corresponds to a power being
exercised through that distance: not only in the sense of “governing at-a-
distance”—something we already know numbers may contribute to—but
rather in the sense of “keeping at a distance”. Numbers provide dissimula-
tion to a power that denies any form of bond with its own object/subject.
A domination, I argued or rather conjectured, being enacted through
an indifference which takes the form of both ignorance on the cognitive
side, and irresponsibility on the moral side.34 The issue is now how the
language of numbers reframing inequality is involved in corroborating
this indifference.
We already know how much the neoliberal “bureaucratization”
(Hibou, 2012) exploits the performative role of quantitative data in
renovating and enhancing the archetypal indifference of the bureaucratic
command.35 As Supiot (2015) shows, the automatisms of the governance
by numbers replicate in digital form the long-lasting mechanistic utopia
of the homo automata, freed from any subjectivity. But the crux of the
matter lies in the very virtues of numbers, as we have seen them at work
configuring inequality as distance. We have seen how the science-based
operations for sparing on words and qualifications, and for “mathema-
tization” (Ogien, 2013) transfigure inequality into an abstract picture.
The abstraction that the language of numbers is able to achieve results in
a rarefied reality. The latter appears, at the same time, in the spotlight
of scientific evidence, and cleared from any other form of knowledge
and language, of view and experience, and even of data. It is precisely
thanks to the capacity of numbers for abstraction, and thus to the abstract
and rarefied picture of inequality they provide, that the inner contentious
meaning of inequality, as a power issue, is being sucked out, and may
be ignored by the powerful. The “skilled ignorance” grounded on the
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quantified inequality goes hand in hand with the moral innocence that
the reference to destiny or chance (like in a gambling game) in its turn
authorizes.
To sum up, the powerful machinery of numerical abstraction trans-
figuring inequality would seem to support the dream of a power that
dominates by pretending to be both cognitively and morally indif-
ferent. But there is a disproportion, here, disturbing the dream. This
is the disproportion between the rarefied picture of inequality that
numbers achieve—objective, precise, and complete as it claims to be—
and the density of the silenced social knowledge on inequality, the related
immense sufferings, and the anger growing around it. This dispropor-
tion reveals that this dream is just a dream. And when the abstract reality
of the quantified inequality grows to the point of irreality, the dream of
indifference appears coupled with obtuseness.
Notes
1. See Carlo Ginzburg (1986) on the history of S. Paul’s precept “noli altum
sapere, sed time”.
2. Carlo Ginzburg (1998, p. 180) shows the political implications of
Perspective in the Dedication of Machiavelli’s Il Principle. As for Hobbes,
the focus is on the Leviathan’s frontispiece in both Gamboni’s and
Schaffer’s contributions in Latour and Weibel (2005, pp. 162–202).
3. Fleck (1983 [1935]). But I am especially referring to the re-elaboration by
Mary Douglas in the framework of her cognitive approach to institutions
(Douglas, 1986, 1996).
4. Here, I examined the arguments and justifications put forward in welfare
policy arenas, especially those in normative texts, deeds and administrative
acts.
5. The word “labour”, too, was (and still is) under a process of redefinition
subverting its historically sedimented meaning (Salais 2007).
6. It is worth recalling here the “eclipse” of the elite issue from social theory
and discourse that Mike Savage and Karel Williams (2008) show to be
an effect of, amongst other factors, the quantitative turn of sociolog-
ical research on stratification and inequality from the mid-1970s onwards.
As national sample surveys were unable to highlight the small group at
the top, “elites thereby flipped from view” (Savage & Williams, 2008,
p. 3). And at the same time, inequality was defined “not as a set of social
relations, but as a graduated hierarchy” (Savage & Williams, 2008, p. 5).
7. It is worth pointing out here that a dual semantic matrix of the noun
“evidence” converges on poverty, i.e. not only a scientific frame, but also
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a legal one, where it is the police who provides the evidence constituting
the information on which legal judgement is based. The combination is
evoked by the images of the “war on poverty” in the USA, drawn for
example from the classic “Regulating the Poor” by Richard Cloward and
Francis Fox Piven (1971). I recall the image of the social worker, popu-
larly known as “social police”, who visits the home of the single mother
applying for benefits in order to check that she is not hiding a husband
under the bed. A different perspective on the legal frame was developed by
Carlo Ginzburg, recalling Peirce, to illustrate his historiographic approach
(Ginzburg, 1986, pp. 159–193).
8. These two qualifications imply two different semantics of poverty, as well
as two different grammars of justice. I refer to only a few aspects of this
difference here.
9. “Individuals, families and groups in the population can be said to be in
poverty when they lack the resources to obtain the types of diet, partici-
pate in the activities and have the living conditions and amenities which
are customary, or are at least widely encouraged or approved, in the soci-
eties to which they belong. Their resources are so seriously below those
commanded by the average individual or family that they are, in effect,
excluded from ordinary living patterns and activities” (Townsend, 1979,
p. 31). The European Commission’s definition, adopted in 1984, is similar
in tone: “The poor shall be taken to mean persons, families and groups
of persons whose resources (material, cultural and social) are so limited as
to exclude them from the minimum acceptable way of life in the Member
State in which they live” (EEC, 1985).
10. In the meantime, the vocabulary of needs has been reinforced and they
have become candidates for the role of “absolutes” in the place of
capabilities (Doyal & Gough, 1991).
11. The comparative element is, indeed, part and parcel of the relative concept
of poverty, according to which it is only possible to judge whether or not
someone is in poverty in relation to other people.
12. As for this crucial question in Sen’s capability approach, see Salais, in this
volume. See also Salais (2009) and De Leonardis et al. (2012).
13. I am quoting David Schmidtz, a representative of neoliberal discourse on
welfare (Schmidz & Goodin, 1998). It is worth noting that something
similar to a “bookkeeping justice” seems to underpin the social credit card
system instituted in China today, that Tom Lam analyses in this volume.
He shows it to be a crucial government’s technology to “economize soci-
ety” and establish a “credit fundamentalism” in pursuing the official dream
of a “harmonic society”.
14. As for architecture just consider the inner political substance of Vitruvius’
and Alberti’s “ars edificandi”. On geography see the political history of
the cartographic reason so wonderfully summarized in Brotton (2012).
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15. Gieryn refers, amongst others, to De Certeau: in this case “place”
translates the French term “lieu”. See also Gregory and Urry (1985).
16. A “spatial- or topological - turn” has also involved social sciences since
the 1980s.
17. Following Robert Castel (2003) who points out how this frame–of civil
more than social security–benefits from, and in turn feeds, the ghost of
“les nouvelles classes dangereuses”.
18. In Italian, the corresponding term “decoro” maintains a double meaning,
as it refers to both (aesthetical) decoration and (moral) dignity.
19. Whose genealogy Foucault has reconstructed in his lectures at the Collège
de France, 1977–1978 (Foucault, 2004). See also Sassen (2006).
20. Also in the light of some case studies I carried out myself (see Bricocoli
et al., 2008).
21. Donzelot (2006). On the related ethnicization of social conflict see Castel
(2009).
22. The reference is to Europe, as I said. More generally, it should be remem-
bered how different the history of cities in the US is, marked as it was at
its very beginnings by “racial” issues and connected dynamics of spatial
compartmentalization that are constantly being renewed.
23. See Brown (2009) in her study on today’s “porous” states’ sovereignty.
See also De Leonardis (2013) and the research literature discussed there.
24. According to Saskia Sassen (2014), it is “expulsion” rather than “inequal-
ity” that better corresponds to the “predatory” capitalism, which she
now sees emerging. “Repulsion” instead is, according to Serge Paugham’s
recent research with colleagues (Paugham et al., 2017), the common atti-
tude towards the poor amongst the urban élites in Paris, Sao Paulo and
Delhi. The aesthetics of these barriers is eloquent testimony to this. Their
sheer crudeness transmits brutality, and the hubris of an act of mere force:
Consider by contrast how beautiful the Otto Wagner Steinhof Spital in
Vienna is. See also Christopher Payne’s rich repertoire of the American
asylums (Payne, 2009).
25. The image has been taken up by Espeland and Sauder (2016) to study
rankings and their social effects, especially in terms of “reverse engi-
neering”. On the performative role of quantitative data in general see
the concept of “rétroaction” (feedback), regarding statistics (Desrosières,
2011), that of “reactivity”, regarding commensuration and ranking
(Espeland & Sauder, 2007; but see also Espeland & Stevens, 2008), whilst
on performance indicators see the Salais’ image of the inverted pyramid,
in this volume.
26. On the economizing function, see Guter-Sandu and Mennicken’s very rich
discussion in this volume, where quantification gets involved in “econ-
omizing the social” in three different ways: curtailing, marketizing and
financializing. However, I am looking at this a bit differently. As far as
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“to economize” may be also intended as the reframing process of “the
social” according to (mainstream) economic thinking, also that “parsi-
mony” the latter predicates and the numbers perform so well, is to be
taken into account. It’s about cognitive economy as well. The two clas-
sical essays by Sen (1977) and Hirschman (1985) still represent a relevant
background for this question.
27. Here I am quoting the title of Alain Supiot’s Lectures at the Collège de
France, 2012–2013 (Supiot, 2015), in which he shows how quantification
gives rise to a new normativity in which the rule of law is being dismantled
and the law itself reduced to an instrument of–he argues–“total market”
laws.
28. On similar cases in Africa see also Boris Samuel (2016). On the
“government by objectives” see Thévenot (2015).
29. As we know from historical studies especially on labour statistics (notably
by Robert Salais) as well as from research on statactivism (Bruno et al.,
2014). An example for statactivism, which also is relevant here as it
concerns measuring poverty, can be drawn from Appadurai’s account on
the mobilization of the inhabitants of the slums in Mumbai (now in
Appadurai, 2013). When the city government, prompted by this mobi-
lization, wanted to do a statistical survey on their living conditions, they
claimed the statistical tools as their own by undertaking the survey them-
selves and deciding how to measure these conditions. However, see Boris
Samuel, in this volume, on some of the limits of statactivism.
30. It would certainly have been appropriate to explore the opposite notion
of “equality”, as it also was subjected to dynamics of resignification, along
with the changes in the words of welfare discussed in the first section of
this chapter. One could note that, on the one hand, the noun “equality”
was used less and less, or was treated as an equivalent of “homologation”
(versus “difference”) so that it acquired a negative meaning; and that,
on the other hand, the semantic field of equality was breaking up into a
plurality of synonyms or substitutes. One of these words is “parity” (parità,
parité), which I mention here, because it seems to provide a fertile terrain
for studying quantification. “Parity” demands that things be placed on the
same level, as peers, it implies a comparative approach, and is correlated
to measurements, rankings etc. (as typically the gender parity index). All
in all, there is some contiguity to be seen here, with the flattening out we
observed in the reconfiguration of inequality as distance. The opposite of
parity is “disparity”.
31. Quite obviously, this convergence does not imply that flattening effects,
occurring in such different contexts, are intrinsic to quantification, which
on the contrary can well be a road for voices to travel up vertically (and
“en généralité”). Rather, the two opposite moves in which quantification
is involved may help to clarify the difference between the two modes
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of quantification—“statistics” or “governance-driven quantification”—that
Robert Salais has identified in his contribution to this volume (see also
Salais, 2010).
32. “Depoliticization involves removing a political phenomenon from
comprehension of its historical emergence and from a recognition of the
powers that produce and contour it” (Brown, 2006, p. 15).
33. Perhaps, in order to clear the ground of any impression of ideological
criticism, it should be remembered that this line of interpretation has a
history. In this respect, it is sufficient to recall certain astute observations
made by Werner Sombart (2006 [1906]) during his trip in the US. The
account of this trip (dating back to 1905) revolves around the question:
“Why is there no socialism in the US?” Sombart identifies one of the
answers in the American “passion” for figures, or more precisely in the
general recourse to quantitative metrics in assessing people and objects.
Thus “bigness” has an absolute prevalence in evaluating and appreciating
“greatness”. Sombart also argues that it is money that, in the end, consti-
tutes the term of reference for these metrics, more precisely money “in
the specific capitalist form” (versus Simmel). In the framework of justifi-
cation theory, see also its comparative-cultural developments in Lamont
and Thévenot (2000) on the relative salience of the market as a principle
of evaluation in the American (versus French) polity. Similarly, see also
Supiot’s (2015) research on the historical-cultural matrix of quantification
associated to the rise of the “total market”.
34. If one follows Richard Sennett 2006, this indifference, seen as a way of
exercising domination, and the divorce between command and responsi-
bility it rests upon, may be considered as a salient feature of the culture
of the new capitalism. However, this indifference also recalls to me other,
disparate, images. First, we might search for the origins of this orienta-
tion in “the revolt of the elites” (and “the betrayal of democracy”, Lasch,
1995) or in that sort of “class struggle from the top down” that Luciano
Gallino (2012) has identified in the dynamics of Italian capitalism since
the late 1970s. Second, from the perspective of recognition (starting out
from Honneth) indifference towards the “other” may correspond to a lack
of recognition, to an identity not imposed–by the “naming” power–but
rather denied (De Leonardis, 2013). Third, this indifference of the ruling
powers seems complementary to the subjection standing from the threat
of, or the condemnation to “uselessness”, that is the condition of potential
or actual “surnuméraire” in the book-keeping of working, and of living
as well, to pertinently quote Robert Castel (2009) once again. Fourth,
this indifference of power also looks contiguous with today’s cynicism
grounded on (both cognitive and moral) relativist positions (Sloterdijk,
2013).
35. Since Webers’s “sine ira et studio” disposition corresponding to the
bureaucrat’s “honour” (see Herzfeld, 1992).
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PART II
The Politics of Evidence
CHAPTER 6
Homo Statisticus: AHistory of France’s
General Public Statistical Infrastructure
on Population Since 1950
Thomas Amossé
Over the past few decades, views of quantification have changed. Largely
seen as accompanying social progress and economic growth during
France’s post-war boom (1945–1975), quantification is now associated
with new forms of domination. There have undoubtedly been differences
in the tone, more or less critical, of social–historical work on quantifica-
tion developed in France and elsewhere, ranging from the more political
to the more cognitive (see e.g. Desrosières, 2008, vol. 2, ch. 1). Denun-
ciations of the tools of quantification as reflections of the negative effects
of neoliberalism1 are yet also relatively widespread on an international
level, as attested to in practice and by the diverse settings analysed in the
contributions of this volume.
How are we to understand this shift? Certainly this is in part a result of
differences (semantic, syntactic and pragmatic) in the quantification tools
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emblematic of each period. In France, socio-professional categories—
which contributed to making the 1960s and 1970s a golden age in the
fight against inequalities (see e.g. Desrosières, 1987 [1977]; Desrosières
& Thévenot, 1988; Amossé, 2013)—have little to do with the more
recently developed management indicators. Their use likewise varies, as
the former was related to knowledge and administration of the national
socio-economic situation by the State and by social democratic authorities
such as the General Planning Commissioner, while the latter aspire to the
self-transformation of micro-economic behaviours (private and public).
That said, this evolution is not solely due to a shift in subject-matter,
viewing angle, or focal length in perspectives on quantification.
As we shall see, a retrospective examination of the forms taken by
the same ‘tool’ over the course of time—focusing here on changes in
the public statistical infrastructure on population—highlights its profound
transformation, which attests to a crisis of totalization (Dodier, 1996) as
well as a neoliberal inflection (Desrosières, 2014). Moreover, we herein
talk of ‘statistical infrastructure’ rather than ‘survey’, despite the latter
being more common in French and other languages. This choice aims
to distinguish the generic subject-matter of our analysis—the statistical
infrastructure—from the different forms it takes on over time (the first
of which being the ‘representative household survey’). Additionally, this
term refers to the utilization of administrative registers made up of
households or individuals for statistical purposes. We further clarify that
company surveys, which focus primarily on accounting and financial data,
are excluded.
The statistical survey, a classic tool of quantification, has not disap-
peared in an era of indicators and benchmarking (Bruno & Didier, 2013).
Yet, as much in its themes and technical characteristics as in the ques-
tions it poses and categories it retains, it is today much different than in
the immediate post-war period. Herein lies the aim of this chapter, to
describe in detail its evolution, which we summarize in three models that
progressively overlap one another: the ‘representative household survey’,
the ‘biographical investigation’, and the ‘matched panel’. These models
articulate, each in a specific way, social science theories, statistical method-
ologies, and public action conceptions. They summarize a way of seeing
and showing the world, of building and acting upon it. From these
models emerge three types of being2 that the different statistical infras-
tructures address—homo statisticus3 they contribute to defining—herein
called subject , person, and individual in reference to the three pillars set
out in Alain Supiot’s (2007 [2005])Homo juridicus.
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These beings are, of course, only made of paper or bytes, but they exist:
simultaneously as a more or less explicit ideal within the minds of statisti-
cians designing the statistical infrastructure, as a support (abstract but also
linguistic) in the interaction between interviewer and interviewee,4 and
as a (more or less visible) unit of analysis in the results. They can be the
object of identification or appropriation processes; these beings provide a
basis for scholarly and ordinary categorizations, reflections of a statistical
normativity that, even if weak under the law, is nevertheless very real.
Placed under the auspices of the State according to the continental tradi-
tion that symbolizes the etymology of the word Statistik, this statistical
normativity is particularly strong in France, having since its origin been
administration-driven (Desrosières, 1998 [1993]).
In what follows, we aim to document the evolution of the relation
between the French State and its statistical citizens, in their multiple and
successive forms. What can a history of large-scale statistical infrastructure
on the general population, of the beings that they pre-construct and to
whom they are directed, teach us about ways of knowing and governing
the economy and society? In addressing this question, we endeavour to go
beyond the individualization thesis characteristic of contemporary times.
The analysis accordingly shows the diversification of statistical beings; the
proposed trinity—subject, person, and individual—underlines the non-
univocality of the changes at work. It also invites reflection on the tensions
that accompany the advent of neoliberalism, from emancipation opportu-
nities to renewal of oppression, without mystification of a past that can
be the only bearer of social and economic progress or, on the contrary,
synonymous with archaism. Far from any instrumental determinism, this
study5 aspires not only to retain plurality but also the elasticity of quan-
tification forms, of their conceptual base as much as their technical
implementation; of their practical uses as much as their political impli-
cations. It builds on recent work on the social history of quantification, a
subject widely reflected upon within this volume’s contributions.
Our three models should not be thought of in purely temporal terms
by which the modern is compared to the old. These are ‘ideal type’
constructions whose characteristics we never find in a ‘pure state’ in the
statistical infrastructure actually carried out. Rather we find various forms
of hybridization. If there is a temporal trend, the latter corresponds to
a progressive diversification, and not to a replacement of one model
for another. Each has passed through, in its own specific way, different
methodological changes: the emergence of the individual as observation
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unit replacing the household; the micro-computerization of collection
modes and statistical analyses; the introduction of a longitudinal compo-
nent in the design. In what follows, we present the three models in detail
before turning to a discussion of the resultant forms of homo statisticus.
The Representative Household Survey
The first classic type of statistical infrastructure examined here has its
origins in France in the 1950s. It was imported from the United States
by public statisticians working at the INSEE (Institut National de la
Statistique et des Études Économiques, the French National Institute for
Statistics) in the immediate post-war period, who had spent time across
the Atlantic training in the latest methodological innovations.6 Among
other tools, they brought back the random sample survey (then used in
the area of employment). This technique gave way to the adoption of
the now standard notion of statistical representativeness, providing the
necessary conditions for the description of the national population as a
whole, as opposed to the hitherto targeting of specific subpopulations
(Desrosières, 2008, vol. 2, ch. 8, p. 194). This period was character-
ized by the strong belief in the scientificity of a ‘new statistical language’
for economic matters (Desrosières, 2008, vol. 2, ch. 3), which coin-
cided with the desire to depict a post-war society in full reconstruction.
Numerous surveys were at the time created, forming a first point of depar-
ture for repeated studies still active today. Described as ‘structural’, these
surveys dealt with general themes that both organized administrative
action and reported on French daily life: employment (1950), housing
(1955), family budgets (1956), health (1960), training and employment
skills (1963), time-use (1966). The ‘programme of priority surveys on
standards of living’, adopted in 1965 under the Fifth Plan, reflects the
accordance of this type of survey with the knowledge and management
of social and economic life objectives pursued at the time by the General
Planning Commissioner.
The questionnaires of these surveys are usually short and in paper
format.7 They have only a few filters (technical indications that determine
whether to ask one or a set of questions) and the general principle is to
use the same questions for the entire population, with identical formula-
tions and response options for all respondents. They follow the model of
a social identity card resembling, for example, the census report which de
6 HOMO STATISTICUS: A HISTORY OF FRANCE’S … 173
facto defines the principal socio-demographic characteristics of the popu-
lation. There is thus only space for the ‘major variables’,8 or those of
an administrative nature, approved by public statistics and assumed to
be unanimously and uniformly understood. These variables generally go
hand in hand with legal categories or are derived from institutions, such
as civil status registers for sex and age, nationality and country of birth
for geographic origin, diploma or nationally certified trainings for level
of education, administrative subdivisions (departments, regions) for place
of residence or work, contractual terms for professional situation (type of
contract, working time). As suggested by Michel Gollac (1997), the law
saves on construction costs, as there is a shared belief that the categories
that refer to the law are solid.
Due to high production costs (up until the introduction of micro-
computing)—the survey samples are smaller in size and their analysis
constrained by limited automated processing capacities—the results often
take the form of tables or charts, with few intersecting variables: on one
side there are indicators on employment, housing, health, etc., and on
the other side those corresponding to socio-demographic characteristics
(sex, age cohort, nationality, region of residence, etc.). Their purpose is
to provide ‘photographs’, thematic snapshots of society, so as to gain an
understanding of its organization and functioning. The periodic reissue
of the surveys provides insight into macro-social dynamics. The results
are produced according to schemas of a structural-functionalist inspira-
tion that govern the elaboration of the surveys. It is in this manner that
the demographic, social or economic behaviour of the population and its
households are studied: the economy and social matters primarily being
the domain of the ‘head’ (a man)9; the domestic and familial reserved for
women, their spouses.10.
Public statistics considers the household to be the central unit of anal-
ysis. Indeed, this is the title given, for almost twenty-five years, to the
section primarily responsible for designing statistical infrastructure on
population at INSEE: the Population and Household Department (from
1966 to 1989). The notion of household separates the interior (private)
from the exterior (public) according to a strict gender division of roles.
In addition to accommodating a male-dominated vision of the world, this
concept also reflects a holistic vision of society and the economy. By law,
men and women long had clearly assigned roles within the household.
Women could not work without their husband’s permission until 1965 in
France, and divorce by mutual consent was not introduced until 1975.11
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In this context, the statistical household is seen as a full-fledged economic
actor in terms of income, consumption, savings, or economic expecta-
tions. As such, according to the monthly business survey (still in place
today), households have opinions, independent of the men and women,
parents or children, who compose them.
The statistical nomenclature of socio-professional categories occupies
a special place in this survey model. Its success was total during the
three decades following their creation in the early 1950s (Desrosières
& Thévenot, 1988). Broken down at the level of head of household
or father, these categories are systematically used in statistical tables,
evincing class inequalities or those of social origin.12 This ‘major vari-
able’ is emblematic of the back and forth between public statistics (and
its surveys) and the socio-economic administration in France at the time:
on the one hand, statistical nomenclature draws on social categories,
occupational subdivisions which, backed by the law, are in place within
companies and administrations; on the other hand, it is used directly by
social actors, whether under the General Planning Commissioner or, to
mention just one example, the indexation of the minimum wage which
gives rise to national negotiations between labour unions and employers’
organizations.
The scope of these surveys is usually households in ordinary accom-
modations in metropolitan France, which compose the statistical heart of
society, an echo of the electoral body. The non-zero probability of selec-
tion of households that organize the sampling procedures can, in fact,
be thought of as the equivalent of a statistical right to vote. Further-
more, the methods of analysis used are essentially summation techniques,
much like the adding up of votes in an election. The notion of representa-
tiveness is central here, its statistical meaning lending political acceptance
to the term. If, in addition, we consider the particular role played by
the law and institutions, this survey model certainly seems emblematic
of the representative democracy of intermediary bodies characteristic of
France from the 1950s to the 1980s. Indeed, the General Planning
Commissioner constituted one of the primary transmission channels in
organizing government and social partner participation in the elaboration
of medium-term policies based, specifically, on predictions from statistical
surveys.
This political-administrative tone is found in the term ‘survey’ itself.
While it has certainly been used in a generic sense since the post-war
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period within the French statistical community, it also refers, origi-
nally, to the search for information within a judicial framework, then by
further extension the systematic collection of testimonies or documenta-
tion aimed at clarifying an issue or dispute.13 These different definitions
share the implicit meaning of an ‘unveiling’; of obtaining private, some-
times secret or hidden, information. The word also recalls the asymmetry
of the survey context, which has long been reinforced by the sociological
profile of INSEE interviewers (former gendarmes and military personnel)
(see Dussert, 1996). This asymmetry is, moreover, particularly signif-
icant in that it distinguishes between ordinary households and public
agents. The statistical survey, notably that which follows this first model,
is marked by the State’s seal: official notification letters often accompa-
nied by an obligation to respond, the professional card of the interviewer
knocking on the door bearing the colours of the flag—such elements give
off an air of an administrative questioning.
This survey model was for many years the only one that existed. Then
progressively, starting in the late 1970s and particularly in the 1980s,
two other models were developed. That said, this initial form has not
disappeared, but rather continues to exist, giving way to hybridization
between original and emergent models with the micro-computerization
and the integration of longitudinal questionings (see ‘matched panels’
below). Today they are essentially annual surveys by wave (on the labour
force, housing, etc.) which, as a continuation of their antecedents from
the 1950s and 1960s, compose the ‘back bone’ of the INSEE statistical
infrastructure.14 There have, however, been two notable developments.
First, they are increasingly governed by European regulations, for the
purposes of updating social descriptions at the continental level in the
form of reporting indicators or national barometers relying on several
‘core variables’. While similar to the ‘major variables’ mentioned above,
the latter differs in not always referring to institutional categories, in the
absence of common institutions at the European level.15 Second, they
aim to more fully cover the entire population, surveying segments of
the population usually labelled as “outside the scope” such as the home-
less, those in institutions (prisons, health or social establishments) or by




The second type of statistical infrastructure on population examined
here has its origins at INSEE during a time of reflection and critique
of the social sciences in France starting in the mid-1970s with, for
example, the shift towards Pierre Bourdieu’s critical sociology, affirma-
tion of the work of Michel Foucault, and the start of Luc Boltanski and
Laurent Thévenot’s pragmatic sociology. A two-fold movement of diver-
sification thus began to shape large scale public statistical infrastructure.
First, in terms of the variables used, with less primacy given to institu-
tional categories in the questionnaires, and more openness towards the
social sciences, whereby theoretical advances and methodological obser-
vations of ordinary practices provided new ways of questioning the world.
Secondly and more broadly, the themes of such infrastructure diversi-
fied, going well beyond the economic behaviours of households and the
socio-demographic characteristics of their members.16
The ‘biographical investigation’ questionnaires stand out for their
length and evident distancing from examinations of a more administrative
nature. They follow a linear path much like the biographical interviews
of interpretive sociology,17 and frequently employ retrospective questions
and timelines to reconstruct respondents’ trajectories. To this regard, two
practical protocols were developed. The timelines can, on the one hand,
rely on paper chronologies allowing respondents to mark their own points
of reference (a birth, a move, a promotion, etc.) and in this way recon-
struct different parallel accounts (i.e. familial, residential, professional,
etc.). On the other hand, or simultaneously, the timelines can be assessed
using resources offered by computerization, allowing to gradually unfold
stories in function of past events. Thanks to filters and the configuration of
successive questions, the survey fits the life of the respondent like a glove.
In this model, the survey situation targets the unit of time and of place
in order to ensure the coherence of responses, which rely on memory
recall, sensitivity, and the perception of contexts, and thus depend on the
interaction between interviewer and interviewee.
The objective of ‘biographical investigations’ is less about consistency
with official categories (specific to the ‘representative household surveys’)
or the pureness of ‘matched panels’ (see below) than the sincerity
and coherence of the responses provided. This statistical infrastructure
model has contributed to the development of new questions relative
to emotional experiences, whether they be physical or mental, using a
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subjective (perception or opinion; feeling or emotion) or more objective
(ordinary situations, practical experiences) approach. In this way, violence,
suffering or hardship, physical ailments or bodily nuisances, satisfaction or
happiness, freedom, etc., become ‘statisticable’ notions. Simultaneously,
information on the temporal context or local environment is collected,
on different levels or according to different timeframes, often fixed by
the respondents themselves. Multiple ‘nested’ descriptive circles can thus
be identified: from the closest members who compose the ‘living unit’ or
‘relations’ (terms which invite moving beyond the alleged unicity of the
‘household’) to the furthest, such as the social class or geographical area
to which one feels belonging.
Examples of statistical infrastructure within this model, which share
some or all of its features, are as diverse in their themes as in the govern-
ment departments or administrative bodies that produce them. They
were originally carried out mostly by INED (the French Institute for
Demographic Studies), where in the 1980s demographers began imple-
menting statistical modelling for the analysis of biographies (Courgeau
& Lelièvre, 1989),18 and then a decade later, multilevel or contextual
analyses (Baccaini & Courgeau, 1997).19 Such statistical infrastructures
have, however, also subsequently been used by a number of other public
institutions. Two particularly stand out for their attention to biograph-
ical nature, to perceptions of past situations, and importance given to
the contexts in which personal trajectories unfold. The first, the Health
and Career Path survey (2006 and 2010; Santé et itinéraire profes-
sionnel) asks respondents to reconstruct their entire professional careers
while also indicating major health events, with the objective of under-
standing how health and work influence one another over time. The
second, the Life History—Construction of Identities survey (2003;Histoire
de vie—construction des identités) combines a complete retrospective time-
line (residence, family, employment, economic well-being) with questions
aimed at understanding the articulation of the latter with different facets
of personal identity (e.g. family, work, friends, hobbies, health, origins,
etc.). As explained in the survey’s guideline note, the idea is to account
for the multiple processes of identifying individuals with places, groups,
histories, values: “the individual bears multiple identities” whose “main
dimensions must be explored” (see Héran, 1998). These two statistical
infrastructures both leave a great deal of freedom to the respondents in
how they mark their biographical itineraries and give more room to their
subjectivity.
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More than one method has been developed to use data collected in this
way. Duration models, chronograms and, more generally, life course anal-
ysis methods all aim to understand procedural logics, successive choices,
bifurcations, potential disruptions or protections of a given trajectory.20
In a different way, exploratory factorial analyses can both show structural
oppositions within the population and the coherence of answers for each
respondent. Results can lead to a first, inductive, modelling of areas previ-
ously little explored and where a full understanding has not been reached
in the absence of structuring ‘major variables’.21 More generally, “bio-
graphical investigations” seem to be consistent with the desire to reconcile
the holism and individualism we find in the “new sociologies” described
by Philippe Corcuff (2007 [1995]).22 In two different registers and disci-
plines, the methods derived from Amartya Sen’s capability approach in
economics and the multilevel analyses used in demography (Baccaini &
Courgeau, 1997) have been adopted in efforts to understand the effect
of situated interactions and local contexts.23
These approaches all have in common the fact that statistical represen-
tativeness is not the primary concern. Certainly the statistical infrastruc-
ture relies on a random sampling procedure and the subsequent analyses
often use weights based on the latter, but this use is secondary in that
it is the processes, the consistencies or oppositions, that are of partic-
ular interest. Echoing the sociological interview principle, the methods
share a reasoning ‘by row’ at least as much as ‘by column’; in the
sense that they first follow the logic of the respondents, not that of the
variables. This sort of thinking is present from the very conception of
the questionnaires—the queries are formulated using verbatim accounts
from sociological studies—and of their computerization (filters linked to
previous responses, which act like reminders during an interview). The
term ‘investigation’ used here recalls the exploratory dimension of this
statistical infrastructure: simultaneously as a study of ‘rows’ (that is to say,
an attempt to reconstruct, for each person, their complex biographical
history, their subjectivity, their social inscription) and taken as a whole, in
many ways following an exploratory research approach.
The Matched Panels
The third form of statistical infrastructure responds to a micro-causalist
agenda, which differs both from grand narratives which collective enti-
ties deploy as historical causes, or biographical narrations where causality
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is presented in a singular way. The statistical infrastructure that follows
this logic was made possible by unprecedented advances in information
processing, and maintains a close relationship with micro-econometrics.
Long dominated by macro-structural approaches, they were developed
along with individual computerization in the 1990s before becoming
dominant in the next decade. Like the ‘biographical investigation’, this
statistical infrastructure uses a large number of variables. However, in
contrast, their collection of information does not necessarily suppose a
specific unit of place and of time. While the information gathered can
certainly draw on questions asked by an interviewer during a single inter-
view, the latter is just as likely to derive from subsequent interviews
(possibly with different interviewers and respondents for the same panel
unit) or from matching with external data of diverse origins. In fact, the
origin or the situated consistency of the collected information is not of
all that much importance. What counts is their quality, thought of as
intrinsic, and the ability of the statistical infrastructure to amass pertinent
variables for each respondent so as to be able to saturate the explanatory
models with the phenomena under analysis.
When the classic format of the face-to-face interview is used, this form
of statistical infrastructure relies on a complex questionnaire including
numerous case disjunctions, where computerization plays a crucial role.
Multiple filters and parameter settings allow to adjust the questioning
and adapt the formulations so as to obtain, for each respondent, the best
measure of the targeted variables. Computerized questionnaires are not
modelled on either the social identity card of the ‘representative house-
hold survey’, or the carefully tailored ‘biographical investigation’. They
are foremost routines, computer programmes, difficult to grasp in their
entirety. Indeed, the initial structuring requires a paper format trans-
lation, necessary in order to give analysts a clear understanding. The
current Labour Force Survey (Enquête Emploi) questionnaire provides a
good example: its paper version is more than 80 pages long (compared
to the simple DIN-A3 sheet in its original form); its reading, broken up
by numerous filters and parameter settings, underlines the complex task
of trying to construct a linear, narrative version. It is, more broadly, an
intricate set of documents (technical notes, training guide, survey lexicon
or glossary, etc.) necessary for using the ‘data’. These questionnaires,
fragmented and complex, in reality, blend into the object they target,
i.e. panel individuals; direct questioning is one way (among others) of
obtaining information deemed pertinent. The collected variables rarely,
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or secondarily, refer to practical experience or to institutional categories,
but rather ideally and in principle, to observed facts24 in accordance
with theoretical categories which, besides, derive more from the natural
sciences than the social sciences. They are ideally continuous, being cate-
gorical only when imposed by constraints (conditioning of reality or
resulting from data collection arrangements). It is about ‘good vari-
ables’ (to use a common econometric expression), and not ‘ordinary
variables’ or ‘major variables’ which are both too dependent on the
administrative, spatial or temporal context. Education, for example, is
thus ideally measured by number of years of study, and not by diplomas
obtained (for which recognition by the State can vary over time) or the
level of education reported (susceptible to perception bias). The aim of
establishing causalities, scientifically demonstrated and ideally universal in
scope, necessitates discarding variables that do not relate to any theory
or may be endogenous. The term ‘data’ is preferred to ‘responses’; the
constructed and declarative nature of the information must be neutralized
in the analysis, following an objectivist plan that aims to get rid of limits
associated with the subjectivity of the respondents or with conventions
linked to institutions in the development of variables.
This type of statistical infrastructure is also characterized by a specific
way of viewing time. Like the ‘biographical investigations’, longitudinal
information is of central importance. In contrast, however, here such
information is collected prospectively through data collection or matching
of information repeated over time. Retrospective examinations are seen as
tainted by bias, echoing the work of Karl Popper in the immediate post-
war period, later analysed in detail and criticized by Luc Boltanski (2012),
whereby history, the past, memory, are all seen as obstacles to the estab-
lishment of scientific truth, which should be timeless. If time plays a role,
it is only as a source of variation and turned towards the future; it allows
to identify causalities between actual and subsequent events. It is not
about understanding historical processes—viewed as impossible to grasp
other than as partial constructions (loss of respondents from one exami-
nation to another) or biased reconstructions (memory). It is a question of
having repeated measures, of independent observations over time of the
same panel units, so as to establish statistical links between various changes
that have affected them over the period under analysis. At INSEE, a
shift in orientation towards prospective panel data occurred in the mid-
2000s (Chaleix & Lollivier, 2004), in part explaining our use of the term
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‘matched panels’ to describe this model. The adjective ‘matched’ empha-
sizes the matching used to collect various information on the individuals
panelled.
Examples of such statistical infrastructure, today numerous, are most
often prospective panels. They tend to dominate public statistics and have
contributed to transforming ‘representative household surveys’, leading
to a hybridization of the two models. This is the case, for example,
with regard to the Labour Force Survey (Enquête Emploi), whose longi-
tudinal dimension was significantly reinforced in 2003, when it came to
rely on a ‘continual’25 statistical infrastructure. Whereas once it was (in
its original form) emblematic of our first survey model, two important
characteristics now attest to its hybridization. First, its original objective
(establishment of the unemployment rate) has shifted from a reporting
logic–made possible by the assumed strength of institutions themselves
to give meaning to a direct question on labour status, notably unemploy-
ment, to a factual logic where only the combination of specific criteria
referring to the past week (or reference period) determines unemployed
status under the International Labour Office definition (Goux, 2003).
Second, the increase in the number of interview waves has allowed for
the development of panel analyses.
The European Community Household Panel (1994–2001) and its
successor, the Survey on Income and Living Conditions (2006) provide
additional examples of hybridizations. In addition, the Permanent Demo-
graphic Sample (Echantillon démographique permanent; census subsam-
ples matched with civil status, electoral participation or, since 2011,
social-fiscal data) and the Dads panel are older examples, which have
recently been enhanced and whose exploitation has been strengthened.
Classic themes are addressed in this form of statistical infrastructure
(e.g. housing, education, employment, health, etc.). They refer to areas
of public action, but in a renewed form compared to the ‘representative
household survey’ model. The emphasis is placed on individual change,
its determinants and consequences, rather than on understanding broad
macro-structural dynamics in an effort, for example, to organize national
planning and accounting. In the shift towards micro-statistics, global
management of the economy and society is no longer the central concern,
as it was during the time of the planners, but rather scientific expertise,
a priori neutral and independent, allowing to evaluate the capacity of
public policies to change, within a given domain, individual behaviour.
In this regard, incentive theory, sometimes implicitly, plays a determinant
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role. The political dimension of this form of statistical infrastructure is
thus naturalized: their design integrates political objectives in advance, in
the definition of eligible populations and target variables. Certain forms
of this statistical infrastructure are particularly inventive in their efforts
to evaluate public policies, such as the Panel on State-aided contracts
(Panel des contrats aidés) carried out in 2008 and 2014 by the Ministry
responsible for labour and employment. In this case, the policies were
evaluated using a quasi-experimental model directly imported from the
natural sciences (notably medical research).
While specific, this ‘matched panel’ sub-model (described here as
‘quasi-experimental’), is no less important from a symbolic point of view.
The INSEE report on longitudinal data (Chaleix & Lollivier, 2004)
in fact accords a central place to the latter: panels must be “targeted
at specific populations (that is chosen in reference to the evaluation
process of a given social policy, which usually means that collection begins
before the introduction of the policy in question, so as to be able to
observe change over time)”, “coupled with information from administra-
tive registers (to limit survey time and assure greater reliability of certain
information)” and follow a “sampling plan that includes a control group”
(Chaleix & Lollivier, 2004, p. 22).
In ‘matched panels’, the notion of representativeness is secondary. The
descriptive results are usually but a first step, which aims to verify that
there is no bias in the structure of the sample excluding an identifiable
segment (according to observable characteristics) of the population of
interest. Indeed, for panels, maintaining the initial representativeness of
the samples is particularly challenging due to attrition. Although dynamic
weighting can be developed, helping to guarantee representativeness over
time, most studies restrict their analyses to cylindrical samples (i.e. to
individuals who responded in all the waves of the panel) and don’t use
weights. These methodological options highlight the tension between
survey specialists and econometricians,26 and more broadly between the
aims of representatively describing populations and estimating factors
associated with a specific situation or behaviour. The methods used,
most often micro-econometric, neither need nor take into account the
representative structure of the samples analysed, as if the ‘data’ were
exhaustive.27 It is the size of the sample, or the repetition of observa-
tions (within a population and/or over time) and the (large) number and
(‘good’) quality of variables that are determinant in demonstrating the
‘purified’ causalities of composition effects or selection processes.
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Econometric modelling generally identifies one or more response vari-
ables—a behaviour or a situation that should evolve or improve in the
population, such as educational attainment, participation in the labour
market, etc.—and a large variety of explanatory variables. Among the
latter, an analytical distinction is made between so-called variables ‘of
interest’ and ‘control’ variables. The former, which correspond to poten-
tial public action levers (financial or in-kind support, for example),
dominate the reflection while the latter delineate as precisely as possible
the socio-economic profile, geographical or professional environmental,
etc., of the respondents. Ideally, as mentioned above, control variables
should be exogenous (that is, not depend on either the response vari-
ables or the variables of interest). They can thus either be an assumed
stable property of the respondents (e.g. sex, date of birth, age at end of
initial study, etc.) or a characteristic of their environment that they have
not chosen.28 The number and the precision of these control variables
condition the degree of purity of the statistical associations between the
response variables and the variables of interest. They define what econo-
metricians call observable heterogeneity and are not generally described in
published results. They are only occasionally used in analyses of subpop-
ulations (e.g. women or men, those with low levels of education, etc.)
aimed at evaluating the differential effectiveness of the policies studied.
Establishing causality relies on even more demanding and sophisti-
cated methods than those leading to controlled correlations. Without
going into the technical details of the three main methods employed
(instrumental and panel econometrics, experimental matching), we can
emphasize that all use the temporal and contextual richness of individual
data to eliminate any source of endogeneity (reverse causality, omitted
variable, etc.) and to ensure perfect control of individual heterogeneity
(observable and unobservable29). Such types of statistical infrastructure
differ from the previous two presented above, as much in their objec-
tives as in their formats and analytical methods. Undoubtedly, these
models lean on different social science disciplines and the influence of
the latter on French public statistics over the last seventy years. But they
are not limited to this influence, in the sense that methods circulate and
spread from one discipline to another, and the ‘models’ that compose the
three types of statistical infrastructure identified here take on, in fact, a
normative dimension as they are implemented by public statisticians.
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Homo Statisticus: Three Types of Being
Constructed by the Statistical Infrastructure
The description of the three models provides several initial characteris-
tics of the beings to which the different statistical infrastructures refer. In
what follows, we summarize their features using the same terminology as
that employed by Alain Supiot to describe the three pillars of his homo
juridicus (Supiot, 2007 [2005]), with which the three forms of homo
statisticus share a surprisingly similar kinship.
We have chosen to call the being defined in and by ‘representative
household surveys’, subject . This subject has a more pronounced political
dimension than the beings of the other two models. Its tone is adminis-
trative, as we have seen, with its official socio-demographic characteristics,
the institutional variables defining its identity. From the outset, the char-
acteristics of the subject refer to the collective beings with which it is
assumed to identify (at a minimum during the survey), according to
the process described by Nicolas Dodier (1996) of temporarily accepting
assimilation to the pragmatic condition of statistical identity. This identity
is borne by the ‘major variables’ of ‘representative household surveys’:
the subject is the representative, among others, of collective beings; it
is a member of a class, a category, or a group. Its singularity is not,
in a sense, detachable from its properties, which are familial and sexed
status within the household (‘head’ then ‘reference person’, or spouse, a
child, etc.), age group (e.g. youth30), social group (e.g. managers or blue-
collar workers, farmers, etc.), nationality, or geographical unit of resident
(region or department).
Subjects are thus only indirectly represented, by their categories of
belonging: institutions such as the family, school, company, or admin-
istration, and more broadly the State (as source and guarantor of the law)
primarily determine the categories that express, as much to society as to
themselves, the surveyed beings. It is not, however, solely the range of
collective belongings that public statistics uses to characterize its subject ,
but also economic behaviour, and social roles expected of the subject. This
assignment is particularly clear with regard to the role of women, about
whom statisticians ask: how should they assist in the reconstruction of
post-war France, by having children (according to a fertility logic whose
military inspiration has shifted to a production aspiration) or by providing
a source of additional labour-power (Amossé & de Peretti, 2011)? More
broadly, analyses of sex and age groups, migratory status or social group,
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region of residence, are difficult to separate from a planning vision that
poses, or rather imposes, behaviours based on a rationale of matching
social characteristics to expected socio-economic conditions. According
to sex, age, social class, etc. public statistics see, but also and above all,
foresee average, or probable, conditions for its subjects, in terms of school,
work, family, etc.; the training-employment matrices initially developed
under the General Planning Commissioner providing a good example.
By their categories of belonging, the subjects are integrated into a
holistic representation of the economy and of society, as cogs in a mech-
anism. These beings are only active subjects to the extent that they accept
their assigned role of contributing to the collective future. They are actors
and acted upon, subjects of and subjected by public statistics, much like
the two facets (active and passive) of the notion of ‘subject’ that Alain
Supiot stresses in homo juridicus (Supiot, 2007 [2005], p. 17). In descrip-
tions of the tables and graphs that result from these surveys, it is the
collective beings that are the subjects of sentences.31 In this way, they
take on a certain realness, becoming common nouns (‘women’, ‘youth’,
‘managers’, etc.), that circulate both in public administration services, in
scientific publications and events, in meetings between social partners,
and even in ordinary situations. This is a vision of the world made up
of subjects that are inseparable from their institutional social properties
borne by the first survey model.
The parallel between electoral representation and statistical represen-
tativeness, central to this type of survey, illustrates in another way the
political dimension of these subjects. With their non-zero probability of
selection, according to the random sampling procedure, they are part of
a ‘statisticable’ population, analogous to the electorate. Linking of the
surveyed being to the whole is thus achieved in a similar way to the
mode of voting, by aggregation-summation or, technically, with the use
of survey weights. The subject is not only represented by collective enti-
ties, but also compared to the whole, to French society. From this point
of view, recent change in the ‘representative household survey’ is not
insignificant. Whether in terms of shifts due to processes of European
harmonization or extension to margins previously considered ‘outside the
scope’, this statistical infrastructure introduces two new types of subjects:
French peri-subjects and European proto-subjects, which join in statistically
defining the economy and society without, however, having a political
representation that is, as of yet, anything more than marginal or nascent.
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Even if sub-models (retrospective, subjective, situated) can be iden-
tified within ‘biographical investigations’, the corresponding statistical
infrastructure draw on homine statistici with similar characteristics, what
we call here persons. As highlighted above, such statistical infrastructure
shares a certain kinship with sociology’s semi-structured interviews in
that the beings to whom they are addressed are attempts to statistically
capture the singularity of personal situations. They are constructed as
the questionnaire proceeds: the questions follow a biographical trajectory,
and sometimes adapt to the latter. The numerous open-ended ques-
tions take into account, in an exploratory fashion, the subjectivity of
the respondents, allowing for the expression of opinions or assessments.
The co-construction of these beings and of the questionnaires underline
a critical difference, symbolically, from the subjects of the ‘representative
household surveys’. Indeed, the statistical infrastructure of this second
model grants greater freedom to the beings it addresses; these beings are
not entirely pre-constructed as can be the case for subjects (who must
accept that their singularity is limited to institutional categories) or indi-
viduals (whose characteristics must respond to the requisites of scientific
theories, as we will see below).
It is neither the ‘major’ nor the ‘good’ variables that define the person,
but the near as possible accounting of their experiences, their practices,
their feelings, their wishes. This form of statistical infrastructure seeks, in
fact, to reveal the various facets of an identity, possibly plural, constructed
over time; the multiple interactions that persons have with their loved ones
or their environment, their resources and their capacity to take action
and plan for the future. The biographical investigation is in itself an
experience, during which the person surrenders, body and soul, to the
interviewer, much like the notion of ‘person’ described by Alain Supiot.32
Some, such as the statistical infrastructure underlying the investigation on
Violence Against Women (2000; violences envers les femmes), have more-
over raised practical and legal issues for public statistics, in their necessary
consideration of the emotional burden and moral commitments faced by
interviewees and interviewers.
The practical, sometimes intimate, identity of persons considered is thus
revealed during the administering of the questionnaire, and the tone of
the interviews often remains present in the production and reception of
the results: to the personal implication of the respondents corresponds
an empathetic recall of statisticians as readers. The process of identifi-
cation, as described by Dodier (1996), here calls upon the experience,
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sometimes symbolic, of a common humanity (and not the sentiment of
collective belonging as for the subjects). From one end of the statistical
chain to the other, attention is paid to the body and emotions, to interac-
tions and confrontations with other people, to biographical bifurcations
and disruptions. Although there is no one analytical framework used in
this type of statistical infrastructure, the capability approach developed
by economist-philosopher Amartya Sen (which, for example, has inspired
recent forms of statistical infrastructure on educational pathways) corre-
sponds quite closely to the notion of person. It describes beings who are a
priori capable of desiring, of expressing themselves, of making themselves
understood, of learning, and of working (when they have good quality
jobs), and finally of finding a harmonious balance between work and
family (Bonvin & Farvaque, 2007).33 More broadly, this logic is consis-
tent with political subjectification processes linked to struggles for social
rights.
We use the word individual for the beings corresponding to the
‘matched panels’. This being can be seen primarily as a way of identifying
causalities between two groups of variables (response and of interest, to
use econometric terminology). The corresponding statistical infrastruc-
ture is thus not really focused on individuals per se, either in and of
themselves (as persons) or as members of the collective entities to which
they belong (as subjects). From a literal point of view, the term recalls
a basic unit that cannot be divided. Certainly, the composite nature of
the statistical definition of these beings, resulting from an assembling of
matched data, brings to mind Arjun Appadurai’s (2016) concept of the
“dividual” in reference to actors in the finance sector who, like the deriva-
tives they manipulate, are socially divided. Reference might also be made
to the algorithmic beings of big data, made up of multiple data marks and
imprints (Rouvroy & Berns, 2013). That said, the resemblance is closest
to the individual described by Alain Supiot in Homo juridicus (Supiot,
2007 [2005], p. 13): the individual is at once identical and unique, indi-
visible and stable (it is the “basic accounting unit par excellence”); in its
irreducible unicity (“unknowable essence and containing its own end”),
a free being (“substantial ego[s] that freely forge social links rather than
being fashioned by them”).
The individuals in this third statistical infrastructure model have these
qualities. They are characterized by stable and immutable properties,
which neither determine nor are determined externally. These beings are
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different from subjects in that they are not a priori integrated into collec-
tive entities. They don’t have interactions, connections that they build
over the course of time and that contribute in turn to their construc-
tion, like persons. Analytical methods for ‘matched panels’ are most often
based on so-called ‘i.i.d.’ hypotheses, meaning that the statistical obser-
vations, or the individuals at a given moment in time, are independent
and identically distributed. With regard to principles, and beyond specific
modelling, dependence is not possible either between individuals or
between their successive states over time. These beings are, in this way,
alone and without history. They have neither depth nor belonging. They
are a support for statistical identification, this essential heterogeneity on
which the models rest, but which they ultimately aim to make disap-
pear. Similar to the creation of data files for the use of heterogeneous
information, their characteristics are removable: they are statistical tools
(controls), not the objects of analysis, in the absence of a descriptive plan
followed by exploitations using ‘matched panels’.
An aggregation of situations, individual states or behaviours, results
from these statistical models. The statistical individuals of the ‘matched
panels’ are not strictly speaking the individuals of standard economics.
Although they share numerous traits, their definition is empirical and
not theoretical; it is not necessarily assumed that they are driven only
by their preferences or utility. There is not, in any event, explicit place for
either communities, classes, groups established by belonging, or for local
context, familiar environment, close circles. Like atoms without connec-
tions to one another, individuals cross time and space. Their trajectories
are certainly influenced by their environment, which only acts, however,
as an external element and is not, a priori, modified in turn. Moreover,
this influence does not fundamentally change individuals . Time is made
up of events, of shocks, that have consequences but don’t contribute to
building a history, either personal or collective.
As basic beings of this type of statistical infrastructure, individuals
have something almost fictional about them. They are both syntactically
central–symbolizing and, especially, allowing the micro-statistical shift that
characterizes the analyses—and semantically absent, upstream and down-
stream of data collection. They are necessary, but must also be overcome:
they are seen as obstacles, as reflected by the notion of ‘unobservable
heterogeneity’ and the clear need for the results to be reflected by the
notion ‘purified’. The polysemy of the term ‘identify’ characterizes well
this present-absent dynamic. It is not about the interviewees, interviewers,
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researchers, or readers being able to identify with the individuals who
are produced by these statistical infrastructures (like with subjects or with
persons, but in different ways). Rather it is about being able, thanks to
them but also by making them disappear, to statistically identify equa-
tions, i.e. to assess statistical associations between variables that should
be able to be separated from the observations on which they rely. Indi-
viduals are supports and not the objects of identification. This sacrifice
of diversity is undoubtedly characteristic of statistical methods of analysis
more generally, which aim to establish results that are valid beyond single
cases. However, a non-trivial observation is that identification resources
do exist in the first two statistical infrastructure models, whether in
the institutional manner of subjects of collective entities to which they
belong, or in empathy with persons “having declared that…”, “suffering
from…”, “hoping that…” (to take several examples of phrases used in the
‘biographical investigations’). These resources disappear for individuals
who, as we have seen, can be represented as mosaics that, before being
assembled, were composed of heterogeneous, fragmented pieces. In anal-
yses produced using this last statistical infrastructure, phrases most often
directly link two types of variables: the first, those of interest, reflecting
(eventually as consequence) the fact of having benefited from a public
policy; the second measuring the evolution of a situation, of a state on a
market (housing, education, employment, etc.).
Conclusion
Over a period of about seventy years, the French public statistical infras-
tructure on the general population has diversified. Today, three models
co-exist: ‘biographical investigations’, and the ‘matched panels’, which
were successively added to the original ‘representative household surveys’.
These models have different specificities, not only in terms of their
formats but also their theoretical frameworks, objectives, methods of anal-
ysis, and visions of public action. They imply three different types of beings
who represent three variations of humanity (here in its statistical version)
in as many ‘ideal types’: the subject , the person, and the individual . The
last few decades have seen a blossoming of these last two beings, who
previously were as if restrained by the sole logic of the subject in the
‘representative household surveys’.
The originality of these two typologies (of statistical infrastructure and
of beings) is relative. There are echoes of divisions already highlighted
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and analysed, within the social sciences and its sub-disciplines. Indeed,
the subjects of the ‘representative household surveys’ (and the collec-
tive entities that represent them) are primarily found in the structural
analysis of populations, macroeconomics, structural sociology, and social
history of grand narratives. The persons of the ‘biographical investiga-
tions’ have instead followed the reorientations of demography (interaction
between events, diversity of populations, link to context), sociology
(biographical shift, ‘new’ sociologies, etc.) and history (critical shift and
microhistory). The individuals of the ‘matched panels’ are analysed by
micro-econometricians, neoclassical economists or rational choice soci-
ologists, with ties to experimental psychology or contract law. Another
limit of the proposed typology is that, one might argue, only certain
statistical infrastructures possess all the characteristics used to describe
the models. Yet, the strength of these proposals is their empirical basis,
the way that they precisely aggregate a large number of traits that result
in a ternary interplay of oppositions. Following the intuitions of French
pioneering work on the social history of statistics, the analysis of quan-
titative tools seems particularly instructive for organizing the plurality of
ways of seeing reality. That said, the transformation of statistical beings—
the tensions, conflicts, hegemonic drive of notions associated with subjects,
persons and individuals—does not solely correspond to the evolution of
social theories in France. There is every reason to think that the elements
discussed here have a more general scope, and are relevant to the “politics
of statistics” (Desrosières, 1998 [1993]).
What can we conclude, politically, from this diversification of statis-
tical infrastructure and statistical beings ? First, that the emergence of
individuals , who occupy both a central and evanescent place in their
statistical infrastructure, echoes critiques often formed against neoliber-
alism, where incentivized individuals would be deemed free, but without
much power, whereas the subjects of a Keynesian planner, admittedly
acted upon, were socially protected and retained their capacity for collec-
tive action thanks to institutions (Castel & Haroche, 2001). Our third
model is no less political, nor any less related to the State than the first.
The role of the State is, however, profoundly transformed, in that it aims
to establish market instruments entailing feedback loops on individual
behaviours, much like the corresponding form of government (neolib-
eral ‘city’) described by Alain Desrosières (2014) or the absent State
proposed by Robert Salais (2015). The personal logic complicates this
description, and cannot only be understood as a parenthesis between
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subjects and individuals . This logic nuances the ‘individualization’ move-
ment broadly employed (in the social sciences as well as in public debate)
to describe contemporary change, but whose ambivalence can be sensed.
The real ability to act belongs to persons, the only beings to which the
statistical infrastructure accords a value per se. This evolution leaves some-
what open, however, the question of their collective aggregation, or the
political forms with which they may be associated.
Acknowledgements This text has been translated from French to English by
Maya Judd.
Notes
1. Given their complexity and range of accepted meanings, both ‘neoliber-
alism’ and ‘quantification’ could clearly be further discussed, something
that is not possible here due to space constraints.
2. The use of italics for the generic term being and its various forms
(subject , person, individual) based on the history of statistical infrastruc-
ture, aims to avoid any confusion relative to their general or academic
meanings, which vary according to social science disciplines, time-period,
and country.
3. Here we take up Jean-Claude Passeron’s (1999) expression, in contrast
to the homo singularis “which can only be recounted on the deathbed of
an individual or collective story” (Passeron, 1999, p. 18). We will later
see that one of the beings—person—in some ways resembles this homo
singularis.
4. We broadly use the terms ‘interviewer’ and ‘interviewee’ here to describe
those involved in the collection of information for the various types
of inquiries, whether this consists of a ‘survey’, an ‘investigation’, or a
‘panel’.
5. The analysis uses a variety of material including documentation from
more than thirty components of the French statistical infrastructure, as
well as different archives of the public statistics system, notably those of
INSEE (Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques,
the French National Institute for Statistics) collected over the course of
the past fifteen years.
6. This experience is recounted, for example, by Raymond Lévy-Bruhl
(INSEE, 1977, p. 561).
7. The questionnaire for the first Labour Force Survey, conducted in 1950,
provides an example, being composed of just one double-sided DIN-A3
sheet.
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8. As observed by Affichard, the first Labour Force Survey allows “exper-
imentation of questions from which a classification of the population
into ‘major variables’ (employed, unemployed, non-active) is produced”
(Affichard, 1987 [1983], p. 90).
9. The tables indicate, for example, housing situation, level of income,
and consumption patterns based on the characteristics of the ‘head of
the household’ (his age group, employment status, socio-professional
category).
10. From 1954 to 1970, the post-censal surveys on family history were only,
for example, addressed to married women (Locoh et al., 2003).
11. Note, however, that shortly after the French Revolution of 1789, divorce
by mutual consent was legalized for a relatively brief period of time
(1792–1803).
12. See, for example, the co-authored book published under the collective
name Darras (1966), containing the work of INSEE sociologists and
statisticians, including that of Pierre Bourdieu and Claude Gruson.
13. See the entry, ‘survey’, in Alain Rey (1998), Dictionnaire historique de la
langue française, Le Robert, vol. 1, p. 1246.
14. According to the medium-term programme objectives of INSEE from
2006 to 2010.
15. The limited number of these variables is less due to technological
constraints (as in the past), than to difficulties related to the political
harmonization of national categorizations.
16. This is the case, for example, in the area of educational orientation. In
a presentation of surveys on these themes, Joëlle Affichard and Michel-
Henri Gensbittel (1987) contrast so-called “diagnostic”, subjective, or
opinion variables, with those of the “State” (Affichard & Gensbittel, 1987,
p. 186).
17. The expression “biographical turn” (Chamberlayne et al., 2000) has been
used to describe the widespread adoption of comprehensive biographical
interviews in sociology in the 1980s and 1990s.
18. The adoption of this approach means no longer using as the unit of anal-
ysis an event (marriage, birth, death), examined separately and which is
assumed to be the result of homogeneous behaviours within a group (e.g.
a social or age group), but instead the “individual biography, considered
a complex process” (Courgeau & Lelièvre, 1989, p. 2).
19. Although models of this type were proposed in the 1960s, they were not
truly implemented until the 1980s, due to a lack of data (Baccaini &
Courgeau, 1997, p. 833).
20. These methods are linked to various analytical frameworks, including the
demography of biographies (Courgeau & Lelièvre, 1996), the economy
of transitional labour markets, or in a transversal fashion, the analysis of
bifurcations or disruptions (Bessin et al., 2010).
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21. See, for example, Baudelot and Gollac (2003) on the links between well-
being and work and, from a different perspective, that of Amossé and
Chardon (2006) on the construction of identities.
22. Removed from quantitative methods, they are not, however, directly
implicated in the elaboration of such statistical infrastructure.
23. Multilevel modelling can also be used in a “matched panels” perspective,
our final statistical infrastructure model presented here.
24. The difference between described experience and observed fact is impor-
tant. ‘Matched panels’ aim, with precise guidelines and formulations
(notably in terms of the period of reference concerning an event), to
avoid any ‘hazy responses’, in contrast to the narrative logic employed
by ‘biographical investigations’, where it is expected that the experience
will be related as a whole, necessarily subjective to some extent. From the
‘biographical investigation’ perspective there is no evidence, objectivity,
naturalness of facts, but rather the construction of a set of information
relevant for describing the experience, feelings and actions of respondents
(echoing the ‘informational base’ theorized by Amartya Sen).
25. The survey comprises, in reality, six waves of quarterly questioning. The
longitudinal dimension of the Labour Force survey is old, with a renewal
method of the annual sample in thirds which was followed continuously
from 1968 to 2002 (Goux, 2003). That said, this design is not in line
with longitudinal analysis objectives, and has moreover rarely been used
from this perspective.
26. We can highlight two opposing groups of methodological statisticians
at INSEE. The battle between them was symbolically lost by the data
production specialists, notably of surveys, who in the mid-1990s had to
relocate to the laboratory newly associated with ENSAI (training school
in Rennes for second rank managers of INSEE, the ‘attachés ’), while
the specialists of data analysis, mostly econometricians, stayed in Paris
in the laboratory associated with ENSAE (one of France’s top schools
in economics and statistics and in the training of first rank managers of
INSEE, the ‘administrateurs ’).
27. Often overlooked, the possibility of generalizing ‘all things being equal’
results on non-representative data remains debatable.
28. The strictest models exclude, at least as exogenous, all variables that could
be the result of respondents’ past decisions (e.g. region of residence,
characteristics of their work organization, etc.).
29. This notion of unobservable heterogeneity aggregates all the non-
observed characteristics of the respondents.
30. Laurent Thévenot’s (1979) analysis of the lack of clarity concerning this
category shows how it had been thought of until then.
31. See Desrosières (2008, vol. 1, ch. 9) for an initial analysis of the evolution
of the syntax used in the presentation of statistical results.
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32. In their legal version, persons are beings endowed with a personality
(“generic concept in which body and soul are held together”) and histori-
cized, bearers of logic of progress (“the revelation of the human spirit to
itself”, “history [having] a prophetic dimension”) (Supiot, 2007 [2005],
p. 21).
33. There is, from this point of view, a tension between two facets of the
person; between the passive nature associated with the description of
that which they experience, their ‘suffering’, and a more active dimen-
sion linked with their autonomy, with the notion of ‘achievement’, as in
the work, for example, of Amartya Sen.
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Politics of Calculable Worlds
The politics of quantification rests on preliminary processes of trans-
forming the world to make it quantifiable, by form-giving, formatting,
in-forming, codifying and equivalence-making on the basis of a variety of
conventions. This chapter concentrates on such transformations that make
the world calculable. It first presents the analytical tools of our research
agenda on the politics of statistics and quantification. They are used here
to characterize the processes of transformation involved in the globaliza-
tion of a new mode of governing that operates, away from states, through
voluntary certification standards made up of measurable objectives. Initi-
ated as a form of communication along the supply chain of major
agro-industry products, it enlarged and gained public legitimacy through
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the implementation of multi-stakeholder governance, while extending the
plurality of normative issues it covers, from agricultural good practices to
environmental and labour standards, or social accountability. By contrast
to other modes of governing, this normative pluralism is entirely encap-
sulated in the measurable characterization of the product—palm oil in
the case we investigated—which is certified to conform with the “sus-
tainability standard” of the Roundtable for Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO).
All regulations of human actors’ behaviours are deposited externally in
the material product that circulates between them, and its certification.
Certification implies a formal statement which is not legal but issued
from an accredited third party body. It gives written assurance that the
product or service is in conformity with the standard; the certificate being
a form of communication between seller and buyer, while the label is
a form of communication with the end consumer. While accountants
or auditors certify accounting numbers, this third party body certifies
product attributes that consumers cannot evaluate even when they use
them. It codifies the process of production, its environmental impact and
labour conditions—what economists named “credence” attributes of the
product. Such governance is not only based on the objectivity of numbers
but on a wider expectancy: that the material world of products, with
which and through which human beings interact, would turn into a set of
objective options, and their certification would guarantee the individuals
who choose them that fundamental values or goods are satisfied.
Our analysis deals with the arts of calculating that are at the core of
this contemporary mode of governing by certification standards. Calcu-
lating has two connected significances in this art: counting to govern
with numbers, but also counting on an environment that is designed
to be more reliable and offer possibilities to calculate on it. The linkage
between counting and counting on is encapsulated in the term “calcu-
lable” with its double meaning of quantifiable and dependable. The first
points to measurement while the second introduces a broader idea of
guarantee and, therefore, an evaluation.1 In the first sense, the British
approach to Foucault’s “governmentality” and “the administering of
lives” (Mennicken & Miller, 2014) that Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller
initiated in the nineties focused early on “governing by numbers” (Rose,
1991) and the invention of “calculating selves”, “calculable spaces”
and “calculative practices” (Miller, 1992, 2001). It was developed from
accounting practices into a major and productive research agenda on
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modes of governing economic, social and personal life (Miller & Rose,
2008; Rose & Miller, 2010).
Another earlier main research agenda on the politics of numbers orig-
inated from the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic
Studies (INSEE) at the end of the seventies, and initially dealt with a
different domain of practices producing numbers: state statistics. After
the pioneering work by Alain Desrosières on the history of socio-
occupational categories (Desrosières, 1987 [1977], 1987 [1983]; see also
Desrosières & Thévenot, 1988), the historical perspective was reinforced
by a symposium in which INSEE brought together historians working on
quantitative series and statisticians who were urged to take a reflective and
historical look at the surveys they were responsible for (Affichard, 1987
[1977], 1987 [1983]). From the very start, history was a major focus of
this research agenda, as shown by the early book co-written by Robert
Salais on the social categorization of unemployment (Salais et al., 1986),
or the author’s research on the genealogy of surveys and social categories
that measure social inheritance since Francis Galton’s eugenics (Thévenot,
1987 [1983]).
While Desrosières related the history of statistics to the forma-
tion of states and their characteristics (Desrosières, 1998 [1993]),2 I
brought together the chain of operations involved in the transforma-
tion of personal answers into quantified statistics, and the comparable
chain of transformative operations induced by representing and voicing
personal concern in the proper format for politics. I early concep-
tualized the elementary process that makes this possible through the
notion of “investment in form”. An investment in form “produces equiv-
alence” and “social coding”, the term “code” covering “the set of
conventions which govern ‘regulated’ communications between people”
(Thévenot, 1983, 1984). On the conceptual basis offered by these “con-
ventional forms of equivalence”, the research agenda on the “politics
of statistics” (Thévenot, 1990) investigated the various segments of the
statistical production chain—survey and data collection, classification,
codification and the processing of information—to identify fundamental
correspondences between “statistical equivalence forms” and the “polit-
ical constructions of the bond between members of the same polity”
(Thévenot, 1987 [1983]).3 It extended to policy implementation and
evaluation, as well as social, economic and political theories involved in
this evaluation (Thévenot, 1983, 2011a, 2016).4 The initial programme
on governing through statistics was expanded to non-state modes of
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governing through standards and objectives (Thévenot, 1997, 2009,
2015a, 2019b).
The British and French currents lacked opportunities for dialogue.5
The present book offers such an opportunity, thanks to the interactions
facilitated by its co-editors Andrea Mennicken and Robert Salais, and
meetings with Peter Miller who provides his views in an afterword, as
well as Wendy Espeland.
Far from the politics of state statistics, the transnational—or even a-
national—worldwide extension of private voluntary standards has led to a
mode of “governing through standards” (Thévenot, 1997, 2009; Ponte
et al., 2011; Ponte & Cheyns, 2013) that is intended to make the world
not only reliable and countable but even certifiable (Thévenot, 2015a).
What does it imply in terms of its politics, since this mode of governing
has been refurbished in response to criticisms which pointed to the lack of
legitimacy that current standard-setting procedures undergo? Several years
of a collective research programme I have taken part in focused on inves-
tigating the practices of this new calculable world.6 Observing governing
through a certification standard in action has demanded close fieldwork
to follow the most vulnerable actors, from their daily life in remote rural
areas to “open spaces” of public roundtables, or private confidential nego-
tiations. Proper analytical tools were needed to grasp the wide variety of
actors’ practices, knowledge, evaluations and voices when they strive to
express their concern and criticize.7 After the next section, which sets out
our research programme in more detail, the second part of this chapter
examines the normative and regulatory basis of governing through certi-
fication standards, which is intended to ensure political legitimacy while
taking distance from state legal and political systems. Which alternative
to the rule of law does governing through certification standards offer?
While the second part deals with the production of regulations, the third
one tackles their enforcement. What are the functional equivalents for
the judicial system in putting the standard implementation to a critical
test? How do actors—particularly those who are most vulnerable—cope
with the proper requirement of a certifiable world: Transforming all their
concern, from the most personal to the most collectively political, into
the format of measurable objectives that the standard enforces?
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From State Statistics to Government Through
Standards: A Research Programme on the Politics
of Conventional Forms and Engagements
Belonging to the “Disobedient Generation” of the “Sixties” (Sica &
Turner, 2005), I shared the Marxist critical stance which prompted the
reversal of the hierarchical superiority of abstract and formal knowledge in
favour of practice. It propped up the significance of practical know-how
along the chain of actors which produce statistical data. Following knowl-
edgeable pollsters and coders who were usually downplayed and treated
as low-skilled white-collar workers, I turned to the workplace of the statis-
tical chain, and investigated it as an industrial production line. This line
creates in-formation not by assembling parts but mostly by trans-forming,
changing the format of entities. Manufacturing transforms a personal-
ized matter—currently collected from oral interviews—and shapes it into
a standardized public form: the formal format of codified and quanti-
fied items. In the case of social statistics, this trans-formation aims at
trans-muting “In Person” into “In Common”, one of the most intense
experiences and learning of the Sixties politicization. The Marxist tension
between theoretical and practical knowledge was at stake, but also the
exploration of the “Two Bodies” in which every human being invests
(Thévenot, 2005) and not only kings and rulers (Kantorowicz, 1997
[1957]). One body is “invested” with a form which ensures communi-
cation in the sense of making common and endowing with coordination
power. The other formless corporeal, living and mortal body puts into
question such conventional “invested forms”.
Social Coding and Investments in Conventional Forms: The
Prerequisites for the Politics of Quantification
Each practical step of the transformative chain that creates data was
investigated: interviewing respondents at home, filling in questionnaires,
coding answers within social classifications (Thévenot, 1981a). The
transversal operation of giving form—or formatting—led to conceptu-
alize “social coding” (Thévenot, 1983) which initially focused on the
formatting of occupations.8 “Investment in form” was conceived as the
establishment of a conventional form of equivalence such as classification,
criterion, code, standard, routine, rule of thumb, house rule, instruction,
custom, regulation, right, trademark, model, template, mould (Thévenot,
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1984). Certification standards are among those invested forms, and most
of the items of the previous list of invested forms were found in our field-
work on standard-setting and implementation. Three main criteria were
initially set out to distinguish various types of invested forms: (1) the
lifespan or extent in time—from a short-lived model, up to a perennial
custom; (2) the area of validity or extent in space—from a personally and
locally attached rule of thumb or house rule, up to international rights;
(3) the objectivity or material consolidation—from an ideal mental crite-
rion, up to a solid template.9 Investing in forms consists of the costly
sacrifice of present coordination potentialities to ensure future returns
in terms of economies in the cognitive and practical processes of coor-
dinating actions. Formatting into a formal form is a step prior to any
quantification, and a basic procedure in making the world calculable.
Power relations ensue from invested forms, such as “the power relations
between [agents who use very general forms and] agents who make use
of more specific forms”, this last power being disqualified by Taylorism
when formal definitions of tasks phased out rules of thumbs built up
by practiced workers (Thévenot, 1984), as did Toyotism later (Charles,
2016).
Our “practice turn” (Schatzki et al., 2001; Thévenot, 2001b) was
not initially influenced by American pragmatism. In addition to what I
said of the Marxist reassessment of practice, and the legacy of Bour-
dieu’s Outline of a Theory of Practice (1976 [1972]), our pragmatic
or pragmatist view on invested forms was influenced by research on
work and organization, more precisely on the problematic of “coordinat-
ing” action.10 This unusual term in the social and political sciences was
taken in the sense of an uncertain process rather than its achievement in
order. Such a perspective benefited from the cooperation with François
Eymard-Duvernay who elaborated further the economists’ notion of
“specific investment” to contrast personalized and non-transferable long-
term relationships based on codified relationships that can be maintained
at a distance (Eymard-Duvernay, 1986). This collaboration was subse-
quently extended within the founding group of the so-called Economy of
Conventions of Convention Theory.11
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Placing Value on Invested Forms: The Plurality of Orders of Worth
Involved in Justifications and Criticisms Referring
to the Common Good
The definition of invested forms did not explicitly refer to evaluation. Yet,
the above-mentioned criteria used to characterize them sustain distinct
modes of evaluation (Thévenot, 1984). An early empirical research on
the invested forms which respondents and coders used to identify occu-
pations showed three core ways of making one’s occupation worthy: the
legal qualification or office one fills in (état ), the art to which one is
devoting oneself (profession), the traditional trade (métier) that one learns
by doing (Thévenot, 1981b, 1983, 2016). This first insight into the rela-
tion between invested forms and worth—the three kinds of worthiness
of occupation roughly correspond to the later identified civic, industrial
and domestic “orders of worth”—was then fully developed through the
intense collaboration and co-authorship with Luc Boltanski, which led to
the new analytical step of “worth” analysis (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1987,
2006 [1991]).
Boltanski had earlier written on classifications (Boltanski, 1970) and
co-authored with Bourdieu a seminal article on classification struggles as
a continuation of class struggles (Bourdieu & Boltanski, 1975), giving
a classist critical twist to the Durkheim-Mauss legacy on social classifi-
cations (Durkheim & Mauss, 2009 [1903]). He had later advanced a
more thorough analysis of the representation process in the case of Cadres
(Boltanski, 1987 [1982]). In our collaboration, we first designed a series
of experimental games to investigate the non-expert’s modes of classi-
fying occupations and “finding one’s way in social space” (Boltanski &
Thévenot, 1983).12 They brought to light the strong connection between
bringing occupations together (“rapprochement”) in social categories and
placing value on them.
Taking part in public debate requires that participants transform their
personal concerns—or possibly sacrifice some of them that cannot bear
the transformation—to invest in conventional forms and reach a higher
level of generality (“Montée en généralité”). In the next step of the
collaboration with Boltanski, we identified the grammar of Orders of
worth as the model of the sense of justice that human beings rely on,
when they justify and criticize. We initially identified six repertoires of
evaluation that correspond to this model, each order of worth seeking
legitimacy by claiming to contribute to a distinct conception of common
204 L. THÉVENOT
good (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1987, 2006 [1991]). According to this
model, considerable aggrandizement of personal concern is needed to
demonstrate that one’s voice is relevant for the common good. Indi-
vidual interest does not qualify. Since different orders of worth refer to
different constructions of the common good, their confrontation publi-
cizes difference—in the sense of differing in a dispute—which culminates
in severe critical clashes. Each order offers the footing to “denounce”
the conception of the common good that another order claims. Unequal
commonality entails hierarchical ranking of states of worth. We initially
avoided the all-purpose vocabulary of “power”, to be more precise about
qualifications that contribute to both empowerment and domination.
Yet, orders of worth relate directly to inequality of power since a higher
state of worth provides a higher capacity for coordinating others’ actions.
Claims of legitimacy strengthen this form of power. Our analysis thus
continued Weber’s differentiation of orders of legitimate domination.13
In addition to distinguishing a plurality of modes of evaluation
involved in the justifications and criticisms that aim at public legitimacy,
the model of orders of worth differentiates the ways evaluative judge-
ments about worthiness are put to the test. The pragmatist realism of
the “reality test” (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006 [1991]) involves items of
the material environment, on the condition they qualify for the tested
order of worth, and may thus be taken into account in the judgement
and be granted evidentiary value. Because of the two previous features,
this model differs from Actor-Network-Theory (ANT) which does not
make it possible to contrast modes of relations between beings—human
or not—on the basis of their mode of qualification and thus valuation.
With regard to its use by Foucault, the concept of dispositif can be made
more precise and broken into component parts. The qualification of each
of them for an order of worth disposes human beings to engage in justi-
fication according to this kind of worth. The pragmatist realism that the
“reality test” and “qualification” carry contributed to the development
of the notion of “quality conventions” that makes more precise the anal-
ysis of organizations and markets. Previous research by Eymard-Duvernay
on “models of the firm” in diverse industrial sectors (Eymard-Duvernay,
1986, 1989) was refined by differentiating, inside the same organization,
a multiplicity of modes of coordination framed by these various “quality
conventions” used in the valuation of persons, things and their relations
(Eymard-Duvernay, 2002; Storper & Salais, 1997; Thévenot, 2001a).
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The Worth of Standards
Standards are valuable for the industrial worth of technical efficiency
when they primarily contribute to the compatibility of methods and tools
of production. This worth remains dominant in the palm oil standard
intended to spread a uniform agricultural model that is oriented towards
industrial efficiency. Since our pragmatist approach relates valuation to
coordination, the temporal orientation of each order of worth impacts
on the mode of coordination it governs. Industrial worth sustains a
forward-looking orientation that is fully reflected in the idea of tech-
nical investment, since equipment and methods fabricate the future by
providing predictability.14 In addition, this worth is conducive to quan-
tification, which is currently involved in the reality test for this order of
worth.
The standardization of market goods and services also enhances their
market worth. Companies that engage in the standard-setting process
seek a competitive advantage.15 The two conventions of industrial
and market worth—and their worlds of objects—differ significantly in
the spatiality (Cartesian space/free circulation space) and temporality
(future/present orientation) they sustain in coordination. These differ-
ences stir up critical tensions which are internal to the economy and
weigh on standard-setting: fixing for the future the standardized char-
acteristics of products opposes the market worth orientation towards an
ever-changing present.16
The worth of renown, or fame, is also significant for standards. It
does not rely on prices but on signs of recognition in public opinion.
It strongly motivates the commitment of entrepreneurs in standardization
procedures when combined with market worth in “compromises” such as
branding and marketing (Richey & Ponte, 2011). A campaign triggered
by Greenpeace in 2010 proposed a devastating parody of a Kit-Kat choco-
late bar advertisement, in which a bar was stuffed by the bleeding finger
of an orang-utan. Within a few weeks, Nestlé accepted to negotiate with
the NGO because the firm was deeply concerned by the drastic conse-
quences of this campaign on the brand image. Like market worth, the
worth of renown in opinion orients towards the present and its “trends”.
This worth is made measurable and quantifiable through opinion polls.
By contrast, domestic worth emphasizes traditions and customs, and
sustains a temporal orientation anchored in the past. The traditional arts
and crafts qualify for this worth and have occupied an important place
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in the history of quality standards, from the very beginning when they
were promoted by corporations. Still very present in today’s food certifi-
cations (Boisard & Letablier, 1989; Busch, 2011; Cheyns & Ponte, 2018;
Diaz-Bone, 2011; Ponte, 2016; Star, 1991), this worth is most often in
a critical position in standards of the RSPO type, because of the weight
placed on industrial worth. This critical position is still weakened by the
fact that domestic worth is hard to measure and quantify, except through
“compromise” variables that combine domestic with industrial worth.
The reality test of the worth of inspiration brings evidence of rupture
and revelation, in a temporal orientation on the present and a spatial
presence evoking epiphany. Insofar as industrial standardization tends
to fix things for the future, it generates critical tension with the worth
of inspiration. Yet, “innovation” processes that create new products and
services supposed to reach a compromise that strikes a balance between
the conflicting requirements of inspiration, market and industrial orders
of worth. This worth of inspiration derives from a genealogy of valuations
of religious deeds and spiritual engagements. In our investigation, this
inspiration worth was involved in forest peoples’ denunciation of palm
oil standardized plantations practices that ignore sacred places.
Standard-Setting in Search of Legitimacy: The Grammars
of Commonality in the Plural
Although orders of worth do play a significant role in some RSPO
actors’ statements, criticisms or activities, the standard itself, its setting
and enforcement processes, thwart actors’ attempts to engage in public
critiques and justification of large scale. The reason is the following:
In response to criticisms pointing to the lack of legitimacy of private,
voluntary standards-setting procedures, the RSPO type of transnational
standard is built on the “multi-stakeholder governance model”, or
“multi-stakeholder initiative” (MSI). To understand how MSI governance
conflicts with the model of orders of worth, another analytical step is
needed: the model of orders of worth has to be situated in a broader anal-
ysis of the ways in which actors take part in disputes that claim legitimacy
for the whole community.
Grammars of practice which support pluralist constructions of common-
ality and difference can be characterized by basic operations: communi-
cating—in its original meaning of making an issue common; differing—
in the sense of disagreeing; and composing—in both the ancient sense of
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settling a dispute and the wider current meaning of calming (Thévenot,
2014, 2015b). These grammars diverge in the transformation they
demand of personal concern into a common format that allows people
to agree and disagree. The format of difference channels discrepancies
between voices. In addition to evidencing the uses of orders of worth
in the United States and France, a comparative research programme
(Lamont & Thévenot, 2000; Thévenot & Lamont, 2000) contributed
to the identification of the grammar that underlies multi-stakeholder
initiatives.
Because of its link to the long and diverse liberal political tradition, I
named it liberal grammar. As rightly argued by Veikko Eranti (2018),
it could be named “grammar of interests”. I originally avoided the term
“interest” because of its naturalization in the social and political sciences,
when it is viewed as an inner force guiding individuals. In the liberal
grammar, it specifies the format to differ and agree in public. Instead of
the large transformation of personal or local concerns into common good
issues, and the resulting harsh confrontation when rival conceptions of
the common good clash, the transformation of personal concerns into
individual choices is lesser, and the confrontation less critical.
Yet, the liberal interested individual is also in a state of being formatted
for the public. Any personal concern has to be converted into the format
of a choice—designated as “preference”, or “stake”, or “interest”—which
an autonomous individual makes between options that should be in a
form accessible to all other individuals who constitute the liberal public.
This format of opting individuals cannot express most intimate attach-
ments. Too deeply personal, intimate or emotional concerns are not
appropriate for liberal communication (Centemeri, 2015; Stavo-Debauge,
2012). In the grammar of plural orders of worth, differing is strongly
critical, resulting from the denunciation of an order of worth in the name
of another (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1987, 2006 [1991]), while in this
liberal grammar differences are less dramatically expressed, because they
are presented as individual interests. Criticism is only allowed at a lesser
degree and the integration of differences is achieved by “negotiation” and
“bargaining” between “stakeholders”. Yet, the burden of the transforma-
tion weighs on human beings to fit this liberal format, and may oppress
them as well. This analysis rectifies the current idea that liberal politics
are “horizontal” as opposed to the vertical hierarchy of orders of worth.17
All grammars of commonality are inherently hierarchical because of the
gradient they maintain between more and less common formats. The
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coordinative power of those who engage in the most common format—
being able to articulate their concern as choices for common knowledge
options, in the liberal grammar—entails de facto domination over those
who do not and depend on the previous ones.
This distinction of grammars helps to clarify the quantification and
evaluation methods used by governing. Fifty years of using the same
statistical survey to evaluate social, educational and employment poli-
cies showed the dependence on these grammars of: policies, methods
of their quantitative evaluations (socio-occupational categories, mobility
tables, correspondence analysis, econometrics) and even underlying social
and economic theories (reproduction, de-skilling of work, human capital)
(Monso & Thévenot, 2010; Thévenot, 2011a). Civic and industrial
orders of worth support the first welfare-social state policies, quantifica-
tion methods and social theories, whereas market order of worth and the
liberal grammar are backing the more recent policies, quantified evalua-
tions and theories.18 This dependence is also visible in Emmanuel Didier’s
contribution to this volume, which examines the relation to quantification
that various American sociology currents have. Interactionism and, more
broadly, the trends that constitute the “Qualitative sociology” pole influ-
enced by American pragmatism presuppose a liberal grammar of opting
autonomous individuals, a grammar that also underlies their sociolog-
ical criticism of the paternalistic welfare state and its categorical statistical
treatment of social groups.
Committed to Objects: Valuable Regimes of Engagements
with the World Affected by Standardization
Unlike other modes of governing, the one that maintains a calculable
world by certification standards intervenes in the surrounding material
objects to regulate the relations between human beings. Our analysis has
thus to leave discursive public arenas and scrutinize the variety of valued
human relations to material objects, whether they are public or not. The
concept of engagement was crafted to capture such valued relations with
the environment, each of them consolidating and empowering the self
through a certain mode of coordination with oneself that is secured by
this relation (Thévenot, 2006, 2007, 2013, 2019c). This self, or person-
ality, has a dynamical identity resulting from the integration of a plurality
of modes of engagement.
Each mode of engaging with the world rests on a distinct mode of
in-formation, if we extend this notion to highly personal knowledge
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and pay attention to the personal indices or landmarks that give conve-
nient form and disposition to a familiarized background. Engaging in
familiarity is valuable because of the personal ease it generates, due to
familiarization with this environment. This intimate relationship to habit-
uated and inhabited places supports a primordial trust in oneself and
is deeply affected by changes in the environment. The industrial agri-
culture development system that the RSPO standard promotes through
“good practices” breaks with the personal relationships of using and
inhabiting the land that each member of rural communities has with his
or her environment. Highly idiosyncratic, engaging in familiarity does
not easily lend itself to the commonality and communication.19 It meets
the greatest difficulties to find a place in governing by standards which
favours, as we shall see, a completely different regime of engaging in
plan, or project. More than an instrumental relationship to the world,
this engagement aims at the good of being able to project oneself into the
future through individual plans, provided that surroundings are seized in
a functional format.
Dynamical regimes of engagement go through trying moments which
provide the opportunity to test landmarks and update them. Engagements
are thus polarized by two stances, and the process of certification collapses
the distinction between the two in favour of the first. The first stance of
static quietude sticks to the fixed form that serves as a marker of the
engagement and is tested in the trying moment. It corresponds to the
letter of the convention or the institutional act when engaging in public
justification.20 The second stance of moving inquietude brings the aware-
ness of the sacrifices that this fixed form entails, when the situatedness of
the engagement opens up to other possibilities of coordination.
Distinctive Features of a New Calculable
World Governed by Certification Standards:
Which Substitute for the Rule of Law
in the Production of Regulations?
Standards came to constitute a calculable global world through two types
of extension of their original technical purpose. Their scope expanded, in
terms of the variety of values they take into account. Standard-setting and
enforcement procedures enlarged, in search of democratic legitimacy.
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Made in Standard: All the Good that Money Can Buy
Standards were originally thought to make technical tools, methods
and products more compatible, and to provide economies of scale
according to the technical efficiency of industrial worth. Quality stan-
dards expanded their scope along market worth. They developed to bear
the burden of the common knowledge identity of market goods that
market competition requires against moral hazards, and they backed the
market diversification of these goods and services (Busch, 2011; Bowker
& Star, 2000; Eymard-Duvernay, 1986, 1989, 2002; Lampland & Star,
2009; Salais & Storper, 1993; Storper & Salais, 1997; Timmermans
& Epstein, 2010). As mentioned before, economists use the category
of “credence” goods and services when the quality cannot be identi-
fied by “search” or “experience”—referring to repair services—and may
generate fraud (Darby & Karni, 1973). This category of “credence” good
is currently used for the kind of certification that we now consider, such
as Fair Trade. Gaëlle Balineau and Ivan Dufeu (2010) rightly contested
this categorization, observing that these kinds of goods do not suffer
from information asymmetry in the production process, but from another
source of uncertainty because the goods’ “attributes are seen as means to
reach another goal” (Balineau & Dufeu, 2010, p. 335).
This “other goal” actually introduces a most dramatic change in the
role of standards. Standards came to carry the responsibility for the satis-
faction of basic rights or conceptions of the common good, through
certified and measurable properties attributed to goods or services. In
democracy, such values are taken into account by legislative bodies of
government in the process of making laws. Political public arenas are
dedicated to critical debate on this process, with justifications referring
to the plurality of these basic rights or conceptions of the common
good. The new kind of “standardizing liberalism” (“libéralisme normal-
isateur”) (Thévenot, 1997) and mode of “governing by standards”
(Thévenot, 2009, 2015a) arise when such evaluative and normative prin-
ciples are reduced to measurable characteristics of goods and services, and
when individual consumers’ choices on the market place replace political
debates. This reduction (see Fig. 7.1) can be illustrated on three norma-
tive principles: social justice and collective solidarity to struggle against
inequalities; environmental concern; tradition and customs. Each of the
three corresponds to a separate order of worth (civic, green, domestic)
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The critical plurality of debated conceptions of the common good
turned into the certified qualities of market goods
critical public debates between























Fig. 7.1 From debated conceptions of the common good to certified qualities
of market goods
which is involved in public justifications and criticisms that claim legiti-
macy by referring to various conceptions of the common good (see the
left side of Fig. 7.1). Each of these normative principles is formalized and
formatted in laws (labour, environmental, customary) and legal rights. In
the reduction to certification standards, each is transformed into measur-
able characteristics of products and services, such as Fair Trade, Organic,
Protected Geographic Indication (see the right side of Fig. 7.1).
Multi-Stakeholder Certification: A Liberal Public in Which Opting
Individuals Are Formatted as Stakeholders and Options
as Measurable Objectives
With the expansion of their scope and the range of values they take into
account, standards of a new generation had to strengthen their standard-
setting and enforcement procedures that were previously criticized for
their lack of transparency and legitimacy. This was the case for a series of
transnational standards that claim to certify sustainability, independently
of the political authority of states, and were built on main value-chains of
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the agro-environmental business: RSPO (Roundtable on Sustainable Palm
Oil) in 2003, today 1000 members; RTRS (Roundtable on Responsible
Soy) in 2005; Bonsucro (Better Sugarcane initiative) in 2006; BCI (Better
Cotton Initiative) in 2006; RSB (Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels) in
2008. RSPO began with an agreement that WWF obtained from Unilever
in order to be more efficient and faster than states and international
legal systems in coping with deforestation. In response to criticisms, these
certification standards are ruled by multi-stakeholder governing bodies
(“roundtables”) based on the liberal grammar introduced above.21 In this
multi-stakeholder variant of the liberal grammar, individuals-in-public are
given an additional qualification within a closed list of “stakeholders”
corresponding to different interests or preferences for options, with an
equal voting right in the general assembly: (1) Oil Palm Growers, (2)
Palm Oil Processors and/or Traders, (3) Consumer Goods Manufac-
turers, (4) Retailers, (5) Banks and Investors, (6) Environmental/Nature
Conservation NGOs, and (7) Social/Developmental NGOs.
Standardization alters the liberal grammar in that options are to be
formatted as elementary plans to be engaged in, with the projected
output of measurable objectives listed as “indicators” and additional
“guidance”.22 Even when they are not quantified, they require codifi-
cation and formality.23 In spite of this dominance of the engaging in a
plan, the RSPO standard progressively included references to conceptions
of the good or rights—in terms of “principles of criteria”—that do not fit
this format because they overflow the limits of small narrow plans. In the
2013 change, four new “criteria” were added, which point to hot issues
to be governed: “C1.3 – ethical conduct (Growers and millers commit
to ethical conduct in all business operations and transactions)” with the
guidance: “A prohibition of all forms of corruption, bribery and fraudu-
lent use of funds and resources”; “C6.12 – forced and trafficked labour”;
“C6.13 – respecting human rights”; “C7.8 – minimizing GHG emission
from new plantings”.
There are six headings of “principles and criteria” under which indica-
tors and guidance are grouped. The first, “Commitment to transparency”,
concerns information and documentation, including “a written policy
committing to a code of ethical conduct and integrity” (indicator 1.3.1)
and “a prohibition of all forms of corruption and bribery” (guidance).
The second, “Compliance with applicable laws and regulations”, states
that “2.1. There is compliance with all applicable local, national and rati-
fied international laws and regulations” with extension to other rights:
7 A NEW CALCULABLE GLOBAL WORLD IN THE MAKING … 213
“2.2. The right to use the land is demonstrated, and is not legitimately
contested by local people who can demonstrate that they have legal,
customary or user rights”. The use of the land is also considered in: “2.3.
Use of the land for oil palm does not diminish the legal, customary or
user rights of other users without their free, prior and informed consent”,
with indicator 2.3.1 stipulating the objective of “participatory mapping
involving affected parties (including neighbouring communities where
applicable, and relevant authorities)”, and indicator 2.3.2 stipulating the
objective of “copies of negotiated agreements detailing the process of
free, prior and informed consent (FPIC)”.24 Each of the last four head-
ings of “principle and criteria” relates to distinct orders of worth that
they reduce to objective indicators. The third is market-oriented towards
economic and financial viability, the fourth is prescribing a certain indus-
trial organization of work, the fifth (“Environmental responsibility and
conservation of natural resources and biodiversity”) raises environmental
issues and the sixth (“Responsible consideration of employees and of indi-
viduals and communities affected by growers and millers”) addresses civic
labour rights while extending to “community values” and “cultural and
religious values” in the guidance.
Participative Technologies and Procedures to Deliberate
Over Regulations
The general assembly of members meets annually in a “convention” which
votes resolutions and changes of the standard. The quest for democratic
legitimacy does not rest only on vote but also on direct voices of the
constituency through arrangements and procedures that were designed
to allow a wide participation in the deliberation over the standard.
Beyond the limitations of voices through exclusion, the concept of a
“participation format”, developed by Audrey Richard-Ferroudji (Richard-
Ferroudji & Barreteau, 2012) in accordance with that of engagement ,
helps to clarify the conditions to take part, and the resulting “bur-
den” that bears on participants as demonstrated by Julien Charles in
various domains, from management to politics (Charles, 2012, 2016). In
the RSPO general assembly, the requirement to be “pragmatic”, “prac-
tical”, “realistic” and “effective” urges participants to formulate their
voice as engagement in a plan, and express themselves in public in the
format of individual choice between optional plans. This is congruent
with communicating—making issues common—in accordance with the
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liberal grammar. It explicitly opposes the “absolute or the ideal” of
engaging in public justificatory orders of worth backed by conceptions of
the common good. Prescriptions make explicit the required liberal public
civility: “understand the stakes” (options) and express your own (“I want
that!”), “be not shy”, “proactive”, “intervene”, “make the first move”,
“take the floor” (Cheyns, 2011).
The large number of participants gathered for the few days of the
convention led the organizers of roundtables to provide participatory
technologies issued from management. By bringing participants physi-
cally closer, the small size of groups is intended to allow more accurate
perceptual attention to others. In the 2006 roundtable, the device called
“world café” was introduced. It was designed in the end of the 1990s
to have participants “spontaneously” formed into “small, intimate table
conversations” about shared issues, recording outputs on papers (initially
“tablecloths”) and periodically switching tables so that ideas might circu-
late and connect (Brown, 2002; Brown et al., 2005). In the RSPO
version, the short-term temporality (twenty minutes) of each session
bringing together six unknown people evoked “speed-dating” techniques.
This brevity, the circulation from one table to another and the absence of
a theme displayed on each table, raised among participants a sense of an
arbitrary and poorly significant exchange.
To overcome these shortcomings, another facilitation technique was
introduced in the 2013 roundtable, the “open space technology” (OST).
Also issued from management and conceived by Harrison Owen in
the 1980s, OST was worked out to foster “self-organization” (Owen,
2008). Its device meets the requirements of a liberal public of individuals
expressing themselves through their choice for options made public. Each
individual “convener” takes the responsibility of naming and posting in
public an issue for a possible breakout session. Other participants have
to choose among the posted themes as options offered to all. A playful
staging is intended to turn the implementation into an exciting game.
The initiator takes a placard and writes a slogan or objective to gather
a discussion group (see Fig. 7.2a, b). Discussions in small groups last
for one hour, each taking place in parallel sessions during two days. The
output of the conversation is to be written on a flipchart as a list of objec-
tives which will then be collected and transcribed on printed charts. When
posted on the walls of the assembly hall, they make possible, in the next
step, to produce some proposals to be voted in the plenary meeting.
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Fig. 7.2 a, b Photographs of Open Space Technology (OST) in action (Source
Photographs by Laurent Thévenot)
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In addition to the liberal matrix, explicit mentions to market coor-
dination are given. The “open space” is presented as a “marketplace”
where participants “shop” for information and ideas (Owen, 2008).
Displaying their respective placards, conveners “sell” their respective
slogan-objectives on the competitive “market” of discussion groups. Indi-
viduals are urged to “freely” circulate between groups according to the
one “law” of OST, the “law of two feet”. It urges participants to leave the
ongoing conversation of a group of discussion for another, “given both
their right and responsibility to maximize their own learning and contri-
bution” when they “lose interest” in a breakout session. Owen affirms
that this is the correct civility: moving on is “the polite thing to do”. It
would be quite rude according to another grammar of commonality more
hospitable to attachments and generous hospitality (Thévenot, 2014).
These breakout sessions constitute small-scale and short-lived meet-
ings that do not have the validity of the general assembly and may raise
doubt about their legitimacy. Therefore, OST provides “principles” which
ensure the validity of the constitution, timing and production of these
small groups. The RSPO Open Space kick-off PowerPoint recalls Owen’s
(2008) four principles that assert the legitimacy of these contingent
groups:
Whatever happens IS the only thing that could have happened
Whenever it starts IS the right time
Whoever comes IS the right people
When it’s over IT IS over
In the PowerPoint presentation, four other norms introduce additional
requisites for communicating in the open space. Most of them specify the
conveners’ dispositions that are required by the liberal public. Norm 4—
“[speak your] voice, share your opinions and reasons. Do it clearly and
briefly”—makes explicit the right mode of communicating in the format
of one’s individual “opinion”, stipulating the clarity and brevity already
pointed to in the above-mentioned requirement to be “pragmatic”. It
involves to engage in a plan, with a short-term and clear-cut objective.
Norm 3—“respect [all]”—specifies the disposition of tolerance towards
differing voices. Mentions to “views” or “styles” (“regardless of whether
their views or style are similar to ours”) sustain the multicultural extension
of the liberal grammar.
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Norms 1 and 2 complement the liberal matrix. Norm 1 (“listen”)
does not only prescribe the kind of attention to another individual’s
opinion that the liberal grammar requires. It also recommends to “be
genuinely curious about their perspective”, which points to a distinct
regime of engaging in exploration (Auray, 2011) aiming at the good of
surprising novelty.25 It echoes another rule of the open space: “Be ready
to get surprises”. Norm 2 (“suspend [judgement]”) does not only plead
for respect to other individuals’ opinions but for avoidance of criticism:
“Suspend our agreement or disagreement”.
A-liberal Conceptions of Communication and Their Managerial
Reductions
If we look into the genealogy of these open space management technolo-
gies, we find they were initially designed to go beyond—or below—the
liberal public space and overcome its limitations, as suggested by the
explicit references to “café” style conversations, “backstage”, “behind the
scene” and “hallway chats”. David Bohm, the author of the most influ-
ential On dialogue (Bohm, 1996) that Open Space Technology draws
upon, was concerned by constructions of commonality and difference that
significantly depart from the liberal political tradition.
While obtaining his PhD in the theoretical physics group directed
by Robert Oppenheimer at the University of California at Berkeley,
his engagement in communist organizations prevented him from being
integrated in the Los Alamos project, despite Oppenheimer’s proposal.
When he was an assistant professor at Princeton University, he was called
upon by the House Un-American Activities Committee in 1949. He
invoked the Fifth amendment right to refuse to testify and give evidence
against his colleagues. Princeton suspended him and he left the United
States for Brazil and later United Kingdom, as a Professor of Theoret-
ical Physics at the University of London. In addition to the collective
spirit, or more precisely the civic worth of solidarity that oriented his
youth political engagement, his physicist’s activity has been a second
source of insights into the limitations of the autonomy attributed to
entities and even subjects. Pointing to the “fragmentation” that thought
processes—and not only theoretical modelling—bring to the perception
of the world, he considered that dialogue should shed light on the limita-
tions due to this fragmentation. His contention that “the representation
of thought enters the presentation of perception” (Bohm, 1996, p. 57)
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is not only Kantian but meets Ernst Cassirer’s neo-Kantian turn based
on Einstein’s space–time modelling. A third source of his insights issued
from his collaboration on human cognition with Stanford neuroscientist
Karl Pribram, the psychological philosopher Jiddu Krishnamurti and the
London psychiatrist and practitioner of Group Analysis Patrick de Maré.
All these resources supported Bohm’s conception of dialogue which
distances itself from the liberal composition of differences through
“negotiation”:
A great deal of what nowadays is typically considered to be dialogue tends
to focus on negotiation […] People are generally not ready to go into the
deeper issues when they first have what they consider to be a dialogue.
They negotiate, and that’s about as far as they get. Negotiation is trading
off, adjusting to each other and saying, ‘Okay, I see your point. I see that
that is important to you. Let’s find a way that would satisfy both of us. I
will give in a little on this, and you give in a little on that. And then we
will work something out.’ (Bohm, 1996, p. 18)
His criticism of negotiation extends to the format of “problem” which
occupies a central place in Dewey’s pragmatism. He even criticizes the
exposition of individual opinion—the mode of taking part in the liberal
public—the “pressure […] to get in there quickly and get your point of
view across, particularly if you are one of the ‘talkers’. Even if you’re not,
you have that pressure” (Bohm, 1996, p. 30). Bohm digs into the ground
of the liberal grammar and illuminates the limitations of engaging in a
plan: “Now, I’m going to propose that in a dialogue we are not going to
have any agenda, we are not going to try to accomplish any useful thing”
(Bohm, 1996, p. 17). He refers to what Michael Polanyi has called tacit
and personal knowledge (Bohm, 1996, p. 52) pointing to the format we
rely on when engaging in familiarity.
In spite of these various sources which diverge so strongly from the
construction of a liberal public of individuals choosing among options,
these divergences were blunted in the managerial usages of Bohm’s
original conception of dialogue and the resulting RSPO Open Space
Technology and participatory dialogue mechanisms.
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Experiencing Participative Technologies in Practice: “Open Space”
and Dialogue Dispositions Put to the Test of “Smallholders”
Engaging in Them
All RSPO participants are not equally prepared for the objective-oriented
participation format that “Open Space” demands. Managers and inter-
national NGO members are well versed in the required techniques and
procedures. They demonstrate a skilful utilization of the small group talks,
using them strategically as a first move in a sequence of plans expected to
extend eventually the objectives listed by the standard in the prescribed
format of “criteria, indicators or guidance”. We observed a group on
labour issues that a member of Oxfam stood ready to offer on the “mar-
ket” of the open space. He planned that the output of this first strategic
step would be the creation of a “working group” that was designed to
propose to the vote of the general assembly the revision of the standard
and the introduction of new criteria about labour rights. This was an
example of a step by step—plan by plan—process calculated to obtain
substantial changes of the standard and introduce links with human rights,
once formatted as criteria, indicators and guidance.
From now on, we shall concentrate on RSPO governing devices and
procedures as they are practically put to the test by the most vulner-
able actors of the palm oil value chain. Since our approach offers a
dual analysis based on either personality or community, we followed both
entities: a personality of “smallholder” (Arifin) and a “local community”
the territory of which was severely impacted by industrial plantations
(Karang Mendapo). Via a series of surveys (Cheyns, 2011, 2014; Cheyns
& Thévenot, 2019a; Silva-Castañeda, 2012; Thévenot, 2018), we were
able to observe how such a personality and community took part in RSPO
governing devices and coped with the formats that make this world calcu-
lable. They were backed up by a variety of NGOs that we could also
observe at different levels of their action.
Reacting to the 2009 plenary “smallholder session” in which presen-
tations were only made by certification companies and agencies while
smallholders themselves did not play a part, Arifin took advantage of
the “Questions and Answers” session to speak publicly in the general
assembly. Introducing the recently created farmers’ union “Indonesian
Oil Palm Farmers Union” [Serikat Petani Kelapa Sawit: SPKS] and
promoting the representation of family farmers in RSPO, he empha-
sized the “inequitable” mechanism used to fix palm bunch prices and the
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sharing of the value along the chain. As observed by Cheyns, he spoke
quietly at first, then his voice became louder and its pitch higher, his
movements animated and he often pointed to the dais with the papers in
his hand (Cheyns, 2014). As a result, the President asked to “avoid state-
ments” and to provide “shorter questions and comments”. A manager
of the Indo Oil company commented to a NGO Sawit Watch official:
“Why is it that my ‘young fruit’ makes a noise like that?” The manager
referred to a hierarchy within the Batak ethnic group to which Arifin and
himself belonged. Arifin used the opportunity of a later public meeting to
denounce this “young fruit” (i.e. “child”) paternalist domestic qualifica-
tion the manager attributed to him. He underlined that he was not taking
part in the roundtable as a young Batak, but as a representative of the
farmers’ union, SPKS. He thus claimed for a civic qualification (Cheyns,
2014) instead of the domestic one that the manager tried to impose.
Commenting on his intervention in an interview by Cheyns, Arifin said
that he was angry and felt oppressed because when smallholders “want to
fight, they go to jail” while businessmen in RSPO “are the ones who
apply this pressure on the ground”. Other members of the SPKS family
farmers’ union actually found his tone “still too soft” because “what is
important is to be honest” and Arifin contrasted his full engagement
with presentations by a lot of people who “don’t speak from the heart”
(Cheyns, 2014). Arifin’s engagements overflowed in two ways the format
of the limited plan confused with an objective. He engaged in public
criticism and justification (in the civic denunciation of structural inequal-
ities along the value chain, and promotion of union representation) and
also in the familiarity of the small farmers’ daily life which is severely
impacted by industrial “good practices” of farming. Yet, this expansion of
the participation formats was harshly criticized and Arifin called to order.
During the 2013 roundtable introducing the Open Space Technology
and the marketplace of breakout sessions, Arifin first looked upset by
this format (see Fig. 7.3a, left-hand). However, unlike other “smallhold-
ers” who were discouraged or eventually disappeared at the moment
of welcoming newcomers, he overcame a long moment of embarrass-
ment and hesitation and finally got involved. He lifted up a placard
written in Indonesian and English: “Smallholder and replanting. Who
to support?” [sic] (see Fig. 7.3b, right-hand). His theme assembled
participants who were exclusively smallholders. It produced conclusions
presented in Indonesian on a flipchart.
7 A NEW CALCULABLE GLOBAL WORLD IN THE MAKING … 221
Fig. 7.3 a, b Photographs of Arifin, firstly embarrassed and hesitant in front
of the Open Space Technology, then animating his “open space” group (Source
Photographs by Laurent Thévenot)
Fig. 7.4 a, b, c Photographs of Arifin, at ease during a conversation at the
cafeteria (Source Photographs by Laurent Thévenot)
Off the roundtable, the author had a conversation with Arifin in the cafe-
teria. He was quite at ease, expressing himself in a familiar engagement
with lively gestures and facial expressions (see Figs. 7.4a, b, and c). He
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came back to his experience of the Open Space, complaining that:
[…] on the replanting of palm trees for smallholders who want to remain
independent, a major issue for sustainability, because they are numerous,
is that there were no representatives of consumers, buyers, major compa-
nies or banks. […] They rather do brand imaging. […] In Open Space,
industry players seem to be passive and wait for conclusions. (Conversation
of Cheyns and Thévenot with Arifin, Medan, November 2013, translation
by Dani Pradana)
He noted that “NGOs are the ones who open the topic and participate.
Industry players don’t”. Arifin voiced his discontent because of the gap
between RSPO discussions and his field experience:
Initially participants feel satisfied because they expressed their problems,
but then they become unsatisfied because they do not see implementation.
[…] RSPO is supposed to be a place where various individual interests are
combined in a common interest. But once the mutual agreement has been
reached, its implementation goes back to individual interest and I am fed
up with this situation. It’s a waste of time and energy to reach this agree-
ment when it is not implemented. (Conversation of Cheyns and Thévenot
with Arifin, Medan, November 2013, translation by Dani Pradana)
To remedy this, Arifin continued, one should “make sure that each
topic discussed in these forums reach the executive board. […] There
should be rules to ensure parties enforce mutual agreements”. Arifin
emphasizes that the costly operation of composing the common interest
from individual interests, in a mutual agreement between differing voices,
is defeated on the ground.
Another reason for the gap between the discussions framed by the
various technologies of participation and the achievements on the ground
is that, unlike many actors involved in the formulation of the standard,
“parties which have to implement them are common people who don’t
know much about the procedures of RSPO. […] They don’t know how
P&C [‘Principles and Criteria’ of the standard] came to be; the farmers,
workers, businessmen, fields actors who have to implement them” (ibid.).
We thus observe that this in-depth criticism of the government by certi-
fication standards, informed by Arifin’s experience as a small planter,
although easily deployed in the familiar format of the conversation at
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the cafeteria, was disallowed by the general assembly because of the
mandatory participative format in a plan.
Some Lessons Learnt on the “Participative” and “Legislative”
Legitimacy of Governing by Certification Standard
In this second part, we considered the principles and effective implemen-
tation of the substitute for the legislative function that governing through
certification standards offers. Among the various modes of normativity
that matter for members of RSPO to express their differing voices, the
objective of a calculable world results in drastic selection to fit the stan-
dard. Indicators that make it measurable, and the format of engaging in
a plan which is a prerequisite for the reduction to indicators, heavily
constrain the organization of the dialogue and deliberation preparing
decisions on the standard. In spite of the explicit domination of the
format of the plan, formulated in the imperative of being “pragmatic”,
some participants go beyond this constraint. They articulate conflicting
conceptions of the common good that raise political and economic justi-
fications and criticisms, or air personal suffering because of the violation
of their familiar environment. Even if they are regularly called to order,
these strongly critical participants, issued from local concerned communi-
ties and relayed by NGOs, actively contribute to changes in the standard
content and procedures. However, are the standard and procedures
enforced?
A-testing, Pro-testing and Con-testing:
Substitutes for the Judicial System in Putting
the Standard Enforcement to a Critical Test
In this mode of governing, how are deeds put to a critical test? What
are the substitutes for the judicial bodies of a legal system? When
criticizing the enforcement of regulations, how do concerned people
(1) provide evidence issued from their knowledge and information (A-
testing); (2) express objection (Pro-testing); (3) communicate differing
views in dispute and conflict (Con-testing)?
224 L. THÉVENOT
Audit Procedures
The participatory setting framed by the “Open Space” operates de facto
as an inquiry device since participants use it to attest evidence collected in
their experience, in support of their argumentations and claims. However,
the de jure process of inquiry is the expert auditing integrated in this
government. Silva-Castañeda investigated the practical work of four out
of the six audit firms that have certified RSPO companies operating in
Indonesia (Silva-Castañeda, 2012). In her investigation, she cared to
“create a climate of familiarity, taking a walk with villagers in their forest
to be sensitive to their familiar engagement with the environment” (Silva-
Castañeda, 2012). By contrast, the process of “rendering auditable”—by
virtue of designing measurable procedures and performance—is a test of
“the quality of internal […] systems, rather than the quality of the product
or service itself as specified in standards” (Power, 1997, p. 84).
Indicators listed in the RSPO standard are codified records of informa-
tion requests, safety plans, emergency procedures, calendars, monitoring
systems, and “companies must develop management systems that will
enable them to demonstrate their compliance with the standard” (Silva-
Castañeda, 2012). Because auditors regard the document as the ultimate
form of evidence, “a lack of ‘evidence’ – in other words of documents
– on the side of local communities stands in contrast to the companies’
documentary arsenal” (Silva-Castañeda, 2012).
In one of the breakout sessions of the open space that we observed,
smallholders and non-smallholders met on the topic of audit. Rather
unexpectedly, two auditors joined the group and engaged in criticizing
the debated limitations of their work. The self-critical awareness of the
auditors allowed an outstanding critical exchange about this core device
in the control of the standard enforcement. Because auditors belong to
the main inspection body of this mode of governing, their taking part in
the critical public debate creates tensions with their official function.
RSPO “Dispute Settlement Facility”
The “RSPO Dispute Settlement Facility” is intended to fulfil some of the
jurisdictional functions. Without covering all the aspects of the pre-trial
investigation of a case, registering a complaint is part of the critical inquiry
we are interested in, in which smallholders are involved. Following our
methodological grid, we shall consider the three main operations which
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compose the chain of transformation between the kind of wrong which
the plaintiff suffers and the formal complaint which is duly registered.
While at-testing begins with attending and points towards providing
evidence, pro-testing addresses the critical statement to an interlocutor, a
step towards the larger public needed in con-testing, which is constrained
by the strong requirement of togetherness and based on the invested
forms needed for a common format. In our fieldwork with Cheyns,
we strived to follow the formulation of the complaint from a village
in Indonesia close to Jambi, Batu Ampar, up to the RSPO settlement
devices.
Contest: Formatting the Complaint in the Right Form for the Public
The needed transformation of the wrong in an official complaint is
not a specific feature of this mode of governing. A legal case in court
would also require to select “facts” and format them so that they would
be taken into account in the procedure. Yet, the plaintiff’s frustration,
which often results from the formatting, turns out to be particularly
severe in RSPO dispute settlement procedures, since complaints have to
be strictly formulated in terms of the principles, criteria, indicators and
guidelines of the standard. Just as they prepare communities to take the
floor at roundtable public sessions—through role-playing exercises among
other techniques (Cheyns, 2014)—various NGOs give them a hand in
learning and carrying out the transformations of their harm into a stan-
dard complaint. It is worth noting that a range of distinct NGOs build
up a chain that parallels the needed transformations to turn local knowl-
edge into proper public information formats. Some Indonesian NGOs
develop local and close links with smallholders, as Sawit Watch—also a
member of the RSPO Executive Board—or Wahli. They help “growing
a common cause in proximity” by “accommodating attachments” and
emotions within convivial preparatory meetings with farmers and commu-
nity representatives (Cheyns, 2014). Other international NGOs, such as
Oxfam, play their major role within RSPO official bodies, moving forward
new rights in the standard. Some of them, such as the Forest Peoples
Programme, are able to navigate between the different levels and related
engagements, from familiarity to public justification with reference to
the common good, because they combine the scientific knowledge and
methodology issued from anthropological scholarship and the skilled
practice of international organizations (Colchester, 2002; Colchester &
Chao, 2013; Cheyns & Thévenot, 2019b).
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A first complaint was send to the RSPO DSF (Dispute Settlement
Facility) by the village or Batu Ampar and written in Indonesian. Without
formal template, it mixed a DSF category (“Effort taken to resolve
the issues”) with other ones. Gun, a local member of the Indonesian
NGO Sawit Watch, helped villagers to write this first version. A second
version still written in Indonesian was framed within the DSF Form,
after the first complaint had been rejected because of its inappropriate
format. The chronological narrative which was so significant for the
history of the community was taken out. In addition to “Efforts have
been taken to resolve the issues”, the other two DSF categories, “Nature
of Complaints” and “Supporting Evidence”, were filled in. Nauli, who
created the local branch of the Indonesian NGO Wahli (Wahli Jambi),
gave a helping hand. Already an activist in college, he later organized
demonstrations in labour regional unions. As a lawyer, he dealt with
cases related to activism, students, labour cases and community cases. We
observed this double training in activism and law among other interme-
diaries who have to compromise between different worlds. Nauli critically
comments:
A lot of fuss about “sustainability”, catchy phrase. No concern for
local communities. No conflict resolution model. Commitment on paper,
not in actual practices. Weak involvements of local communities. (Nauli
interviewed by Cheyns in Jambi, 6 November 2014)
This second attempt still did not suit the needed format of the DSF
complaint. Karlo, who is a less local member of the Sawit Watch NGO,
rewrote in English a third version of the complaint. In the “Nature of
complaints” category, he transformed the former list which mentioned
under the heading “Land dispute” the items: “management system, part-
nership system, land grabbing”. In the new list of grievances, he strictly
connected each item to the numbered principle or criteria which were
viewed as violated. Under the heading “Land dispute related to violation
of the Principles 2.2 and 2.3”, he wrote:
The right to use the land is demonstrated, and is not legitimately contested
by local people who can demonstrate that they have legal, customary or
user rights [2.2]; […] Use of the land for oil palm does not diminish the
legal customary or user rights of other users without their free, prior and
informed consent [2.3].
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In these successive versions, we see the progressive trans-formation of
evidence, from formats that fit smallholders’ experienced troubles faced
in their engagements, to formats that rigorously stick to the objectives
phrased in the headings of the standard.
Attest: Land Appropriation and Appropriate Evidence
The extension of industrial plantations damages a range of farmers’
engagements with the land and the surrounding nature. Smallholders
face great difficulty in bringing into the dispute the acceptable evidence
of these damages and rights infringements. The reason is that RSPO
Government depends on the formalization of modes of engagement to
the land which stay remote from the various relations maintained and
valued by villagers. Liberal property right is only one among many modes
of appropriating land (Silva-Castañeda, 2015) and nature that make them
proper to one’s use or habitat, and maintain the kinds of dependency
that cosmologies or mythologies convey (Breviglieri & Landoulsi, 2016).
These modes, which suffer from the radical change provoked by industrial
plantations, procedures and normative frameworks, are weakly taken into
account by the standard.
The need for exclusive property and associated rights demands
mapping and boundaries, between neighbouring communities in partic-
ular. A document—in Indonesian—produced by the Batu Ampar village
community and distributed at the 2012 roundtable to document the
“Case profile” with the questioned company describes the relationship
to the land as follows:
The methods used by the villagers in cultivating their farms and orchards
still follow old methods of wise and traditional management, although
some have adopted relatively modern tools and framing techniques.
Communal work traditions (gotong royong) are still practiced on planting
and harvest times for agricultural produce, including thanksgiving cere-
monies and family parties/celebrations.
In 1916, the community moved across the river to its present location,
the document states in this respect:
[…] the boundaries of Batu Ampar customary territories were delineated
in a customary tembo, an oral customary seloko (poem) which began to be
recorded in a written form during the 1940–60s. The written record made
in 1985 still forms the guidelines for the current boundaries of the Batu
Ampar village.
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Table 7.1 The local familiar and customary format of evidence
Tunggul Bungo Besar Pemayang Tembesu Tebat Patah Pematang Belubang
A tree stump with a
large flower growing
on it/the stump of a
large flower
A dry islet in the
swamp with a





with a break of
mole
Landmarks are based on such customary, local and even personal
formats of evidence (see Table 7.1).
We observed in the field the “trans-formatting” chain artfully designed
to overcome this handicap via proper devices. Currently engaging in
familiarity with the natural environment, some villagers—not even the
chief—had the familiar knowledge needed to identify local markers of
territories, such as plant species or trees—when they were not already
destroyed by new industrial plantations. The instrument of global posi-
tioning system (GPS) made possible the transformation of these markers
into geographic coordinates (see Figs. 7.5a, b). This chain of inquiry
translated local and situated formats of information, such as familiar
landmarks, into formal proofs that would be accepted as publicly justi-
fiable “evidence” for the standard. The villager’s chief (the woman on the
right in the photograph of Fig. 7.5b) was helped by an NGO member
with a GPS who calculated “the coordinate points based on the Tembo
names obtained from the Batu Ampar village, as well as the agreement
between the Batu Ampar and the Karang Mendapo”.26
Protest: Direct “Private” Interaction
A result of the mapping efforts that Batu Ampar villagers strongly strug-
gled for was a decision [SK] by the local governing authority—the head
of district [Bupati]—settling the debated boundary between their village
(Batu Ampar) and the adjacent one (Karang Mendapu). It grounded
their claim that their rights were infringed because of the faulty map
that the company drew in 2001. This new piece of formal evidence was
expected to be pivotal in their fight for their rights. In the DSF category
“Efforts have been taken to resolve the issues” that was already filled
in the first version of the complaint, they recorded three points in the
last version: (1) Boundary checking into the field by District and Village
Government; (2) Boundary determination by Bupati with the issuance
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Fig. 7.5 The transformation of familiar-customary landmarks (a) into quantifi-
able space markers; (b) recorded by the NGO technician (left) and the village
chief (right) (Source Photographs by Laurent Thévenot)
of the decision on the administrate border village; and (3) Asking the
company for implementing the decision letter.
The head of the village, Yanti, came from her village to the RSPO
annual meeting in Medan. Away from the public arenas, roundtable
annual meetings offer the opportunity of “side events” that allow a direct
confidential exchange between stakeholders for private negotiation. We
managed to attend such a closed meeting between: a director of GAR
(Golden Agri-Resources) headquartered in Singapore; the main palm oil
company of one of the largest Indonesian conglomerates Sinar Mars27;
which owns the local subsidiary company KDA in Jambi; the director of
this subsidiary company KDA; the village chief Yanti; Karlo from NGO
Sawit Watch; Nauli from NGO Wahli local branch in Jambi; Agun, a
mediator from the consultant firm TFT (Tropical Forest Trust) who was
paid by GAR. Local participants spoke Indonesian while a translator whis-
pered the English translation to the GAR director who did not understand
Indonesian. The photographs show the full roundtable (Fig. 7.6a); the
GAR director with his assistant listening to the translation in English
(Fig. 7.6b); Karlo with the camera recording the meeting (Fig. 7.6c);
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Fig. 7.6 Photographs of the direct confrontation with the headquarters
company directors. (a) (top photograph; right of the table, from left to
right): Karlo (NGO Sawit Watch), Bondan (Sawit Watch), Yanti (Batu Ampar
village chief), Nauli (NGO Wahli Jambi); (b) (bottom left): GAR (Singapore)
director of communication; (c) (centre): Karlo; (d) (bottom right): Yanti (Source
Photographs by Laurent Thévenot)
Yanti dressed up for the occasion and wearing the hijab (Fig. 7.6d, in
contrast with her informal clothing and cap she had on in the field, see
Fig. 7.5b).
Karlo (NGO Sawit Watch):
The Batu Ampar villagers have worked hard to resolve the boundary issue
during the past year. I present documents describing the effort made to
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resolve the boundary issue. […] we brought this up to RSPO to try and
pester the company to implement the government decision so that Batu
Ampar can access its lands.
Yanti (chief of the village):
Our last meeting was stuck on boundary issues. In July this was resolved
at the government level in favour of Batu Ampar, and I have requested
KDA to implement this resolution and allow the Batu Ampar villagers to
work the land. The company has not given a satisfactory answer. […]
Agun (mediator from Tropical Forest Trust, paid by GAR):
The Bupati [head of district] office held the SK [decision] and demanded
payment. TFT wouldn’t engage with this since it involves bribery and we
don’t know how the SK [decision] finally got issued. […]
Nauli (NGO Wahli, local branch in Jambi):
Can’t KDA give evidence of progress that can be presented to the Batu
Ampar community? Without progress Yanti’s efforts may lose community
support, so give us something to show. […]
Karlo:
I don’t quite understand the notion of the Bupati asking money for the
SK. Does this have anything to do with the Batu Ampar request for funds
for boundary mapping? […]
Yanti:
I’d like to mention that I’ve borrowed money to perform the mapping
and boundary delineation work.
Mediator:
Well, TFT doesn’t want to know about bribery.
Yanti:
We’re not talking about bribes! It’s about the costs of the mapping work.
Yanti (to the director of this subsidiary Company KDA):
Would you dare to walk into the disputed area, since you said you’re a
Jambinese?
Nasir:
I would as a Jambinese, but that’s not the problem.
Some Lessons Learnt on the “Judicial” Legitimacy
of Governing by Certification Standards
In this third part dedicated to the ways standard enforcement is put to a
reality test, we followed three general procedures for monitoring compli-
ance with the standard and dealing with disputes about it, which have
counterparts in the judicial system (complaint, judgement), its periphery
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(mediation) and other private or public government processes (audit).
The three differ due to the formatting of the world they demand to make
it calculable, and the disposition of the participants they involve, so that
all beings “qualify” for the test and can be taken into account in the
judgement. Audit is carried out in the company, most often on the basis
of documents, and is therefore the most formal test and the farthest from
a direct confrontation between protagonists. The Dispute Resolution
process requires of the plaintiffs hard formatting work for the complaint
to be admissible. Judgement includes a process of questioning the parties
but not the adversarial confrontation organized by the judicial system.
Finally, the mediation test is the least formal of the three. The parties in
conflict are brought together face-to-face to display their disagreement
on their conformity to the standard. It allows them to become involved
in regimes of engagement that deviate from the format of the plan and the
objective set out by the standard. As observed more generally in medi-
ation (Cardoso de Oliviera, 2005), the openness to familiar engagement
that this face-to-face relation makes possible is conducive to expressions
of suffering or humiliation that complainants consider to be lost in the
judicial process that sacrifices them in favour of qualified facts.
In order for the test to have public legitimacy, the bodies that guar-
antee the procedure should be impartial: auditors, RSPO members issuing
a judgement, or mediators. In the three types of tests we examined,
this impartiality is highly questionable. Such procedural faults reveal the
imbalance of power between parties, which the liberal grammar and the
multi-stakeholder matrix claim to overcome to the benefit of the juxta-
position of “stakes” in a horizontal dialogue around a “roundtable”. In
the first test, failure comes from the financing of audits by companies
with resulting dependency and conflicts of interests. In the second test, a
fault results from the choice among the “board” of the “judges” who rule
on dispute resolutions, which was recently remedied. In the third test, the
flaw ensues from the financing of the mediator by the company that is one
of the parties in conflict. The consequences of this flaw are made visible
in the meeting above when the mediator himself, and not one of the
parties, undertook to disqualify the new major piece of evidence provided
by the village chief: the delimitation of the village territory ratified by
the local administrative authority, which contradicts the map produced
by the company. This disqualification on grounds of “bribery”, without
any supporting evidence, is an interference by the mediator to which
the village chief, Yanti, replied firmly. As a young Muslim nurse, she
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demonstrated her ability to shift the regime of engagement with great
versatility. Although adjusted by her formal dressing and composure to
a public space, she was also able, in the presence of managers, to adopt
familiar expressiveness and gestures (Fig. 7.6d) of indignation that we also
observed on Arifin (Fig. 7.3b).
In the continuation of this move towards familiarity, she challenged
the local company’s manager to come on site. The request to “come on
site”, which contrasts most radically with the detachment of the judge-
ment from the contextual situation, and even more with abstraction
through numbers, is often expressed by critics to demonstrate that the
chain of transformation of their testimony has, in the end, led to the
sacrifice of what was most important to them and affected or threatened
(Richard-Ferroudji, 2011; Thévenot et al., 2000; Thévenot, 2019a).
Unlike the closure of the judicial system, which is due to its heavy
normative equipment, jurisprudence accumulated over time and with
support from its professional bodies, the most recent RSPO system is rela-
tively more open to varied modes of normativity. They are either explicitly
transferred into the standard (production methods, national and interna-
tional law, indigenous peoples’ rights, customary law, etc.) or advanced
via criticism and interventions by legitimate stakeholders . The diversity of
these stakeholders allows disputes to question the lack—or reduction—of
certain modes of normativity even if they eventually undergo a signifi-
cant transformation to enter the standard.28 The most vulnerable actors,
with the support of an architecture of NGOs that fit the stakeholders’
various engagement formats, from local proximity to dealings with inter-
national multinationals, seek compromises, through inquiry and critical
devices, with such governing through objectives whose limitation they
are aware of. With one foot in and one foot out, they also engage in
other modes of attesting, protesting and contesting, such as unionization
or street demonstration in relation to the 2013 RSPO convention.
Discussion of the Certified Objectivity
Sought by a “Standardizing Liberalism”:
Power-Knowledge and the Enlarged
Analysis of Oppression and Criticism
Quantification studies are part of research on objectivity which historians
of science nurtured (Daston & Galison, 2007; Porter, 1995). The social
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sciences have a long tradition of critical deconstruction of claims to objec-
tivity, fostered by social constructivism, ANT (Actor-Network Theory)
and STS (Science and Technology Studies). Just as STS authors concerned
with the coordination power of “regulatory objectivity” (Cambrosio
et al., 2009), our research agenda adopts a pragmatist approach to the
study of the politics of quantification. More precisely, it investigates the
relations between quantified objectivity and modes of governing that
make the world calculable. In contrast to a range of politics that govern
by quantifying the individuals themselves (Thévenot, 2011a, 2019b), be
they state policies based on survey statistics, or organizational ones that
digitally track individuals, or the quantified “social credit” which Tong
Lam introduces in this volume and which combines the central control
of the Chinese state with the data mining of digital individual tracks, or
even the “quantified self” movement that Uwe Vormbusch examines in
this volume, the politics considered in this chapter govern human beings
indirectly through objects, via the transnational voluntary certification of
market goods. In spite of its material basis and “private” character, this
form of government takes on values that are generally under the respon-
sibility of the “public” government of people based on the rule of law.
As pointed out by Andrei Guter-Sandu and Andrea Mennicken in their
contribution to this volume, “the boundaries between the public and
private are blurred and/or reworked”. The liberal grammar that stays
in the background of these new modes of governing indeed facilitates
the link with market coordination and contributes to this blurring. Yet,
research attention should be given to the consolidation of this link by
the standardization of goods—a process which is, in itself, neither liberal,
nor implicated in market competition. Rather it evolved into a new kind
of “standardizing liberalism” (Thévenot, 1997) which has expanded on a
world scale.
Marc Breviglieri analysed at large this expansion in the domain of
“the guaranteed city” (Breviglieri, 2018), showing the formatting it
brings about in the environment that stands close to a person’s singular
intimacy—the habitat—and supports the construction of commonality
built on cohabitation. The array of labels, accreditations and certifica-
tions that guarantee a “smart city”, “inclusive city”, “global active city”,
“what works cities”, etc., transforms what Breviglieri calls the “architec-
tures of usages” which, by contrast, rely on familiarized dependencies
between inhabitants and the spaces they dwell in. This transformation
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produces certified options that allow the choice of opting liberal indi-
viduals, and market coordination as well. In her comprehensive research
on “halal” certification (Bergeaud-Blackler & Kokoszka, 2017; Bergeaud-
Blackler et al., 2016), Florence Bergeaud-Blackler demonstrated that the
investments in forms and measurement conventions required by this stan-
dardization led to a dispositif that combines inspiration, market and
industrial orders of worth to reach a stabilized compromise and create a
certifiable halal quality of goods and services. She showed the effect of this
reduction of faith to a measurable and certifiable quality: it reinforces, on
a large scale and insidiously via the market, a literalist and fundamentalist
conception of religion (see also Stavo-Debauge, 2018).
The European government of education (see also Corine Eyraud’s
contribution in this volume), health, social work and employment—i.e.
core policies of the former welfare state—also display this process of “stan-
dardizing liberalism”. What are the similarities and differences with the
certification we studied? Although standards are central (Landri, 2016;
Normand, 2016a; Timmermans & Berg, 2003; Normand, 2010), as well
as good practices (Normand & Derouet, 2016) in these post-welfare
policies, both are grounded in “politics of evidence” (Normand, 2016b,
2020) which do not have the same role in the RSPO certification stan-
dard. Decision-making processes also diverge, since the European policies
combine elements of state legal systems with experts from influential
transnational think-tanks and private firms, all of them being connected in
networks through which normative and evaluative tools “travel” (Lawn,
2013). Yet, in spite of the links with representative democracy, this combi-
nation does not appear to be much more favourable to critical questioning
(Bruno, 2016) than the RSPO standard.
Research on these different policies, and “standardizing liberalism”
more generally, provides an important meeting place for the two research
approaches on standardization and quantification brought together in this
volume (see also Hansen, 2016, 2017; Normand, 2016a). This volume
enables a dialogue between two long-standing research agendas on quan-
tification, which until hitherto, with some notable exceptions, particularly
more recently, have not interacted that much: Foucault inspired studies of
quantification, on the one hand, and French works on the “Economie des
conventions”, modes of justification and orders of worth, on the other
hand. The dialogue engendered here helps elucidate convergences and
divergences between these approaches.29
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The first point of convergence results from the significance of words-
things connections already unfolded in Foucault’s Les mots et les choses
(Foucault, 1966), before STS and ANT paid attention to materiality.
Being concerned with the notion of “qualification” in our analysis, these
became also important in Foucault oriented studies of quantification
which extended from accounting to material arrangements, such as those
studied in the “spatial reordering of the manufacture” by Peter Miller and
Ted O’Leary (1994); Foucault’s dispositif being a shared inspiration for
both.
In contiguity with the previous connection through Foucault’s micro-
power of dispositifs, the power-knowledge connection (Foucault, 1985
[1984], 1995 [1975]) is a second central issue in both research
streams, although grasped differently. In Foucault inspired governmen-
tality studies, the “administering of lives” (Mennicken & Miller, 2014)
and managing at a distance through the “conduct of conduct” are key
issues. In the other approach, in-forming, trans-forming and formatting
through invested conventional forms are central operations, because they
sustain coordination power under uncertainty.
A third shared concern—clearly visible in this chapter—is the move
beyond the state, but also beyond the “neoliberal” as an all-encompassing
notion. But also here the main categories used to achieve this move differ.
Compared to the Foucauldian historical-genealogical approach aimed at
studying and unpacking regimes of political rationality, the “Economie
des conventions” approach is interested in the critical pluralism of modes
of evaluation constituted by conventions, orders of worth and valued
regimes of engagements. While “programmes” (of governing) are the
main empirical objects in the Foucauldian tradition to scrutinize manage-
ment reforms, breaking down policies and politics into a variety of valued
modes of coordination is at stake in the other tradition, with special atten-
tion given to the tensions between most public conventions and most
personally convenient modes of engaging, and the chain of transformation
involved when shifting from familiar attachments to public qualifications
(Nielsen, 2015).
Shared concern and dialogue might intensify on research objects that
bring to light changes in governmentality and modes of governing in
response to former waves of criticism. Mennicken and Miller30 noted
that research on modes of “exercising voice” is all the more needed
today, as for instance the language of NHS health policy guidelines
they study shifted from an earlier focus on “satisfaction”, to “choice”
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and now towards “voice”, with even attention paid to “formal and
informal knowledge (‘soft intelligence’)” and “relationship knowledge”.
In their contribution on quantification in the English Prison Service in
this volume, Guter-Sandu and Mennicken also come to take into account
a diversity of values that quantification gives room to, including the rise
of measures of decency in response to former criticisms.
Accounting for differing voices, their evaluative orientations, the
formats of the evidence that qualifies for claims according to grammars
of commonality, are a main strength of the extended Convention Theory
research programme. Following the processes of attesting, protesting and
contesting brought new insights into politics, the ways people take part in
the polity and express a differing voice (Luhtakallio & Thévenot, 2018).
Many contributors to this volume share a concern for critical voices and
what quantification does to them. They follow the process of investiga-
tion, construction of the categories and the information used to quantify
and govern, considering both structural domination and the participa-
tion of the persons in the organization and criticism of this domination,
with a possible enhancement of citizens’ capabilities (De Leonardis et al.,
2012). Fostering on this point the dialogue between the two research
agendas nurtured by this volume, Vormbusch recalls in his chapter that,
while the sociology of critique has been criticized for overlooking the
historically specific restrictions limiting the very possibility for critique,
Foucault has been accused of neglecting human agency. Regarding self-
quantifying practices as “an investigative praxis […] without neglecting
the discourse of power”, Vormbusch shifts the analytical angle towards
“the participants’ agency and their capacities of critique”.
In her contribution to this volume, Ota de Leonardis brings to light
a “semantic shift” towards “spatialization” of inequality that obscures
the “political issues of power” and the “vertical political architecture of
modernity”, because of a new ideological “dream of a domination free
from any bond with the dominated”. This statement converges with the
changes that result from the new calculable global world that this chapter
is dedicated to. Sharing the concern of the governmentality agenda for
a more precise analysis of what is usually covered by the extensive term
“neoliberal”, we identified three distinct components whose combination
obscures dependency between individuals and domination bonds.
The first component is political liberalism, currently presented as “hor-
izontal” politics that free autonomous individuals from hierarchies and
the kind of hierarchical bonds that we modelled in orders of worth.
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Yet, the analysis of the liberal grammar shows that, as any grammar of
commonality, it creates a dependency between human beings because
of the coordination power provided by the format of commonality,
and the dominated situation of those who are not in a position to
engage in this format. The undeniable emancipatory empowerment of
the liberal grammar has a price: all engagements are to be transformed
into individual choices—or preferences—for common knowledge options.
Even intimate bodily engagements involved in sexual and love relation-
ships, for which this liberal emancipation is widely recognized, have to
be transformed into common knowledge options designated as “sexual
preferences”.
The second component is the market competition convention of
coordination. It is distinct from the liberal grammar because of its
two dominating common forms: money and price. Yet the connection
between liberal politics and market competition is easily made possible by
confusing options with market goods, and “choosing” with “buying”.
The third component strengthens this connection by encompassing in
market goods a wide variety of conceptions of the common good, or
fundamental rights, as certifiable and assessable properties of these goods.
In an unprecedented extension of the commodity fetishism that Marx
exposed, the combination of these three components reinforces the illu-
sion that human beings are freed from dependency and hierarchy bonds
and only connected through a world of things, becoming independent
opting individuals facing an array of secured options. Yet, unless critical
capacity recovers from the illusions of an assessable world, as we have seen
among some “smallholders” and NGOs, under the pressure of the new
calculable world people’s temper might become incalculable.
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Notes
1. Because of our attention to conflicting valuations in calculability, we
depart from other uses of the term in literature, such as Callon and
Muniesa (2006).
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2. This approach is particularly suited to relate statistics with the history of
the new state of the Soviet Union, as demonstrated by Martine Mespoulet
in her chapter in this volume (see Chapter 2, “Creating a Socialist Society
and Quantification in the USSR”).
3. Wendy Espeland developed an important and influential research agenda
on “commensuration” (Espeland & Stevens, 1998), without linking this
programme explicitly to the study of the modes and politics of producing
equivalence.
4. For recent comparative research, conducted in the same spirit, on changes
in lifelong learning systems among five European countries (Germany,
Denmark, France, Sweden, UK), see Verdier (2017). Magnus Paulsen
Hansen (2017) pragmatically followed the processes of justification and
critique, emancipation and coercion, as well as quantified modes of “trying
the unemployed”, in comparative research on measurement, measures
and evaluation that compose contemporary unemployment reforms in
Denmark and France aimed at the “Active Society”.
5. For a recent overview on the sociology of quantification, see Diaz-Bone
and Didier (2016).
6. Directed by Emmanuelle Cheyns (CIRAD), this research project was
funded by the Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR) (grant No.
ANR-11-CEPL-0009). See Cheyns (2014, 2011), Cheyns and Thévenot
(2019a), Thévenot (2018). See also the research carried on by Laura
Silva-Castañeda (2012).
7. I do not refer here to the precisely delimited concept of “voice” that
Albert Hirschman distinguished from “loyalty” and “exit” (Hirschman,
1970), but to the sequence of operations of attesting, protesting and
contesting (see section “A-testing, Pro-testing and Con-testing: Substi-
tutes for the Judicial System in Putting the Standard Enforcement to a
Critical Test” of this chapter).
8. A large part of the original article on “social coding” (Thévenot, 1983)
has been made available in English (Thévenot, 2016) with additional
comments benefiting from thirty years’ experience with the analysis of
investments in qualification and quantification, unfolded in Convention
Theory.
9. On the relations with Bourdieu’s approach to [symbolic] forms, see
Thévenot (2011b, 2016); to Simmel’s forms, see Thévenot (2017).
10. Foucault’s Les mots et les choses (“Words and things”, translated as The
order of things (see Foucault, 1971 [1966])) also exerted a signifi-
cant influence over our initial research, as evidenced in the title of the
article presenting our research on classifications, “Words and numbers
[les mots et les chiffres]: socio-professional nomenclatures” (Desrosières &
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Thévenot, 1979). Because of the close attention Foucault paid to power-
knowledge and the variety of forms of bringing together [rapprochement],
his influence departed from that of Bourdieu.
11. For more detailed presentations of this avenue of research in English and
its continuation in Convention Theory and French Pragmatic Sociology,
see Amossé (2013), Desrosières (2011), Diaz-Bone (2016), Thévenot
(2016).
12. A new generation of sociologists well versed in quantitative methods repli-
cated and elaborated further the experimental games: Amossé (2013),
Deauviau et al. (2014), and Penissat et al. (2015).
13. Any unequal ordering or ranking among human beings threatens an
ideal of a common humanity which has been endorsed by various moral,
religious and political principles. We found that two distinctive features—
shared by all orders of worth but not all repertoires of evaluation—are
intended to appease this threat: (1) the “superiority” of more worthy
should benefit all, as far as their worth is linked to a construction of
the common good; and (2) this “superiority” or unequal qualification for
worth should not be permanently ascribed to their persons but regularly
put to the reality test of effective coordinated actions.
14. For a wide view on the future and expectations, see Beckert (2011, 2016).
15. Robert Salais and Michael Storper devised a pluralist approach to the
organization of economic activity which has some family resemblance
with orders of worth but aims at integrating production and market. It
differentiates “worlds of production” through institutions, social practices
and conventions, which coordinate economic actors by defining specific
“frameworks of economic action” (Storper & Salais, 1997). Quite inde-
pendently, Roger Friedland and Robert Alford have developed another
pluralist approach of organizations in terms of “institutional logics”
(Friedland & Alford, 1991) which became influential in the English liter-
ature on organizational studies, and only recently came into dialogue
with Convention Theory and Pragmatic Sociology (Brandl et al., 2014;
Cloutier & Langley, 2013; Patriotta et al., 2011).
16. François Hartog underlined the contemporary “presentism” by situating
it in a succession of “regimes of historicity” (Hartog, 2003).
17. On the criticism of “flatland”, see De Leonardis (2008). See also our
concluding critical discussion in this chapter on this point.
18. In his contribution to this volume, Thomas Amossé examines the contin-
uation of this history and the recent rise of “matched panels” techniques
involved in a quasi-experimental evaluation of incentive policies targeted
at specific populations, and intended to establish “purified causalities” of
“good variables” on individuals’ behaviours.
19. Engaging in familiarity hardly achieves a mutuality which remains partial.
It is obtained by communicating through personally and emotionally
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invested “common-places” of extremely unequal scales, from the closest
level of intimacy in love or friendship to wide communities. The good of
ease in familiarity can turn into evil when oppressing other engagements,
or made instrumental in populist politics. On these issues, see Thévenot
(2014, 2020).
20. The sociological use of the “taken-for-granted” of “lifeworld” mainly
sticks to this first side of engaging in familiarity usually termed “routine”.
21. A meta-norm principle borrowed from the “International Social and
Environmental Accreditation and Labeling” (ISEAL), which enacts stan-
dards of standards and defines “what credibility looks like for standard
systems”, is called “engagement” and introduces this governance principle
with the following definition: “Engagement. Standards-setters engage a
balanced and representative group of stakeholders in standards develop-
ment. Standards systems provide meaningful and accessible opportunities
to participate in governance, assurance and monitoring and evaluation.
They empower stakeholders with fair mechanisms to resolve complaints”
(see https://www.isealalliance.org/credible-sustainability-standards/iseal-
credibility-principles, accessed 16 June 2020).
22. On the reduction of European Community government and evaluation
to “guidelines” which are themselves reduced to quantitative “indica-
tors”, with the detailed case of the guideline “Ensure inclusive labour
markets”, see Salais (2006, 2017). More on the distance between the
political rhetorical justification one can see in the wording of guidelines
and the effective policies that are driving their monitoring through perfor-
mance indicators can be found in Salais’ contribution to this volume. On
benchmarking for state policies, see also Bruno and Didier (2013).
23. In the 2013 changes, forty new indicators were added, such as the quanti-
fied “4.4.4. mill water use per ton of Fresh Fruit Bunches (FFB)”, “4.6.2.
records of pesticide use”, “5.4.1. renewable energy use and fossil fuel use
per ton or Crude Palm Oil (CPO)”.
24. On the normative principle of “Free, Prior and Informed Consent”,
its anchoring in the liberal grammar of individual choice, and possible
or contingent extension to peoples’ collective consent, see Cheyns and
Thévenot (2019a, 2019b).
25. This sense of curiosity to others is nowadays frequently observed in norms
and practices of US liberal communities (Berger, 2012; Eliasoph, 2011).
Curiously engaging in exploration converges with the key insistence on
“experience” that was at the heart of Dewey’s pragmatism.
26. Our young Javanese translator who accompanied us in the field, although
moved by a curiosity as strong as ours, was not able to understand and
thus translate without ambiguity the wording of the landmarks. He was
obviously lacking the familiar engagement with the places thus named
and pointed to by the villagers.
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27. After a Greenpeace campaign in 2010, Burger King, Unilever and Nestlé
cancelled their supplier contracts with GAR subsidiaries due to unsustain-
able farming practices. GAR adopted afterwards a zero-deforestation policy
which required Greenpeace, GAR and a consultancy firm to develop a
tool to codify and quantify forest called the High Carbon Stock (HCS)
approach. Because of the pre-eminence of the liberal grammar, it still
rests on the format of relations to the land and bargaining negotiations
that raise criticisms similar to those reported here (Cheyns et al., 2020).
28. On the opening of legal studies to a wider variety of modes of norma-
tivity, see the special issue in English of La Revue des Droits de l’Homme
dedicated to “Modes on normativity and normative transformations”,
edited and introduced by Véronique Champeil-Desplats, Jérome Porta
and Laurent Thévenot (Champeil-Desplats et al., 2019). On the “‘trans-
formation’ of social rights [transferred] under modes of normativity other
than those of human rights”, such as objectives, programmes, indicators,
standards, see in this special issue Porta (2019).
29. In addition to the numerous meetings that were held in connection
with the production of this book, Andrea Mennicken and Peter Miller
hospitably organized an additional side-meeting at the LSE in April
2017, with Uwe Vormbusch, initiator and go-between, and myself. This
meeting nurtured my comments that still do not pretend to synthetize
the generous and considerate conversations we then had.
30. Exchange during the London meeting.
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CHAPTER 8
Do Performance Indicators Improve
the Effectiveness of Development Aid?
Ousmane Oumarou Sidibé
Performance indicators, inspired by benchmarking techniques invented in
the private sector, are increasingly used in public management, according
to the notion that in order to survive in a competitive environment,
countries must continually improve their organization by importing “best
practices” that prevail among their “competitors” (OECD & World Bank,
2008). Alain Supiot calls this the “dogmatics of universal competition”
(Supiot, 2009). These indicators are the cornerstone of results-based
management (Managing for Development Results, MfDR) and have
become the key criteria for measuring the effectiveness of public poli-
cies, on the basis of quantitative targets. Governments are anxious to gain
points in international rankings by any means, focusing especially on the
Human Sustainable Development Index compiled by the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP). In this index, countries are ranked
according to a series of indicators that implicitly set a norm, suggesting
that the “lowest performing” countries need to better their scores. In this
framework performance indicators have become a formidable tool in the
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hands of a few international experts, who insidiously impose far-reaching
public policy choices on states, in the absence of any real debate among
citizens.
In Third World countries these indicators are in effect used by interna-
tional funding bodies to orient development aid in the context of a change
of strategy, shifting from “project aid” to budget support, in keeping with
the Paris Declaration of 2 March 2005.1 There is now an international
consensus that management of project aid, largely controlled by funding
bodies, undermines the responsibility of recipient countries, hampers
mobilization of resources and raises transaction costs. In response to this
criticism, the ministers in charge of development from developed and
developing countries, and officials of bilateral and multilateral funding
organizations convened in Paris on 2 March 2005. At this meeting they
resolved to reform delivery and management of aid as stated in the Paris
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. To make aid more effective the Paris
Declaration underscored the following five principles:
Ownership: Recipient countries set their own public policy and
strategy in the framework of Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS),
which are the reference documents of public policy;
Alignment : Donor countries align their support with the recip-
ient countries’ national priorities, systems and procedures of public
financial management, instead of each following its own system;
Harmonization: Donor countries coordinate their choice of sectors
to support (education, public health, etc.), control and reporting
procedures to be put into place, and share information to avoid
overlapping action;
Results: Recipient countries work with partners to define results
expected from funded programmes and on their evaluation;
Mutual accountability: Donors and recipient countries are both
accountable for results achieved in development action.
The general budget support recommended by the Paris Declaration is
intended to improve mobilization of resources and foster greater mutual
responsibility of donors and beneficiaries of aid.2
In the course of the 1990s, some African countries, among them
Tanzania, Uganda, Mozambique, were able to shift from project aid to
budget support. In West Africa, Mali was a pioneer of budget support aid,
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under a Framework Arrangement for general budget support agreed in
March 2006 by the government of Mali and funding bodies. Agreements
for sectoral budget support in the areas of education, public health and
decentralization and institutional development were concluded respec-
tively on 18 July 2006, 19 July 2006 and 11 September 2009. Under
these agreements, the disbursement of aid in these sectors is contingent
upon attaining quantitative figures for a number of indicators.3 Advo-
cates of this approach see in it a way to bring the authorities in recipient
countries to report to funding institutions on the results of development
programmes, in exchange for greater (although “under surveillance”)
responsibility in the use of the resources attributed. To link action under-
taken to results obtained and more systematically monitor performance,
the funding bodies outline results chains in loan agreements. These results
chains form part of the logical framework that connects the objectives, the
activities pursued to attain them, the resources deployed and the results
obtained in relation to those expected, and the impact achieved.
This chapter illustrates how these performance indicators have
contributed to undermine public policies in Africa. We look at several
examples drawn from experience in Mali, particularly in education and
public health. This research highlights the harmful effects of performance
indicators (Sect. “The Harmful Effects of Performance Indicators”),
queries the meaning of management by indicators (Sect. “Querying
Performance-based Management in Third World Countries”) and takes
up the issue of the autonomy of aid recipient countries in management
of their public policy (Sect. “Giving Aid Recipient Countries Greater
Autonomy to Conduct Their Public Policy”).
The Harmful Effects of Performance Indicators
Upon close examination it becomes clear that the use of performance
indicators in managing public affairs often leads to outcomes that are
contrary to the stated objectives (Desrosières, 2014). In the education
sector in Mali, while indicators pertaining to the gross enrolment rate
in the primary education fundamental cycle (71.0% in 2013) and to the
completion rate for the fundamental cycle (51.0% in 2013) (Ministry of
the Economy & Finances, 2014) attest to progress in universal schooling,
they have nonetheless had undesirable effects on the education system.
It should be remembered that the widespread introduction of perfor-
mance indicators for education in Africa was based on thinking that lent
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credence to the idea that education in Africa suffered more from poor
governance than from inadequate funding (Boone, 1996; Mingat & Tan,
1998). This neoliberal theory, very much in vogue at the World Bank at
the time, was supported by international comparisons of the internal effi-
ciency of education systems, measuring the number of years in school
against the share of spending for education in GDP (see Mingat &
Suchaut, 2000; Olivier & Orivel, 1999).
International rankings do indeed reveal the low efficiency of African
education systems in the 1990s, compared to Asian and Latin American
countries where pupils stayed in school twice as long, on average, for the
same proportion of GDP spent on education. This theory, positing that
school performance is not fundamentally related to the volume of finan-
cial resources allocated to education, had earlier been advanced in other
contexts in Brazil and in the United States, most notably in the Coleman
Report in 1966 (Hanushek, 1997; Harbison & Hanushek, 1992). Subse-
quently, this theory served as the “scientific” basis for a number of
decisions that can be seen as factors in the present crisis of education
systems in Africa.
Under agreements with international aid donors, the national educa-
tion ministers of African countries were pushed to apply brutal reforms
with the sole aim of improving the internal yield of the systems, without
regard for the quality of teaching. In this context various highly debat-
able measures were taken in order to maintain the largest body of
teachers possible with the lowest possible payroll costs. Continuing to
follow international comparisons, we recall that in the 1980s the Bretton
Woods institutions worked hard to demonstrate that African teachers
were overpaid, and that this hampered universal schooling. They strongly
recommended that these countries recruit more teachers, for the same
aggregate payroll expenditure. On the strength of this advice salaries were
sometimes drastically cut, as in Cameroon, resulting in a demotivation
of the teaching body, with foreseeable consequences for the quality of
teaching. This theory was also the basis for the creation of different cate-
gories of teaching personnel in all African countries (non-civil-servant
status, contract workers, volunteers, etc.). The first non-civil-servant
teachers were hired in Mali in 1991, in general, technical and vocational
secondary education. This practice was extended to primary education in
1992, and at an ever greater pace thereafter. In 2002, 95% of new teachers
hired were contract workers.
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The only justification for the introduction of this new type of staff was
the desire to create new categories of teachers, without civil service status
and trade union representation, and poorly paid, in order to attain the
targets and improve the internal efficiency of the system as measured by
indicators. The aim was to formally achieve universal school attendance,
to improve ranking under the Human Sustainable Development Index
(UNDP) as well as according to the Millennium Development Goals
standard (MDG).
Today the undesirable effects of this policy cannot be denied. Impartial
observers recognize that non-civil-servant teachers lack both the training
and professional ethics required for this function. Corruption in schools
is largely due to the status of this group of teachers. Poorly paid at the
outset, poorly trained, receiving little consideration and without any real
perspective for professional advancement, these teachers had few reasons
to observe ethical standards, in which they had never been inculcated in
any event. Having never felt included in this profession, they brought the
educational system to its knees.4 In hoping to economize on payroll costs,
the country had disinvested in its essential resource, teachers.
Another unexpected effect of the massive introduction of non-
professionals into the teaching body, in order to boost performance
indicators, was to discourage civil-servant teachers. Many ultimately gave
up in the face of the unorthodox practices of their young colleagues
recruited from any number of different trades (accountants, plumbers,
electricians, even individuals without degree or diploma) whose only
motivation was to avoid unemployment. The most surprising aspect of
this is that the Bretton Woods institutions, with all the brainpower within
their ranks, did not foresee that once non-professional teachers had
attained a level of critical mass within the system they too would seek
to have the same advantages accorded to their civil-servant colleagues,
which would wipe out the payroll savings purportedly achieved by hiring
non-professionals. For quite a few years in Mali now, the issues pursued by
teachers’ unions have focused mainly on acquiring the same remuneration
for non-civil servants and for civil servants.
Another paradox of this system is that the conditions for the appli-
cation of structural adjustment programmes led countries like Mali to
close most teacher training schools in the 1980s, and to implement volun-
tary early retirement schemes for civil servants in order to reduce overall
remuneration costs, thus creating a shortage of qualified personnel in
the education sector.5 When in the 1990s social services were granted
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priority for hiring civil servants, there were no more qualified teachers
in the job market. This led to a massive influx of insufficiently trained
people in the categories of teachers created outside of the civil service,
provoking serious disturbances in the education system (strikes, successive
“blank” academic years, etc.). On top of this, in their desire to mechan-
ically raise the schooling rate, education authorities were less rigorous
in their oversight of ethnic-community-based schools and medersas, for
instance, schooling dispensed in Arabic. In a country where French is
still the official language this could only aggravate youth unemployment
(Ministry of the Economy & Finances, 2014).
It was also with encouragement from the World Bank that African
governments fostered the development of community schools, financed
by village communities. These schools were housed in straw huts, with
pupils seated on grass mats, without textbooks or school supplies. The
teachers sometimes had not even completed primary school, and with
salaries three to five times lower than remuneration in public schools, the
quality of teaching was severely affected. Other highly debatable teaching
reforms were undertaken in the pursuit of good indicator scores. In Mali,
for example, one teacher might be assigned to teach two grade levels at
the same time in the same room, the pupils doubling up on the benches
(double load), or to teach two groups of pupils of the same grade level
alternating morning and afternoon (double time).
The internal efficiency of a teaching cycle is also measured by the
capacity to retain pupils from the beginning to the end of the cycle. To
obtain a good score the system is likely to artificially limit the number of
pupils repeating a year, even if the pupils have failed to improve, for the
simple reason that repeating a year is considered to be a waste of public
money (Mingat & Suchaut, 2000). Brutally applied, this way of thinking
has without any doubt led to bargain-basement teaching in countries like
Mali. To boost the completion rate for the fundamental cycle of primary
education the National Education Ministry in Mali instituted in the 1990s
a policy designed to pass as many pupils as possible to the next higher
grade level, even with very poor results (as low as 2/10). This mani-
festly eroded the overall achievement level. Testing to measure basic skills
(reading, writing, arithmetic) has shown a notable drop in achievement
among pupils in Mali, and even a critical failure in subjects such as Math-
ematics and French (CONFEMEN, 2004). What is worse, and again with
the notion of boosting indicator scores related to internal system effi-
ciency, many African countries formed class groups of 100 or 200 pupils,
8 DO PERFORMANCE INDICATORS IMPROVE … 259
assigned to harassed teachers, with disastrous consequences for the quality
of teaching.
The consequences of these policies on teaching are such that today we
question them, in pursuit of a more coherent system. Education systems
are too complex to apply an analysis based on quantitative factors, as for
factory production. If efficiency is defined as the ratio between a given
result (duration of schooling) and financial resources consumed to attain
it, this indicator is not in itself significant. We must look farther and
measure the impact of the system as a whole. More broadly, one of the
effects of mechanical application of performance indicators has been the
creation of a two-tier education system in all African countries; public
schools are open to all, with the prime mission of raising the schooling
rate, while schools in the private sector are reserved for a rich minority of
the population who seek a certain level of quality, and at the same time
lessen pressure on the public purse.
The pernicious effects of performance-based management can be seen
through indicators that measure budgetary expenditure in sectors deemed
to be high priority. While indicators that measure the share of the
national budget devoted to so-called high priority sectors (education,
public health, agriculture) provide an incentive to concentrate resources
in these sectors, they also have the drawback of pushing the government
administrations in question to spend public money on measures that do
not always improve the provision of services to the public.
In addition to questions of the quality of public expenditure and the
capacity of these sectors to absorb this money, the use of these indica-
tors drives ministries to analyse their budgets not in terms of needs, but
in terms of percentage of the national budget, leading to sterile quar-
rels and competition throughout the budget process. In this respect it
can be observed that priorities have shifted to infrastructure investment
in the most recent generation of Poverty Reduction Strategies. As grain
prices have been rising on world markets, agriculture, which was until
recently neglected, is moving up in the list of priorities. While one can
only express satisfaction with this particular evolution, as a general rule
we observe regular changes in priority goals, an illustration of the fragility
of objectives when they are not popularly supported.
Successive reforms, sometimes abandoned before completion, often
for reasons related to the international agenda, without consultation of
the people, is a source of real instability in public policy in developing
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countries. In this respect Africa appears to be a laboratory for all sorts of
experiments.
In the area of justice, indicators pertaining to the number of judges
per capita and to construction and renovation of judicial infrastructure
(courthouses, prisons, housing for magistrates, etc.) give an idea of public
budget support for this sector. These indicators do not, however, in
themselves give information on the quality of justice, or on the inde-
pendence of the judiciary, and even less on the level of satisfaction of
those who have recourse to the courts. Quite the contrary, application of
these two indicators combined pushes governments to concentrate their
efforts on hiring judges and building courthouses, to the detriment of
other crucial measures to institute fair remuneration of judicial personnel
and to strengthen the ethics of the judicial apparatus as a whole.
One of the great weaknesses of “trigger indicators”, i.e. those that
determine the amounts of aid to be paid annually under funding agree-
ments, lies precisely in the fact that recipient countries have incentives to
focus on attaining the objectives that have been given, to the detriment
of other aspects of public policy. The quest to reach the target figure
set for the indicator becomes something of an obsession, detached from
the policy it is meant to support. The finance ministry, anxious to cash
in on the money promised by donors, puts pressure on other govern-
ment administrations to attain the key indicator levels, and there is a great
temptation to doctor the figures when objectives are not reached.
But a national indicator, by nature, does not reflect the conditions
and the results of a public policy in distinct geographic areas. There are
indeed strong disparities between regions. Looking at education in Mali,
while the national rate of completion of the first cycle of schooling was
51.0% in 2013, this average encompassed significant differences across
regions. The Bamako district registered the highest completion rate, with
77.9%, while in the districts of Kayes, Koulikoro, Ségou and Sikasso
this rate stood at 44.4, 64.9, 49.5 and 53.5% respectively (Ministry of
the Economy & Finances, 2014). The same disparities are found for
public health indicators and access to drinking water. Globally speaking,
the Bamako district is situated well above the national average, while
interior regions, in particular in the north of the country, have lower
scores. This underscores the dilemma of the northern part of the country,
where repeated and ongoing rebellions are in part linked to differences in
development between regions. These differences are not reflected in the
national indicators published in international rankings.
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Along the same lines, certain indicators must be carefully exam-
ined, and cross-analysed in conjunction with other data. While the
pupil/teacher ratio for fundamental primary education (first cycle) is a
relevant indicator, in that it describes the level of adult interaction with
pupils, it must nonetheless be counterbalanced with the fact that in the
schools with the most teachers (in cities) many of them are deployed in
administrative positions, rather than in classrooms, or are simply extra
staff on hand.
The public health indicator stating the percentage of the population
that lives within five kilometres of a functional healthcare centre (56%
in 2013) does not inform us as to the real accessibility of healthcare
(Ministry of the Economy & Finances, 2014). We know that due to
the paucity of medicines available in healthcare centres, and frequently
to understaffing (as centres are located farther from large cities), the local
population has little reason to go to these centres. People, especially the
poorest, are likely to have recourse to traditional medicine, or worse to
obtain remedies from “itinerant pharmacists” who are quacks and deliver
counterfeit drugs. According to the 2013 report on implementation of
PRS credits, barely one in three people in Mali visited a healthcare centre
in the course of the year (Ministry of the Economy & Finances, 2014).
It is rare that someone living in Mali would not have a health problem
at least once a year, especially as malaria is endemic. The fact is that the
economic accessibility of healthcare is the real challenge, in all African
countries.
Furthermore, some indicators are difficult to quantify, contrary to what
some may think. Two examples in the area of national health insurance
(“sécurité sociale”) coverage are the percentage of the population covered
by secondary insurance (“mutuelles”) and the percentage of the poor
population that has medical coverage. This is a real preoccupation, as
traditional social safety nets are becoming weaker, and are less and less
able to cushion the social problems of the poor. However, it is diffi-
cult to compile reliable information on secondary health insurers, their
subscribers and the services offered, as this is an informal sector that has
sprung up in a legal and institutional framework that is inadequate.
It can also be noted that indicators are sometimes far from compa-
rable between countries, contrary to what is intended. The 2013 report
on implementation of PRS credits gives an unemployment rate of 7.9%,
which is quite surprising when compared with that of developed countries
(Ministry of the Economy & Finances, 2014). Knowing that this figure
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refers to persons of working age who meet both of the following condi-
tions—without economic activity during the period, or without formal
employment and availability to take a job–it is easy to understand that
the indicator masks massive under-employment, to the order of 80% in
most African countries. The vast majority of people considered to be unaf-
fected by unemployment in fact work in subsistence agriculture or in the
informal sector, and work only a few months in the year. The expansion
of the informal economy is one of the key mutations of the labour market
in Africa over the last two decades. The structure of employment has been
considerably transformed by a shift from jobs in the formal sector to work
in the informal sector, which has become a sponge absorbing the urban
workforce. The informal sector adapts quickly to the real circumstances
of the labour market, and the ease of taking and leaving work makes it
attractive, in particular for vulnerable groups such as women. Research has
shown that even within a single country, comparison of unemployment
figures over the long term is problematic, because of the transformation
of the phenomenon itself (on this issue see Salais, 1986; Thélot, 1985).
Querying Performance-Based
Management in Third World Countries
In technocratic circles in the Third World, performance indicators are
considered to be the miracle cure that will ensure proper use of public
money. The most sceptical of technocrats see these tools as a practice
imposed by international donors to force the leaders of recipient countries
to finally be accountable for their management. But few people seek to
understand what is really at stake. Indeed, these new tools of international
cooperation based on quantitative objectives may appear comfortable for
managers. A time frame and evaluation grid that are known in advance
are components that can be reassuring for policy chiefs, who are looking
for immediate results.
It is nonetheless true that a mechanical application of these tools
leaves no room for in-depth thinking to accompany complex processes
that involve fundamental changes, sometimes even a cultural revolu-
tion, setting off profound movements in society. One of the problems
of performance-based management is to define relevant and legitimate
targets. Reaching a consensus on targets is truly a challenge, as it is diffi-
cult to set priorities that are acceptable to a broad majority. While it may
be easy to agree on objectives in a corporation (lowering costs, raising
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productivity and profits, etc.), finding a consensus is much more arduous
in the public sector. The aims of public policy are multiple, and some-
times contradictory, so reaching consensus can be extremely laborious. It
is true that it is the duty of those who govern to manage public resources
properly and report on their use to citizens, and this makes the principle
of Managing for Development Results (MfDR) legitimate. But first there
must be agreement on the meaning and substance of this concept, for the
results culture is not the same everywhere on the globe.
Let there be no mistake, the choice of indicators is not politically
neutral. Since the beginning of the 1990s, in the wake of the fall of
the Berlin Wall and with the growing move to democracy in Africa,
“governance” has become the central theme of international aid and
cooperation, the lens through which the relations between international
donors and aid recipients are seen (James, 1998; Olivier de Sardan,
2007). A technocratic conception, inspired by the aims of reducing
deficits and restricting the role of state government, now governs the
relations between aid donors and recipients under cooperation agree-
ments, with considerable room for sanctions against countries that deviate
from prescribed practice in terms of good governance (on this issue see
Meisel & Ould, 2008). In reality in Western countries, fervent advo-
cates of MfDR (Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States, etc.),
this reform inspired by neoliberal economic thought is intimately tied
to systematic budget cuts as part of a move to clean up public finances,
and these cuts become an end in and of themselves. Without a doubt
the neoliberal free market movement of the 1980s that propounded the
notion of “less government” and relegated social and cultural issues to
the back burner had major repercussions on public policy in countries
that receive aid.
What should we make of the fact that a country like Mali, heir to an
ancient culture, home to world heritage sites in the old cities of Djenné,
Tombouctou and Gao, guardian of thousands of ancient manuscripts,
has no public policy indicator pertaining to the safeguarding of these
treasures?
Likewise, social protection is analysed within the confines of the offi-
cial outward-looking system, that posits the modern system as its model
and refers only to the tools used in official regimes, which are meant to
be extended more or less as is, to the rest of the population without
taking into account peoples’ needs, or existing mechanisms. It has to
be recognized, however, that the state of healthcare coverage in Africa
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cannot be remedied using only existing tools associated with formal insur-
ance regimens that cover between 5 and 10% of the population. There
are other mechanisms of solidarity and redistribution, however. Research
has described the faltering of traditional solidarity systems, under the
effect of increasing focus on the individual, a process in African societies
driven by monetization, urbanization and the consequences of neoliberal
economics. This has led some authors, such as Axelle Kabou, to ques-
tion the capacity of African society to stand up in the face of these social
changes (Kabou, 1991). Others, including Vimard and Locoh, are willing
to bet on the adaptive capacity of African solidarity mechanisms (Locoh,
1988, 1993a, b, 1995; Vimard & N’cho, 1997;). A number of solutions
can be proposed as ways to integrate traditional solidarity into the global
system of social protection. It is clear that indicators pertaining only to
these covered by modern social security systems cannot be expected to
reflect the reality of social protection in Africa.
In this context, how can a new social contract be devised, setting
reciprocal obligations for families, communities, local authorities, civil
society and the national government, in order to ensure that the poorest
members of society have effective rights to social protection? What forms
of consultation and cooperation between all the players are needed to
renew thinking and means of action to address the real needs in the
sector? These are the fundamental questions that must be answered to
set up a complete and coherent social protection system.
In truth, the notions of ownership and responsibility touted by the
Paris Declaration have not yielded “true” appropriation, but have resulted
in national domestic policy piloted by donor countries. The Paris Declara-
tion does not afford truly autonomous action, without which there can be
no responsibility on the part of recipient countries. With a knife to their
throats, the recipient states must sometimes accept to see their public poli-
cies guided by the key indicators that are imposed, with the hope that they
may regain some degree of control later. Furthermore, while donor coun-
tries have made significant progress in coordinating their action, much
remains to be done by the recipient countries to improve their internal
coordination (among different government ministries) and set their own
priorities for discussion with donors. This is due to weak national leader-
ship, and to the weak institutional capacity of national administrations that
do not yet possess the means to implement results-based management.
There is abundant literature that shows how institutional variables
affect the performance of public policy (Burki & Perry, 1998; Fukuyama,
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2004; Persson & Tabellini, 1997). The quality or weakness of institu-
tions are factors that explain time and time again the success or failure of
many aspects of reform in states that receive development aid (Burnside &
Dollar, 1997; Dollar & Easterly, 1999; Sindzingre, 1998). On this point,
it can only be regretted that under structural adjustment programmes in
the 1980s these countries were led to drastically “shrink” their rosters
of civil servants (which were in fact quite meagre already), and to create
numerous programme management units. This was not conducive to a
stable institutional environment. In Mali, for instance, all administrative
reform measures in this period were undertaken in the name of “man-
agement of structures and staffing”, a culture that continues to mark
government administration in the country.
Likewise, and even if some donor countries have aligned practices with
those of recipient countries, different types of aid may coexist, sometimes
within the same programme, and with the same donor. This coexis-
tence may impose considerable burdens on the national government in
terms of record-keeping and reporting, taking time away from action to
provide services to the people, which after all is the purpose of the aid.
States deemed to be fragile, with little human resources, are forcibly given
sophisticated tools that they are not well equipped to implement. In the
same way, programme managers in aid recipient countries spend a good
deal of their time collecting data on progress to attain “target values”
for indicators, on reporting tasks and on discussion of these issues with
representatives of donor countries. Clearly, this is time not devoted to
work managing the programmes themselves, undermining the objectives
of results-based management. In fact, performance-based management,
invented in the private sector, is not readily transposed to the public
sector, where it is less effective by reason of the very nature of public
service. It would be pointless to try to measure with strict accuracy the
cost of public action, precisely because these services are provided for all
citizens.
In the Sahel countries, for example, government administration does
not adequately cover the vast desert areas, and consequently the poor level
of service to citizens (healthcare, education, safety and security of people
and property, etc.) are factors of instability. In Mali, the sparse population
in the north means low resources for local authorities as well as partic-
ular constraints in terms of economic, social and territorial organization
(highly dispersed population, little infrastructure, open spaces, nomadic
peoples). Low population density goes hand in hand with underprivileged
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areas that are poorly served in terms of basic amenities (water, schools,
healthcare) and are remote and isolated. With little capacity to harness
financial resources and hence low investment, low population and remote
location, these territories are subject to additional costs that should not be
borne by the local population alone. As equal access to public services is
an imperative principle of republican government, it is not reasonable to
apply across the board the same performance indicators–and most notably
the ratio of public expenditure per capita–for public service throughout
the country.
Referring to other contexts, Daniel Kaufman has given a very good
description of the limits of management by indicators and this modelling
of public action (Kaufman & Kraay, 2007). All this is to say that the real
challenge facing developing countries, particularly in Africa, is to rebuild
the capacities undermined by decades of structural adjustment and to
regain a measure of negotiating power in their relations with international
donors.
Giving Aid Recipient Countries Greater
Autonomy to Conduct Their Public Policy
The dependence of developing countries with respect to donors is a
notion that encompasses several different aspects (Naudet, 1999). In the
most common sense, this dependence refers to the situation in which
outside aid continues to weigh heavily in national budgets, while levels
of development and internal financial capacity stagnate (see Azam et al.,
1999). Dependence can also be apprehended through indicators, such as
the share of aid in GDP, or in the conditions of aid allocation. Above all,
dependence is characterized by little room to negotiate with donors. In
this light the faltering capacity of recipient countries, the “fragile states”,
takes on new meaning, particularly in Africa. Chronic political instability,
military coups and armed rebellion are among the ills that plague African
states, described as oligarchic, neo-patrimonial, fragile, failed, among the
long string of adjectives that flourish in the “post-colonial” approaches
that predominate in political science literature since the 1980s (on this
issue see Haut Conseil de la Coopération International, 2005; World
Bank, 2006; but also Badie, 1992; Devarajan et al., 1999).
With very few exceptions (Cabo Verde, Botswana, South Africa,
Rwanda), African countries struggle to establish state structures that are
able to conduct strong public policy on their own, and to meet the needs
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of citizens, while resisting the demands of international donors (on this
issue see Joseph, 1999; Mhonimpa, 1994; Prest et al., 2005). On this
continent more than elsewhere, the relations between donors and recip-
ient countries are skewed, and even coercive, with stringent conditions
and ever more exacting timetables for implementation. Indeed, while
in the spirit of the Paris Declaration indicators are to be chosen from
the grids in PRS documents or from the logical frameworks of sectoral
programmes, in truth it is the weight of the funding institutions that is
the determining factor, in particular for setting the target values to be
attained. Furthermore, this is the justification for the fact that negotia-
tions on the budgetary arrangements that frame budgetary support last
for months and absorb all the energy of programme managers. These
arrangements set, among others, the “trigger indicators” that authorize
disbursement of variable tranches of aid. The choice of “target values”,
i.e. the quantitative objectives to be reached each year as policy is imple-
mented, are the focus of especially tough discussions. Be as it may, in
the end it is always the donors who have their way, recalling the famous
saying of the Malian philosopher Amadou Hampaté Bâ, who noted that
“the hand that gives is always above the hand that receives”. This situation
is illustrated by the words of a representative of donor countries:
The Malian government pilots the plane; we make sure there is a flight plan
and that the altitude is properly measured; if the needle of the altimeter is
not good, we will find better instruments for the pilot. (Bergamashi, 2009,
p. 27)
Coordination between donors and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) imposes cross-linked conditions, increasing the pressure on the
recipient countries. This type of condition–measures creating the obli-
gation to link disbursement to progress markers set in advance under
funding agreements–is in fact embedded in the mandate of international
financial institutions, and is considered to be a sign of their credibility
(Kanbur et al., 1999). It is hard to comply with these conditions, which
explains the ambivalent attitude of recipient countries towards the reforms
imposed by donors. Their formal acceptance often gives way to resis-
tance in different forms when it comes to implementation (see Azam
et al., 1999; Collier, 1997; Kahler, 1992). Faced with the difficulty of
meeting some of the required conditions, recipient governments may turn
to various subterfuges to postpone, circumvent or vitiate these rules. In
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some cases, conditions are suspended, knowing that from the outset recip-
ient governments evaluate the costs of not complying with the conditions
(see Bird, 1998; Bayart et al., 2002).
Paradoxically, the states with the least institutional capacity to manage
the weighty apparatus of management by indicators are those on whom
the donors impose the most stringent terms of conditionality, because
they lack the capacity to negotiate. By setting ambitious goals the donors
perhaps thought they would lift the recipients out of the danger zone;
in fact, they have pushed them in deeper. In this respect, the annual
joint review of aid by both donor and recipient countries are truly exam-
inations, intended to assess the level attained for the indicators retained
under the funding agreements. They are above all a humiliating experi-
ence for the recipient governments, when ordinary civil servants from aid
agencies conduct themselves as judges, pronouncing sentences without
appeal, setting the level of aid that will be disbursed, according to their
appraisal of the results obtained.
It must also be said, however, that conditionality is sometimes
exploited by the recipient governments themselves, for internal political
purposes; donors can be held up as scapegoats, to justify unpopular (even
if often essential) government decisions in the eyes of national public
opinion (Collier, 1998; Rodrik, 1996). In reality, behind the pretext of
granting greater autonomy to Third World countries to manage the aid
they receive, the new approach based on budgetary support is a signif-
icant step towards a more political concept of aid, as part of a process
to transform the political and social landscape of recipient countries,
following pathways already defined by the donor countries. The donors’
injunctions are based on a transfer of models, replacing the sociolog-
ical foundation of states, as if an idealized and disembodied institutional
reorganization could be decreed, instead of being worked out by inter-
action between public authorities and civil society. This forcible transfer
of model aggravates the deficit of legitimacy of the state already found in
African countries, and further undermines civic and citizen responsibility,
by discrediting government action and widening the gap between citizens
and the state.
Each donor country has its own world vision, its own framework of
reference, that is vaunted in the country’s relations with aid recipient
countries. The desired transformations are imposed from the outside.
This process can even go as far as direct supervision of entire sections
of government, as in Sierra Leone, Iraq and Afghanistan. All this is to say
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that recipient countries should be able to construct their own public poli-
cies, in the context of their specific circumstances, without being forced to
follow an outside model. Countries may be inspired by successful practices
elsewhere, but freely and voluntarily, making the necessary adjustments.
It is a matter of respecting the dignity of states, especially the most fragile
among them. This movement must be advocated by democratic powers
with real popular support and legitimacy from a fully involved civil society.
The fundamental issue is that donor countries must turn away from
what Régis Debray, referring to Europe, has called a culture imbued with
its own formulas when in dialogue with other countries (Debray, 2007).
This is an enormous challenge, because it will oblige donors to change
their intellectual processes and accept cultural diversity, something for
which Western elites are not necessarily prepared. Experience teaches us
that good governance is not achieved by decree. It is constructed by
society in each country, in its specific circumstances. Political dialogue
between donor and recipient countries naturally has a legitimate place,
but the terms of this dialogue must be balanced. Each country should
be allowed to pursue its own trajectory, according to its circumstances.
The notions of the common good, the general interest and even of soli-
darity are not given the same meaning everywhere. Levy and Fukuyama
have clearly shown how approaches diverge, depending on the situations
found in each country (Levy & Fukuyama, 2008).
The concept of the effectiveness of public action is framed differently
in the United States, in Europe and in Africa. Whereas Americans appraise
the effectiveness of public policy through the lens of Schumpeterian “cre-
ative destruction” that enables a system to remain dynamic by eliminating
its least effective agents, Europeans give preference to public funding
based on a social contract. To promote economic and social develop-
ment some Asian countries have emphasized the reinforcement of the
state apparatus, while others, notably in Latin America, have preferred to
bolster democracy in the political system.
Conclusion
The growing interest in using indicators to allocate development aid is
closely connected to the needs of world capitalism. In this light, indicators
are needed by investors, including international aid agencies that act as
lenders, as a way to gather information on the quality of governance, and
“country risk”. The underlying idea for investors is to be assured of “good
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governance” and of a functioning market economy that will guarantee
returns on investment. It is therefore hardly surprising to note that indi-
cators are biased, even if the bias is hidden. This makes use of indicators
problematic. In the absence of a universal common reference framework,
countries do not necessarily share the same vision of development.
Despite these imperfections, the concept of performance indicators
cannot be totally rejected. The problems arise when they are mechani-
cally applied to rank countries, and even to sanction countries depending
on their rank. This practice is less and less acceptable, even in schools for
evaluating pupils. An indicator should be just that, literally furnishing an
indication of the quality of governance, but not in itself a full appraisal
of quality. From this point of view, indicators can send a warning on the
state of public policy, and foster discussion, without issuing a judgement
with no appeal, and are much less a guilty sentence.
Management by performance must in no case be allowed to be a
new ideology, or a tool in the hands of a few technocrats who decide
what is good for entire nations and impose profound changes on society.
This approach can be legitimate only as an inclusive process intended
to support discussion and joint efforts to seek the best use of public
resources, according to criteria of intelligence, balance and fairness.
Elected officials and citizens, through their organizations and associations,
must take their full place in this process. To allow people to appro-
priate this discussion they must be properly informed as to the stakes and
outcomes, with access to forums where views can be freely expressed, and
the full range of opinion heard, in particular those voiced by the weakest
groups in society.
Notes
1. Project aid, whether managed by project unit or through institutional
support more or less directly administered by funding bodies, is criticized
for low disbursement rates, high overhead costs and weak appropriation by
recipient countries. For these reasons a number of donors, including the
European Union, are turning more and more often to budget support,
i.e. aid paid directly into national budgets to fund all activities in the
budget without specification (general budget support) or to support certain
targeted sectors (sectoral budget support), most often public health and
education (Feyzioglu et al., 1996).
2. On issues related to budget support see the study carried out by researchers
at the University of Birmingham for the OECD Development Assistance
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Committee (DAC) and other donors: IDD and Associates, Evaluation of
General Budget Support: Synthesis Report. A joint Evaluation of General
Budget Support 1994–2004, May 2006 (IDD & Associates, 2006).
3. On the choice of indicators for budget support, see: Introduction d’indi-
cateurs de Résultat en Matière d’Appui aux Programmes d’Ajustement
Structurel dans les Pays ACP, Etude réalisée à la demande de la Commission
Européenne, Rapport de Synthèse, Vol.1, CERDI, June 2002.
4. For a discussion of teachers’ capacities in Mali see: La formation des
enseignants dans la francophonie: diversités, défis et stratégies d’action
(2007). Montreal: AUF. Profil de l’enseignant de qualité au Mali. Oxfam,
IE, OPT, SNEC, MEALN, undated. Principes directeurs pour un profil
de compétences national des enseignants du primaire. Internationale de
l’Education, Oxfam Novib, 2012.
5. In principle, teachers and public health personnel were not eligible for early
retirement, so as to preserve these social services, but in fact they were the
most severely affected, because workers in these sectors suffered from more
difficult conditions than civil servants in other sectors.
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CHAPTER 9
Archaeology of a Quantification Device:
Quantification, Policies and Politics in French
Higher Education
Corine Eyraud
Over the last fifteen years, I have aimed to enter into the analysis of
broader phenomena and processes by decoding the genesis and uses of
quantification devices.1 The accounting reform of Chinese state enter-
prises, for instance, makes it possible to grasp the essence of the Chinese
economic reforms of the 1990s (Eyraud, 1999, 2003). The construction
and implementation of a system of performance-based management in
French universities informs us about the profound transformations these
organizations have undergone in the last two decades (Eyraud, 2014;
Eyraud et al., 2011). As Alain Desrosières points out, these various studies
suggest that “it is possible to look at the same time at social or political
philosophies and seemingly technical tools, considering them as a totality”
(Desrosières, 2000, p. 84).
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However, my recent research on the transformation of French state
accounting2 (Eyraud, 2013) has shown that an accounting system can be
employed in relation to different, sometimes conflicting logics and objec-
tives, for example, in attempts to show that the state is heavily indebted
or not so much, to improve public management, or to encourage the
outsourcing of public activities. The link between a specific type of quan-
tification device and a particular social or political philosophy does not
seem to be univocal; both do perhaps not constitute “a totality”. Hence,
the nature and conditions of their linkage have to be questioned. I did
this first through a renewed analysis of the French state accounting reform
(Eyraud, 2016). This led me to put forward a grid for the analysis of
quantification devices which seems capable, first, of casting light on the
very nature of this link and, second, of making visible the possible choices
involved.
The purpose of this chapter is to test this grid by revisiting our work on
performance indicators for French universities. I choose thus to start from
the analysis of a concrete quantification device—i.e. performance indica-
tors—and conduct a kind of “archaeologic” analysis, using it as a lens
for investigating and understanding the changes French universities have
undergone since the mid-2000s. Drawing on the works on quantification
done by French social scientists, such as Alain Desrosières (1988 with
Thévenot; 1998 [1993], 2003‚ 2008a, b, 2014), Robert Salais (1986,
2004, 2010, 2016), Alain Supiot (2010, 2015) and Laurent Thévenot
(1979, 1983, 1990, 2016), this paper seeks ultimately to enhance our
understanding of reactivity.3
The analytical grid I propose distinguishes between three different
levels that exist within a quantification device, each of which is examined
in a separate section of this chapter. First, there is what might be called
the bedrock level: a quantification device is grounded in a founding vision
that is generally congruent with a particular form of state or economic
system. Second, there is what might be called the intermediate level: a
quantification device contains a conception of the objectives and “raisons
d’être” of the entity that is quantified. Third, there is the level that relates
to the micro-conventions of calculation: philosophies can be hidden at
this microscopic level and give a particular orientation to the device.
However, the analysis of these three levels does not tell us everything
about the orientation of the device and the effects it can produce; the
device is part of a larger configuration, the context of its deployment and
its uses have thus to be examined. That constitutes the fourth dimension
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of the analytical grid, which will be examined in the fourth section of this
paper. Returning to the question of the device as a totality, the conclu-
sion will show that this specific device is not a very integrated assemblage,
which explains its real but at the same time also limited effects.
The analysis is based, first, on in-depth interviews with government
and university officials, second, on the study of official documents, reports
and archival materials from parliament, central government, the Ministry
of Higher Education and several universities, and, third, on participant
observation. I conducted participant observations in my role as a member
of the Governing Board and Finance Committee at my own univer-
sity. Further, I was a special adviser to the President of my university
on performance management systems. I attended the training on perfor-
mance indicators and performance management for universities provided
by the Ministry, and I participated in the implementation of the perfor-
mance indicators in my own university. This variety of materials allowed
me to follow the numbers from their birth through their very detailed
construction process to their concrete uses.
The Bedrock: NPM, LOLF
Performance indicators are the latest form of public statistics. The devel-
opment of their current form and uses began in some European countries,
such as Sweden or the United Kingdom, in the late 1980s, and was a
part of much a broader phenomenon: the rise of New Public Manage-
ment (NPM). This term is quite ambiguous, even stretchy: it is used to
speak about government reforms implemented in Great Britain during
the Thatcher government, in the United States during the Reagan and
Clinton administrations, in the Netherlands under a Christian-Democrat
government, or in Sweden and New Zealand under Labour governments.
All these reforms have a number of common features but also many differ-
ences (Hood, 1995). The shift in doctrines of public accountability is
part of their common ground. Before NPM, democratic accountability
depended on limiting corruption, waste and incompetence in public
administration. To this end, the public sector was kept sharply distinct
from the private sector in terms of ethos, methods of management, orga-
nizational design, people and career structure. An elaborate system of
procedural rules was designed to prevent favouritism and corruption. In
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contrast NPM involved a very different conception of public account-
ability, with different patterns of trust and distrust. As Hood (1995,
p. 94) writes:
The basis of NPM lies in reversing the two cardinal doctrines of public
administration; that is, lessening or removing differences between the
public and the private sector and shifting the emphasis from process
accountability towards a greater element of accountability in terms of
results. Accounting was to be a key element in this new conception
of accountability, since it reflected high trust in the market and private
business methods and low trust in public servants and professionals.
In this process, the introduction of the “Loi organique relative aux
lois de finances” (henceforth referred to as “LOLF”) was in France a
very important step. This law, passed in 2001 and taking effect in 2006,
introduced performance management and private accounting to the state
and public services. The first objective of the LOLF was to make the
government and the public services accountable to parliament for the
results of their actions, and to give more power to parliament over
budgetary policies and choices. Since 2006, French MPs have two new
documents for the budget debate: an annual performance plan and an
annual performance report for each public policy. The first one deter-
mines the objectives for the following year; quantified indicators (known
as performance indicators) are used to quantify these objectives and set
the targets which have to be reached. The second one gives an account of
the results achieved (relative success or relative failure) over the last few
years. National performance indicators were set at each level of govern-
ment and for all public bodies, so that a performance-oriented form of
management was introduced throughout the public services and public
administration, which was the second objective of the law.
A performance measurement system for public policies is based on the
idea that the state is accountable for the results of its actions, which is
based on, as Hood highlighted, a specific conception of public account-
ability which emerged from the 1980s, and which now prevails.4 This is
what might be called the bedrock level of quantification: a quantification
device, such as a performance indicator, is grounded in a founding vision,
an ontology.5 It would be possible to go deeper and view this conception
of public accountability as being rooted in a specific way of governing
that might be called “government by objectives” (Thévenot, 2015).6
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From these specific conceptions of governing and accountability, the
French government made several choices. First, in probably a typically
French way, a law (here the LOLF) was used to establish the system
of performance management, using a standardized, centralized, top-
down approach. Second, the LOLF speaks of “performance” and not of
“results”. At the beginning of the 2000s, this was the choice made by
many governments (such as the UK and the US), but not all (see Canada,
for example). Whereas “results” can be seen as a quite a neutral word, the
notion of “performance” carries many connotations (Jany-Catrice, 2016):
ideas of outstanding qualities, of achievement (specifically in sports), of
excellence, of winning; the notion of competition being not so far from
them. Third, the LOLF chose to assess public performance only by means
of quantitative indicators, relying on the belief that only numbers are able
to report on public action and social reality, and, hence, demonstrating a
“trust in numbers” (Porter, 1995).
A quantification device is thus the bearer of some great fundamentals:
here, it implies a specific way of governing (government by objectives), a
particular conception of public accountability, a standardized, centralized
and top-down approach, a focus on performance, and a specific way of
assessing public performance (via quantitative indicators) which is based
on a belief in numbers.
Performance Indicators for French
Universities: What Are Their Raisons D’être?
The formulation of the first annual performance plans introduced by the
LOLF involved designing a set of performance indicators. However, what
is the “performance” of a public policy? What do we expect from a prison
or from a school? What does a “well-performing university” do? Do we
expect it to produce graduates adapted to the labour market and fitting
the needs of private companies? Do we expect it to allow women and men
from different social origins to attain the same levels of education? Do we
expect it produce a lot of patents that enhance the competitiveness of
national companies? Do we expect it to broaden human knowledge? Do
we expect it to provide a fulfilling and motivating working environment
for its staff and students? Measuring the performance of a public institu-
tion is clearly built on a system of values, and it involves the making of
fundamental, societal choices on what is important to measure.
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In 2006, the first annual performance plan for higher education and
research specified 33 indicators for universities with targets to be attained
within five years. Where did these indicators, which French universities
and the French Ministry of Education were accountable to Parliament
for, come from? The LOLF could have been an opportunity for large
democratic debate on the outputs and outcomes we expect from our
public policies and public services. However, in my view, the LOLF was
a missed opportunity for democracy, the choices of indicators were made
in a completely technocratic way: they were the result of discussions and
negotiations (from 2003 to 2005) between the ministry in charge of the
public policy in question (here the Ministry of Education, Higher Educa-
tion and Research, which I will refer to as the Ministry of Education), on
the one hand, and the Treasury, on the other. Surprisingly, the discus-
sions between the two ministries were not about the expected outcomes
of higher education, but directly focussed on the indicators themselves:
one ministry proposing certain indicators, which were then very often
refused by the other.
To prevent the application of a “realist epistemology” to numbers,
Desrosières suggested to talk not about “measurement” but about the
“quantifying process”. As he put it:
The use of the verb ‘to measure’ is misleading because it overshadows the
conventions at the foundation of quantification. The verb ‘quantify’, in its
transitive form (make into a number, put a figure on, numericize), presup-
poses that a series of prior equivalence conventions has been developed
and made explicit […]. Measurement, strictly understood, comes after-
wards […]. From this viewpoint, quantification splits into two moments:
convention and measurement. (Desrosières 2008b, pp. 10–11)
In our case, that means that the ministries argued about measurements
before agreeing on what the performance of higher education is. We
can analyse these controversies through the interviews I conducted with
officials of both ministries and try to understand the rationales of each.
For the Ministry of Education, the indicators served various objectives.
Firstly, the Ministry conceived them as incentives for universities to act in
a certain way. As a senior official in this Ministry put it:
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There is a political will behind each indicator; we would like each indicator
to be an incentive for universities to be better in a certain field or to
develop in a certain way.
The indicators, then, are seen as signals.
Secondly, the Ministry thought about how the indicators could be used
during its negotiations of the education budget with the Treasury. The
Ministry proposed for example the following indicators: cost per student,
student–teacher and student–administrative staff ratios, all of which are
quite low in France compared to other OECD countries with similar GDP
per inhabitant. These indicators would allow the Ministry to justify an
increase of its budget, in particular in relation to staff numbers. Thirdly,
the Ministry wanted to present a positive image of higher education. This
can be seen in several interviews, where interviewees for example said:
We’re not masochists. You try to have indicators which can only improve;
you do not want to be shot for it.
We wanted to show what was working well.
In contrast, the Treasury’s main concern was about its uses of the indi-
cators during budgetary negotiations with ministries. It was very aware of
their potential use as devices to justify the need of enhanced income and
staff numbers. See, for example, the following comment from a senior
Treasury official:
We absolutely did not want indicators which allow our counterparts to
say ‘to get better results on this indicator, we need more money, more
teachers, more premises, more computers or anything else’.
The Treasury refused, for this reason, nearly all the indicators that were
put forward by the Ministry of Education. Contrary to the third objec-
tive of the Ministry of Education, indicators which presented a negative
image of the Ministry to the public, which depreciated or undermined the
value of its activities, would turn into a useful weapon for the Treasury.
They allowed it to be in a stronger position to negotiate the education
budget. Several quotations from the Ministry of Education showed that
the Treasury was pressing for “negative” indicators:
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The Treasury wanted to impose figures that you can find in tabloid head-
lines, such as failure rate, dropout rate and so on, a negative picture in
fact.
The next section will show that the very limitations of the indicators
were exploited in this struggle.
By analysing not only the controversies around the indicators but
also the final indicators themselves, we can now try to make visible the
value systems on which they are based. The works of Boltanski and
Thévenot (2006 [1991]) and Boltanski and Chiapello (2007) are useful
for that. To analyse disputes and controversies, Boltanski and Thévenot
(2006) identified seven “orders of worth” which imply systematic and
coherent principles of evaluation, justification and legitimacy. Each of
these “orders” (or “worlds”) gives importance to different values:
– The inspired world values imagination and creation.
– The domestic world values tradition, long-term relationships and the
respect of hierarchies.
– The fame world values celebrity and public opinion.
– The civic world values collective interest, solidarity, equality and
democracy.
– The market world values competition and the exchange of goods
and services on a profit basis.
– The industrial world values efficiency, productivity and technical
competences.
– The projective world, which features prominently in the New Spirit
of Capitalism (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2007), values flexibility,
mobility, attractiveness and networks.
It is possible to link each of the indicators (some refer to teaching,
some refer to research activities) of the annual performance plan for
higher education to a specific world; only four of the above listed worlds
are relevant for the purposes of our analysis. For each of these worlds,
several topics and associated indicators can be identified. For the indus-
trial world, for example: production volume (percentage of people with
a university degree); production “failure” (non-completion rates); lead
time (rate of PhD students defending their PhD thesis within three years);
and efficiency (percentage of university building capacity in use). For the
market world: revenues (percentage of revenues coming from intellectual
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property rights); competitiveness (share of world scientific publications,
percentage of patents deposited by universities); and inclusion in the
labour market (employment rate of graduates three years after gradu-
ating). For the projective world: attractiveness (percentage of foreigners
among masters, doctoral and postdoctoral students, and academics); visi-
bility (two-year citation impact); and networks (rate of participation in
European Framework Programmes). For the civic world: fairness (ratio
between foreign and home students’ success rates).7
In summary, as far as teaching is concerned, the industrial world (with
eleven indicators) is dominant, whereas the projective (four indicators),
market and civic worlds (three indicators each) are present but in much
weaker form. Especially the indicators related to the civic world are quan-
titatively weak but also qualitatively poor: the indicators chosen do not
send out a strong political signal, for example towards widening participa-
tion and democratizing higher education. With regards to the indicators
for research, six of them can be linked to the market world and five to the
projective world. It is ultimately a widely economics-based idea of perfor-
mance that emerges from the chosen indicators, focussing on revenues,
efficiency, competitiveness and insertion in the labour market. Some of
the indicators, especially those related to research, also focus on attractive-
ness and networking, being thus closely akin to “knowledge economy”
theories. On the other hand, the political and civic dimensions are not
very pronounced at all.
The Upper Stratum: The
Micro-Conventions of Calculation
There is a large number of possible choices available at the most gran-
ular, even microscopic, level of each calculation. These choices have
also been debated by the ministries. The Ministry of Education and the
Conférence des Présidents d’Universités (CPU) [Association of University
Presidents] often preferred indicators expressed in absolute terms, which
they consider better for showing the high activity levels and social useful-
ness of higher education. The following excerpt from a letter from the
CPU to the Secretary of Higher Education clearly illustrates this:
Our general analysis of the indicators put forward [by the Treasury] is that
several of them are disadvantageous, are negative for universities. While
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French universities have to accept all the students who have passed the
baccalauréat, they will be judged on qualitative criteria, such as success
rates within a certain period of time (three years for undergraduates and
PhD students for example). It is absolutely necessary that universities can
also show quantitative results, such as the number (that is in absolute
terms) of graduates they have trained.
By contrast, the Treasury systematically refused indicators expressed in
absolute terms, and even refused their relative expression for a temporal
analysis, such as growth rate. Let us consider, for instance, the indicator
aiming to measure the objective of “Producing scientific knowledge at
the best international level”. The two ministries struggled fiercely over
it. The Ministry of Education promoted the number or the growth rate
of French publications in internationally recognized journals, whereas the
Treasury promoted the percentage of French publications in internation-
ally recognized journals.8 The latter was finally chosen, so the Treasury
won the battle on this indicator.
If we go back to the “orders of worth” analysis presented above,
it is possible to regard the absolute measure as related to the indus-
trial world, underlining production volume and the increase of this
production volume; it is rooted in a productivity-based perspective. The
relative measure can be seen as linked to the market world and being
rooted in a market-based perspective, all the more so because the term
“market share” is used in several speeches of Treasury officials, as well as
many of the interviews I conducted with them. Furthermore, the latter
choice allows comparisons between countries, and between universities
or research centres. This choice, as Desrosières stated, “creates a new
world in relation to which everyone has to position himself” (Desrosières,
2008b, p. 15); it makes benchmarking and ranking possible, and it makes
it possible to put under pressure the universities or research centres which
are at the bottom of the league (see also Dixon & Hood, 2016). As
Ozga wrote: “Comparison defines the new mode of governance […].
Comparison is war by other means” (Ozga, 2008, p. 268).
Even the limitations of the indicators can be used for this war, as a
member of the Ministry of Education put it:
The Treasury really put pressure on us to calculate some of the indicators
in a certain way. For example, we had to fight really hard to make sure
that the rate of PhD students defending their thesis within three years
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should take into account students who have their viva before the 31st of
December and not only before the beginning of the new academic year
in September. This would change the result by more than 20 percentage
points.9
The determination of the targets to be reached in the mid-term
constitutes further evidence of this struggle between positive and nega-
tive pictures. The Ministry of Education wanted them to be set at an
achievable level, the Treasury wanted them to be as high as possible.
Furthermore, this negative picture tarnishes the image and perception
of the public service in question in the eyes of MPs and in the eyes of
the public. Indicators can then be used to justify reforms: this sector is
doing badly, hence new policies are needed. For instance, the percentage
of French publications in internationally recognized journals has been the
most widely publicized indicator when talking about the quality of French
research, fuelling alarmist discourses. Nicolas Sarkozy used this indicator
in his speech of 22 January 2009 to legitimate the implementation of the
Law on Liberty and Responsibility of Universities (the LRU) which was
passed in 2007, but denounced by a great part of the French academia.
To sum up, the analysis of the construction process of the indicators
picked up three elements: the indicators conceived as signals, the devel-
opment of comparability and an economics-based idea of performance.
This confirms Desrosières’s (2008a) analysis. “Markets, incentives, bench-
marks and rankings” have been, since the 1980s, “new and increasing
features of public statistics” (Desrosières, 2008a, p. 112). But these indi-
cators are only “loosely linked to each other” (Miller, 1992, p. 84).
This way of developing quite an inconsistent set of indicators seems a
specificity of NPM, considering that each field of social reality has its
own dynamic separated from the others. In contrast, macroeconomic
or national accounting aggregates are a very different kind of statistics,
highly interconnected and based on a conception of the economy as a
whole entity.
The analysis has also shown that a quantification device, such
as a performance indicator, is the result, down to its smallest detail,
of power struggles between the actors involved. Hence, “the moment
of indicator design is a defining moment which will shape the future”
(Desrosières, 2014, p. 47), and it is therefore a moment particularly
important to analyse.
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The Life of the Device: Context,
Uses and Developments
To understand the orientation of a quantification device and the effects it
can produce, the context of its deployment and its uses have also to be
examined.
2006–2012
The development of performance indicators is still at a relatively early
stage in France. We must remember that one of the main objectives of
the LOLF was to make the government and the public services more
accountable to parliament for the outcomes of their actions. The perfor-
mance indicators were supposed to be used by the MPs during the budget
debate. However, all the reports and speeches during the national budget
debates 10 were based on budget figures, describing the evolution of each
policy measure; and the discussions among MPs turned to the relevance
of these budget decisions. Performance indicators were not used at all in
these debates. Two reasons at least can explain that. Firstly, the LOLF did
not link performance to funding. As Lambert and Migaud, two MPs and
fathers of the LOLF, pointed out:
Managing a public entity is not the same as managing a company. For
the state, there is no direct link between the level of budget funds and
the objectives to be achieved. To decide the level of appropriations, the
notion of needs will remain the most important. It is thus possible that
achievements will have no budgetary impact. (Lambert & Migaud, 2006,
pp. 13–14)
Secondly, the indicators are rather meaningless for the MPs. They
are quite technical. Because of the objective of consistency, the indica-
tors have changed little since 2006, and the MPs, as was mentioned,
did not participate in their construction. MPs do not find the indicators
meaningful in relation to public policy making. Since they discuss policy
options and consider to be at the heart of political choices budgetary
decisions, they use budget figures. Furthermore, the budget debate is
conceived to be more of a debate between MPs from different polit-
ical parties, rather than an exchange between parliament and public
administration.
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As shown above, within the government, the Treasury and the Ministry
of Education anticipated, while negotiating the indicators, that these
might be used during the budgetary negotiations. But the performance
indicators were not used at that moment either; as a senior official from
the Treasury put it:
We were afraid that the different ministries would use the performance
indicators to ask for an increased budget—that is the reason why we were
so tough during the discussions about these indicators. But in fact, nobody
uses them during the discussions of the ministries’ budgets; we speak about
money, about staff, about policies, not about performance, neither them
nor us.
The performance indicators were, in the end, not used in the two
situations where they were expected to be used. However, they were
going to be very powerful in a different, unexpected way. A French
state reform, called the “General Revision of Public Policies” (RGPP),
launched by Nicolas Sarkozy in 2007 immediately after his election,
initiated a new usage of them: performance indicators became tools for
resource allocation from the Ministry of Education to universities. To
make this understandable, we must briefly explain the history of the
French university funding system as summarized in Table 9.1.
The new system of resource allocation, called “Sympa” (which can be
translated as “cool”) resulted from discussions between the Department
of Higher Education of the Ministry of Education, the parliament and the
Conférence des Présidents d’Universités (CPU) [Association of University
Presidents]. The system had two parts: one depending on activities (80%)
and one depending on performance achievements (20%). Although, this
does not seem to be a big change compared to the previous system, it
actually was, as the newly introduced activities criterion had also a perfor-
mance dimension. It is now no longer merely the number of students
registered at the beginning of the year, but the number of students who
sit the exams, and it is no longer the number of staff, but the number
of “publishing academics” that counts (and non-publishing academics
hamper the performance of their own university). If one incorporates this
last criterion into the “performance share”, the share makes up more than
50% of the budget of most universities,11 although it is the 80–20 ratio
which has been taken up in the parliamentary reports and documents and
speeches produced by the ministries and CPU.
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Table 9.1 French university funding system (from mid-1980s to 2012)
(compiled by the author)
Up to mid-1980s From mid-1980s to 2008 From 2009 to 2012
(Sympa)
100% block granta based
on:
– Number of students
– Number of administrative
and academic Staff
– Surface area
70–80% block grant based
on:
– Number of students








- Number of students
sitting the examsb







– Number of Master
degrees deliverede
For Research:
– Grades of university
research centres (A+, A,
B or C)
– Number of PhD degrees
delivered
aThe tuition fees were very low (they are in fact more comparable to registration fees than to tuition
fees); they were set by the Ministry of Education and were the same for all universities. They were
taken off the block grant. The system remains the same today: annual tuition fees were around 300
euros for BA and MA degrees in 2020–2021
bSubject to a weighting based on the field (exact sciences, natural sciences, social sciences and
humanities) and the level (undergraduate or graduate) of the degree
cSubject to a weighting based on the field: exact sciences (COEFF 2.5), natural sciences (COEFF
2.6) and social sciences and humanities (COEFF 2.0), and multiplied by the grade of the research
centre: a publishing academic who works in an A+ unit is weighted 2.0, in an A unit 1.5, in a B
unit 1.0 and in a C unit 0.5
dWeighted by the grant holders’ ratio
eSubject to a weighting based on the field
Although I have not examined the negotiations and controversies
behind the production of the new resource allocation system, we can
analyse its indicators. Some of these are derived from the LOLF, however,
at least four different rationales can be noticed: first, a pure performance
logic awarding good and bad marks (counting the number of publishing
academics, awarding grades to research centres); second, an attempt to
consider social and cultural inequalities (for example, by weighting the
success rate by the grant holders’ ratio)12 driven by equity concerns; third,
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the acknowledgement of a university’s activity (for instance the number
of Master degrees and PhD degrees delivered, so an indicator in absolute
terms as the CPU asked for the LOLF indicators); fourth, a weighting by
fields, which is a remainder from the first resource allocation model (see
also Table 9.1).
Quite technical and poorly publicized, the Sympa system received very
little attention beyond the circles of the CPU, Ministry of Education and
some well-informed MPs. These parties welcomed the new resource allo-
cation system for several reasons. First, it was the result of negotiations
in which these parties had been involved, and different rationales had
been taken into account. Second, it was deemed to be an objective system
based on clear criteria which replaced the 20–30% of contractual resources
which previously had to be negotiated between a university’s manage-
ment team and the Ministry. Third, besides its performance dimension,
it was supposed to make visible inequalities existing between universi-
ties and, hence, could help address and reduce these. Fourth, parallel
to the introduction of the new system, the government committed to
a general increase of the higher education budget; so each university
was supposed to benefit from Sympa, and under-resourced ones were
supposed to benefit more.
However, it quickly became apparent that things should turn out very
differently. The Ministry decided to increase the budget by far less than
originally promised, and it also decided not to put the increase into
Sympa’s envelope, but a separate “Undergraduate Success Programme”
(Plan Licence), which should become a key measure for the government.
In fact, the Plan Licence is still attached to the name of Valérie Pécresse,
then Minister of Higher Education. The Plan Licence was allocated to
each university without using the Sympa’s criteria, and through negotia-
tions with each university. As a staff member of the Ministry of Education
put it:
Actually, the Ministry wanted to keep the power in its hands, at least what
it thought was power; it wanted to have something on the table. And to
be able to use it to encourage universities to apply voluntarily some new
regulations (for example encourage them to merge). The result is: it was
the tougher university president, the one with political support, the one
who was president of an already well known university, etc. who earned
the most.
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Since the Sympa’s envelope remained steady, gains for some meant
losses for others. The CPU, on the other hand, refused the notion of an
“over-resourced” university and rejected any redeployment of resources
between universities. Because of the decision of the Ministry and the
position of the CPU,13 the possibility of reducing inequalities faded
away, while the effects of Sympa’s performance dimension became quickly
evident.
Performance is now financially rewarded, while non-performance is
financially punished. In this context, having indicators which take into
account the inputs or the conditions of teaching and research is very
important. Performance can be linked with the academic level of the
students, or with good working conditions, such as the number of admin-
istrative staff, which allows academics to do less administrative work and
to have more time for research. In the same way, non-performance can be
linked to “low” inputs and difficult working conditions, something which
Sympa’s weighting tried to take into account, but now the punishment is
only going to make worse.
Merton already revealed this phenomenon in the 1960s, and he called
it the “Matthew effect” (Merton, 1968) referring to the following passage
in the gospel of Matthew: “For everyone who has will be given more,
and he will have an abundance. Whoever does not have, even what he has
will be taken from him” (New Testament, Matthew 25:29). We can also
speak of “cumulative advantages”: a favourable relative position becomes
a resource that produces further relative gains, so the rich get richer at
a rate that makes the poor become relatively poorer. And the richest
universities are generally the ones where most of the students come from
privileged social backgrounds. So, performance-based financing, which is
a frequent component of New Public Management, leads to a concen-
tration of resources around those who already have the most,14 which
has significant implications for our conceptions of equality and justice.
Suleiman already noted in 2003 that a lot of the proposals coming
from New Public Management theories “have little to do with bureau-
cracy in itself and much to do with the distribution of public resources”
(Suleiman, 2003, p. 20). But often this political dimension is hidden:
“The allocation of resources seems to result instead from the dynamism
and the quality of individuals and institutions” (Le Galès & Scott, 2010,
p. 132).
Generally speaking, this way of funding introduces competition
between universities: once the total budget for higher education is
9 ARCHAEOLOGY OF A QUANTIFICATION DEVICE … 291
decided, the fact that some universities have financial rewards, and
so more money, naturally means that other universities will have less.
Competition takes place at the heart of performance-based financing
systems. Furthermore, these “Sympa indicators” have impacted univer-
sities’ policies. Sympa’s weighting pattern has indeed had an incentive
effect: an increase of five hundred students who pass their degree (for
the same number of students passing the exams) would generate an
additional budget of e80,000, while a 2.5% increase of the number of
publishing academics would mean an additional budget of e474,000.
In this context, a lot of universities chose to redirect financial and
human resources from teaching, not towards marketing, as Espeland and
Sauder (2007) observed for American Law Schools, but towards research.
Furthermore, it is advantageous for universities to recruit new academics
for research centres ranked A + or A, and not for the ones graded B or
C. Lastly, a lot of universities chose not to hire research officers, but to
recruit only university lecturers and professors, because the activity of the
former is made invisible by Sympa, although the potential lack of research
officers does not bode well for the development of science.
In addition, more and more universities decided to introduce a
performance-based resource allocation system internally, especially for
their research centres. They introduced a variable part for their budget,
for example 15%, based on performance indicators, such as the ratio of
publishing academics and the grade of the research centre (which is partly
based on the same ratio). But most often the management teams of the
research centres do not know anything about the criteria on which the
allocation of the remaining 85% is based. They are rather committed to
the variable component, arguing that at least here the criteria are known
and clear, and that it is a more transparent and fairer way of allocating
resources, not depending on personal relationships and lobbying. With
this system, they know what they have to improve and so they have the
feeling of being able to contribute to the sound management of public
money.
But, this link between performance and funding also produced what
can be called “punitive practices”: some research centres excluded the
non-publishing academics (to increase the ratio of publishing ones); some
decided not to pay for the costs when a non-publishing academic gave
a presentation at a conference. The presence of such practices depends
largely on the disciplines; they are quite rare in the social sciences but
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quite common in economics and management,15 all the more so because
the criteria used to decide whether one is publishing or non-publishing
are, as will be discussed later, more strictly defined in economics and
management than in the social sciences and the humanities.
This way of governing public services by financial incentives is really
new in France. The relationships within the state and public services
(and between them) are thought of in terms of microeconomic theory,
specifically agency theory: “Society is viewed as a system of essentially self-
interested ‘elementary particles’” (Supiot, 2015, p. 216); institutional and
individual actors are thus thought of in terms of homo economicus, whose
actions can be driven and controlled through a system of punishments
and rewards. This is often the basis of management by objectives in the
private sector and in the context of New Public Management. Vinokur
(2008) summarized these changes when talking about a shift from the
model of “obligation of means + trust” (the obligation of means resulting
in a bureaucratic ex ante form of control, and the trust in job security
for civil servants) to a model of “obligations of results + distrust”. We
already highlighted the “low trust in public servants and professionals”
when referring to Hood (1995, p. 94), which accompanied the rise of
NPM and its new conception of accountability.
Finally, the performance indicators have widely replaced, within univer-
sities, the previous statistics they produced internally for a better under-
standing of their students. Performance indicators, and specifically those
used by Sympa, became the dominant metrics compared to the statistics
produced for acquiring knowledge about students’ characteristics. This
trend, which can also be found in health care and the social services,16
is part of “the shift away from the social welfare state as guarantor of
basic solidarities and rights, access and treatment for all, to the state as a
provider of services” (Jany-Catrice, 2016, p. 129).
Since 2012
In 2012, the resource allocation model of Sympa was abandoned by
the new French government set up under the presidency of François
Hollande. This demise has to be linked to several protests from students
and academia from 2007 onwards. As mentioned before, the government,
set up in May 2007 under the presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy, had imme-
diately passed a new law on Liberty and Responsibility of Universities
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(the LRU Law).17 This law led to great protests, strikes and demonstra-
tions, from 2007 to 2009. Initially, the protests were against the new law
as a whole; later (in 2009), they partly focused on the new status intro-
duced for university lecturers and professors by the new law, under the
so-called “modulation des services”. Here, those who were classified as
non-publishing might be given, by the president of their university, more
teaching. Opponents to the reforms widely criticized the quantitative eval-
uation of the research centres and individuals, which led to centres being
ranked and academics categorized as publishing or non-publishing.
The AERES (Agence d’Évaluation de la Recherche et de l’Enseignement
supérieur), whose setting up in 2006 was already controversial, was in
charge of these assessments. It developed, during the summer of 2008,
the criteria that defined an academic as publishing or non-publishing,
and it designed a ranking of scientific journals for each discipline: an
academic was considered as publishing, if s/he had published two arti-
cles in a journal ranked A or B during the past four years. In the fall
of 2008, many petitions emerged signed by academics, academic profes-
sional organizations and trade unions, scientific committees and editorial
boards of academic journals; some of these petitions were against the
ranking system, some against the priority given to publication in jour-
nals at the expense of other scientific activities (including the publishing
of books), and some were against forms of quantitative evaluation all
together. In response to these, in October 2008, the AERES allowed
the academic disciplines themselves to identify a list of scientific journals
without ranking them, and it made it possible to count books and book
chapters as publications (at the discretion of the respective assessors). In
2009, AERES published new lists of journals, and while nearly all the
social sciences and humanities decided not to rank the journals listed by
them, economics and management studies did and still do so.
To bring the strike against the new status for lecturers and professors
to an end, the government added that non-publishing academics might
be given more teaching by the university president only if the academics
concerned agreed. Critics of the ranking of research centres arose again a
few years later, leading to new petitions in 2011. In response to all these
protests, the Socialist Party committed during the presidential campaign
(2012) to organize a National Conference on Higher Education and
Research. François Hollande was elected, and the National Conference
was held in November 2012. The previous system of assessment was,
among other things, widely criticized during the Conference, and the
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participants proposed that research centres should no longer be graded
and ranked. A working group, comprising representatives of the Ministry
and the CPU, was set up in April 2013 to re-examine the Sympa model.
At the beginning of 2014, the AERES replaced the grades with a “tex-
tual appreciation” of research centres, which made Sympa obsolete. The
working group was supposed to produce a new resource allocation model
by the end of 2014, but the Ministry and the CPU did not manage to
agree, and the working group stopped working in 2015.
From the above, four sticking points can be at least identified. First,
the Ministry conceived Sympa as a decision-support tool, providing it with
some room for manoeuvre and negotiations. In contrast, the CPU wanted
the system to automatically calculate the budget of each university.
Second, the Ministry would have liked to include the payroll in Sympa,
but the CPU refused. Third, there was disagreement about the indica-
tors themselves. The negotiating bodies seemed to agree on replacing the
number of publishing academics by the number of academics, but they
disagreed on the performance indicator for research that would replace
the grades of research centres. The Ministry proposed two indicators,
one measuring the participation in European Framework Programmes,
and one based on the number or the percentage of Institut Universi-
taire de France laureates. The CPU questioned the method of calculation
of the first and refused also the second arguing that it measured indi-
vidual performance but did not evaluate the collective performance of a
research centre or a university as a whole. Finally, a controversy about
the weighting factors by field led to the conduct of a cost analysis of
teaching and research in order to base the factors on objective informa-
tion. As a result, the decision-making process on the budget allocated
by the Ministry to each university became, contrary to what was initially
intended, even less transparent.
Conclusion
This chapter has traced the life of performance indicators in French higher
education from their birth in the beginning of the 2000s to the end of
the 2010s. Analytically, it distinguished between three levels that make up
a quantification device, such as performance indicators: (a) the bedrock
or the ontology of the device; (b) the intermediate level made up of
the conceptions about the “raisons d’être” of the quantified entity; and
(c) the upper stratum comprising the micro-conventions of calculation,
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and it analyse the context in which the indicators were deployed. This
study has shown how relevant it is to enter into the analysis of a specific
field by decoding the genesis and uses of its quantification devices.18 As
Salais has highlighted: “The choice of the indicators, the construction
of data and their uses reveal the normative assumption of the policies”
(Salais, 2004, p. 298). The three levels and the context are the result
of socio-historical processes in which different social actors participate,
bearing different philosophies or value systems. These processes can lead
to great coherence between levels and context. But they can also lead
to a weakly integrated device that exhibits many “gaps”. As Kurunmäki,
Mennicken and Miller, drawing on Deleuze and Guattari’s works, put it:
“The unity of such assemblages derives only from the co-functioning of
their components; the relations that are formed among them” (Kurun-
mäki et al., 2016, p. 399). We can try now to capture the salient points
of this assemblage.
This assemblage is based on the idea that the state is accountable
for the results of its action, which is a specific conception of public
accountability which emerged from the 1980s and which now prevails.
The state chose to assess results by, and only by, quantitative indica-
tors, which reveals a belief in numbers and a “realist epistemology”.
From these starting points, this assemblage became economics-based
and competition-oriented. Firstly, by choosing the vocabulary of “per-
formance” (rather than the more neutral term “results”). “Performance”
carries many connotations and introduces the notion of competition.
Furthermore, the various negotiations between different parts of public
administration led to a widely economics-based idea of performance
focussed on revenues, efficiency, competitiveness, insertion into the
labour market, attractiveness and networking, being thus closely akin to
“knowledge economy” theories. On the other hand, political and civic
dimensions of governing were almost absent. The chosen indicators and
the way they are calculated made comparisons, benchmarking and ranking
possible; they came to be conceived as signals towards universities. A
performance-based financing system was implemented that introduced
financial rewards and punishments, which was strengthened by some of
the Sympa indicators, such as the number of publishing academics and
the grades of the research centres. This system led to the production
of “Matthew effects” and it introduced competition between universi-
ties. Because of Sympa’s weighting pattern, it encouraged universities to
redirect financial and human resources from teaching towards research.
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Together with the “modulation des services”, it made the development
of punitive practices against individuals possible. This was a new way of
governing public services in France: the relationships within the state
and public services (and between them) became thought of in terms
of microeconomic theory, and specifically within the framework of the
agency theory; collective and individual actors were thought of in terms
of homo economicus. All of these elements are quite coherent.
However, the LOLF did not, at its beginning, link performance to
funding, thus there was no performance-based funding system at the
national or ministerial levels. The indicators resulted from discussions and
negotiations; they resulted from power dynamics and different strategies
which introduced different logics. The present analysis has tried “to disen-
tangle such multiplicities” (Kurunmäki et al., 2016, p. 397) of rationales.
Aside from the competitive logic, there was also strong support for a
transparent and automatic funding system that would be able to coun-
teract nepotism and arbitrariness (and at the same time a refusal from
the Ministry of such a transparent and automatic system). Porter (1995)
and Supiot (2015) showed that quantification devices are also an essen-
tial part of “government by rules” and of democracy. There was a strong
demand for a funding system based on the needs of the universities, more
than on their results; a well-informed MP, for example, welcomed in 2014
the change of indicator from the number of publishing academics to the
number of academics. There was finally a will to take into account the
social and cultural inequalities in order to reduce them.
Furthermore, several protest movements within academia have strongly
criticized the rationale of competition, the quantitative mode of evalu-
ation, the definition and use (modulation des services) of the status of
“publishing academic”, the rankings of academic journals, the grading
of research centres and the punishing practices. These movements were
victorious in some respect: the modulation des services is now only possible
if the non-publishing academic agrees with the ruling; the grades for
research centres have been abolished; the publication of books and book
chapters can be taken into account for the social sciences and humanities;
and journals are no longer ranked in these disciplines. These alterations
have reduced the impact of the competitive and punitive dimensions
of the device and explain why, together with the tenure and status of
“fonctionnaire” for the great majority of academics,19 it has become,
at least in the social sciences and humanities, a very limited “engine of
anxiety” (Espeland & Sauder, 2016).
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In summary, the reforms studied here, and the quantification devices
implied, do not form a very integrated assemblage. This explains why
the changes that the performance indicators were supposed to help bring
about were at the same time significant and limited, in comparison with
what may have occurred in the UK higher education system for example
(see also Eyraud, 2016).
The three-part analytical distinction introduced in this chapter,
combined with an analysis of the context in which a quantification device,
such as a performance indicator, is deployed, makes visible the very broad
range of possible options. One can agree with the idea that the state and
the public services must be accountable to citizens, regarding it as a signif-
icant democratic progress. But this does not mean that only numbers are
able to report on public action and social reality; being accountable is
not just about reporting numbers. As Supiot pointed out: “To confuse
measurement and assessment inevitably dooms us to lose our sense of
proportion; assessment is not only measurement; assessment requires that
the measurement is referred to a value-based judgement which gives it
meaning” (Supiot, 2010, p. 82). De Gaulejac went even further: “We
should abandon the economist, objectivist and mathematical conception
of assessment and adopt a qualitative, democratic and dynamic one” (De
Gaulejac, 2012, p. 77). Indeed, the very idea of measuring performance
by indicators should be questioned, since there may exist other preferable
ways of assessing public services.
However, even if quantitative evaluation should not be the only way,
quantitative indicators can be useful in the process. In that case, the
starting point, from which the indicators emerge, should be a wide-
ranging public debate on what is expected from public policies. As
Gadrey (1996)proposed, Boltanski and Thévenot’s (2006) “orders of
worth” can help to specify the different expectations placed on indica-
tors. Furthermore, detailed definitions of the indicators should not be a
way of surreptitiously encapsulating values and hierarchies. These micro-
conventions of calculation should be drawn up with an aim of impartiality,
and when a choice is needed it should be made democratically in order to
construct what could be called a “shared objectivity”. Finally, the uses of
the indicators should also be carefully scrutinized and debated. The deci-
sion to base funding on performance indicators has powerful effects, such
as an increase in inequality. The analytical grid proposed here provides a
blueprint for building “what should be, in our view, a satisfying process
of quantification” (Salais, 2016, p. 133).20
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Notes
1. I use the term “device” referring to Foucault’s concept of “disposi-
tif”. Foucault defines dispositif as “a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble
consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory deci-
sions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical,
moral and philanthropic propositions—in short, the said as much as the
unsaid (…). The dispositif itself is the system of relations that can be
established between these elements” (Foucault, 1994, p. 299). The term
thus emphasizes the complex and varied nature and the systemic dimen-
sion of these “ensembles”. I have chosen to use the notion of “device”,
even if the English translation of Foucault’s “dispositive” has given rise to
extensive discussions. Some of the published translations retain the term
in French; others opt for various solutions such as “apparatus”, “device”,
“arrangement”, etc.
2. In 2006, the French state moved from a specific public accounting system
to a business accounting system.
3. This concept refers to Espeland and Sauder’s work. They define “reactiv-
ity” as “the idea that people change their behaviour in reaction to being
evaluated, observed or measured. […] Because people are reflexive beings
who continually monitor and interpret the world and adjust their actions
accordingly, measures are reactive” (Espeland & Sauder, 2007, pp. 1–2).
Desrosières has also insisted on this aspect of quantification throughout
his work (see for example, Desrosières, 2008b, p. 12).
4. In the same vein, Miller (1990) demonstrated the interrelation between
accounting and the state, and Desrosières showed that there is a degree of
congruence between modes of governance, conceptions of the state and
statistical tools (Desrosières, 2014, pp. 33–58).
5. Miller and Rose (1990; 1992) used the notion of “programme”.
6. It would be possible to go even deeper into the roots of Western
civilization and the way it conceived government (Supiot, 2015).
7. A table which groups the various indicators into the different orders of
worth can be found in Eyraud (2014, p. 81).
8. We can note here that even if the two ministries did not agree on the
way of calculation, they implicitly agreed on the principle that scientific
production had to be measured by, and only by, publications in academic
journals.
9. In France, the great majority of PhD vivas take place from October to
December. This quotation also shows the absolute need, if one wants to
understand statistical figures, to go into the details of definitions, delimita-
tions and methods of calculation (Eyraud, 2008). It is one of the reasons
why international comparisons using statistical data are so difficult to
handle properly.
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10. I have followed the budget debates for higher education on the parlia-
mentary channel each year since 2007, and, on that matter, there is no
change even after 2012.
11. The calculation can be made using the universities’ Sympa data sheets,
which I managed to get hold of for two universities.
12. Grants are allocated based on means-testing parental incomes. The idea
behind is that scholarship students are the ones with low cultural capital,
thus, with a lowest probability of success which has to be taken into
account in the performance measurement of a specific university.
13. Neither the Ministry of Higher Education nor the CPU are homogeneous
organizations. These were decisions and positions that had to be won
inside these organizations.
14. This process is reinforced by the different “policies of excellence”
launched since 2010 and their competitive funding arrangements.
15. I did not conduct any interviews within natural science research centres.
16. But not in all domains. Dubet showed, for example, that quite a similar
way of governing French secondary schools pushed them to produce
social data on their pupils to justify their choices and to obtain addi-
tional resources (Dubet, 2016, p. 387). Statistics produced for acquiring
knowledge about pupils existed before, but only at the national level, not
at the school level.
17. To understand more about the law and the protests, one can read
in French Vinokur (2008) and in English Briggs (2009). The English
page of Wikipedia is also quite informative: https://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/2007%E2%80%9309_university_protests_in_France, accessed 15
September 2019.
18. Even if it does not provide a complete analysis of the field, because
some of its characteristics and transformations are beyond the scope of
the quantification devices. For a comprehensive understanding of the
recent transformations of French higher education, one should integrate
at least the severe budgetary constraints with which the universities are
confronted (Henry & Sinigaglia, 2014; Sinigaglia, 2018), the different
“policies of excellence”, the policy of university grouping and merging,
and the change of universities legal status (Eyraud, 2020).
19. The situation is different for casual workers, especially for the young
generation. The LRU introduced the possibility to recruit “casual lectur-
ers”, but a lot of academics, academic organizations and trade-unions
opposed it, so few governing boards of universities decided to hire people
under this new status. Things may change quickly as a result of a new law,
the “Loi de Programmation de la Recherche” (LPR) passed in December
2020.
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Since the late 1980s, the HM Prison Service in England and Wales
has undertaken a series of steps to transform its prison establishments
into calculating, economically minded, performance-oriented institutions.
This happened in the broader context of wider New Public Manage-
ment reforms (Hood 1991, 1995). Of particular importance, in this
context, was the government’s engagement in prison privatization and
the introduction of private sector accounting and management consulting
expertise (Mennicken, 2013). The government hoped that the introduc-
tion of private prisons would help to “provide an alternative standard
against which to measure the performance of public prisons, thereby
bringing about improvements in the public sector” (James et al., 1997,
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p. 9). Privatization was promoted to transform prison establishments
from inflexible, inefficient, rules-based bureaucratic organizations to cost-
conscious, performance-oriented entities. The rise and spread of stan-
dardized performance measures paralleled these developments. Quantified
performance targets were introduced to make public and private prison
performance outcomes more visible and transparent and to enhance
competitiveness amongst individual establishments (Ministry of Justice,
2009, but see also Home Office, 1988, 2000).
This chapter uses the case of prison privatization in England and
Wales to scrutinize what it means to “economize the social” through
numbers. By economizing we refer to the processes through which indi-
viduals, activities and organizations are constituted or framed as economic
actors and entities (Çalışkan & Callon, 2009; Miller & Power 2013).
Emphasis is placed on the process by which a supremacy of the economic
over society, including politics and domestic life, is articulated and estab-
lished (Miller & Power, 2013). Economizing defined in such broad
terms has many components: First and foremost, “it implies a concern
with the idea of efficiency – governing aimed at enhancing individual
or collective performance, the reduction of wastefulness, and the impo-
sition of rationing through calculation” (Kurunmäki et al., 2016, p.
396). Economizing also encompasses the creation and expansion of
markets, and an enhanced focus on competition to improve performance
(Çalışkan & Callon, 2010; Davies, 2014). Lastly, financialization, under-
stood as the rise and expansion of financial markets, financial expertise and
(capital) investment rationales, can be seen as a variant of economization
(Mennicken & Espeland 2019, p. 234). In this context, French scholars
in particular have drawn attention to the processes whereby things (e.g.
higher education) or human beings (e.g. prisoners) are turned into assets
evaluated in their capacity to create value from the perspective of an
investor who expects calculable future returns (Chiapello, 2015; Muniesa
et al., 2017).
Quantification undergirds all these processes of economization. Quan-
tification and commensuration are key conditions for economic calcula-
tion and action (Mennicken & Espeland 2019). Cost accounting, such
as the National Reference Cost Index for NHS hospitals or the calcula-
tion of prison unit costs, for instance, helps instantiate ideas of efficiency
and frugality at the heart of hospital care and the management of prison
establishments. Ratings and rankings (e.g. of organizational entities such
as universities or prisons) enable benchmarking and the stimulation of
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competition (e.g. between universities), and are often closely linked with
the establishment of (quasi)markets in the public services. Furthermore,
especially over the past fifteen years or so, we have seen an increase in
quantified social impact assessments, such as social return on investment
figures, aimed at making the value of charity and public sector work know-
able and visible from an investor’s perspective (Barman, 2016; Hall et al.,
2015).
In the following, we scrutinize the multiplicity of such quantification
practices and their implication in different processes of economization
in the Prison Service of England and Wales. First, we show how prison
privatization in the 1990s was accompanied by a rise of prison perfor-
mance metrics, rankings and ratings aimed at facilitating a shift from
“governing by rules” to “governance by numbers” (Miller 2001; Supiot
2015). We observe a market-oriented utilization of quantification, aimed
at stimulating competition amongst and between public and private
prison providers. Next, we turn to attempts aimed at undoing such
economization. We trace efforts of “moralizing” prison performance
metrics through the development of measures of the quality of prison life
(Liebling, 2004). We show how such moralizing quantification eventu-
ally came to be undermined by austerity policies and related economizing
practices of curtailment and frugality. Lastly, we discuss the implication of
prison quantification in processes of financialization and (capital) invest-
ment rationales, focusing on the introduction (and abolishment) of the
world’s first social impact bond in Peterborough prison.
We argue that to uncover the multiple effects of economization and
quantification brought about by market-oriented new public management
reforms and prison privatization, one needs to set presumed dichotomies
between the public and the private aside and turn instead to the multi-
plicity of economizing practices (here: curtailing, marketizing, financial-
izing) and their implication in different forms of quantification. Ironically,
in the case of England and Wales, numbers and state contracts governing
privately managed prisons also shielded these establishments from econ-
omization (e.g. budgetary savings requests); and it is the public prisons
that have been exposed the most to measures of government austerity.
Furthermore, we need to be careful not to equate quantification with
economization. Although quantification is an important condition for
economization, it is only recently that quantification has been largely
annexed by the phenomenon dubbed neoliberalism (Kurunmäki et al.,
2016). We call for greater attention to the complex interplays unfolding
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between different practices of quantifying and economizing. In so doing,
we also argue for closer scrutiny of the conditionality of the performa-
tivity of quantification (Butler, 2010; Kurunmäki et al., 2016). We need
to pay closer attention to the conditions under which numbers produce
(economizing and other) effects, and we need to better understand the
varying nature and extent of those effects.
Quantifying and Marketizing:
Prison Privatization, Quantification
and the Ethos of Contestability
Since the 1980s, public services in the UK have undergone a series of
far-reaching reforms. Instead of state coordination, market competition
came to be seen as an effective lever for driving efficiency and innova-
tion (Hood 1991; Miller & Rose 1990; Pollitt, 1993).1 The reforms,
labelled “New Public Management” by scholars (see, e.g., Hood, 1991),
were based on a conception of accountability that, as Hood (1995, p. 94)
writes, reflected high trust in the market and private business methods,
and low trust in public servants and professionals. New Public Manage-
ment ideas also took hold in the Prison Service (Bennett et al., 2008;
Bryans, 2007; Coyle, 2005; Coyle et al., 2003; Liebling, 2004; Liebling
et al., 2011), providing fertile ground for plans of prison privatization.
It was assumed that selective privatizations and the threat of market
testing public prisons, where the HM Prison Service had to bid against
private prison providers for the running of its own prison establishments,
would stimulate the development of a “business culture” (Black, 1993)
and “yield cross-fertilization benefits” (Harding, 2001). “The market”
was called upon to discipline public prison administrators, financially and
operationally (see, e.g., Home Office, 1988 and the introductory quote).
Competition between and amongst public and private prison providers
should help drive down costs (e.g. costs connected to the running of
prison establishments), increase quality (e.g. the quality of prison life) and
effectiveness (e.g. the effectiveness of operational procedures).
The first private prison establishment was opened in England and
Wales in 1992 (Wolds Remand Prison, which was a newly built prison)
(James et al., 1997). In the same year, the first public prison (Strange-
ways Prison) was also market tested (Prison Reform Trust, 1994). Market
testing permitted the private sector to compete directly with the public
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sector for the management of prisons that were considered to be “failing”,
that were not meeting performance targets, for instance with respect to
cost management or security standards, evidenced for example by prisoner
escapes or riots. As Black notes:
Market testing within the Prison Service will be twofold: First, under the
provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1991, the Prison Service will have
to compete with the total privatization of certain prison establishments.
[…] Internal services currently run by the Prison Service are also to be
contracted out, both to the public and private sectors. This is the second
tier of market testing. […] In the open market, an agency status Prison
Service will have to bid with other competitive tenders in order to run its
own existing establishments, under certain proscribed conditions. (Black,
1993, pp. 27–30)
The introduction of market testing and privatization coincided with
an “institutional crisis” in the Prison Service (King & McDermott, 1989;
Resodihardjo, 2009). Between 1980 and 1987, prison expenditure had
increased in real terms by 72% (James et al., 1997, p. 48). The over-
crowding of prisons had become a serious issue. By 1990, England alone
was imprisoning more people than any other Western European country
(Pozen, 2003, p. 263). In the early 1980s, a third of the offenders in
custody were sharing with one or two others cells designed for only one
person and, in June 1989, Wadsworth prison in London had only eight
cells with access to sanitation at night versus 1149 without access (ibid.).
Furthermore, in 1990 the Prison Service experienced a series of severe
prison riots. The riots had started in Strangeways Prison in April 1990,
and spread thereafter to more than 20 prisons throughout the country.
As Resodihardjo (2009, p. 93) writes, for Great Britain, these were “the
most serious series of riots ever experienced… When the quiet returned,
three people had died, 133 inmates and 282 prison staff had been injured
and there [sic] the cost of the damage ran into millions of pounds”.
In view of these issues, and the lobbying efforts of the security industry,
neoliberal think tanks and the general preference of the Thatcher govern-
ment for free enterprise, prison privatization and market testing were put
forward as solutions to the various problems facing the Prison Service,
despite fierce opposition from the entire British penal lobby and the
Labour Party. From 1992 onwards, the Prison Service began to be reor-
ganized in terms of a “mixed economy”, with a mix of public and
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private prison service providers (King & McDermott, 1995). And by
the late 1990s the debate had shifted from whether the government
should principally allow private prisons or not to how it could best govern
them, including the assessment of the efficacy and effects of privatization
schemes (National Audit Office, 2003; Pozen, 2003).
In these reforms, a key role came to be assigned to quantification and
“auditability” in terms of numbers (Power 1997). Standardized perfor-
mance metrics should help make prison performance visible and govern-
able across public and private prison establishments. These quantification
tools were supposed to turn prisons into competitive, market-oriented
“accounting entities” (Kurunmäki, 1999). Whereas in the 1970s in the
Prison Service, and in the public services more generally, corporate plan-
ning had been the main mechanism through which central oversight was
exercised, in the late 1980s, this began to change, and policy-makers
turned to ideas of market coordination.
Market-oriented quantification, via accrual-based accounting, perfor-
mance measurement and prison ratings, should facilitate an extension of
the rationality of the market to the Prison Service, and public admin-
istration more generally, domains previously viewed as non-market and
non-economic (Davies, 2014; Kurunmäki et al., 2016). Quantification
thus became implicated, as Foucault put it, in a much broader process of
governmental reform, characterized by the transformation “from a market
supervised by the state to a state under the supervision of the market”
(Foucault, 2008, p. 116) (see also Bruno & Didier, 2013; Miller & Rose,
2008; Supiot 2012, 2015; Rose & Miller, 1992; Davies, 2014).
The first set of standardized performance metrics was introduced into
the Prison Service in 1992–93 by Derek Lewis, the Prison Service’s
first chief executive who was recruited from the private sector. These
metrics included, amongst other things, the number of prisoner escapes,
the number of assaults (on staff, prisoners and others), the number
of hours spend in purposeful activity, the proportion of prisoners held
in unit of accommodation intended for fewer numbers, the proportion
of prisoners held in prisons where prisoners are unlocked on week-
days for a total of at least 12 hours and information about the average
cost per prisoner place (Prison Reform Trust, 1996). In subsequent
years, the number of prison Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) steadily
increased from 8 to 18 in 2000–01 (Liebling, 2004, pp. 58–63), to 28
for the newly created National Offender Management Service Agency
(NOMS) in 2008–09 (joining up the prison and probation services).
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These KPIs included public protection measures (measured in number of
escapes), Offending Behaviour Program (OBP) completions, OBP starts,
number of completed drug rehabilitation programmes, drug testing
results, employment of prisoners upon release, accommodation of pris-
oners upon release, number of serious assaults, overcrowding data (target:
number of prisoners held in accommodation units intended for fewer pris-
oners does not exceed 26% of the population), staff sickness, race equality
data (target: at least 6.3% of prison staff should be from ethnic minority
groups), costs per prisoner place and audit compliance (NOMS, 2009,
pp. 18–19).
In 2003, such quantifications were given a further boost by the
introduction of benchmarking and composite performance ratings. The
benchmarking and rating programmes were introduced following Lord
Carter’s correctional review in which he called for the establishment of
the principle of “contestability” within the HM Prison Service (Carter,
2003; Home Office, 2004). According to Nellis (2006, p. 53), Carter’s
review exemplified “the messianic managerialism”—the re-engineering of
existing structures and functions to produce “guaranteed”, quantifiable
and externally verifiable behavioural outcomes—that had come to charac-
terize New Labour’s approach to modernization (see also Pollitt, 1993;
Power, 1997). From 2003, prison performance measures of safety, secu-
rity, rehabilitation and economic efficiency came to be put together in
a weighted scorecard, drawn up in the fashion of Kaplan and Norton’s
Balanced Scorecard (Kaplan & Norton, 1992), on the basis of which
composite performance ratings are drawn up, similar to the “star ratings”
of the NHS. Public and private prisons are rated and compared on a 1 to 4
performance scale. Level 4 is awarded to excellent establishments that are
delivering “exceptionally high performance”. Level 1 indicates a “poor
performer”. Since the introduction of the ratings, according to a study
by Bryans (2007), prison governors find themselves operating in a “more
competitive” and “less collegiate” world; “more than ever before, their
focus is on how prisons are performing relative to other similar prisons”
(Bryans, 2007, p. 74) (see also Bennett et al., 2008).
Underlying the introduction of the prison ratings was a belief in the
power of market incentives, and the aspiration to govern through compe-
tition (Mehrpouya & Samiolo, 2016). As Bryans (2007, p. 73) writes,
with the help of the ratings poorly performing prisons were publicly iden-
tified and given six months in which to improve their performance. A
failure to improve meant that the prison faced the threat of closure or
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being contracted out to the private sector. The performance measure-
ments thus redefined the prison as a separate performance-oriented
unit—a calculating accounting entity, responsible for its own success
and failure. The prison ratings enabled comparisons between public and
private sector prison performance and they helped render ideas about
competition and competitiveness operable. The government also used
(and still uses) quantified performance targets in the definition, detailing
and monitoring of private prison contracts and the operation of a financial
penalty system if such contracts are non-fulfilled.
Before quantified performance measures were introduced, prison
values and objectives had been articulated in Circular Instructions, which
had been criticized for being “uncoordinated and uncosted” and “lacking
a mechanism of ensuring the initiatives they contain are implemented”
(Lygo, 1991; Prison Reform Trust, 1992). Of course, the created “mar-
ket” for prison services is highly imperfect. It is a market that is highly
regulated and not characterized by free trade and exchange. The goods
traded are not private goods: they are public services aimed at the delivery
of public security, punishment and rehabilitation at a reasonable cost.
Private prisons act on behalf of the government. They are supervised by
the state and accountable to parliament. Private prison providers have
to obey the same rules and regulations as public prison establishments.
The state is the sole “buyer” of prison services, acting in the interest
of a third party—the public. Prison services do not represent a good
that is consumed. Prisoners do not have “a choice” and, also, prison
establishments cannot freely choose which prisoners they want to house.
One could argue that ideas of marketization and privatization did
not lead to the creation of an actual market. First and foremost, we
observe the emergence of calculative bureaucracies, created in the name
of the market, and a corresponding rise in managerialism (Bennett, 2019;
Liebling & Crewe, 2013), akin to what Boltanski & Thévenot (2006
[1991]) have labelled in terms of an “industrial world”, characterized
by attempts aimed at “asserting greater managerial control within estab-
lishments over both staff and prisoners, making them more ordered and
more legitimate inside and out” (Bennett, 2016, p. 8; but see also Bryans,
2007; Coyle, 2005). Furthermore, expanding quantification and calcula-
tion did not automatically contribute to an enhancement of administrative
capacities. First of all, the prison performance measures and ratings placed
new demands on administrative capacities, for example with regard to
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the expertise required to make quantification operable, to work with and
make sense of the numbers.
Limits of Marketizing Quantification
Operational and financial performance measures, summarized in
published prison ratings, were aimed at stimulating organizational intro-
spection and inter-organizational competitiveness. They were enrolled
in attempts aimed at “exacting responsibility” (Miller 2001, p. 380)
following ideals of total, finely calibrated control. Yet, at the same
time, we see also the creation of new zones of opacity, invisibility and
non-accountability (Bennett, 2016; Liebling, 2004; Mennicken, 2013).
Research has shown that accounting entities are fictional and network-
effacing superimpositions on complex organizations (Mennicken &
Power 2015, p. 213). Underlying the concept of an accounting entity
is the fiction of separable economic units (Hines, 1988) and aspi-
rations to use accounting, such as performance measurement, as a
tool for the mapping and managing of social and economic relations
(Hopwood 1984; Kurunmäki, 1999; Miller 2001; Miller & Rose, 1990).
The boundaries that delineate an organization, such as a prison, as
a performance-oriented, economic unit separate from other organiza-
tions are not clear-cut, natural or fixed. The making of an accounting
entity is not so much an economic than a political process (Kurunmäki,
1999): “The actors who identify entities and define their limits are many
and varied, and may speak on behalf of legal, economic, social, polit-
ical, aesthetic and professional interests” (Kurunmäki, 1999, p. 220).
Also in the Prison Service quantification and “accountingization” were,
and still are, contested and commensuration, “the transformation of
different qualities into a common metric” (Espeland & Stevens, 1998),
a “congenitally failing” (Miller & Rose, 1990) undertaking. Even seem-
ingly straightforward measures, like measures of cost, are far from being
unproblematic. Should prisons costs, for example, be expressed as a
per diem rate for prisoners, or as a fixed sum assuming 100 per cent
occupancy?
Inconsistencies exist between the performance measures and targets for
public and private prison entities (National Audit Office, 2003). Attempts
aimed at establishing comparability are further undermined by variation
in the characteristics of different prison entities (size, location, design,
function and age). The contracts negotiated for each private prison differ,
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making it difficult to draw comparisons between different public and
private prison establishments. It is also difficult to establish an exact corre-
lation between financial penalties that private prisons occur and their
operational performance (National Audit Office, 2003). Financial deduc-
tions can be reduced following negotiations between the Prison Service
and the private prison contractors. According to the National Audit
Office (2003, p. 17), these negotiations are not solely concerned with
the prisons’ operational performance, but take also account of problems
of “inflexible contract monitoring”. In other words, negotiating penalty
deductions allows for the flexing of otherwise inflexible 15-year or 25-year
contracts, which normally are based upon fixed key performance indi-
cators (KPIs) and targets. See for example the dialogue below between
Martin Narey (Director General of the HM Prison Service in England
and Wales, 1998–2003) and Alan Williams (Member of Parliament) in a
Public Accounts Committee hearing:
Mr Williams (Committee of Public Accounts) Can you just clarify a
point which is genuine misunderstanding? In Figure 9 on page 15,
cost per penalty point, Ashfield is £94, Altcourse is £293. Why is
the cost per point three times higher in one than in the other?
Mr Narey (Commissioner for Correctional Services) It is because each
penalty point regime— and I confess to having had to have a tuto-
rial on this just this morning—is unique to that particular prison. If
you want to compare how a particular prison has performed against
another one, you cannot just look at the penalty points incurred,
but you will see that prisons have very different base lines, that is,
the number of penalty points which are tolerated before a finan-
cial penalty is enforced. That again reflects the fact that we have
different schemes for different prisons.
Mr Williams Why was Ashfield set at £94? Why is it so different,
particularly in view of subsequent events? The worst offender of
the lot, yet it has the least disadvantageous penalty point system?
Mr Narey It has been significantly at a disadvantage in terms of the
money we have taken from it, a total of £4.2 million, as Mr Beeston
said. Whatever the penalty point regime, the fact is that we have
been able to use sanctions against Ashfield going way beyond the
use of penalty points, in this case in closing places and saying this
is not a safe enough place in which to put young prisoners so as to
make a very significant financial sanction.
Mr Williams Was the £4.2 million based just on penalty points or
on other factors?
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Mr Narey No, the £4.2 million was primarily based on closing places
and saying we do not think this is a place which is safe enough or
good enough to meet our standard requirements so we are not
going to put young people into there. (House of Commons, 2003,
Ev18)
Further it is difficult to attribute re-offending rates to individual prison
performance, as prisoners are regularly transferred between prisons, tran-
scending prison boundaries and the accounting for them (Bastow, 2013;
Mennicken, 2013). The Prison Service struggled, and still struggles, to
identify the most appropriate KPIs. As the Prison Reform Trust (1996,
p. 3) observes:
First, people may not agree as to the most important goals. Second,
measuring performance in a quantitative way gives no indication of quality.
Third, goals which cover general areas of work can be measured using a
number of different KPIs. For example, helping prisoners to return to the
community is not achieved solely by providing more than the minimum
visiting entitlements; it is also achieved by enabling prisoners to gain educa-
tional qualifications, or by helping them find accommodation after release.
Fourth, the date may not be accurate or objective. Finally, even if there is
agreement as to the KPIs, the target performance may be set too high or
too low.
Following these and other criticisms the KPIs were reviewed, repaired
and extended (see also Liebling, 2004). They constitute a moving target,
and a platform for an ever-expanding apparatus of quantification and
calculation, which itself has been described as unwieldy and uneconom-
ical (Bennett, 2016; Coyle, 2005, 2008). Prison governors have to meet
increasingly detailed reporting demands, facing “constant oversight from
internal auditors and external inspecting bodies” (Coyle, 2005, p. 97; but
see also Bennett, 2016). Prison governors also find it difficult to prioritize
amongst the various performance measures. They are often overwhelmed
by the reporting demands, which take them away from “where the action
is”, the “floor” and day-to-day interactions with prisoners and prison
officers (Bennett, 2016; Bryans, 2007; Coyle, 2005, 2008).
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Moralizing Versus Economizing Numbers
Quantification involves a transformation of quality into quantity, of
subjective experience into objectified knowledge (Espeland & Stevens
2008; Kurunmäki et al., 2016). In so doing, it prepares the ground
for new possibilities of governing (Kurunmäki et al., 2016; Miller 2001;
Supiot 2015). But, as Kurunmäki et al. (2016, p. 395) highlight, we need
to be careful to separate quantification from economization, for not all
quantification implies economization. Although the rise of prison perfor-
mance measurement in England and Wales was, in large part, animated
by market-oriented reforms and ideals of competition, the introduction
of the performance measures gave also rise to the creation of an unwieldy
calculative bureaucracy and new information systems that needed to be
managed and fed.
Furthermore, we should not forget that the performance measures, at
least at their onset, also had a “democratizing” ambition, an aspiration to
hold managers, public administrators, and civil servants to account, so as
to counteract nepotism and arbitrariness (Kurunmäki et al., 2016; Lewis,
1997; Prison Reform Trust, 1996). Prison interest groups, such as Prison
Reform Trust, for instance, had welcomed the introduction of the perfor-
mance measures, as they allowed for insight into areas of prison activity
which had not been publicly accounted for previously (Prison Reform
Trust, 1996). Of course, the performance measures were also criticized
by the very same groups. The Prison Reform Trust, for instance, ques-
tioned the purpose of the prison league tables arguing that they were
useful as an internal management tool but did not provide a clear picture
of prison life (Solomon, 2004, p. 2). According to criminologist Alison
Liebling (2004, p. 26), the market-oriented prison performance ratings
and the regime aspirations arising out of them “left crucial questions of
moral responsibility and individual transformation untouched”.
Following such criticisms, the measurement system came to be
reformed from within. In 2000, the Home Office commissioned
Professor Alison Liebling, Director of the Prisons Research Centre at
Cambridge University, with the task to develop “quantitative measures of
qualitative dimensions of prison life” (Liebling, 2004; Liebling & Arnold,
2002). Liebling and her team developed new performance measures along
two dimensions: relationships (respect, humanity, trust, staff-prisoner
relationships and support) and regimes (fairness, order, safety, well-
being, personal development, family contact and decency) (Liebling,
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2004). These measures were aimed at “moralizing prison management”
(Liebling, 2004) and at counter-acting the economization and manage-
rialization of prison life. The newly developed “Measures of the Quality
of Prison Life” (MQPL) were fully rolled out for both public and private
sector prisons in 2012, when they became part of the weighted score-
card of prison performance and were fully incorporated into the 1–4
prison performance ratings under the heading of “decency” (making up
28.6% of the overall prison performance rating). Liebling and her team
perceived the performance measures as a mediating, rather than econ-
omizing, instrument (Miller & O’Leary, 2007)—as a mechanism that
could be utilized to link up and mediate between conflicting concerns
and prison values, such as those of security, economy and decency. They
used quantification as a way to bring prison values relating to questions of
rehabilitation, care and decency back in, and to give prisoners “a voice”
through the introduction of a standardized survey aimed at capturing
their day-to-day experiences (Liebling, 2004).
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide a detailed assessment
of the success of this quantification project in reshaping and rebalancing
prison value configurations. Further, as Robert Salais’ contribution in
this volume reminds us, we need to be cautious when labelling this as
“democratization”. Questions of democracy do not only concern issues
of consultation and participation (e.g. participation in processes of perfor-
mance measurement, or the capturing of multiple voices through KPIs).
As Salais argues in this volume, democratizing quantification would
also entail a critical engagement with the very logic of “managing by
numbers”, with the very process of capturing and transforming a pris-
oner’s voice via KPIs, and the extent to which such quantification is
still able to take account (or not) of individual capabilities, hopes and
desires. Nonetheless, we ought to acknowledge that the Prison Service’s
KPIs contributed not only to an infusion of the Prison Service with
market-oriented ideals of efficient, economic management. The perfor-
mance measures also served as a platform for debate about prison values
and reform, not least because of the public attention and criticism they
attracted.
At the same time, such measures can themselves become challenged
and changed by economization. Put differently, quantification is not only
an instrument of economization; it can also be subjected to economiza-
tion and destabilized as a result. Liebling’s Measures of the Quality of
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Prison Life (MQPL), for instance, soon after their system-wide introduc-
tion and establishment, came to be undermined by austerity policies and
related economizing practices of curtailment and frugality. In the wake
of the 2008 financial crisis and government austerity measures, concerns
with cost and “economies of scale” came to overrule the Prison Service’s
“balanced” performance measurement system. Definitions of failure were
narrowed to definitions of failure in economic (i.e. cost management)
terms. In a report by the HM Chief Inspector of Prisons we read (HM
Chief Inspector of Prisons for England & Wales, 2013, p. 7):
The National Offender Management Service (NOMS) as a whole (that
is, prison, probation and headquarters functions) had to make savings of
£246 million on top of the £228 million savings delivered in 2011–12.
This represented a further reduction of seven per cent of NOMS’ resource
budget against the spending review baseline. Public sector prisons alone
had to find savings of around £80 million. NOMS overall savings were
delivered by a combination of workforce restructuring; market testing and
privatisation of entire establishments and specific services; standardising
costs and services; and reconfiguring the prison estate by closing some
smaller, older prisons and increasing the size and number of very large
establishments.
The bulk of savings that the Prison Service had to deliver was achieved
through a changed estate management strategy. As is highlighted in the
quote above, this included not only land sales, but also the closing of
smaller, older prisons (with approx. 150–250 certified places of normal
accommodation on average) that, in comparison, were costlier to run than
new, large establishments with more than 1,500 places where economies
of scale can be realized (see, e.g., Oakwood Prison). According to the
National Audit Office, by the end of 2013–14, the changed estate
management strategy contributed £71 million of savings since 2010
(National Audit Office, 2013). The National Audit Office notes that
the estate strategy’s explicit focus was on cost measurement and reduc-
tion (i.e. economizing understood in terms of curtailment) and that this
limited how far it could address concerns with quality and performance
(National Audit Office, 2013, p. 5). The annual prison performance
ratings and HM Inspectorate of Prisons’ regular reports were not consid-
ered in the estates management strategy. Only cost calculations were
taken into account. Of the 18 prisons closed or identified for closure
by December 2013, eight were considered to be “high performers” on
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dimensions related to Liebling’s Measures of the Quality of Prison life
(National Audit Office, 2013, p. 30). Different forms of quantification
thus came to be hierarchized; leading to a prioritization of issues of
security and cost over objectives of individual rehabilitation, measures of
decency and the quality of prison life (Bennett, 2019; Liebling & Crewe,
2013).
Ironically, contracted-out prisons were largely spared from these cuts,
due to the inflexible nature of the 15- or 25-year contracts under which
they are operating and “because of the cost and difficulty of terminating
contracts early” (National Audit Office, 2013, p. 6). In other words, state
contracts governing privately managed prisons shielded these establish-
ments from economization in the form of budgetary savings requests,
and public prisons were exposed the most to measures of government
austerity. This does not imply that private prison establishments are not
economized, but different mechanisms of economization (and quantifi-
cation) are at work here, and it is important to differentiate between
these. Private prisons, for example, might be more financialized than
public prisons, and it is to financialization as one specific modality of
economization, and the implication of quantification in such processes
of financialization, that we turn next.
Quantifying and Financializing: Accrual
Accounting and Social Impact Bonds
Financialization can be seen as one distinctive mode of economizing
that has taken hold in the Prison Service, as well as in other parts of
the public services in England and Wales, over the past 38 years, first
through the government’s Financial Management Initiative (FMI), which
was launched in 1982, later through the Private Finance Initiative (PFI),
which was launched in 1992, and more recently through the experimen-
tation with Social Impact Bonds (for instance in Peterborough Prison)
(Anders & Dorsett, 2017; Disley et al., 2015; Joliffe & Hedderman,
2014). According to van der Zwan (2014), studies of financialization
interrogate how an increasingly autonomous realm of global finance has
altered the underlying logics of the industrial economy and the inner
workings of democratic society. Financialization encompasses a range of
different developments connected to the rise and spread of finance: the
emergence of new accumulation regimes (including the increasing impor-
tance of financial services and financial assets on a company’s balance
sheet); the increasing importance of capital markets that is paralleled by an
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ascendency of the shareholder orientation; the financialization of everyday
life; and the rise and spread of financial economics, for example into
accounting.
Also the public services, including the Prison Service of England
and Wales, have been affected by such processes of financialization.
With prison privatization, new stakeholders entered the picture: finan-
cial investors, such as banks and shareholders, who seek financial returns
on their investments. When this chapter was written, 13 prisons out of
117 were private and contractually managed by G4S Justice Services,
Serco Custodial Services and Sodexo Justice Services. In 2019, these
private companies housed nearly 20% of the prisoners in England and
Wales (20% of approx. 82,000 prisoners).2 All three security firms are
globally operating corporations listed on multiple stock exchanges. G4S
Justice Services, for instance, is listed on the London and Copenhagen
stock exchanges. Serco Custodial Services is listed on the London Stock
Exchange. Sodexo Justice Services is part of the Sodexo Group that is
traded on the Paris Bourse and the New York Stock Exchange.
Private prison managers are not only subject to government over-
sight and scrutiny. They are also wary of stock price reactions. Inter
alia, this brings to the fore concerns with reputation management—
a prison establishment’s appearance to the (financial) market. Globally
operating security corporations are interested in economic gains. They
are concerned with winning new prison contracts and renewing old ones,
and with avoiding both adverse publicity and drops in stock price (Volokh,
2002, p. 1870). Quantification is here not only implicated in the deter-
mination of operational prison performance against nationally stipulated
KPIs, but also in financial profit and loss calculations, and a logic of (finan-
cial) “capitalization” (Muniesa et al., 2017), where prison establishments
and prisoners come to be viewed as (financial) assets, as vehicles for the
generation of future (financial) returns (see also Birch & Muniesa, 2020).
Such a financialization of the prison organization is intertwined
with a shift in the conventions underpinning (economic) quantification
(Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006 [1991]; but see also Chiapello, 2015;
Chiapello & Walter, 2016). Chiapello (2015) highlights the progressive
diffusion of financialized conventions of quantification. Such conventions
have been developed and spread by accounting and finance professionals,
for example in the form of net present value calculations, probability-
based estimates of financial value, and market prices as true value bench-
marks (see also Muniesa et al., 2017). Such financialized conventions of
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quantification have not only been utilized in private prisons. They have
also travelled into public prisons. As Liebling (2004, p. 71) writes, with
privatization a “new rationality of governance” (Miller & Rose, 1990,
2008) was introduced into the (public) Prison Service, where auditing
and accounting practices originating from “the world of finance” came to
be applied to the non-financial practices and systems of the Prison Service.
Private Sector Accrual Accounting
In particular, private sector budgeting and accrual accounting were
promoted as “a necessary precondition for identifying inefficiencies” and
“managing capital budgets properly”. As O’Quinn and Ashford (1996,
p. 31) put it: “While adopting accrual accounting and budgeting is
technical, it is a necessary precondition for identifying inefficiencies,
improving services and saving taxpayers money”.
Unlike cash accounting, private sector accrual accounting records
the changes in value of assets and liabilities and distinguishes between
operating and capital flows (Ellwood & Newberry, 2007; O’Quinn &
Ashford, 1996). Expenses are recorded as incurred and revenues as earned
(rather than when cash changes hands). Fixed assets, such as buildings
or equipment, are capitalized, i.e. they appear as a separable item on an
organization’s balance sheet. The introduction of business-like accrual
accounting was supposed to allow for better measurement of costs and
revenues and more efficient and effective use of resources, for example,
through charges for fixed assets, or calculations of full costs of providing
a public service, which could then be compared with the prices charged
by outside suppliers (Ellwood & Newberry, 2007).
In the Prison Service, the introduction of private sector accrual
accounting was largely driven by the desire to establish financial compa-
rability between public and private prison providers, and to stimulate and
govern private financial investment (see also Ellwood & Newberry, 2007).
Private sector accrual accounting was supposed to enable the development
of benchmarks for inter-organizational financial comparisons. It should
help establish a common business language, making financial reports read-
able across the public and private sectors. Thereby, it should increase
inter-organizational competition and strengthen “financial transparency”
and “fiscal responsibility” (O’Quinn & Ashford, 1996).
Yet, numerous studies have also challenged the relevance of accrual
accounting to governments and have highlighted difficulties of its
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practical implementation (see, e.g., Ezzamel et al., 2014; Ellwood &
Newberry, 2007; A. Bruno & Lapsley, 2018; Barton, 2004). Such diffi-
culties were also experienced in the Prison Service. The assumed benefits
proved difficult to realize. The valuation and recognition of assets, such
as property and equipment, was far from straightforward, given that no
market exists to determine their “fair value”, including financial losses due
to impairment. Furthermore, assets, such as prison buildings or the equip-
ment they contain, do not generate any cash revenues for the government,
rather they represent a future stream of expenses.
Moreover, private prisons and the costs of running those remained off-
balance sheet. This applies also to the costs connected to the preparing
and monitoring of private prison contracts. Private prison establishments
are governed by contract. These contracts fall into two main categories.
Design, Construct, Manage and Finance (DCMF) contracts, also known
as Private Finance Initiatives (PFI) that are typically 25 years long and
Manage and Maintain Contracts that are typically 15 years long. These
contracts are negotiated behind closed doors and they are not available
to the public, as they fall under the commercial confidentiality clause.
“Fiscal transparency” is thus punctuated, the “representational faithful-
ness” of the Prison Service’s accrual-based accounts highly limited, and
the objective of financial comparability and contestability undermined.
Finally, financial and operational prison performance, and their respec-
tive quantification, are largely de-coupled. It is not easy to assess their
interplay from the Prison Service’s financial and management reports, and
there is no systematic mapping of the impact of financial management on
a prison’s operational effectiveness, including measures concerning the
quality of prison life, and vice versa.
Despite these limitations, the accounting reforms introduced new ways
of thinking about what the state consists of. The state does not “pay”
or “fund” any longer. Instead, it “invests” in an accountable manner
(Mennicken & Muniesa, 2017; Muniesa et al., 2017). The reforms also
led to the rise of new experts, the emergence and empowerment of
financial experts and expertise. The transformations shifted the locus and
focus of governing. They redefined relations between the state, public
and private prison providers, “making up” prison providers in financial
business terms, introducing private-sector oriented forms of calculation
and financial responsibility. Such reforms also paved the way for exper-
imentations with new forms of financing, supporting the rise of “social
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finance” initiatives, aimed at stimulating investments that generate finan-
cial returns for the (private) investor while including measurable positive
social impact, e.g. in the form of reduced recidivism rates. It is to such
forms of investments, and the implication of quantification in these, that
we turn last.
Social Impact Bonds
By way of concluding this section, we would like to draw attention
to a relatively new class of financial instrument, so-called Social Impact
Bonds (SIBs). Social Impact Bonds are aimed at “socializing finance”—
“rethinking finance for social outcomes” (Social Finance, 2009). Social
Impact Bonds are based on a commitment from government to use a
proportion of the savings that result from improved social outcomes
to reward non-government investors that fund the intervention activ-
ities. They are based on a contract negotiated with government that
includes definitions of a success metric (e.g. 1-year reoffending rate for
short-sentence offenders in a specified geographic area); a specific target
population (e.g. offenders aged over 18 leaving prison after a sentence of
less than 12 months and returning to a specified geographic area); and
the value of success (i.e. the amount returned to investors for a given
improvement in the social outcome; generally a proportion of the related
savings to government) (Social Finance, 2009). The private investment
is used to finance a range of interventions to improve the target social
outcome over the contract period (often around 5 years). If the interven-
tions are successful and the social outcomes improve, government pays
investors a reward based on the pre-agreed payment schedule (this scheme
is also referred to as “payment by results”). SIBs seek to “align govern-
ment policy priorities with the interests of non-government investors
and social service providers” (Social Finance, 2009). They are aimed at
creating “a rational investment market” and aligning “the financial and
social return on investment” (Social Finance, 2009).
In the Prison Service, a pilot with a Social Impact Bond was started
in 2010 in Peterborough Prison. This Social Impact Bond was aimed
at reducing the reoffending of approximately 2000 male prisoners who
were discharged from HMP Peterborough after serving a sentence of less
than 12 months between 2010 and 2014. Social Finance, a not-for-profit
financial intermediary, developed the model, raised the finance and was
performance managing the bond. The Ministry of Justice commissioned
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the service, with part of the outcome payments contributed by the Big
Lottery Fund. Organizations involved in delivering the service were: St
Giles Trust; Ormiston Children and Families Trust (Ormiston); SOVA;
YMCA; Peterborough and Fenland Mind (Mind) (Disley et al., 2015;
Civil Society Media, 2014).
The investment pool totalled £5 million from 17 social investors
including: the Barrow Cadbury Charitable Trust; the Esmée Fairbairn
Foundation; the Friends Provident Foundation; the Henry Smith Charity;
the Johansson Family Foundation; the Lankelly Chase Foundation; the
Monument Trust; the Panahpur Charitable Trust; the Paul Hamlyn Foun-
dation; and the Tudor Trust. If re-offending was reduced overall by at
least 7.5%, investors received a minimum repayment of 2.5%. The greater
the drop in re-offending beyond this threshold, the more the investors
would receive. The total payments by Government were capped at £8 m
(or £7 m in real terms) and return to investors was capped at 13% annual
IRR (Civil Society Media, 2014).
The Peterborough Social Impact Bond was part of a broader govern-
ment strategy to outsource the financing of government services and
to stimulate more third sector involvement in the delivery of these. An
interim report of results (Joliffe & Hedderman, 2014) showed that the
frequency of re-conviction events for the Peterborough SIB cohort 1
was 8.4% lower compared to a matched national control group (142 re-
conviction events per 100 offenders in Peterborough’s cohort 1 compared
to 155 re-conviction events per 100 offenders nationally). This means
that the provider (One Service) was on track to achieve the 7.5% reduc-
tion target for the final payment based on an aggregate of both cohorts,
but that the pilot had not achieved the 10% reduction target for cohort 1
(Joliffe & Hedderman, 2014).
The final cohort impact evaluation (Anders & Dorsett, 2017) found
that the provider had managed to reduce the number of reconviction
events amongst those discharged from HMP Peterborough by 9.7% for
cohort 2. Reduction across both cohorts was estimated to be 9.0%,
which reached the minimum threshold of 7.5% across all cohorts, and
was sufficient to trigger payment under the terms of the SIB contract
(Anders & Dorsett, 2017). The evaluation of the Peterborough SIB was
far from straightforward. In the evaluation of the first cohort, it took
the evaluators 11 months alone to agree the sample and obtain all the
data needed to begin the analysis (Joliffe & Hedderman, 2014). And,
unlike random control allocation, the applied method of propensity score
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matching (PSM), although regarded as one of the best ways of matching
quasi-experimentally, could not take account of unmeasured differences
which may account for variation in reconviction rates aside from “treat-
ment received” (Joliffe & Hedderman, 2014). It was also not possible to
precisely replicate the approach adopted in the dry run because of data
quality issues, including missing data pertaining to the type of offence
(Joliffe & Hedderman, 2014, p. 4).
Apart from such measurement challenges and the costliness of the
evaluation, SIBs like the Peterborough SIB have also been criticized for
their short-term orientation, high transaction costs, and their focus on
the fulfilment of quantifiable targets that dictate the rate and amount
of payment received by contracted service providers (Cooper et al.,
2016; Edmiston & Nicholls, 2018; Jeamet & Salais 2019). As Edmiston
and Nicholls (2018) highlight, this can compromise service quality and
integrity due to “gaming” and perverse incentives (see also Cooper et al.,
2016; Jeamet & Salais, 2019). Social investors are likely to have different
and potential conflicting motivations. Some may prioritize financial return
on investment, whereas others may focus on the social impact rather than
financial rates of return (Edmiston & Nicholls, 2018).
In the case of the HMP Peterborough SIB, according to the final
process evaluation report produced by RAND Europe (Disley et al.,
2015), the private provider (One Service) made extensive efforts to
engage offenders and ex-offenders through the provisioning of through-
the-gate and post-release support (addressing practical problems, such as
housing, benefits, training and education). Yet, often the contact with
One Service was ended after a few months and a longer-term engage-
ment with ex-offenders was difficult to achieve (Disley et al., 2015). It
was also highlighted that different organizations hired by One Service
shouldered unequal burdens in delivering the service, and interviewees
perceived contractual relationships behind the Peterborough SIB to be
complex (Disley et al., 2015).
In addition, not all reductions in re-offending (more precisely re-
conviction) bring realizable savings, where costs of existing services are
largely fixed and prison numbers are not a direct product of re-offending
(Fox & Albertson, 2011). The Peterborough SIB’s focus on reduced
recidivism rates is itself highly questionable. It is based on what Robert
Salais has termed in this volume “governance-driven quantification”,
where meeting contractual requirements is prioritized over the (long-
term) needs of subjects (see also Morley, 2021; Supiot 2015), and root
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causes underlying the commitment of crime remain largely unaddressed.
As a recent OECD report on SIBs stated: “There is a fear that this strong
focus on results can change the public service ethos or lead to a narrow
mechanical determinism in service delivery” (OECD, 2016, p. 16, cited in
Morley, 2021). SIBs reframe public service users, in this case prisoners, as
potential revenue sources rather than conscious agents and citizens, and
they often lack engagement with subjective experiences and preferences
(Cooper et al., 2016; Jeamet & Salais, 2019; Sinclair et al., 2021).
However, the actors involved in the Peterborough SIB differed from
those engaged in the prison privatization schemes described earlier. Most
of these actors are located in the not-for-profit voluntary sector, and
boundaries between the public and private have become increasingly
blurred. As Edmiston and Nicholls (2018) remind us, we need to be
careful not to dismiss the heterogeneity of these actors and their varied
motives. We need to be careful not to overlook the heterogeneous
kinds of private capital present within public services and their dynamic
influence on service operations and delivery.
On the one hand, SIBs foster the penetration of financial criteria
and issues into what were previously non-economic areas (Sinclair et al.,
2021). Yet, on the other hand, they can also come to be utilized for the
“socializing” of finance, as some investors might forego a higher rate of
return for the sake of social impacts, because of their charitable orientation
(Disley et al., 2015; Edmiston & Nicholls, 2018). We need to be mindful
of the multiple ways in which quantification and financial concerns come
to be interlinked—reinforced, mitigated or undermined—in the day-to-
day realization of such schemes. Of course, this does not mean to say that
(financial) “governance-driven quantification” (Salais, in this volume) is
suspended. But we need to attend to the conditionality of its performa-
tivity (Butler, 2010) and scrutinize the circumstances that enable its scope
and depth to increase and intensify (or not).
Conclusion
This chapter has explored different dynamics of economization and quan-
tification in the Prison Service of England and Wales. In so doing, it
concentrated on neoliberal, Anglo-American dynamics of quantification
and economization, characterized by attempts aimed at the remaking of
everything and everyone in the image of homo oeconomicus (Brown, 2015;
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Davies, 2014; Supiot 2012). In the UK, such developments were kick-
started under the Thatcher government (1979–1990) and later continued
under the rule of Labour. This chapter has scrutinized what it means
to “economize the social” drawing attention to three different modali-
ties of economizing and the varied implication of quantification in these:
ideas and practices of marketizing, politics of austerity (curtailment) and
processes of financializing.
First, we examined the rise of market-oriented quantification in the
form of prison ratings and rankings aimed at stimulating competition
amongst public and private prison providers. We then attended to the
limits of such quantification and showed how in particular criminologists
undertook efforts to undo such economization through the develop-
ment of “alternative” forms of quantification measuring the quality of
prison life. These efforts, in turn, were undermined by the government’s
austerity policies, and related economizing and quantifying practices
which brought concerns with economies of scale and cost management
to the fore. Lastly, we explored the implication of prison quantification
in processes of financialization, drawing attention to practices of private-
sector accrual accounting and experimentations with Social Impact Bonds
(SIBs).
We underscored the importance of unpacking the multiplicity of econ-
omization and quantification. Quantification is an important condition
for economization, but should not be equated with it. To develop a
better understanding of the multiple roles that quantification can come
to fulfil we need to investigate interactions between different quantifica-
tion regimes (e.g. cost accounting regimes, prison performance ratings
and quantifications of the quality of prison life) and their implication in
different “orders of worth”, as Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) would
put it. We need to follow the numbers across the different sites of their
production and circulation (see also Kurunmäki et al., 2016, and the
other chapters in this volume). Further, we need to be mindful of the
different facets of economization. This chapter focused on neoliberal
forms of economizing and quantifying—reforms that were undertaken
in the name of the market, involving a logic of competition and capital
investment rationales. Of course, we should not forget about other forms
of economizing and quantifying—involving, for instance, state planning,
public statistics, redistribution and public welfare rationales (see here also
the contributions by Mespoulet and Amossé in this volume).
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Finally, we have shown how economizing quantification can be punc-
tuated, undermined and undone. State contracts governing privately
managed prisons also shielded these from economization, such as govern-
ment austerity measures. The introduction of prison performance ratings,
aimed at enhancing transparency, comparability and inter-organizational
competitiveness, was accompanied by the creation of new zones of
opacity, invisibility and unaccountability. Private prison contracts as well
as SIBs, for instance, are negotiated behind closed doors, and they can
further the production of mutual lock-ins that, in many respects, suspend
the logic of market discipline. Furthermore, the market-oriented reforms
led to a creation of an unwieldy calculative bureaucracy, new quantifi-
cation systems which needed to be fed and maintained, which could be
described as uneconomical.
For those interested in the powers of quantification in all its forms, the
challenge is to get to grips with its multiple modalities and intertwinement
in different programmes and processes of reform. As Kurunmäki et al.
(2016, p. 400) remind us, the performance of calculating selves, pris-
oners, prison officers and prison governors, may be evaluated by others
without their knowledge, or against their wishes. Prisoners and prison
governors may seek to influence prison ratings in their favour and tamper
with the numbers. On the other hand, quantification can be turned
against programmes of marketization, financialization and austerity. This,
as also the chapters by Salais and Thévenot in this volume show, happens
when ruling mechanisms of quantification and programmes of governing
(e.g. governing in the name of the market or efficiency) are subjected to
scrutiny, debate and critique, when forms of disruption are sought that
go beyond “gaming the numbers”, when numbers become attached to
dreams and schemes of doing things differently (Kurunmäki et al., 2016,
p. 400).
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Notes
1. This and the next two sections are based in part on Mennicken (2013,
2014).
2. See https://www.justice.gov.uk/about/hmps/contracted-out and
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/prison-population-statis
tics, accessed 19 June 2020.
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CHAPTER 11
The Shifting Legitimacies of Price
Measurements: Official Statistics
and the Quantification of Pwofitasyon
in the 2009 Social Struggle in Guadeloupe
Boris Samuel
The historic mobilization experienced by Guadeloupe in early 2009
resulted in a 44 day-long strike, whose watchword was the struggle
against the high costs of living and pwofitasyon. The social movement
denounced the opacity of the state’s regulation methods and of the
management of the main economic sectors, particularly in large-scale
retail. The strike was led by a group called LKP (Lyannaj Kont’ Pwofi-
tasyon—l’alliance contre la pwofitasyon), which used numbers as a weapon
to analyse, claim and negotiate. Pwofitasyon is a creole word which
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gained prominence at the time of the 2009 conflict. The LKP collec-
tive translated it into French by the expression outrageous exploitation
(“exploitation outrancière”). It means abusive economic exploitation,
with the connotation that this exploitation is rooted in both colonial and
capitalist relations. The Union générale des travailleurs guadeloupéens, a
leftist union had already used the term in social conflicts before, since
1997 at least (Ruffin, 2009). The identification of pwofitasyon always rests
on the same idea: players holding a dominant position in a given market
or in an economic activity capture an undue profit, resulting from the
existence of high sales prices. The denunciation of the pwofitasyon thus
makes the quantified (re)evaluation of the profit or the abusive margins a
passage not only possible, but also necessary.
In the case studied here, the fight against pwofitasyon resulted in a
multiplication of calculation work, which was at the very heart of the
2009 movement. The essential role of figures in the 2009 struggle was
not limited to the issue of price formation. The platform of protest put
forward by the LKP carried a broad set of measures aimed at the revalu-
ation of purchasing power. One of its central demands, for instance, was
the introduction of a wage bonus of 200 Euros for those on low incomes.
The negotiations consisted of a series of number battles around this
and other demands. The parties involved in these standoffs were public
institutions—the French National Institute for Statistics and Economic
Studies (INSEE); the General Directorate for Competition, Consumption
and Fraud Prevention (DGCCRF)1; the Inspectorate General of Finances
(IGF); the Court of Audit; and others—as well as non-state actors urging
the administrations to produce new quantitative analyses, audits and
figures, such as the unions and the LKP. This ability to propose new
frameworks for thinking about the economy, as well as new quantification
methods was one of the strongest points of the mobilization.
How far has the “statactivist” (Bruno et al., 2014) momentum of
the LKP and other non-state actors been capable of shifting the legiti-
mate price measurement methods and the social construction of the price
debate, and by what means? This is the question that this study addresses.
Based on empirical observations of the calculations used during and in the
wake of the movement, and analysing the conditions of their implemen-
tation as well as the discussions they triggered, this article will attempt to
assess the processes by which the new measures became legitimate.
The text is organized as follows: The first part will show that the 2009
social conflict involved a variety of actors, differing in their relations to
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calculation and also in the quantification methods they used. The strug-
gles with numbers lead to unequal outcomes, in which technical but also
relational resources determined the balance of power between the actors.
The second part will question the legitimacy of the new quantifications of
high costs of living appearing in the wake of the social crisis, at a time
when official price analysis and measurement studies were particularly
poor. It will compare the different quantification methods under discus-
sion during and after the negotiations: some estimates of abusive margins
proposed by the LKP, which, although effective to impose a public debate
on the pwofitasyon, were considered too simplistic to become legitimate;
a measurement of price differences between Guadeloupe and mainland
France undertaken by the INSEE, which did not sufficiently highlight
abusive profits to become visible and legitimate, although it was meant to
be a reference; and, finally, a practice widely used in official reports, the
press, or political speeches, which selected and displayed individual prices
in order to report, and denounce, the existence of abusive pricing prac-
tices. It is this latter utilization of figures which proved to be the most
efficient in the public space under consideration here.
The article illustrates the shifting legitimacies of price measurements
after the 2009 social conflict: the common and rigorous statistical
methods used by the INSEE created controversy, because they did not
display abusive prices with sufficient strength, while the innovative but
clumsy quantification practices of the LKP led public actors to adopt new
ways to account for pricing practices and for the price level gaps with
mainland France.
The Quantification of Pwofitasyon
in the 2009 Battles for Power
Quantification as a Mode of Action for a Variety of Players
The first protests leading to the January and February 2009 general
strikes were triggered by an unexplained rise in fuel prices. In the French
overseas départements, unlike as in the rest of France, fuel prices were
administered and they were fixed via a “formula”,2 which was periodically
revised, taking into account a variety of parameters, such as freight and
employment costs, profit margins granted to the operators, international
prices, or the USD exchange rate (according to Decree 2003–1241 of 23
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December 2003) (see Bolliet et al., 2009, pp. 8–9) (Autorité de la concur-
rence, 2009a, pp. 4–5). The “formula” used for the price calculation was
deemed to guarantee an equitable regulation of the sector, but in prac-
tice criticisms of the industry’s lack of transparency and its abusive pricing
mechanisms had become stronger and stronger in the years preceding the
conflict.
In 2005, an association of fishermen—the Association of Sea Fish-
ermen of North Basse-Terre—complained that the tax free price paid by
their profession had unexplainably increased by 70% between 2003 and
2005, while the all-inclusive prices had progressed much less (Gircour
& Rey, 2010, p. 86). Facing the impossibility of understanding the
price determination mechanisms (Les pêcheurs exigent de la transparence,
newspaper article in France-Antilles Guadeloupe, 18 August 2006), their
criticism targeted the regulation techniques employed by the DGCCRF.
Here, the “formula” was debated for the first time outside of the admin-
istration. Then, in 2007, one of the major wholesale importers of the
island, Didier Payen,3 went on a crusade against fuel supply policies and
price-setting mechanisms in Guadeloupe. In a detailed study, not dissim-
ilar to what an audit firm could have supplied, he showed that cost differ-
entials were, at least to a large extent, due to the supply policy in place for
over 40 years—a policy favouring local refining and granting a monopoly
for importing and refining to a private company (the Société Anonyme
de Raffinerie des Antilles, SARA)4 (Payen, 2009, p. 33). Furthermore, he
showed that the calculation of pump prices contained various obvious and
unjustifiable irregularities, such as the double-counting of certain taxes
(as for instance in the case of the accounting for the tax on used oils)
(Payen, 2009, p. 29). Although his work gave rise to discussions among
the island’s economic and administrative actors in 2007 and 2008—the
report was even endorsed by the Regional Economic and Social Council
of which Didier Payen was a member—his intervention did not alter the
methods used by the DDCCRF (regional outpost of the French General
Directorate for Competition, Consumption and Fraud Prevention, the
DGCCRF, in Guadeloupe), which continued to apply the same “formula”
to set prices.
The social movement against pwofityason examined here arose in this
context. In the first half of 2008, international oil prices rose sky high,
before starting to decline in July. Yet, as the months went by, pump prices
continued to rise in the various French Overseas departments. The peak
was reached on 1 October 2008.5 A collective of entrepreneurs whose
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activities were hard hit by the increase, was the first to protest against
this unbearable situation: it called for a strike in November 2008 and set
up the first roadblocks in December. From the outset, Yves Jégo, Secre-
tary of State for Overseas territories, showed himself to be receptive to
the protest movement’s messages. He, too, was somewhat suspicious of
the administration’s way of regulating the oil sector, which he considered
opaque and potentially collusive (Jégo, 2009, p. 89).
In December 2008, the Inspection Générale des Finances (Inspec-
torate General of Finances, IGF) was asked to investigate the situation,
and the Competition Authority was seized in February 2009. Pending
the conclusions of these audits, the State adopted transitory measures,
applying an immediate 31 centimes reduction per litre for lead-free
petrol, and a 22 centimes reduction for diesel (Guadeloupe: An agree-
ment to reduce oil prices triggers the removal of the roadblocks, 2008).
To compensate SARA’s loss of income, the agreement reached with the
collective of entrepreneurs also provided for temporary State transfers
to the company. Far from appeasing the social situation, the agreement
actually fuelled the conflict: The Lyannaj Kont’ Pwofitasyon (LKP), the
alliance against pwofitasyon, was set up on 5 December 2008 upon the
call of the Union Générale des Travailleurs de la Guadeloupe,6 the main
Guadeloupian trade union, which was completely opposed to the State’s
compensatory transfer to SARA. The very object of their anger were
precisely the profits made by the company, which they considered to be
illegitimate, i.e. pwofitasyon. Hence, it called for a general strike on 16
December, the day after the agreement was signed with the entrepreneurs
(Gircour & Rey, 2010, p. 97).
LKP’s accusations were incomprehensible to the administration, which
denied any fault. The “formula” may of course have been clumsy,
since price revisions were not frequent enough to guarantee a good
matching of prices at the pump with international market fluctuations.
However, according to the administration, no collusive or irregular prac-
tices occurred,7 and despite the existence of certain dysfunctionalities,
price regulations had mostly suffered from a lack of adequate consumer
information. The March 2009 General Inspectorate’s report confirmed
these assertions. But it also acknowledged that the complexity of the
“formula”, and its outdated character, had made fuel prices opaque and
vulnerable to calculation errors. The impact remained low, however: only
8 centimes were due to these errors, that is 5% of the price, and not 40%,
as asserted by Payen.
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LKP’s call for a strike was, however, the starting point of a wider
movement. The radical trade unions, UGTG (Union générale des
travailleurs guadeloupéens), CGTG (Centrale des travailleurs unis) and
CTU (Confédération générale des travailleurs de Guadeloupe), aspired
to start a general strike on a broad set of claims going well beyond
oil prices. Between December 2008 and January 2009, the collective
prepared a broad platform of protest comprising 165 points.8 The denun-
ciation of pwofitasyon and the issue of purchasing power formed the
platform’s base (Ruffin, 2009).9 The reasoning justifying the denunci-
ation of fuel prices was replicated in numerous sectors, considering that
prices were seen to hide abusive margins more generally: the LKP thus
drew attention to the possibility of abuses on the markets for “basic
necessity items”, such as transportation, water, rents, electricity, commu-
nications, etc. To address this situation, the collective demanded the
adoption of a variety of measures: the promotion of transparency, both in
the private sector and public services, for example through the conduct
of a programme of audits, or the creation of a “workers’ research office”
(Bureau d’études ouvrières, BEO) intended to help trade unions monitor
prices; the bolstering of purchasing power via a series of social transfers to
households (the symbolic claim being a bonus of e200 for all employees
below a certain level of salary, and other claims pertaining to an increase of
the social minima); interventions on price formation (the LKP demanded
for example a “significant reduction of all taxes and margins on basic
necessity products and on transportation” as well as the freeze of certain
prices, such as rents and fuel); the fight against the pre-eminence of the
importing companies and the promotion of Guadeloupian products.
What does the above teach us about the role of calculations and
figures in the formation of social and political relations in Guadeloupe?
Economic calculation played several roles here. The mobilization was
aimed at fighting against the social and economic relations which calcu-
lation had helped establish (for example, the determination of fuel prices
through the “formula” had immediate and daily consequences for the
entire region). Besides, various actors turned calculation into a weapon,
mobilizing their analytical capacity to denounce or even accuse the private
firms and public administration of abusive pricing practices. Lastly, calcu-
lation was used by administrative and political players who carried out
audits and controls in order to promote transparency and arbitrate the
conflict, making calculation also a mediation tool.
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Moreover, social actors stood out by their plural use of calculation and
differed in their position with respect to the handling of figures. For the
administration in charge of regulating the fuel sector, the handling of the
“formula” echoed a routine task of “government at a distance”. The inter-
views I conducted showed that the executives in charge were concerned
with professionalism and accuracy, while being subjected to strong pres-
sure by the economic actors. Since the existence of calculation errors was
somehow part of the routine in their eyes, they also demonstrated the
administration’s relative indifference towards citizens (Herzfeld, 1992;
Hibou, 2012, pp. 128–129). For some executives also, the handling of
the formula could possibly reflect the collusion with the operators of the
oil sector, who were seeking to draw maximum profits from the frame-
work established by the “formula”, but this could not be proven.10 Here,
different players used calculations and economic analysis to denounce the
arbitrariness and opacity of price management. Didier Payen decided to
undertake his own investigation of fuel price formation, making large use
of quantification and collecting information via his personal network. His
task was difficult: his report underlined how it had not been easy to obtain
relevant information‚ the administrations hardly being open to his inter-
rogations. Nevertheless, he belonged to an economic elite that had some
access to information and power circles and was also able to spread his
message. His report was even published by the regional Economic and
Social Council.
This was not the case for the fishermen, who a priori turned out to be
the victims of the calculation’s arbitrariness. By initiating an inquiry into
the “formula”, they seemed to fight David’s fight against Goliath, but
while facing the opacity of price determination, they finally obtained some
pieces of the puzzle of the fuel sector’s management. Central political and
administrative authorities could also act as counter-powers to the local
authorities: The State Secretary, and the supervisory bodies questioned
the way the figures were used, claimed their right to inspect and audit the
data, and reaffirmed their capacity to impose sanctions in cases of proven
circumvention of the rules. Finally, by demanding the end of pwofita-
syon and claiming the existence of abuses, the LKP’s relation to data was
two-sided: they expressed doubt and uncertainty as to the integrity of
the calculation methods and considered it was a sufficient reason to chal-
lenge the legitimacy of power practices, and to enter into a struggle with
the administrative authorities. Furthermore, later events of the movement
(see also the next section below) show that the collective used calculation
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as a weapon and an accusatory tool, even when it could not prove the
existence of abuses.
Thus, there are different styles of calculation, which are characterized
by varying capacities of actors to master calculation techniques, varying
access to information, varying relationships to the political authority and
different motivations in making the calculations.
These varying styles of calculation also reflect different historical trajec-
tories. Didier Payen, in particular, was not only interested in social
dialogue and defending his own entrepreneurial interests: he was a
member of MEDEF and acted in his capacity as a representative of heads
of businesses; he was also a notorious supporter of free market ideas.
He highlighted the virtues of free trade continuously, and disputed the
regulatory measures taken by the French authorities. His calculation tech-
niques expose this multi-layered social and political position, for example
he mixes the writing of pamphlets with the work of an audit. His approach
was not that of an auditing firm, as can be observed immediately from the
style of presentation: large characters, flashy colours to highlight the most
important findings and underline the denunciative tone. His approach was
reminiscent of the correspondence between chambers of commerce and
the administrative authorities during imperial times, when merchants and
settlers from the islands challenged state decisions in order to obtain free
marketing rights (Lemercier, 2008; Tarrade, 1972, pp. 224–285).
The LKP’s and unions’ calculation techniques also deserve to be ques-
tioned from a historical standpoint. The use of calculation and technicity
for purposes of activism must be considered in the light of the specific
history of unions in Guadeloupe, and of their relations towards the
administrations.11
The Role of Technicity and Expertise in the Negotiations
The struggle breaking out in January 2009 with the general strike showed
that LKP’s actions related in a variety of ways to state administrations
and to the logics of expertise. On the one hand, the collective’s skill
and capacity enabled it to negotiate with the State on its own ground,
in particular, because some of its members stemmed from the administra-
tion. The collective also had close links with most technical administrative
bodies, such as the INSEE, which could support the activists during
the negotiations with their expertise. Nevertheless, the negotiations were
also an unequal process, in which highly skilled negotiators from the
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State’s Overseas department cabinet in Paris succeeded in getting the
upper hand over LKP’s leaders, who did not have the same access to
economic information, and who did not enjoy the same calculative skills
when it came to the design and discussion of new public policy instru-
ments. Such observations ask for further investigation of the links that
these “statactivist” (Bruno et al., 2014) mobilizations maintain with state
administrations and expertise. Historically, both unions and employers’
organizations fought to impose their conceptions of quantification, and
they employed quantitative skill in their struggles; yet, they were also
often backed by statistical administrations (Stapleford, 2009; Touchelay,
2014; Volle, 1982). What kind of situation is reflected by the Guadelou-
pian case? What kinds of links between the LKP’s activist use of numbers
and administrative expertise can be uncovered in this instance?
Thanks to the protests, LKP quickly met with resounding success. After
the indefinite general strike which was launched on 20 January 2009, a
series of important demonstrations began (Calimia-Dinane, 2009). On
Saturday, 24 January, and Sunday, 25 January, over 10% of the island’s
population are said to have marched in the streets of Pointe-à-Pitre. The
Prefecture, impressed by these successes, agreed to enter negotiations. It
also took a decision for which it would later on be much blamed by the
State’s Overseas department: the Prefect agreed to a live television broad-
cast of the negotiations (Jégo, 2009, p. 54). The live broadcasting by
Canal 10, from 24 to 28 January, was an unprecedented event. Thanks
to their skills and mastery of the economic and social issues under discus-
sion, the LKP members stood up well to the Prefect and his administrative
directors. On each of the points up for negotiation, the administrative
directors—often coming from mainland France like most in the state
administration hierarchy, and in Guadeloupe for just a few years—faced
union members who had managed to build solid knowledge of the files
over many years. At that time in Guadeloupe, both among activists, the
administration, the negotiators and the press, the LKP was praised for its
skills, and placed on a pedestal, whereas the administration was allegedly
found to have been incapable and at fault. The course of the negotiations
confirmed LKP’s victory. The televised discussion was interrupted early,
on an order from Paris. Prefect Desforges read a message from the State
Secretary Yves Jégo denouncing the way the negotiation had been turned
into a “tribunal” (Jégo, 2009, p. 54). And Yves Jégo decided to come to
Guadeloupe in person to settle the matter.
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At the beginning of the strike, the movement thus succeeded in
gaining the upper hand over the state players by demonstrating its ability
to use “government tools”, such as administrative files and techniques
of economic calculation (Desrosières, 2008, p. 59). This evidences a
profound transformation of the modes of political action in the Départe-
ment. After the violent struggles that had occurred during the 1970s,
which included armed and terrorist action,12 since the 1990s, the left-
wing anti-establishment and separatist movements moved onto different
institutional ground (Daniel, 1997; Réno, 2001). Its leaders, many of
whom were born after Guadeloupe’s “Departmentalization”, got to know
(and to challenge) the state apparatus from the inside. The separatist
parties became very successful in local elections by asserting their manage-
ment abilities, while facing a political class seen as corrupt and unreliable.
This shift, however, remained limited to political parties only. The main
unions within LKP, such as UGTG and CGTG, continued to present
themselves as the legatees of the radicalism of past struggles. Continuing
to refer to the traumatic memory of the great repressions of the 1960s
and 1970s, such as the May 1967 episode, when police fired at crowds,
resulting in a number of victims, still kept secret to date by the French
State,13 these unions continued to use force and inflexibility as weapons,
sometimes even advocating resort to violence (Braflan-Trobo, 2007).
Yet, the use of such radical methods generated a deep division among
trade unions in present-day Guadeloupe. Major strikes had often resulted
in a divided society. In this respect, LKP’s approach marked a break. The
trade unions united with political parties and a number of associations
to form an unprecedented alliance (Bonilla, 2010; Bonniol, 2011, p. 92;
Chivallon, 2009; Gircour & Rey, 2010, p. 101; Larcher, 2009). The LKP
could take advantage of a generational renewal. By grouping officials
from different economic and social sectors, customs officers, company
executives, political leaders, academics, representatives of consumer
organizations, etc., it benefited from the arrival of union leaders who
came from the very heart of the bureaucratic and political system. Elie
Domota, head of LKP at the time, and originally from UGTG, the main
Guadeloupian autonomist union, was for example deputy director of
the ANPE in Guadeloupe. Alain Plaisir, the collective’s economist at the
time, was a customs officer with a thorough knowledge of economic
policies and the tax system. Thus, LKP was in a position to initiate
the struggle via the administrative field itself. It was comfortable with
the handling of figures and administrative data, presenting itself as the
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institutions’ interlocutor. In this respect, the movement can be seen as a
“XXIst century movement”.14
Nevertheless, only a few months after the mobilization, the initial
impressions of success started to fade. The idea that the LKP could play
on an equal footing with the public administration thanks to its skills
was contradicted by the observation that the movement—with its limited
means—was facing a dominating State apparatus. In many respects, the
fight was unequal. A closer look at one of the negotiations helps to get a
sense of the multiple factors shaping the power relations that developed
between by the LKP and the other parties around economic policies. The
negotiation of the wage agreement resulting in a e200 bonus for workers
earning less than 1.4 times of the SMIC (guaranteed minimum wage)
affords in particular a better understanding of the movement’s relation to
economic and statistical expertise.
The negotiation involved the State, the local authorities and the social
partners (trade unions and heads of businesses). It took place shortly after
the adoption of a new social system in France, called the “active solidarity
income” (Revenu de Solidarité Active, RSA), which provided a bonus to
all persons whose income was below the minimum wage. But this system
had not yet been applied outside mainland France, in spite of repeated
appeals from the overseas departments’ elected representatives (Le RSTA
moins avantageux que le RSA? Newspaper article, France-Antilles Guade-
loupe, 15 May 2009). The negotiation’s aim was to determine the overall
financial effort that could be made by each of the parties (region, regional
council, State and companies) in order to pay a bonus. The total amount
obtained would determine the salary threshold below which the bonus
could be paid, and therefore the number of beneficiaries. The first phase
in the negotiation had made it possible to find an agreement close to
the wishes of the LKP. Under the auspices of Yves Jégo, the MEDEF
accepted that the bonus would apply to all employees earning less than
1.6 of the SMIC (guaranteed minimum wage). But the State secretary was
disavowed by the government and the agreement was adjourned before it
could be sealed and signed, probably due to pressure from the lobbies of
heads of businesses in Paris (Jégo, 2009, p. 11). Because of this U-turn by
the government, the unions’ position became more extreme, and tough,
even clearly violent, methods propagated by certain radical fringes of the
LKP, such as Alex Lollia’s “GTL” (Groupe d’intervention des travailleurs
en lutte) (Gircour & Rey, 2010, p. 14), emerged at this point. Shops
were closed by force to comply with the general strike order; extremely
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tough road blocks took place, night-time violence, lootings of shopping
centres, clashes with police forces erupted, even causing the death of a
trade unionist, Jacques Bino, who was shot dead near a roadblock during
the night of 18–19 February (Gircour & Rey, 2010, p. 123).
In the midst of this tense situation, a team of negotiators was
dispatched from Paris by Matignon. The discussions turned into a tug
of war. The LKP refused to go beneath the threshold of 1.6 of the
SMIC (guaranteed minimum wage), which it considered had already been
obtained during the first negotiating phase. The other parties could not,
or did not wish to, finance the total sum. At this point, the discus-
sions placed calculations at the centre of an open conflict, and INSEE’s
(National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies) regional office
played an important part in the mediation. It lay the foundations for
the conduct of the discussions, by supplying all parties with the figures
required for the calculation of various scenarios, in particular figures
concerning employment and the distribution of income by branches.15
INSEE’s regional office was in direct contact with the negotiators,
often quite informally. On LKP’s side, Alain Plaisir, the collective’s
“economist” (and also Secretary General of the Centrale des Travailleurs
Unis, CTU) communicated with INSEE’s regional office, sometimes
directly from the negotiation’s backstage. The delegation of negotiators
could present its requests to the INSEE internally through the admin-
istrative channel, either directly or via the Prefecture’s services. The
negotiations were concluded on 26 February 2009 with an agreement
which was constructed on the basis of the calculations realized by the
statisticians.16 The negotiations were based on calculations simulating the
financial impact of a e200 bonus on a variety of economic branches, and
the collection of available information for this. Such work was of course
technical. But the statisticians’ work also contributed to the political medi-
ation of the conflict. INSEE’s regional department head was considered
by the Paris negotiators to be part of the state administration and, off the
record, he was an attendee of internal meetings held at the Prefecture.
Such an integration was quite unusual, since INSEE’s mandate of inde-
pendence would normally require that it remained distant to the work of
the Prefecture.
In parallel, a close link could also be established informally between the
LKP and the INSEE. The CTU’s union representative within INSEE, a
statistician himself, knew that he could count on his department chief’s
cooperation during the negotiation. Sometimes, the LKP and the INSEE
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would even discuss urgent matters by telephone. Thus, the social dialogue
relied on links that each party managed to establish with the INSEE,
which on the one hand assisted in elaborating measures of economic
policy based on quantitative data, and, on the other hand, sought to act
in a mediating capacity in the conduct of the social dialogue.
Despite the existence of such a political mediation through numbers,
the relations between the parties remained conflicted and unequal. The
events following the agreement show that the process carried numerous
uncertainties. The agreement turned out a posteriori to be much less
favourable to LKP than it had seemed to be at the outset, because the
collective had contented itself with too vague terms. In fact, the State
had merely redeployed funds that had already been budgeted for a similar
scheme, simply re-shaping old policy measures.17 The 1.4 SMIC limit also
created confusion as to whether the threshold amount was net or gross,
which made the agreement actually more restrictive than it had appeared.
As a result of the bonus, certain households passed into a higher tax
bracket, thus reducing the sum they were expected to receive overall (Le
RSTA moins avantageux que le RSA? Newspaper article, France-Antilles
Guadeloupe, 15 May 2009; Verdol, 2010, p. 63). Lastly, from the end
of the first year onwards, the system was no longer fully financed. It thus
turned out that the social negotiation had been less favourable to the
collective than it had seemed, in particular because the other negotia-
tors had been better armed than the LKP to deal with the files and the
evidence contained in them.
These different sequences show the multiple roles technicity and calcu-
lation played in the social dialogue and the struggle against the high
cost of living in Guadeloupe. In the negotiations examined above, the
LKP had indeed succeeded in imposing the establishment of new public
policies, even if the State services, initially taken by surprise, were able
to regain the upper hand. The collective showed that it was possible to
defy the State’s power on its own ground, and even to get the existing
policies shifting. But its activism was also subject to an unequal relation.
This raises the question whether or not, observing the ways in which
economic policies were formulated before and after the conflict, LKP’s
activism succeeded in creating a lasting change in the relations of power
in Guadeloupe.
350 B. SAMUEL
The Legitimacy of Price and Margin Measurements
Did the conflict modify the calculation of prices and quantification and
assessment of (high) living costs? Did the LKP succeed in making its voice
heard, by changing the socially accepted methods of measurement, in the
short and in the longer term? To answer these questions, this section
will examine the means by which the unions’ action and the social move-
ment legitimized, or de-legitimized, new price measures, as well as ways
of thinking about the question of high cost of living.
The Absence of Prices and Margin Measurements Before 2009
Prior to the 2009 crisis, the measurement of prices was in a paradox-
ical situation. In the French Overseas departments, the debate on price
formation was at the centre of attention and socio-political relations, and
the high level of prices was recurrently denounced. And yet the question
of price levels gave rise to very scarce economic analyses and statistical
follow-up efforts. One of the consequences of the 2009 movement is the
questioning of this status quo in which the price question remains outside
the scope of what can be discussed by public institutions.
When purchasing power became the centre of attention of Guade-
loupe’s boiling political scene in 2009, INSEE’s most recent studies on
the cost of living differential between mainland France and its Over-
seas departments (DOM) were surprisingly old. The last one dated back
to 1992, and the one before that to 1985. Such deficiency surprises,
because conducting such studies is theoretically required and constitutes a
core part of INSEE’s working programme. Once every ten years at least,
INSEE is supposed to establish a “geographical price comparison” for the
State to adapt a series of public policies towards the Overseas departments
(DOM): in particular, the level of the bonuses granted to civil servants to
make up for the cost of living gap (the famous “sur-remunerations”) and
other social transfers, such as the “territorial continuity” which subsidizes
transportation to mainland France. In other words, price differentials
between the different DOM and mainland France constitute key data for
the State, but when the contestation broke out in Guadeloupe, INSEE
had not measured them for a long time.
It is difficult to assess precisely why such a situation prevailed. The
debates following the adoption of the Euro in 2002 were for sure a part
of the explanation. The adoption of the Euro generated in particular very
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strong discontent in the Overseas departments (DOM). In the DOM,
and to a lesser extent in mainland France, the changeover to the Euro
was deemed to have entailed particularly heavy price increases, especially
in the large-scale retail sector. Such increases could not be formally proven
by existing surveys in Guadeloupe, but interviews with INSEE officials
confirmed that closer scrutiny of the price factors could have revealed and
confirmed these. INSEE’s official speech, however, buried these increases
inside an assessment of the general level of prices, which allegedly had
remained stable (INSEE, 2002). The lack of official statistical data became
the object of a public debate.
In La Réunion, where the price gap with mainland France reached
70% to 80% on many supermarket products at mid-decade (UCF/Que
choisir, 2004, 2005), the pressure exerted by elected representatives
and consumer groups sought to reinforce the establishment of better
price analysis structures. Thanks to the relentless fight of a communist
elected representative of La Réunion,18 the decision to create regional
price observatories in Overseas departments (DOM) had been adopted
in 2000. These observatories would bring together consumer associa-
tions, administrations, social partners, chambers of commerce, etc., under
the presidency of the Prefect. But until the controversy over purchasing
power grew on the island in 2004–2005, the resistance of state services
remained very intense (Sénat, 2005, p. 1725). According to witnesses
of the creation of the observatory, this reluctance could be linked to
the pressures exerted by the large-scale retail sector lobby (Le collectif
pour l’observatoire des prix: Dix mille signatures pour Baroin, newspaper
article, Le Quotidien de La Réunion et de L’Océan Indien, 5 September
2006). The implementation decrees were only adopted in 2007 (Doligé,
2009, p. 147).
In Guadeloupe, the price observatory held its first meetings in 2008,
and its activities were expanding when the conflict erupted. The observa-
tory intended to conduct a whole new series of analytical works, but at
least during the first years of its existence, it had not been able to produce
any important results (Favorinus, 2009).
The public authorities’ reluctance to (re)calculate and analyse prices
should also be understood in the light of the Overseas departments’
social history. The matter is explosive and had caused the periodic resur-
gence of historical disputes. One matter was particularly explosive in this
context: the 40% bonus (sur-rémunération) granted to civil servants in
Guadeloupe, which they managed to obtain in 1953 following a tough
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fight and a 65-day strike. At that time, only mainland civil servants
were granted such bonuses (similar to the compensations paid to the
civil servants accepting to work in the colonies), and even when Guade-
loupe had become a department in 1946, the native civil servants were
not entitled to this premium (Dumont, 2010, p. 170).19 Since then,
and although the level of the sur-rémunération should theoretically be
indexed to the observed level of prices (measured by the gap with the
mainland), discussions about the adjustment of the bonus were often very
risky, because they carried with them the nagging and conflictual ques-
tion of equal treatment within the Republic, which became effective only
recently (Burbank & Cooper, 2010; Forgeot & Celma, 2009; Mam Lam
Fouck, 2006).
In theory, the price gap observed in 2009 could no longer justify a 40%
bonus: INSEE’s studies of 1992 placed the synthetic indicator at around
12%. Since the beginning of the 1990s, there had been regularly calls for a
reform to reduce the sur-rémunérations (Doligé, 2009, p. 147; Fragonard
et al., 1999; Laffineur, 2003; Ripert, 1990), but these recommendations,
issued in Paris, never became effective, with the spectre of revolt appar-
ently still on everybody’s mind. In addition, the sur-rémunérations also
played an implicit redistributionary role in a situation of great poverty
prevailing in the Overseas departments (DOM: le Medef remet en cause la
sur-rémunération des fonctionnaires, newspaper article, Journal de l’ile de
la Réunion, 11 August 2010; Sur-rémunérations, des avis plus contrastés
à la Réunion, newspaper article, Journal de l’ile de la Réunion, 12 August
2010), all of which made it a very sensitive subject.
In La Réunion, the inopportune release of a price study resulted in
a very serious social unrest in 1997, as well as a “civil servants’ revolt”
(Conan, 1997). My interviews suggest that INSEE, by omitting to carry
out this task in Guadeloupe for almost twenty years, avoided taking up a
position on a question its officials felt was politically too sensitive. But in
doing so, it also took the risk of having to react under pressure by starting
a study at the very moment the debate would truly flare up.20 And this is
precisely what happened in 2009. To be exact, this position is in no way
indicative of the statistics policy in the French Antilles, which rather tends
to be maximalist, because there is a recognized need for more precise data
on the départements’ economies (Morel & Redor, 2008; Rivière, 2009;
Sénat, 2009). Nation-wide surveys are often over-sampled to ensure
their representativeness at the level of the département, and sophisticated
macro-economic aggregates (regional accounts) are compiled. All in all, it
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can be held that on the eve of the conflict, the absence of price data was
both the symptom of the conflictual nature of the matter in the public
sphere and the impact of the status quo on the politics of distribution
(symbolized by the pursuit of the sur-rémunération policy) which was
also an obstacle to frank reflections on price levels on the island.21
This observation also relates to the surveillance of margins and compe-
tition practices, in particular in the mass-market distribution sector. The
pricing practices of economic empires, such as those of Bernard Hayot
or Alain Huyghues-Despointes, both “békés” (Antillean Creole term to
describe a descendant of the early European, usually French, settlers in
the French Antilles) from Martinique, were at the very heart of the 2009
protests. Mass market and import fortunes were built in the West Indies
during the 1970s, with the help of state-sponsored policies. Coming from
the plantation economy, merchants and other entrepreneurs found in the
“catching-up” policies in place from the 1960s through to the 1980s
numerous opportunities to save their assets from the historic collapse of
the sugar-cane sector in the 1970s, in particular by taking advantage of
the public subsidies supposed to stimulate investment in the new markets
and sectors, such as tourism, or large-scale retail. These programmes
generated windfall effects, as well as misuses and excesses. The negative
consequences of these policies were discussed at length by the parlia-
ment (Jalabert, 2007, p. 75; Ripert, 1990).22 And yet, though recurrent
since the mid-1990s, the numerous calls for a serious re-evaluation of
the défiscalisation (tax exemption policies), which were a continuation of
the systems initiated in the 1960s, had never been successful. Recently
the French Court of Auditors (Cour des comptes) and the Economic and
Social Council (Conseil économique et social) took once again an interest
in the question, but their recommendations were not implemented either.
In the same vein, since the DGCCRF lacked human and logistic
resources, its agents undertook no serious study of competition struggles
on the Islands, although such studies would have revealed the dominant
position the main actors had managed to build in the large-scale retail
sector (Doligé, 2009, pp. 132–133).23
The tense status quo around economic policies extends to economic
analyses, measurements and evaluations of prices and margins, which
remained understudied until the end of the 2000s. The 2009 struggle,
with the massive general strike and the roadblocks which paralyzed the
Island’s economic activities for 44 days, got things moving. The social
conflict and the existence of LKP’s platform of protest forced the opening
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of a participatory debate, in particular through the organization of a large
multi-stakeholder consultation under the auspices of the State’s Overseas
department (les Etats généraux de l’Outre-mer, from March to July 2009)
which was followed by the establishment of an Interministerial Committee
for Overseas Departements (Comité Interministériel pour l’Outre-Mer). In
this context, the group working on price formation, purchase power issues
and large-scale retail issued a series of recommendations largely inspired
by LKP’s claims. The group was headed by a former chief of the Guade-
loupean regional office of the INSEE, Delile Diman Antenor, who was
also very respected by LKP members for being a former leftist activist.
The report produced under her guidance proposed the conduct of new
economic and statistical analyses, enabling the setting-up of a fully fledged
“transparency policy” in response to the social movement.
The particular measures provided in the agreement of the 4th of March
2009, which put an end to the general strike, included studies that were
to be undertaken by the INSEE, the DDCCRF, the Price and Income
Observatory, or workers’ associations, such as the “Bureau of Labour
Studies” (BEO) (see Protocole d’accord du 4 mars 2009). The “typical
shopping trolley” and the “household shopping basket”24 were meant
to permit price tracking (and adjustment) in the large-scale retail sector.
The spatial comparison of prices between mainland France and Guade-
loupe conducted by INSEE was intended to evaluate the price gaps. The
programme of competition audits to be undertaken by DDCCRF was
destined to shed light on the practices of certain strategic sectors. In
addition, a study of consumption patterns was to be launched, with the
aim of boosting local production. Furthermore, the creation of a regional
commission for economic and statistical information (CRIES) was consid-
ered (Diman-Antenor, 2009). These various studies were furthermore
slated to be submitted to the Price and Income Observatory (Observa-
toire des prix et revenus). At least on paper, the response to the problem
of purchasing power appeared to be ambitious and coherent.
However, studying the transformation of the ways in which prices were
managed by numbers requires to go beyond examining the presentation
of these plans on paper. The problem lies not so much in the questioning
of the effectiveness of the implementation of this “transparency policy”—
a large portion of the measures has been more or less implemented since
2009. It is about examining whether the price measurements gave way to
new social practices and formed a base for new measurement conventions,
which could be either seen as legitimate, or, on the contrary, as sparking
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debates and controversies. To examine these questions, the remainder of
this chapter will investigate how three different modes of price quan-
tification were used and put up for discussion. Firstly, the chapter will
analyse negotiations of “voluntary reductions” of the prices of the prod-
ucts considered as “necessities” (produits de première nécessité), where
LKP used very intuitive, but not very robust commercial margin esti-
mates. These calculations became quickly delegitimized for their lack of
precision, but they also helped improve the balance of power as they
generated a debate on what constitutes legitimate levels of prices and
margins. Secondly, the case of the spatial price comparison study carried
out by INSEE is considered which highlights how a sophisticated study,
evaluating the price gaps between Guadeloupe and mainland France, can
come to be very negatively received and held to be socially and politically
illegitimate, although such a study had been among the social movement’s
core demands. Lastly, by examining a diverse series of studies of prices
and margins, I will argue that new legitimate price-setting practices even-
tually emerged. However, neither the price index nor the average price
level measurements stood out as proper ways to address issues related to
high living costs; rather, extreme values, such as examples of individual
high prices, seemed to be better able to reflect the population’s feelings
of inequality and injustice in the face of abusive pricing practices. Here,
new quantification methods took root as legitimate ways to describe and
denounce such pricing practices.
The Quantification of Pwofitasyon: Innovation and Tests of Reality
The negotiations held to determine price reductions for the 100 products
knowns as “necessities” reveal LKP’s working methods, its approach to
obtain margin reductions and its use of figures.
The negotiations were held from March to May 2009 under the super-
vision of the Prefecture (Préfecture) and the DGCCRF, and they were
particularly tedious. One hundred product families were designated; a set
of products had to be selected for each of these families. The various
actors of the large-scale retail industry had successive discussions with the
LKP, from local minimarket chains, such as Huit à Huit, to the very large
Bernard Hayot Group. Every day discussions were held, from late after-
noon to four o’clock in the morning, over a period of approximately three
months.25
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The collective of the LKP intended to get the upper hand by showing
quantitative evidence (or at least what it held to be such evidence) of
the existence of pwofitasyon and of the necessity to lower prices and
margins. This was possible thanks to the series of calculations on prices
it had carried out prior to the negotiations.26 At that time, there was no
other available information on commercial margins in the large-scale retail
sector. No public institution could be blamed in this respect, since only a
detailed audit of the sector, or a competition audit could have produced
solid facts about profit margins, and such actions, though within the
DGCCRF’s competence, were not deemed necessary to be undertaken
on a regular basis at that point.27
The technique the LKP collective had adopted under the guidance of
its economist, Alain Plaisir, was rudimentary, but it made it possible to put
a figure on the table. LKP teams prepared listings of prices observed in
mainland France, using the Carrefour chain’s website; for each product, a
theoretical DOM price was then calculated by adding a fixed percentage
to the mainland price to account for the costs of transportation, taxes
and other logistics. The members of the collective considered that these
costs could be estimated by adding a lump sum of 10% to the initial
price. The resulting theoretical prices were then compared with the prices
that were actually observed in the island’s supermarkets; and the resulting
differences equipped the LKP with estimates of “illegitimate margins”
picked up as pwofitasyon by the companies.
LKP’s ambition was at least twofold. First, it sought to expose the
illegal profits, and, second, it used the figures in its price setting nego-
tiations. Each brand brought its own price records and negotiated item
by item. Armed with spreadsheets, the LKP thus cornered the large-scale
actors and obliged them to justify the level of their commercial margins
(see also Fig. 11.1, which provides an excerpt from the records that were
used by LKP in the negotiations). Obviously, the method the LKP applied
was very clumsy, and the obtained values were impossible to verify. Never-
theless, the figures reflected LKP’s mental representation of the price
formation, and they rested on the collective’s “expertise”. They were thus
considered significant enough to uncover misuses and force the concerned
players to admit their abusive pricing practices and to lower their prices.
The method worked. The negotiations led to a series of agreements
providing for price reductions on the 100 “necessities”. These agree-
ments were binding for the companies concerned and gave rise to
new control procedures. Announcements of price reductions had to be




1 Destrellan 2 Cora 3 Milenis
Prix Diff Ecart Prix Diff Ecart Prix Diff Ecart
LAIT CONCENT SUCRE NESTLE 397G 1,65 1,82 1,85 0,04 2% 1,89 0,08 4% 1,96 0,15 8%
LAIT NIDO 28% 400G 0 5,31 5,4 5,3
LAIT POUDRE LAICRAN 900G 6,9 7,59 8,05 0,46 6% 8,79 1,2 16% 7,99 0,4 5%
LAIT CROISSANCE CANDIA BRK 1L 1,85 2,04 1,59 -0,45 -22% 2,2 0,17 8% 1,85 -0,19 -9%
LAIT 1/2 ECREME VIVA CANDIA 1L 0,9 0,99 1,1 0,11 11% 1,35 0,36 36% 1,1 0,11 11%
GLORIA LCNS 3X410G 3,6 3,96 4,73 0,77 19% 4,59 0,63 16% 4,73 0,77 19%
LAIT PPX 1 L 0,59 0,65 0,79 0,14 22% 0,75 0,1 16% 0,8 0,15 23%
LAIT ECREME REGILAIT BTE 300G 1,88 2,07
ST HUBERT 41 250 G 1,9 2,09 2,19 0,1 5%
BEURRE PLAQUETTE BOCAGE 250GR
BEURRIER BRIDEL D/S 250G 2,05 2,26 2,36 0,11 5% 2,59 0,34 15% 2,35 0,1 4%
BEURRE DX 250G PRESIDENT 1,49 1,64 2,29 0,65 40% 2,65 1,01 62% 2,4 0,76 46%
BEURRE MOULE DEMI SEL U 1,55 1,71
BEURRE DOUX 250G MAITRE LAITIER 1,49 1,64
MARGARINE ASTRA 500G 1,4 1,54 2,37 0,83 54% 2,39 0,85 55% 2,35 0,81 53%
FRUIT D'OR VITALITE ALLEGE 250GRS 1,27 1,4 1,77 0,37 27% 1,79 0,39 28% 1,78 0,38 27%
MARG TOURNESOL ALLEG N°1 500G 0,76 0,84 1,15 0,31 38% 1,65 0,81 97%
MARGARINE à frire winny 1kg 1,95 2,15 3,33 1,19 55% 3,33 1,19 55%
S.EPA.4% UHT BRIDELIGHT 2 1,18 1,3
CREME EPAIS.LEG.E&V 33CL+15%MG 1,47 1,62 2,04 0,42 26% 2,05 0,43 27% 1,99 0,37 23%
YOPI CHOCO 4X100G 0,98 1,08 1,7 0,62 58% 1,7 0,62 58% 1,69 0,61 57%
BRIE ROITELET POINTE 200GR 1,75 1,93 2,48 0,56 29% 2,45 0,53 27% 2,59 0,67 35%
VACHE QUI RIT 8 PORTIONS 128G 1,35 1,49 1,58 0,095 6% 1,59 0,11 7% 1,59 0,11 7%
EMMENTAL RAPE 100G ENTREMONT 1,24 1,36
CAMEMBERT 45%MG 250GR BRIDEL 1,7 1,87 2,78 0,91 49% 3,19 1,32 71% 2,79 0,92 49%
EMMENTAL PLAQ PDT 220G 2,35 2,59 2,89 0,31 12%
EMMENTAL RAPE 3X70G +1 GT PRESIDENT 2,7 2,97 3,21 0,24 8% 3,25 0,28 9% 3,15 0,18 6%
Fig. 11.1 Excerpt of the chart used by the LKP during the negotiations of
the prices of the 100 “necessities” (Adapted from the original obtained by the
author with permission from Alain Plaisir/LKP)
displayed visibly in all stores. The DGCCRF was in charge of veri-
fying the enforcement of the agreement. It was also responsible for the
monthly publication of a survey on large-scale retail prices. The negotia-
tions thus led to actual results. However, at the same time, the LKP was
taking a big risk by employing such a simple method. This could easily
engender powerful resistance, as the figures could easily be invalidated.
Both actually occurred very quickly.
The “quantification” of pwofitasyon proposed by the LKP was rapidly
contested. Their use of numbers entailed certain weaknesses which came
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to be exposed in the course of the negotiations. Rather than proving the
high level of prices, the numbers were also used to constrain companies to
lower the prices.28 Although some of the negotiators had true expertise in
price formation, as for instance Alain Plaisir of the CTU union or Justina
Favorinus of the Consommation, Logement et Cadre de Vie association,
the negotiations revealed that LKP had missed some major components
of price formation in their calculations. LKP’s theoretical prices were thus
grossly underestimated, so that some firms came even to be obliged to sell
at a loss. According to members of the LKP, the unions became only in
the course of the negotiations aware of this and the fact that a major part
of the commercial margins escaped mass-distribution operators, and were
instead distributed to other actors, such as importers and wholesalers.
The important role of these actors had not been identified by the LKP
experts before. More generally, the sharing of “gross margins” among a
myriad of participants had never before been perceived by the analysts as a
major cause of high prices (Favorinus, 2009). For a while LKP considered
inviting these other actors—distributors, wholesalers, logistics and ware-
house operators—to the negotiation table as well. But this turned out to
be unfeasible, since this would have entailed more than 300 companies.29
Therefore, the negotiations on necessities had to be stopped in the face
of this obstacle.
In an apparent paradox, by undertaking efforts to quantify price differ-
ences and margins, the trade unions had made it possible for themselves
to better understand the formation of prices, but such better under-
standing made it in turn impossible for them to demand a significant
lowering of prices. LKP’s initial analysis of prices had proven inaccurate.
The pertinence of the notion of pwofitasyon, understood as the grab-
bing of commercial profit by a very limited number of actors, was also
seriously challenged. Nevertheless, the negotiations brought the quan-
tification of price formation to the centre stage of the public debate.30
From this standpoint, it cannot be considered that LKP did not succeed
in undermining the long lasting status quo around pricing practices.
An Expected but Socially and Politically Unacceptable Intervention
by Public Statistics
The case of the work known as “spatial price comparison” produced
by INSEE (Berthier et al., 2010) was the exact opposite of the situa-
tion described above. This study was supposed to be the highpoint of
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the “transparency policy” initiated in response to the social crisis. But
although the study managed to finally quantify the price gaps with main-
land France, thereby officially acknowledging the existence of such gaps,
it failed to become the “instrument of proof” it should have come to be
(Desrosières, 2008, p. 59). On the contrary, the study became an occasion
for heated exchanges and controversy among the actors of the conflict.
First of all, the INSEE study was published relatively late, in July 2010,
i.e. roughly sixteen months after the open conflict had ended. Its release
had been postponed after a debate that had ensued among INSEE’s
specialists, and for the reason of being able to use what was consid-
ered to be the best-suited, but also cumbersome method: the purchasing
power parity (PPP) method of comparison. A reference method used in
international organizations (for instance, the International Comparisons
Programme carried out under the auspices of the United Nations has
used it since the 1970s),31 PPP calculations mobilize expertise composed
both of national accounting and price statistics. The head of the regional
statistical office of Guadeloupe in particular had argued in favour of this
methodology. Yet, in the end, the investment was deemed too costly and
unwarranted in Paris, so preference was finally given to a much lighter
method based on the data that had already been collected for the price
indexes.
There were two good reasons behind opting for such a technique: first,
the existing databases used for the calculation of price indexes immedi-
ately allowed for this type of analysis, no additional data collection was
required; second, the method appeared completely natural and clear to
the price statisticians in charge of the study, who, however, were not
really at ease with the complex analyses of purchasing power parities.
The choice was thus apparently technically driven, marking the reluctance
of price statisticians to engage with a methodology perceived to be too
complex, and involving national accounting approaches they could not
master. This “technically” driven choice had however substantial conse-
quences on the public reception of the study. The applied method was
less suited to address the purchasing power question, and thus was also
far from adequate to address the societal demands for more accurate data
on price differentials.
The study compared the value of a basket of representative consumer
goods observed in the DOM to what exactly would be the price of this
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same basket in mainland France; conversely, it compared a typical main-
land basket to what its price would be in the DOM; and then, in a last
step, it determined an average.
The applied method can be considered problematic for a balanced
understanding of the purchasing power issue for several reasons. For
example, nobody drinks whisky in the West Indies, and conversely,
few people in France eat yam. The comparisons outlined above fail
to adequately consider such (cultural) differences between consumption
patterns, and are in the end not very accurate with regard to reflecting
people’s behaviours and preferences. In addition, the results are not very
legible to the unversed: the final, synthetic gap indicator is computed with
the help of a complex methodology (resulting in a geometric average,
based on Fisher’s law), which is not easily understandable (see also Table
11.1).
A further factor complicated the public reception of the “spatial price
comparison”. The synthetic indicator put forward by the statisticians in



















Martinique 16.9 −2.9 9.7
Guadeloupe 14.8 −2.2 8.3
French Guiana 19.6 −6.4 13.0
La Reunion 12.4 −0.4 6.2
Translated by the author from Berthier, J. P., Lhéritier, J. L., & Petit, G. (2010). Comparaison des
prix entre les DOM et la métropole en 2010. INSEE Première, n°1304. Paris: INSEE
Price differences between overseas departments (DOM) and mainland France in March 2010
Explanation: Taking the mainland consumer basket as a reference, prices in Martinique were on
average 16.9% higher than in mainland France. Taking Martinique’s representative consumer basket
as a reference, prices in mainland France were 2.9% lower than in Martinique on average. Fisher’s
difference indicator, a geometric average of the two differences, shows that prices were overall 9.7%
higher in Martinique than in mainland France. Coverage: Household consumption except fuel oil,
town gas and rail transport
Source Spatial price comparison survey, INSEE
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the study amounted to about fifteen percent, to be precise 14.8%. Esti-
mating the price gap with mainland France at such a level could obviously
create misunderstanding in Guadeloupe given that differences exceeding
50% had been so far mentioned in all studies that were based on the
observation of supermarket shelf prices, in particular concerning many of
the most common imported goods, such as food and household prod-
ucts. Representations of high living costs and pwofitasyon were thus based
on estimated differences of 50% or more. The INSEE figure did not
contradict these estimates, as it was based on a sample of different prices,
including prices for which the difference was much smaller or even nega-
tive, such as rental prices, insurance premiums, etc., which explains the
lower value of their indicator.
But the difference calculated by the INSEE was not socially acceptable,
because it was not in line with the commonly shared representation of the
“high level” of abuse existing on the island. Besides, claiming that there is
a 15% price differential could also pave the way for a possible questioning
of the 40% bonuses (the sur-rémunérations) granted to civil servants. We
have seen before how politically sensitive these are. When INSEE’s study
was published in the summer of 2010, the spatial price comparison failed
to settle the debate. Instead, it led to the creation of more controversy.
Among other things, the publication of the study was undermined by
an untimely intervention of the Prefecture. INSEE’s regional office had
planned a press conference to accompany the release of the study in order
to be able to publicly explain the results and guide interpretations to be
attributed to the figures, to highlight what conclusions could (and could
not) be drawn from the study. For example, they wanted to stress the
considerably large increase of food prices and the disturbing growth of
the synthetic gaps over the last ten years in this area—results which were
in line with the movement’s expectations. Yet, before the press confer-
ence could take place, the regional INSEE office was put under pressure
by the Prefecture and by Paris.32 The French Ministry in charge of over-
seas territories and the Prefecture did not want the results of the study
to get any media coverage as the public release of the results coincided
with the “unfreezing” of gasoline prices in July 2010. Thus the officials
were worried that, in this context, INSEE’s study might inflame matters
further.
This statistical work produced by the INSEE was thus one of the
salient points in the end-of-conflict agreement, but its publication went
completely unnoticed. It even spread dissent. In mid-August 2010, a
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controversy began to grow, opposing in particular the MEDEF, the
Regional council and the INSEE. The interventions drew a connection
between the price gap indicator of roughly 15% which INSEE had identi-
fied and the level of the civil servants’ over-remunerations, as if INSEE’s
study was linked to an alleged plan to question the over-remunerations,
which of course was not what had been intended (Bellance & Coste,
2010; DOM: le Medef remet en cause la sur-rémunération des fonction-
naires, newspaper article, Journal de l’ile de la Réunion, 11 August 2010;
Drella, 2010; Sur-rémunérations, des avis plus contrastés à la Réunion,
newspaper article, Journal de l’ile de la Réunion, 12 August 2010; Sur-
rémunération des fonctionnaires: les clés du débat, newspaper article,
France-Antilles Guadeloupe, 16 August 2010).
Victorin Lurel, President of the region at the time, even accused
INSEE of publishing studies “on the sly” in order to call into question the
social gains of past struggles. A multiplicity of reactions followed, some in
favour of, some against a questioning of over-remunerations, by associa-
tions, parties, newspapers, etc. (Erichot, 2010). Thus, the synthetic 15%
difference, although produced by expert statisticians, failed to be regarded
as a legitimate numerical representation of the department’s high cost
of living problems. Neither was it able to offer mediation in the social
conflict.
INSEE’s work had not been vain, though. Victorin Lurel himself,
who meanwhile had become a minister, used the study a few years later
as one of the pillars in his communications. He nonetheless noticeably
changed the interpretation of the results. This is how he presented his
draft economic regulation law for the overseas territories to the Senate in
2013:
Inside these territories, the prices of most goods and services remain much
higher than those of mainland France (a gap of 22% to 38.5% was measured
by INSEE in 2010 on food products alone). Yet, at the same time, wages
are notoriously lower there, with the median income below 38% [of that
of mainland France], again in 2010 according to INSEE. (Lurel, 2012)
He thus uses the study as the cornerstone of a new strategy of commu-
nication on price levels. I will show in the following that this strategy
succeeded in asserting itself by representing prices not through their
average values or an average index,33 but particular, extreme values,
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considered to be a fairer representation of the inequitable situation lived
by many Guadeloupians.
Towards a New Articulation of Prices and Margins
This last section will show how new legitimate quantifications of prices
and margins emerged in the wake of the social conflict. These quantifica-
tions did not consist of synthetic price indicators. To the contrary, these
new quantifications focused on the reporting and denunciation of indi-
vidual price abuses. Their emergence becomes particularly clear in a series
of studies and opinions which investigated the question of price abuses in
the months after the struggle had been resolved.
The Competition Authority’s Report published in September 2009
(Autorité de la concurrence, 2009b) identified a long list of likely viola-
tions of competition law in the large-scale retail and import sectors. The
report highlighted in particular suspicions of vertical anti-competitive
integration. Importers representing certain brands appeared to own some
of the main retail chains, opening the way to illegal exclusive arrange-
ments, thereby blocking price competition. Likewise, agreements between
local importers and mainland suppliers appeared to hinder new importers
from entering the market, obliging the retail chains to deal with the
brands’ local representatives.
The Competition Authority Report of 2009 further considered that
the difficult access to real estate on the island could act as a barrier to
entry, preventing new distributors from finding land to establish their
business. Conversely, local actors and descendants of old land-owning
families had an advantage. The Authority thus asserted in its commu-
nication from 8 September 2009 (Autorité de la concurrence, 2009b,
2009c):
In the DOM, the markets’ small size and their distance from the main
supply sources are natural obstacles to obtaining prices comparable to
those noted in mainland France. [...] However, these particularities do
not suffice to explain the price gaps on large consumption items between
mainland France and the DOM. Price data from a sample of around 75
imported goods collected in the four DOM show that differences exceed
55% for over 50% of the sampled goods, a percentage that is too high
to be explained solely by freight costs and dock dues (“octroi de mer”).
Above all, the Authority identifies several features of the supply chain
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in the DOM markets which enable the operators to partially escape the
competitive game. (Autorité de la concurrence, 2009c)
These conclusions delighted LKP’s members, in particular the most
leftist trade unionists. The report meant indeed that the official Authority
in charge of the most liberal economic regulations acknowledged the rele-
vance of their analyses of the Guadeloupian markets. This is how LKP’s
main economist commented on the report:
This report is truly devastating for the large-scale retail sector and for
the importers. It explains that pwofitasyon is very strong in this sector.
It explains that prices exceed those of mainland France by an average of
20 to 60%; some of them even by up to 100%. We had already said so,
but this time it is [officially] written, in contradiction with the statistics of
INSEE—another public body—according to whom the price differential is
a mere 10%. This time, thanks to our work, they are obliged to tell the
truth about the prices and about the margins, which are sometimes up to
100%. […] These are centuries-old colonial ties. [...] A manufacturer can
decide to grant exclusive rights to a company in Guadeloupe. [….] Thanks
to these ties both parties make profits. [...] Such practices are illegal, and
the report acknowledges it when it considers punishing anticompetitive
practices. (UGTG, 2009)
LKP members thus saw the report as a legitimation vehicle of their own
quantification methods aimed at attesting the existence of pwofitasyon.
Before the Competition Authority’s report had been published, a fact-
finding mission dispatched by the Senate during the movement had led to
the publication of another report in July 2009 (Doligé, 2009). In a long
passage titled “The crucial question of prices: A two-way solution, compe-
tition and, above all transparency” (Doligé, 2009, pp. 118–149), the
report calls for a clear analysis of price formation, to reveal the specific cost
items entailing high prices. It regrets that state services had not managed
to ensure price surveillance, neither INSEE nor DGCCRF. In addition,
the report supports the idea of the existence of predatory pricing (Doligé,
2009, pp. 121–123). To prove the existence of such pricing practices, it
presents a large amount of information on individual prices and economic
operators.
Regarding freight, for example, it denounces the monopoly held by
the French sea-freight giant CMA-CGM, as well as the excessive prices it
imposes on the market. To prove its assertions, it compares and contrasts
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cost figures presented by the Organization of French ship-owners with
other expert estimates. Its conclusions are definitive: the data provided by
the operators are shown to be false, and the report accuses the shipping
companies of being responsible for 5–15% of the final retail price of large
consumption goods (Doligé, 2009, pp. 141–143). In the same vein, the
report accuses Air France of charging too high tariffs, by comparing them
to other airlines’ tariffs. It also presents the oligopolistic structure of large-
scale retail by showing in a table which supermarket chain belongs to
which old family, thereby highlighting the inherited dominant positions
of the economic elites (Doligé, 2009, pp. 127, 129). In other words, the
Senate’s fact-finding mission took on the role of an informer, adopting a
“naming and shaming” logic in its presentation of price data. It adopted
its own methods to deal with the problem of price levels. In doing so, it
legitimized the movement’s position, and it endorsed LKP’s inferences.
The price surveys carried out by the mission highlighted that price
differences seemed totally random, thus excluding the possibility of
explaining them by systematic factors, such as increased supply costs. In
addition, the mission took account of individual cases to expose price
differentials, including minute details as the following (see also Table
11.2):
The price of ‘Nesquik’, an imported product, is considerably higher in the
DOM: 42% in La Réunion, 75% in Martinique (although the product was
on special offer there), 128% in Guadeloupe and 142% in Guyana. (Doligé,
2009, p. 126)
Thus, the report turned each price, as experienced by the consumers
in their everyday life, into an indication of the existence of abuse and
injustice, deserving to be discussed and publicly denounced in an official
document. Shortly before, price aggregates had been deemed liable for
the triggering of strong protests, and at least some considered it better
not to discuss those in public. But in 2009, it appeared that individual
prices could be considered meaningful events (Boltanski & Esquerre,
2017) proving the existence of unacceptable practices, and deserved to
be known by the public.
Many other instances of this way of quantifying and debating prices
and price differentials can be found after the 2009 conflict: for instance,
in press articles (Vachert, 2010), in studies by consumer associations,34
in surveys carried out by the LKP feeding the press (Témoignage, 2010),
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Table 11.2 Extract from the reported price differentials by the Senate’s fact-
finding Mission (Mission d’information parlementaire) from 2009
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4.20 3.22 3.15 3.20 1.46
(continued)
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Table 11.2 (continued)







10.66 12.07 12.37 11.50 6.07
Translated by the author from Doligé, E. (2009). Rapport d’information au nom de la mission
commune d’information sur la situation des départements d’outre-mer (p. 125). Paris: Editions du
Sénat
Extract from the price quotes reported by the Senate’s fact-finding Mission (prices in Euros)
etc., which suggests a real change in how prices and price differentials
were considered and quantified. This change is also confirmed by an
episode that stayed in everyone’s memory, because it caused hilarity on
the island: Yves Jégo, shortly after his arrival in Guadeloupe, was shocked
and started protesting against the “4 Euro toothbrushes”. Jégo, then
a minister of Overseas territories, suggested several concrete measures
to fight such abuses: in addition to a surveillance unit, it was planned
that a toll-free number would be installed for the receipt of instant
complaints from consumers noting abusive prices in supermarkets. In this,
his plans echoed LKP’s very Trotskyist proposal to create “price brigades”
charged with the enforcement of the agreements, which the collective had
submitted to the Prefect in the aftermath of the conflict.
Against this background, it becomes clearer why INSEE’s synthetic
price index, which was based on the calculation of averages for the entire
economy, was considered indistinct at the time, as it was not limited to
certain symbolically significant basic items (such as toothbrushes) in an
attempt to avoid any overstatement (Témoignage, 2010). Since then, we
can observe a shift in the representations of price gaps which the main-
land considered legitimate. Moral criteria were increasingly used to talk
about price levels, and the denunciation of individually high prices seen
as “abusive” became widely acceptable. In this context, magnitudes had
to be sufficiently high to be deemed acceptable and fit understandings of
unjust price differentials; for instance, “several tens” appeared to be in line
with representations of levels of abuse; and measurement was supposed
to get closer to control such abuses (i.e. prices came to be seen as some-
thing that must be controlled, audited and possibly denounced and acted
upon).
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Victorin Lurel, for example, as already shown above, used the INSEE
study several years after its publication, when he presented his draft law
for overseas economic regulation to the Senate. Here’s what the Minister
declared, following the passage cited above:
[…] we are not talking about relatively bearable differences of 10, 15 or
even 20%. No, we are talking about the chocolate powder all families in
mainland France and overseas put on their breakfast table, which can be
found at e 3.10 here in Paris, while it may be priced e 4.40 in La Réunion,
e 5.43 in Martinique, e 7.08 in Guadeloupe, and even e 7.50 in Guyana!
We are talking about four pots of plain yogurt, priced at e 1.15 in
mainland France, and never less than e 2.30 overseas. Here again, a 100%
difference for two identical everyday goods.
I could continue the list of examples, which may seem harmless and
trivial to you. But believe me, Ladies and Gentlemen of the Senate, they
are the testimony of the striking injustice our overseas fellow-citizens feel
and which can become a ferment for a feeling of abandonment. (Lurel,
2012)
Victorin Lurel clearly and explicitly expressed this new legitimate way
of articulating the price question. The draft law he then presented focused
on avoiding “inadmissible” practices: it affirmed the right to regulate basic
product prices, trade margins and to sanction abusive practices by using a
new tool, the “power of structural injunction” (Evrard, 2013). According
to this legislation, a firm appearing to have built a dominant position on
a given market could be forced to cede a part of its productive capital
(land, shops, machines) in order to make the market more competitive
(Venayre, 2015).
Conclusion
This chapter has studied the role of the measurement of prices and
commercial margins in the 2009 Guadeloupian social struggle against
high living costs. It first showed that calculation was central in the framing
of the mobilization (Cefaï & Trom, 2001). The State and some leading
economic actors (in particular large-scale retail and oil industry opera-
tors) used quantitative tools to manage or regulate prices. These practices
triggered revolt on the island, because they were considered opaque and
illegitimate by several political parties, unions and other associations. The
actors who led the strike, grouped in the LKP collective, used their
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own quantification and economic analysis techniques to identify abusive
pricing and margin-setting mechanisms, and to prove that pricing prac-
tices on the Island had enabled wealth extraction from Guadeloupian
consumers—a situation they referred to as pwofitasyon.
Calculation was also central throughout the struggle and in the ensuing
negotiations. This chapter described thus a “statactivist” (Bruno et al.,
2014) movement in action, showing that the use of quantification was
one of the best political weapons employed by the LKP collective. The
LKP succeeded in challenging the State and powerful economic actors on
their own ground by using quantified arguments. It showed that it was
possible to use economic numbers and arguments to get existing policies
shifting. INSEE attempted to play a mediating role in these negotiations.
However, at the same time, the chapter also showed that quantification
and calculation can end up being one’s Achilles heel—in this case LKP’s.
Although some members of the LKP were highly informed economic
experts, in the end, it was not possible for them to compete with the
State’s calculative skills and expertise on an equal basis, and their perti-
nent use of numbers could only establish temporarily a favourable balance
of power in the negotiations. This observation is important at a time when
prices are measured through ever more complex statistical techniques.
The possibilities to use quantification as an emancipatory device could
be shrinking with the greater complexity of statistical tools (Jany-Catrice,
2019; Touchelay, 2014). By making such a point, and by documenting
the use of numbers by trade unions, this chapter fills a gap in the literature
on quantification and on “statactivism”.
Finally, the chapter stressed the existence of multiple price level
measurement methods, and the shifting legitimacies associated with each
of them in the post-2009 Guadeloupian society. It showed that, although
scientifically legitimate, INSEE’s price indexes were subject to radical
political criticism by a range of actors. By using an average, these indexes
could indeed not account for the existence of the abusive prices that
were targeted by LKP’s mobilization. The high level of prices on some
widely used consumption items was indeed considered as a form of
political oppression, and INSEE’s publications nurtured controversies by
not singling them out: LKP actors, the press and Guadeloupian officials
accused the statistical office of making the existence of such price abuses
invisible.
Furthermore, the aggregate indexes displayed a price difference
between Guadeloupe and mainland France of 10–15%, a magnitude
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that was widely perceived as contradicting the everyday experience of
consumers, who, at least in some instances, experienced price gaps of
100% and more. The perceived illegitimacy of INSEE’s numbers shows
that there existed a different, generally accepted and naturalized, under-
standing of value in the Guadeloupian society at the time, based on
consumers’ experiences and on their imagination of what the price gap
had been (in this case around 40% at least, also corresponding to the
historical sur-rémunerations entitled to the civil servants in Guadeloupe).
After the 2009 struggle, the most legitimate quantifications of prices
and price differentials in Guadeloupe were thus of another sort: aban-
doning averages, these singled out abusive prices (or pricing practices),
either based on individual products or on groups of products. Since indi-
vidual experiences of commercial abuses appeared politically significant
(Boltanski & Esquerre, 2017), extreme prices were mentioned in many
press articles, political speeches and administrative documents in the after-
math of the conflict. Such a use of numbers made it possible to quantify
price differentials while meeting the social demand for a moral and polit-
ical denunciation of abusive commercial practices. Its large adoption by
administrations, journalists, political actors, activists and elected represen-
tatives strongly contrasts with the rejection that INSEE’s indexes had
generated. This new way of presenting prices in an official report (see
Lurel, 2012 above) generated satisfaction among LKP actors, and was
used in the years following the conflict by officials, such as the Overseas
Territories Minister, to display their political engagement for overseas citi-
zens. The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that this new way of
problematizing and representing prices can be considered a socially vali-
dated way to account for the existence of high prices, and a new legitimate
quantification of prices and price differentials after 2009.
Notes
1. In the remainder of the text, the acronym DDCCRF refers to its outpost
in Guadeloupe.
2. The term of “formula” is not used in official texts, which refer instead
to “price structures”. It was, however, a term generally employed by my
interlocutors in Guadeloupe.
3. Didier Payen is the chief executive of an import company, PHP Trading,
which holds the exclusive rights to import major brands (such as Danone,
British American Tobaccos, Johnson).
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4. The SARA has a monopoly for refining and supplying the market with
imported goods. The policy allowing for this monopoly dates back to the
choices made by General de Gaulle. Its principal aim was to ensure the
autonomy of supplies.
5. Data obtained by the author from DDCCRF.
6. The majority worker’s union in Guadeloupe, stemming from separatist
movements. In total, the LKP included 49 organizations (Gircour & Rey,
2010, p. 101; Verdol, 2010, pp. 23–26).
7. Interviews with administration officials; see also Bolliet et al. (2009,
pp. 12–13, 26).
8. To access the full platform of claims see http://ugtg.org/article_700.html
(last accessed 15 July 2019).
9. Pwofitasyon has been promoted by the UGTG since 1997.
10. My inquiries did not afford me the possibility to interview SARA
executives.
11. Such issues were also documented about France (Jany-Catrice, 2019;
Touchelay, 2015).
12. See the case of the GONG, Groupe d’organisation nationale de la
Guadeloupe.
13. According to certain counts, there were close to 80 dead, but the official
count states that only five people were killed. The event also resulted in a
political trial against 18 union leaders.
14. The expression “XXIst century movement” was taken from Julien Mérion,
political scientist. I interviewed him in Pointe-à-Pitre in November 2010.
15. Interviews conducted with trade union and administration officials in
Basse-Terre in 2009, and then again between August and November
2010.
16. The “Bino Agreement” was named after the union member killed on the
roadblocks during the night of 18 to 19 February 2009. It provided for
the payment of a e200 bonus to workers earning less than 1.4 times of
the SMIC (guaranteed minimum wage).
17. Yves Jégo also declared that it was a strategy elaborated by Raymond
Soubie, advisor to Nicolas Sarkozy at the time (Jégo, 2009, p. 121),
as well as several other persons close to the negotiations. Fred Reno
described this situation as a “triumph of the State” (Réno, 2012).
18. Elie Hoarau, in the context of the Loi d’orientation pour l’Outre-mer
(LOOM) adopted by the French government in 2000.
19. A feature of the newspaper Antilla, from La Réunion, makes the
connection between the 1953 and the 2009 sequels (Pied, 2010).
20. Interviews, conducted in March 2012.
21. Calculation possibilities are sometimes limited (Espeland, 1998; Maurer,
2007), but ignorance can also be deliberate (Henry, 2017; Hirschman,
2016).
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22. According to Jalabert (2007), debates on these matters occurred within
the National Assembly during the discussion of the 1973 Budget Law,
and also within the Commissariat général au plan in 1980.
23. Etienne Pfister, Vice General Rapporteur of the French Competition
Authority and Florent Venayre, University of French Polynesia, confirmed
this during a roundtable meeting at the French Agency for Overseas
Development’s Third Overseas Conference on 25 November 2011 in Paris.
24. The “typical shopping trolley” is designed to monitor the prices of 50
among the most consumed goods. It distinguishes in particular between
brand products, the lowest priced items, and distributor-brand prod-
ucts. The “household shopping basket” is composed of primary necessity
goods. Both are mentioned at the end of the conflict agreement.
25. Interviews with various parties present at the negotiations which I
conducted in Guadeloupe in August, October and November 2010.
26. My thanks go to Alain Plaisir, General Secretary of CTU, for the
information supplied on this matter.
27. The DGCCRF initiated a series of audits in the wake of the 4th of
March agreements, dealing with various sectors, such as distribution, fuel,
telecommunications or banks.
28. Interview with administration officials.
29. Interview, Basse-Terre, November 2010. Alain Plaisir mentions LKP’s
attempt to negotiate with the wholesalers at the end of May 2009 also in
Verdol (2010, p. 7).
30. See the report of the workshop on prices of the Etats Généraux, which
mobilized experts from the INSEE, the DDCCRF and customs to explain
that large-scale sector commercial margins and pwofitasyon were often
over-estimated.
31. PPP calculations use the expense aggregates and not only the price index
weights in order to examine consumption habits.
32. Interviews conducted in Guadeloupe in August 2010.
33. Various conceptions of price measurement led to fights (Neiburg, 2011;
Stapleford, 2009). For a theory on the measurement through indexes and
aggregates in economics see in particular Morgan (2012, p. 204) and
Boumans (2005).
34. For example, the “Consommation, Logement, Cadre de Vie” (CLCV) asso-
ciation, which takes an active part in the Price observatory, together with
several other associations, succeeded in setting up price monitoring via the
internet (Lerondeau, 2013).
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CHAPTER 12
“La donnée n’est pas un donné”: Statistics,
Quantification andDemocratic Choice
Robert Salais
This contribution focuses on the use of quantification in the new gover-
nance techniques that emerged for the most part in the 1980s, first in
the United States and Britain, before spreading to Europe and the rest
of the world under the auspices of international organizations such as
the World Bank, OECD or the European Union (OECD, 1994). In
this use, “quantification” refers to maximizing quantitative objectives to
be achieved through definition, implementation and supervision of poli-
cies, either by management rules in organizations and companies, or by
measures adopted in the context of public policy. Such techniques have
profoundly altered the practice and final purpose of quantification. Far
from underpinning statistical observation of reality, quantification is now
expected to serve political measures that are proposed, or already decided.
Quantification is expected, not only to test them, but is also enjoined
to demonstrate their efficiency over time or in comparison with other
policies. Its master concept is performance, which witnesses an inversion
of priority in the use of data in politics: not only aimed at measuring,
R. Salais (B)
Institutions et dynamiques historiques de l’économie et de la Socièté (IDHES),
École Normale Supérieure Paris-Saclay, Gif-sur-Yvette, France
© The Author(s) 2022
A. Mennicken and R. Salais (eds.), The New Politics of Numbers,




but, above all, performing. The historical connection of statistics with
implementing public policies (as described by Desrosières, 1998 [1993];
Hacking, 1990) is taken over by performance indicators that both orient
and evaluate outcomes, objective by objective.
Governance seeks to place effectiveness at the core of collective action,
whether in organizations or in government administrations. This effec-
tiveness is measured by performance indicators. These indicators pertain,
directly or indirectly, at resources and means granted, to results expected
from better management of the company or the administration. These
reforms are justified by the stated (and debatable) claim that “more” is
the equivalent of “better”. It is the role of quantification to show that this
is indeed the case, by internalizing this definition as a key step in reform.
The mainstream economy wholeheartedly applauds this targeted focus
on efficiency. It took time for practitioners of political science to become
aware of the issue, at least partially, especially for those not interested or
not familiar with data construction’s subtleties.1 The sociology of quan-
tification (in particular the branch derived from the sociology of science)
sees in this phenomenon a field of research related to its habitual domain,
with description of these new quantification instruments and practices,
particularly within states, and according to the nature of these states.
In this book, and elsewhere, one finds significant contributions to the
sociology of quantification in these areas.
Introduction: Towards
Governance-Driven Quantification
There is nonetheless something different, something more than the focus
on effectiveness; there is a sort of “revolution” of quantification, when it
is governance-driven. Three aspects emerge, which, we will see, challenge
democracy as a government procedure and collective practice.
First, the objectivity of figures is used as a political argument. Figures
do not lie. In itself a figure tells the truth of the moment on the question
at hand. This truth is of course approximate, because truth is beyond
our reach in this world. But this approximation is taken to vouch for
the seriousness of the figure, and of the arguments based on the figure.
Debate is developing mostly on the existence and amplitude of the margin
of error, and not on the political relevance of the figure produced (that
resides in the details of their modes of definition and calculation).
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Second, the qualitative complexity and diversity of social and histor-
ical processes are reduced to a few quantitative scales of appraisal. The
notions of equivalence and comparability, and a static perception, are
introduced as tools of analysis, whereas many phenomena are singular,
not commensurable to others, and are part of a dynamic group process.
Last but not least, the rational construction of data by the implanted
quantification processes tends to be formatted for proving that the policy
implemented is appropriate and successful. This capacity of self-producing
the politically expected data is one of the most significant innovations of
governance techniques, one that is surprising and hard to understand for
the non-specialists.
To apprehend this development we will take a long view of the social
history of quantification by looking at a specific example, that of its role
in the emergence and decline of unemployment as a social category. For
the effects of governance are not limited to quantification instruments.
By capillarity this governance—as an emerging phenomenon, rather than
as a rational project—gives birth to another political, social, financial and
economic world that alters the way governance sees itself, how it frames
and analyses problems, how it acts and evaluates its action.
By comparing the role of quantification (when it was known as statis-
tics) during the “invention” of the unemployment category, and then
during its decline, we can see what is different and what is new in today’s
governance-driven quantification. The core of the changing between the
two is the status and the role given to democracy and participation of
people, both in political and quantification processes.
In brief, the purpose of statistics is to build general knowledge
“extracted” from the plurality and variety of social conventions people
use in daily life to understand their world, to coordinate with others,
to pursue their aims and try to achieve their ends; and on its knowl-
edge basis to define policies apt to meet these conventions (see also
Desrosières, 2011). By fabricating cognitive proofs that things are going
the right normative way, governance-driven quantification becomes part
of the political process: producing knowledge becomes the oriented by-
product of politics. The purpose of governance-driven quantification is
to find ways to rationally transform social conventions towards some pre-
given political objective, judged by the Centre as optimal.2 So in this
case, as we will see below, such quantification could be best defined as
“inverted statistics”. In my view, the what-works approach that led to
evidence-based policies (see in particular Davies et al., 2000) has been
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the premise of such an orientation which, afterwards, has been developed
into technologies of management by performance.
The history of unemployment as a social category comprises two
periods, its rise, and its fall. Unemployment emerged in Europe, roughly
from 1880 to the 1950s, as a social category to be elaborated, measured
and targeted by public policies. At the same time, what was then called
statistical science, collective reflection and thinking about the instruments
and uses of statistics, emerged. After a period of stability, through the
1980s, this social category began to decline. For Europe, the progres-
sive relegation and probable future disappearance of this category as a
public social concern are the paradoxical fruit of the European Employ-
ment Strategy (EES). It is not that this disappearance is deliberately
intended, quite the contrary, the EES aims to increase employment
levels, by raising the employment rate in the population of working age.
Along with other factors (and the evolution of the labour market) it is
the result of a choice made by the European Union in the 1990s, to
monitor employment policy using performance-based governance tech-
niques. As employment policy remains the prerogative of states, the
European Commission invented a system of voluntary coordination of
national policies, called the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). It
has been extended at the European level to other social domains: social
inclusion, pensions, health/long-term care, and to the Broad Economic
Policy Guidelines (BEPG). The launching period 1997–2006 was crucial
in that the European institutions boosted collective learning by national
senior civil servants of the method and, more generally combined with
other influences, of New Public Management methods.
In the next section (Part I), we review how far producing and inter-
preting data rely upon institutional machineries and, often neglected,
upon the participation of inquired people. In the subsequent section
(Part II), lessons that can be drawn from the socio-historical invention
and deconstruction of the category “unemployment” for three Euro-
pean countries, France, Germany and the UK, will be discussed. The
turn from statistics to governance-driven quantification is illustrated by
the way European institutions deconstructed the category. The following
section (Part III) draws the implications for democracy from the turn
towards governance-driven quantification. It emphasizes the political
move towards “a-democracy”. The final section (Part IV) explores ways
by which social criticism can oppose this turn by taking on board justice
expectations into quantification processes and, in so doing, make way for
12 “LA DONNÉE N’EST PAS UN DONNÉ”: STATISTICS, QUANTIFICATION … 383
reintroducing democracy. To be just quantification must be correct and
fair is the message implicitly sent by Amartya Sen when he puts forward
his concept of informational basis of judgement in justice.
Producing and Interpreting
Data is a Collective Undertaking
Most often, if not always, quantitative data are taken at prima facie by
users. Data present themselves as evidence. For users data are “real”, or
tend towards a pure reflection of this “real”. Thanks to them collective
decisions are evaluated, undertaken and followed. Such beliefs neglect the
fact that data are produced and interpreted along a chain of several steps,
in specific configurations of actors in which statisticians or quantifiers
are involved with other actors, in deliberative arenas. Any data process
should be viewed from two sides: the institutional machinery organizing
the process on one side; and, on the other side, (very often neglected
or even forgotten) the people who, through their answers, are the object
and support of the searched data.
The institutional machinery could be directly that of the state, or that
of a firm or any collective organization requiring data. In this second case,
the state is indirectly present through public regulation and law. The main
components of the machinery are: the conception along which the state
is built; the questioning and its tools (organization of the questionnaire;
the type of inquiry and its methodology or administrative requirements in
case of data as by-products of administrations or management services);
the instructions for coding the answers; the production of statistical tables
(which requires nomenclatures, categories to classify answers and rules
to aggregate individual answers in order to put every person into one
case and only one). All these components play their role along a chain
of production with many steps; each of them open to several possible
technical options and to different interpretations; all managed by sets of
organizational rules.
As outcomes of this chain, users have at their disposal a wide statis-
tical material: variables, tables, correlations between variables, dispersion
figures, indicators, and so on. They can quietly assert, for instance, that
“the number of unemployed people is this”, “the rate of unemployment
is that”. In so doing, they neglect that the data they use have been
produced along a chain of production in which many not neutral tech-
nical choices are to be made. They also neglect the second side of data,
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namely that their primary resource, like coal or iron, has been worked
out, is constituted of persons who have to answer or to be classified.
The beliefs about questioned people oscillate between two extremes.
In one extreme, they have no margin, except to provide the expected
right answer. They are viewed as passive resources or sites automatically
responding to some external stimulus, like in behavioural models of expe-
rience. At the other extreme, they are viewed as pure rational cheaters who
have to be severely controlled. These are both dire mistakes against which
quite nobody (be it politicians, technocrats, civil servants, economists and
statisticians) can be taken, at diverse degrees, as protected.
Firstly, such beliefs impede us to see what one could call “the demo-
cratic paradox” in our (until now) democratic societies. To understand
such a paradox, it is necessary to have, in data production, a wider view of
“democratization” than usual in politics. The first step is to be aware that
asking people to respond to questionnaires basically means that, “some-
where”, their answer has some intrinsic value and should be collected as
such. Not as pure and transparent carriers of some pre-existing underlying
reality, the standard view, but as active interpreters bringing some prac-
tical experience and knowledge of enough value to be used in collective
choices. When collecting their world views and experience of the domain
at stake, persons become active mediators and go-between between the
supposed real and the data. Their experience has to be considered as
having a knowledge value. The second step is to take into account what
they have to say on them when defining categories and methodologies.
Secondly, data are built upon the “official understanding” of the inves-
tigated domain.3 However, depending on their situations of life and
work, their biography and life course, people have varied experiences with
regards to this domain. There are many personal or collective under-
standings of the same reality, each being a priori as effective and relevant
as the others. Sometimes the major part of these understandings could
differ from the “official understanding” which forms the basis of the
questioning. Basically, the intrinsic value of individual answers does not
depend on their good will to answer, or on their correctly answering in
the sense of adhering to the official meaning. This value is elsewhere, in
its potentiality to reveal distances between different understandings for
the same “object”, which leads us to the third point.
Thirdly, and not the least, such intrinsic value is in essence democratic.
For it has the capacity to put the spotlight on the distance (and to open a
window on its meaning) between the understanding a person has of her
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situation and the questioning incorporated in the questionnaire.4 These
distances or gaps between individuals and official understandings on the
same domain signal the existence of the plurality of possible relevant ques-
tionings (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1983; Thévenot, 1983). The official one
is one among others. No data, especially aggregated data, can be said to
be the truth, not only because they are deeply linked to the series of both
technical and political choices made along their chain of production, but
basically because among a range of possible choices, one path only has
been chosen.
One will see the huge impact of all these factors on the nature of data
produced in the three countries we will review below: France, Germany
and the UK.
Inventing and Deconstructing Unemployment
as a Category: The Role of Quantification
Almost at the same historical period (the turn of the twentieth century),
unemployment as a social category and as a procedure to count those
to be classified as unemployed was invented in the major European
countries: France, Germany and the UK. Such inventions lasted half a
century or more. The national processes and their outcomes were very
deeply anchored into national specificities. They brought to people and
their political communities new resources to understand “their” real, to
act within it, to form expectations and projects, to legitimate decisions,
disagreements and conflicts. Invention has followed the road of statis-
tics as we suggested in the introduction. Statisticians were involved in
diverse deliberative arenas, and were at the initiative to create both the
category and the methodology. Deconstruction is following the road of
governance-driven quantification (for a detailed demonstration see Salais,
2007). It disqualifies ancient and familiar resources that offered stable
anchors for people, without, until now, providing alternative types of
resources.
The Invention of Unemployment: Comparing France, Germany
and the UK
The “invention” of the category unemployment at the turn of the
twentieth century demonstrates how far data (categories, procedures,
numbers) are worked and re- worked all along the process by the actors,
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in a sort of joint production.5 There was a kind of double plurality
at work, the plurality of institutional machineries among national states
and within them, on one side, and the plurality of indigenous categories
among people on the other side. In each country, the data to be produced
had to meet a demand for information which was linked not only to
public policies but, above all, to their specific conceptions of collective
objectives and to the way the state should intervene for their achievement.
Formats, specifications, levels of collecting and using data, even the need
to collect or not, all will depend—for the same domain of observation—
on these state specificities, which were, and still are, very diverse among
countries and over time. States were more or less inclined to systematic
and general quantification, more or less open to democratization of data
production. They required different types of data and of their “produc-
tion system”. From the people’s side, there was another type of plurality,
one of the principles of justice considered as legitimate on which to build
the category.6 In the final two sections (Parts III and IV) we will connect
democratization and justice.
In France, whose state has been historically built along top-down,
systematic and central intervention through general categories, the
search for defining unemployment has been undertaken directly by elites
surrounding the central state administration. Lawyers and economists (at
that time trained into the same faculties), statisticians, economic and
social actors, members of the parliament, public officers, tried to have
their word, using their own knowledge and experience. They met in
different assemblies, circles and savant societies (Didry, 2002). In the
1890s, the state created a special institution, named “Office du travail”
which launched inquiries, monographs, collected professional advices to
have a clear understanding of the various work conventions especially with
regards to periods of no work (Luciani, 1992). All together were able to
define a general and practicable category of unemployment which was
incorporated into the census and administered to the whole population,
for the first time, in 1896. All French administrative levels were progres-
sively required to use the same category and to produce the same types of
statistics and tables at all administrative levels. However, the disparities in
the rates of unemployment among regions, professions or labour statuses
reveal durable traces of other conceptions, especially homeworkers and
independent workers, employees of local small firms, craft workers who
have their own conception of the primacy of individual, local or craft
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responsibility in social compensation or in job search organization (see
Salais et al., 1986, chapter 3).
In Germany, a federal state, such a national unification of the category
failed. There were already a series of local definitions and conventions,
depending on the professions, the unions and the towns. These defini-
tions were founded on specific principles of justice that led to various
principles to identify unemployed people: for instance, belonging to local
crafts; being citizen of the local town; being registered on local social help
bureaus (Zimmermann, 2001, pp. 126–138). Land statisticians, convoked
to Berlin, were unable to agree to a common definition. It is only in 1927
that some unification was achieved, thanks to the national social insurance
system which was eager to generalize insurance to unemployed situa-
tions. Yet, being centred on previous craft insurance systems, it tended
to exclude workers that did not belong to craft unions. A categorization
of the unemployed appeared for the first time only in the 1931 popu-
lation census. This was not renewed by the Nazi regime in the 1936
census. Beyond the failure to generalize, it shows that, except for the
Nazi period, Germany as a national entity is built along with a different
conception of the state, mostly that of one we call a “situated” state,7 a
concept we develop in Salais and Storper (1993, fourth part). Such a state
gives precedence to collective autonomy over national top-down interven-
tion. It tolerates diversity; the responsibility to define the common good
at stake and to take care of it can be left to various levels, especially the
Land, the city, the profession or the economic sector. Statistics can have
different frameworks and tables for the same domain, which leaves some
collective freedom to choose the relevant principle of justice for building
the data.
In the UK, the historical picture was also another one, a long and
uncertain battle between at least three conceptions of unemployment,
implying the state only indirectly, and of the assignation for responsi-
bility: poor laws, trade unions or the market. All these systems had their
own statistical categories and data which were not consistent with each
other. Poor law, the oldest system, was placed under the sovereignty of
the King, but managed at the very local level of the parishes; unem-
ployed people were not differentiated from the poor and treated as
such. Trade unions had their own system for their members. Unem-
ployed members were supported by friendly societies which did not
differentiate between the lack of work due to unemployment or strike;
both were financially helped (Phillips & Whiteside, 1985). At the turn
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of the twentieth century, social reformers (the most famous, among
many, being William Beveridge) were hostile to these systems. They
pleaded—with more or less success—in favour of the creation of labour
offices which could rationally construct a true national labour market.
Such a market not only should work as a perfect market, but have the
tasks to clear the market from the unemployable (sent to other social
policies) and to teach workers to be individually responsible for their
situation and their future (Mansfield, 1992). Regarding unemployment,
the UK has thus implemented contradictory conceptions of the state,
valid at certain levels and for some organizations, but not at others:
interventionist for constructing from the top the perfect market, but in
competition with local autonomy and professional diversity which would
have been best taken in charge by a “situated” state. Several principles of
justice are in competition to define and observe unemployment, presum-
ably in some unstable compromises even today, based on, respectively:
the deserving poor, the acknowledgement by peers, the morally regular
worker (Whiteside, 2014).
Governance-Driven Quantification as Inverted Statistics: Europe
and the Reversal of the Pyramid
However, a new actor appears on the field of employment in the 1990s:
Europe, its institutions and political frameworks (for a historical perspec-
tive on building Europe see Salais, 2013). It added complexity, more
uncertainty in the definition and observation of unemployment, and in
the meaning of data. Basically, it contributed to blurring the boundaries
within established categorizations and to deconstructing them. Especially,
short unworked periods are less and less considered as “unemployment”,
but as transitions—that have to be the shortest possible—between two
jobs or tasks. In practice for part of the population it corresponds to
precariousness, but precariousness is not recognized as a valuable category
of social policy and not counted as such (see Standing, 2014).
European institutions introduce new public management reforms
through a specific method, called the open method of coordination
(OMC). This method constitutes a fascinating illustration of the social
and political impact of quantification when internalized into governance
schemes. It reveals its basic specificities. We will pass in review five of
them: the reversal of the statistical pyramid; a new target for employ-
ment policies; statistical tables as driving forces; the set of indicators
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as embedded norms and guidelines as justificatory covers; a cooperative
game between rational actors.
The Reversal of the Statistical Pyramid
Governance-driven quantification operates a reversal of the pyramid
which, in classic statistics, links its large basis (the multiplicity of individual
experiences and the mobilization of their social knowledge of situations
and problems) to its top (the producing of aggregated data, via the
progressive reduction to numbers by aggregating individuals’ answers).
Governance-driven quantification puts the pyramid not on its basis, but
on its top. It starts from the top data (the quantitative global perfor-
mance) to be maximized at all costs whatever the means used to achieve
this objective. It tries, through a descending movement, to produce
the required basis of the pyramid able to generate the expected global
outcome. Quantification rules of measurement, organizational rules of
political schemes are adjusted in order to fabricate, if not individual
behaviours themselves, at least answers, or statistical treatments that fit
with the quantification objectives. The underlying utopia of quantification
and, as a consequence, of governance by numbers (see Miller & O’Leary,
1987; Miller, 1992; Supiot, 2015), is that social subjects are expected
to create by themselves a reality that complies with the objectives. They
would, eventually, spontaneously produce the required data. In general
these are only answers that, through several organizational means, at the
end begin to fit with maximizing the scores. Such utopia to make people
spontaneously creating an “optimal” social reality must not be confused
with the ordinary faking of statistical data, frequent on sensible domains
like unemployment statistics.
A New Target for Employment Policies
In the European employment policies promoted since the end of 1990s,
European Union authorities took the global rate of employment as one
of its major macroeconomic indicators.9 They substituted the search of
Keynesian full employment for the maximizing of the rate of employment
as their main target. In so doing, a “job” is no longer what it promised
to be in the model of full employment. In that model, any employment
guarantees minimum standards of remuneration, of security in the face
of unforeseeable events based upon social and economic rights. What
Europe now guarantees to its citizens was only to have a task, whatever it
could be and under the condition they accept it.
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In practice, to measure the national rate of employment, the Euro-
pean authorities recommended applying the definition that is used by the
ILO to build international statistics on employment: “Employed persons
consist of those persons who during the reference week did any work
for pay or profit for at least one hour, or were not working but had
jobs from which they were temporarily absent” (see, for instance, Euro-
pean Commission, 2006). Statistically speaking, applying this definition is
simply following the ILO definition.
But it takes on a very different meaning when it is translated into
political action. It means that, whatever the task is in terms of quality
(wage, working conditions, duration, type of labour contract), it can
be considered as employment if it lasts at least one hour a week. All
other characteristics were deemed irrelevant when creating employment
data. One should call this “the convention of employment without qual-
ity”. This convention is far from trivial. Employment without quality
is a task stripped of all legislative guarantees (in terms of recruitment,
protection against unfair dismissal, minimum starting wage) and social
provisions (social and economic rights). By removing quality features
when comparing and putting in competition their social systems by means
of such single quantitative scale, the Member States are encouraged to
water down the quality of their employment conventions in order to
improve their quantitative performance.
Statistical Tables as Driving Forces
One should pay attention to what is ordinarily taken for neutral, hence
unproblematic, that is the collection of statistical tables that, for each
yearly report, national administrations are required to fulfil in the areas
using the OMC. One must suspect that, to a large extent, these tables
are the driving forces “behind” the formalism, not only for data, but,
beyond, for political discourse (vocabulary and syntax). Tables also act as
rhetorical justifications of the normative background imbedded and for
most people dissimulated in data, especially in the selected indicators.
Contrary to the standard view, a table is not only a collection of figures
(one in each box, for instance, as in a double-entry table), some being
higher and others lower, from which one can directly draw conclusions
like “the female rate of employment in 2005 is higher in the UK than
in France”. A table is, above all, a procedure for aggregating individual
situations, for instance, relating to employment and the person’s position
in the labour market as built by nomenclatures. All situations compiled
12 “LA DONNÉE N’EST PAS UN DONNÉ”: STATISTICS, QUANTIFICATION … 391
in the table which are considered as identical with regards to these two
nomenclatures are placed in one box. They are considered as equiva-
lent according to the corresponding properties. In other terms, filling
a table by combining individual data requires conventions of equiva-
lence,10 which decide about what should be considered as similar. These
conventions ensure the passage from the particular to the general (what
Luc Boltanski & Laurent Thévenot (2006 [1991]) call the rising into
generality).
Generally speaking, conventions of equivalence are ignored or misun-
derstood by the ordinary users. From the above statement on female rates,
users will spontaneously conclude that “women work less in France than
in the United Kingdom”. But this conclusion is valid only if the legal,
statistical and social definitions of what should be considered as a “job”
are identical in the two countries. In practice, the UK is using a “softer”
definition of part-time work than France, which results in women who
work very few hours a week being considered as having a job and driving
them into such jobs. The situation is even reinforced with the invention
in the UK of the zero hour contract. Applicants are asked to stay avail-
able at home for whatever task and at whatever moment their employer
decides. They are considered as employed even with zero worked hours.
This helps maximize the rate of employment in which the UK is cham-
pion (which, as a counterpart, corresponds to one of the highest poverty
rates in Europe).
The Set of Indicators as Embedded Norms—Guidelines
as Justificatory Covers
Conventions of equivalence govern what we select, what we exclude
and what we construct. Thus, the requested description becomes not far
removed from a normative evaluation of the situation under review.
The basic issue with the Open Method of Coordination—and more
generally governance-driven quantification—is not immediate strategic
action, or neoliberal ideology11; it is about the cognitive conventions
that are selected to drive the political process. The selected set of indi-
cators frames the normative background of the political decision-making
process. It is neither malignity nor political cunning. It is the mere conse-
quence of the fact that any indicator selects what is worth to be known
or not and, in so doing, basically builds the reality that is relevant both
for the deliberative process preceding the decision and for the action to
be undertaken.
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The set of monitoring indicators selected by the European Employ-
ment Strategy (EES) focuses on the supply side of the labour market,
which is the work offer by the manpower. It expresses the norm that work
offer should be the highest, the most flexible and adaptable to economic
hazards as possible. Employability is the main concept. The higher it is
for an individual, the more he would have access to job opportunities.
At first glance, there is no problem here. But complete labour market
models emphasize a second concept at the same level of relevance, the
one of vulnerability to job losses. The more you are vulnerable to job loss,
the less you could access a stable job. So employability should go hand
in hand with job security (or at least stability) as objectives for employ-
ment policies. There is nothing like this in the EES. Furthermore, the
monitoring indicator for evaluating employability is the rate of return to
employment. The fastest it is, the best it is for the EES. But improving
employability is wider than increasing performance, for it has qualita-
tive aspects that, normally speaking, should be taken on board by public
policies, but are not.
Here appears the mismatch between the political rhetorical justification
one can see in the wording of guidelines, and the effective policies that
are driven by their monitoring of performance indicators. The search for
consistency between data and discourse is, in effect, part of the global drift
from politics to management. It tries to be achieved through the connec-
tion between quantitative monitoring indicators and guidelines that are
expressing the objectives corresponding to the different indicators. There
is a rather subtle, but essential shift of normative requirements from
guidelines to indicators. The formal normativity is provided by the guide-
line, the effective normativity by the indicators to maximize. One will
take the example of the EES guideline “Ensure inclusive labour markets”,
introduced in 2006 (European Commission, 2006). It asks the Member
States to develop “active and preventive measures including early identi-
fication of needs, job search assistance, guidance and training as part of
personalized action plans, provision of necessary social services to support
the inclusion of the furthest away from the labour market and contribute
to the eradication of poverty”. Such wording sounds perfect in ethical
terms.
But what does it mean in practice? The answer is provided by the
tool and its real use: the corresponding monitoring indicator, called
“New start” is calculated as being the “share of young/adults becoming
unemployed in month X, still unemployed in month X+6/12, and not
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having been offered a new start in the form of training, retraining, work
experience, a job or other employability measure” (see EES 2006 Guide-
line “Ensure inclusive labour markets”) (European Commission, 2006).
National implementation, aimed at increasing performance, puts incen-
tives and pressures on the unemployed to take any available task, whatever
it is and as soon as possible. The European definition of what to count
as a “job” is rather vague and extensive. It leaves room for free inter-
pretation at national level allowing for the inclusion of new schemes.
Maximizing such indicators cannot really improve inclusion in labour
markets: it mostly increases precariousness.
A Cooperative Game Between Rational Actors (the Member States
and the Commission)
It follows that the EES operates as if it was a cooperative game between
rational actors. Such a game sounds like this. Its mechanism is familiar to
economic theory. Take the Commission and the Member States as the
players. The aim of the game is to maximize the key indicators, those
intended to evaluate the policies being followed. Actors know in advance
the formatting of future evaluation of their actions. Insofar as any learning
outcome takes place, it is of a rational order and likely to affect the proce-
dure. Cooperation consists, for each Member State, in manipulating the
rules of its own measures and their implementation to meet the require-
ments of European indicators. In the cooperation, there are invisible but
known conventions between actors not to go beyond what each actor was
ready to accept. It is not a collective action aimed at genuinely improving
employment in Europe. Due to the limited competences given to the
European level, Member States are not held responsible for a substan-
tial improvement in European employment, nor do they feel themselves
accountable to such improvement when they define their employment
policy actions and coordinate with the others in the EES framework. The
only constraint is that they have agreed—and this commitment derives
from the management by objectives of the OMC—to be accountable vis-
à-vis the Commission with regard to their national scores over the whole
set of indicators.12
This whole process fabricated positive quantitative outcomes. The
global rate of employment (in the European definition) has risen between
1997 and 2005 for the three countries: +2.9 for France; +3.8 for
Germany and +2.1 for the UK. Table 12.1 tries to compare these results
with the evolution of a full-time equivalent rate of employment. It
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Table 12.1 Trends in the overall rate of employment (age 15–64), 1997–2005,
in France, Germany and the UK
1997 2004 2005
EUROSTAT employment rate (from Community Labour Force Surveys)
France 59.6 63.1 63.1
Germany 63.7 65.0 65.1
United Kingdom 69.9 71.6 71.7
OECD employment rate1 (from national accountings)
France 60.2 63.3 63.1
Germany 67.3 71.0 71.1
United Kingdom 70.2 72.3 72.3
Annual number of hours effectively worked by person2(from both Community
Labour Force Surveys and OECD)
France 1559 1531 1542
Germany 1537 1468 1464
United Kingdom 1697 1631 1635
OECD adjusted rate of employment (corrected from the evolution of hours worked by
person from 1997)
France 60.2 62.2 62.4
Germany 67.3 67.8 67.7
United Kingdom 70.2 69.5 69.6
Source Data collected and compiled by Odile Chagny (Centre d’Analyse Stratégique, Paris). This
information was kindly provided to the author
Notes
1Employment data is provided by OECD and is calculated per person and not per job. The source
of the population data is also the OECD. For Germany, OECD data is provided by the Institut
für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung and includes mini-jobs; the EUROSTAT data do not include
these jobs
2For 2004, the annual number of hours effectively worked comes from the table produced by
Bruyère et al. (2006). The trend has been interpolated from previous OECD series of the annual
number of hours worked
corrects the global rate of employment with the decrease of the annual
number of hours effectively worked by person between 1997 and 2005.
The difference between the two roughly estimates the impact of the
increase of short-term and precarious jobs, among them the subsidized
schemes of return to jobs (for instance the mini jobs in Germany): +0.7
for France; +3.4 for Germany and +2.7 for the UK. Beyond approxi-
mations, the impact is notable, more important in the countries already
engaged in the move like Germany and the UK, than in France which
at that time appeared reluctant. The computation made by a team of
12 “LA DONNÉE N’EST PAS UN DONNÉ”: STATISTICS, QUANTIFICATION … 395
researchers (Bruyère et al., 2006, pp. 363–370) was overwhelmingly diffi-
cult (in particular for hours effectively worked by a person). To my
knowledge, it seems that such an undertaking has not been renewed,
though it would be extremely relevant.
Just a (significant) anecdote to conclude this section: at its own
expense, the Belgian employment administration was worried to discover
the very low rank of Belgium among European countries in the national
benchmarking along the “New Start” indicator. The reason was not the
bad functioning of Belgian labour markets, but the Belgian definition of
inclusion. To be considered as included in the labour market, the job
found must have lasted at least two months. When this was not the
case, people remained classified as “unemployed”, which led to a higher
registered unemployment duration. The Belgian administration quickly
corrected this “mistake” by cancelling this constraint on employment
duration. Its quantitative performance improved at the satisfaction of all
European and national officers, except Belgian unemployed people who
were now compelled to accept any task as a job.13
Quantification: Contrasting Rational
Governance with Democratic Choice
Comparing the two phases of the history of unemployment (emergence,
deconstruction) offers some incidental views on the differences of demo-
cratic choice versus rational governance. In both cases quantification plays
a central role, though in very different ways.
Democracy and the Emergence of the Category “Unemployment”
Democratic choice does not consist simply in putting into place optimal
procedures for making a choice, or in asking an assembly, even a demo-
cratically elected one, to vote. What must be achieved is a free and
pluralistic process of public debate, taking the time to weigh all aspects
of the choice to be made, without rushing to come to a conclusion. In
such a debate, the establishment on the subject in hand of a knowledge
basis that should be collectively considered as just and fair is a key dimen-
sion, often underestimated. Just in the sense of not forgetting any relevant
information, fair in the sense of obeying some shared principle of justice.
It is thus, above all, a multifarious social and historical process, driven by
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many social forces, and not simply the construction of a rational choice
operated by the Centre.
Regardless of the country and specific forms that ensued, the “unem-
ployment” category, especially, emerged and developed itself roughly
between the 1880s and the 1950s. It was the occasion of a vast and long
public debate encompassing contrasting and opposing views, with peak
moments at certain points in time. In each country, in its own way, this
debate took place in different arenas (political, economic, social, intellec-
tual, statistical) propelled by organizations and their modes of expression
(reviews, scholarly societies, public events and demonstrations, etc.). The
debate was pursued at different levels and on different scales, in parallel,
or in coordinated fashion, within local and regional entities, sectoral,
professional and trade groups, and internationally. This process preceded
or accompanied the creation of legislation, regulations and institutions.
Most of the collective structures where at the time these debates took
place were hardly democratic, properly speaking, if “democratic” is taken
to mean that the bodies are duly elected and entrusted with a specific
mandate to debate issues and propose measures. They were rather the
result of a need for collective expression that arose at the time, whether
under an authoritarian regime like the German empire or regimes with
democratic leanings as in France and the United Kingdom, whether the
right of freedom of speech existed or not.
A democratic process of choice cannot be decreed from above, or
from outside. This process is often messy, not controlled, nor foreseeable.
However, as we said before, democracy is intimately linked with inquiry.
The answers people give to an inquiry have an intrinsic democratic value,
for they have the capacity to reveal gaps between citizens’ understandings
and official intentions for the domain under scrutiny. These gaps under-
score disagreements and the plurality of social experience of the same
reality, hence the possibility of several relevant questionings, other than
the official one. Both between countries and within them, these disagree-
ments emerged as to how to understand unemployment and to count the
unemployed.
Due to the plurality of relevant judgements on a given situation, the
most important moment in democratic choice processes is not the final
step, the decision, but the preceding phase, the reaching of an agreement
between actors on the “reality” of the situation, on what is at stake, and
on the relevant features to take into account when framing the decision to
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be made. So, a major democratic concern is to enable people and stake-
holders to reach, at least partially, an agreement on the pertinent reality
that matters for their choice; that is what Amartya Sen calls the infor-
mational basis for judgement in justice (IBJJ), as we will see in the final
section further below (Part IV).
Governance-Driven Quantification and “A-Democracy”
The deconstruction process undertaken by European authorities is in
contrast with what we might envision as elements of democratic choice in
the earlier process of invention of the “unemployment” category. The
big change is that, instead of being the fruit of long-term collective
debates implying a variety of actors at different levels, the informa-
tional bases that pilot the choices are now predetermined from the
top by the Centre without any serious deliberation; they incorporate
norms into quantification processes before discussion and choice. Such
bases orient the decisional processes towards some prefixed types of
political outcomes, the ones that the most “naturally” comply with the
embedded normativity of the data. These norms are mostly incorporated
into technicalities (definition of operational categories; rules of manage-
ment implementing political schemes; exploitation of the data produced,
and so on). Remember the political recourse by the European Commis-
sion to ILO statistical categories; and the set of indicators that offer biased
models of labour market functioning, or the subtle ambiguity between
guidelines and indicators.
Political parties and collective organizations become involved in discus-
sions whose questions, informational bases, and agenda have been
prefixed before, on which they have no grip (and often no true under-
standing of the stakes). Classical representative political democracy and
social democracy, too, are circumvented and their role weakened.
I will call “a-democracy” a political regime that maintains the formal
procedures of democracy, but impedes, not formal participation of citi-
zens and actors, but any palpable outcomes positive for them (meaning by
positive outcomes those that truly improve their situation). Several trends
progressively reinforce the efficacy of such a political regime, viewed from
the point of view of the political elite and professional politicians. We will
point out three aspects of such self-enforcing trends: creating cognitive
ambiguity; fabricating quantitative proofs and justifications; generating
difficulties to articulate alternative legitimate claims.
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Creating Cognitive Ambiguity
The “veil of ignorance”14 surrounding the statistical conventions used
to produce the figures creates a situation of cognitive ambiguity. This
ambiguity acts like a smokescreen, allowing the conventions adopted as
benchmarks for public policy to be changed without any awareness or
protest on the part of the public. For example, if the employment rate
goes up, ordinary citizens conclude that their chances of finding a job
(corresponding to their criteria for a good job) are going to improve. But
the European authorities may well—and in fact do—ascribe a different
meaning to the notion of employment, one that resonates with the labour
market deregulation policy they are pursuing, which obviously works
against the expectations of the ordinary citizen. Since it is difficult for
citizens, who have nothing but their individual and local experience to
test general categories, this situation may last. In a situation of cognitive
ambiguity, the task of the authorities consists in maintaining discursive
consistency between the established meaning and the new meaning they
assign to each category. Public administrations and politicians both are
incited to follow this opportunity to maintain such discursive continuity,
as it provides them with better justifications. Referring to Austin (1962)
(as mobilized by Bohman, 1996, p. 204), one could say that, while
employing the same discourse, the European Commission is acting to
modify all the possible worlds in which the language convention (“to
have a job”) is valid. Believing they have remained in the same world,
citizens looking for a job according to the established categories in their
world, are confronted by a world in which the same terms are interpreted
differently and refer to other actions.
Fabricating Proofs of Effectiveness and Efficiency
What is more, through its self-referential logic, this political method
produces justifications of its efficacy that are not only theoretical or discur-
sive but also quantitative. The change in the rules of public policies
(employment policies here) does not aim to improve actual social situ-
ations but to directly boost scores on performance indicators. The ratings
go up without any real improvement in social situations. In fact, those
situations may even deteriorate under the impact of standard, short-term
measures that cost little per beneficiary because they are designed to affect
as many people as possible. The management of public agencies—from
the national to the local level—is reorganized according to the logic of
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performance criteria (Salais, 2010). As a result, the data based on manage-
ment and on assessing operating rules show progress is being made. They
may even be used to demonstrate the veracity of the policy position. In
other words, even if it was not their initial goal, reforms tend to establish a
direct connection at every level between management and the production
of evidence—in other words, self-fulfilling justifications.
Generating Difficulties to Articulate Alternative Legitimate Claims
Creating an environment of procedures of information and of evaluation
adequate to predefined political goals (ultimately, a system self-producing
proofs) leads to growing difficulties to articulate legitimate alternative
claims. As figures and procedures are seen by most of the people as guar-
anteeing truth by their mere existence, they allow for the endorsing of
political credibility. Even if the public debate begins to be fed with such
fabricated data (without any professional or democratic control of their
process of production), which raise scepticism, it nevertheless means for
people that the “facts” are already there. As already existing evidence,
these “facts” format the public debate. So it becomes harder to set claims
which have not been the object, not only of cognitive elaboration but,
more deeply, of common knowledge. For to be heard, claims need to be
backed by other socially produced facts; facts that could constitute the
basis for shared understanding within the political community and can
successfully contest the “official” facts. Following Dewey (1927), such
understanding should not be purely intellectual, but also embedded into
the engagement of people into “publics”.
If not, the path for democratic expression is cut, even if, formally,
democracy remains. The social foundations for active political partic-
ipation and of citizenship would be undermined, the value of them
disappearing for a growing part of the population. By the same process,
quantifiers and their demanders are trapped in self-referential loops in
which data is taken as the right mirror of reality and, finally, as the
reality itself. So the “real” disappears below its quantitative representa-
tion which, being taken as the true real, becomes the basis for defining
and implementing management reforms and, more generally, public poli-
cies. But losing a grip on political and social reality is dangerous for the
political credibility and effective performance of policy makers and politi-
cians. A-democracy is the ultimate step of the diffusion of such political
methods.
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Such political trends call for alternative solutions that correct their
negative outcomes. What needs to be put in place to ensure pluralism?
What about those who are vulnerable (e.g. citizens with disabilities who
cannot easily articulate their opinion)? What should be the relationship
between lays and experts in such debates? How far should participation
go? How should deliberation be organized? And what are the pitfalls?
These questions are beyond the scope of this chapter, mostly because they
are waiting for a relevant effective political agenda that does not yet exist.
To be possible, it requires, above all, collective learning on the subtleties
of social processes of quantification. The first step, in our view, is to be
able to develop an approach to quantification that is open to the social
critique of its use in governance issues. This is the object of the next
section (Part IV).
Social Criticism, Justice and Plurality
of Quantification Regimes
The avenue taken by most of the social critics today is the Foucauldian
one, especially in English language literature. To quote only one, the
work of Wendy Brown (2015) is exemplar. Her book develops a radical
and implacable criticism of all aspects of the turn towards a new political
governance. At first glance one cannot be but in close agreement with her
title “undoing the demos” and her arguments. I discover at work in the
governance-driven processes of quantification what I call a-democracy,
that is the progressive remoteness of the demos from any effective partic-
ipation in collective choices. But is it the same as “undoing the demos”?
Brown’s subtitle, “Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution”, and her demon-
stration of the omnipresence and omnipotence of neoliberalism leave no
room for any collective reaction, or for any counteracting possibilities.
Why to exclude any possibility for the demos to survive and find issues?
I would like to suggest that our approach to analysis of the relationship
between quantification and democracy helps to clarify the point.
In our view, social criticism today must cope with a new element:
the emergence of political strategies whose effectiveness lies in acting
through the choice of “optimal” informational bases of judgement. Such
strategies are perverse, because they distort collective choices in favour
of the interests of the central power (and its supporters) at the detri-
ment of citizens and communities. The main worries are that citizens
and communities’ aspirations and needs are not correctly represented by
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the categories, methods of inquiry and data produced that construct the
informational bases used to pose and solve collective choice. Above (see
Part II), we became aware of such distortions in the case of employment
in Europe. European authorities modified the meaning of what should
be counted as employment, chose an informational basis centred on the
rate of employment and its maximization, all of this pushing the deregula-
tion of labour markets and job precariousness, without any public debate.
Evidence is that there is a denial of democracy, biased participation in
collective choice and social injustice (with regards to peoples’ aspirations).
Introducing Justice and Democracy
The only way to cut the Gordian knot is to introduce preoccupations
with social justice into quantification matters. In every collective choice
implying human activities, two objectives should be involved: economic
efficiency and social justice, and not only one, efficiency, as in rational
governance.15 These objectives should be considered to be at the same
level of importance. It follows that, in one way or another, people
submitted to quantification in some domain should be asked, or inquired,
or adequately represented by movements, associations, political parties
at the collective decision levels, on what they consider as social justice
for them. This is not a simple thing. We all know—because we experi-
ence such moments of feelings of justice or injustice—whether in given
circumstances or activities we are well treated or not by others (or by the
institution we are facing). But to jump from such personal evaluation to
a general principle of justice that would be agreed or accepted by all is
another matter. It, no more, no less, requires democracy, an effective one
in the making of collective choices. So justice and democracy cannot but
go hand in hand in quantification processes. As we have seen above (in
Part II), the historical emergence of unemployment statistics in France,
Germany and Great Britain reveals some presence of such requirements
of justice and democracy that have had unequal collective expressions due
to national specificities. Furthermore, in each country several principles of
justice competed with each other and had to search for compromise or, at
least, for some unstable coexistence at the national level as, in Britain for
instance, the deserving poor, the acknowledgement by peers, the morally
regular worker.
Remembering such past circumstances today does not mean that the
past was better in itself; all the more as social, economic, political realities
402 R. SALAIS
as well as the people themselves have changed. It nevertheless under-
lines—not a small thing—that true participation of people, taking into
account (to a varied extent) their say and experience of the domain object
of public policies, fortunately, is possible. These cannot be excluded. It
follows that it is no longer enough today to denounce the governance
distortions that are both unjust and non-democratic. One must produce
alternative data founded upon just and correct representations of situa-
tions and aspirations of people. A different quantification on the same
issue should be achieved, based upon another collective “understanding”
of the problem to be dealt with. Such quantification has to become legit-
imate in terms of both fairness and correctness of the data produced;
and these data are to be offered to public debate in all their dimensions.
Becoming objectively and politically legitimate is the necessary condition
to be accepted in the public debate and to be opposed to the “official”
basis promoted by the Centre. There is, at the same time, a need to
develop a collective social movement able to take charge of the process
and to oppose the Centre.
The “Informational Basis of Judgment in Justice” (IBJJ)
The only economist (and social philosopher) that I know for his deep
concern about social justice in quantification matters is Amartya Sen.
There are others, however, in my view Sen’s works are the most appealing
and enlightening ones for us to go further.
The crucial point in Amartya Sen’s approach lies in his emphasis on
the informational basis of judgement in justice (IBJJ), which determines
the content and methods of collective choice in a democracy. Sen main-
tains the need for an objective assessment of the state of persons (against
the dominant trend of purely ordinal rankings in theories of justice).
Sen’s accent on objective assessments connects his approach to quantifi-
cation issues. Sen introduces in these issues, as soon as human beings are
involved, the need to provide as grounds for agreement between people
(and for disagreement, as we shall see), tables and indicators that must be
just, in the twofold sense of objectively right and socially fair. If so, tables
and indicators will cover what, in a genial intuition, Sen calls “the factual
territory” over which considerations of justice would directly apply:
The informational basis of judgment identifies the information on which
the judgment is directly dependent – and no less important – asserts
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that the truth or falsehood of any other type of information cannot
directly influence the correctness of the judgment. The informational basis
of judgment of justice thus determines the factual territory over which
considerations of justice would directly apply. (Sen, 1990, p. 111)
This definition of an IBJJ has been introduced by Sen in the context
of a dispute with Rawls within the theoretical field of theories of justice.
I will just say a brief word on this debate. Sen argues that:
Interpersonal comparisons that must form a crucial part of the informa-
tional basis on justice cannot be provided by comparisons of holdings of
means to freedom (such as “primary goods”, “resources” or “incomes”).
In particular, interpersonal variations in conversion of primary goods into
freedom to achieve their life objectives introduces elements of arbitrari-
ness into the Rawlsian accounting of the respective advantage enjoyed
by different persons; this can be a source of unjustified inequality and
unfairness. (Sen, 1990, p. 112; italics in original)
It is worth noting that for Sen the freedom to achieve should be an
actual freedom, not simply a formal one. People should have access to
means calibrated to offer them true possibilities, though it is up to them
to realize these possibilities, or not. It implies that quantification objec-
tives and methods cannot be but defined in coherence with the objectives
and implementation rules of the corresponding policies (see also Salais,
2008).
One will not follow Sen in his debate with Rawls further. Their prin-
ciples of justice are ones among others. But we will insist on the tight
connections with our discussion on quantification. While it was not the
direct purpose of Sen, in practice he severely questions the concepts
of “fact” and of “objectivity” as usually understood and implied in
governance-driven quantification. Most often, the fact is reduced to the
status of evidence, something that is not contestable. For a given problem
in a given situation, there is only one valuable set of facts, those that pass
the test of evidence. No need for justice considerations. By contrast, Sen
demonstrates that to be truly objective, an informational basis—in other
terms a quantification—should satisfy criteria of fairness (like, in his case,
“the actual freedoms enjoyed by different persons–persons with possibly
different objectives—to lead different lives that they can have reasons to
live” (Sen, 1990, p. 112)). Thereby, in introducing the notion of factual
territory, Sen implies that for a given problem in a given situation, there
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can be several different factual territories, depending on the principles of
justice that are applied. It follows, first, that all these factual territories
are a priori valuable for posing the terms and purposes of a collective
choice on the issue at stake; second, that to evaluate how far the data
produced are right requires two things, that they have been produced
along rigorous methodologies (correctness) and, too, that judgement
and agreement (or at least satisfying compromises) have been achieved
between the involved persons and actors on the chosen principles of
justice (fairness).
Deliberative Inquiry as Data Processing
The fecund intuition of Sen regarding deliberation from the point of
view of social criticism is what is at stake is not prior deliberation over
which norm is the right one (a conception based on a hypothetical
ontological plurality of norms), but deliberation suited to an adequate
grasp of the social reality (a conception based on the observation of a
variety of situations from the point of factual territories of justice). Due
to the impossibility to objectively decide between ontological norms, an
approach in terms of plurality of norms falls into an endless “recon-
ciliation through the establishment of justificatory equivalences” in line
with Boltanski and Thévenot (2006 [1991]). In so doing, as Pellizzoni
rightly points out, social criticism becomes unable to pose any founda-
tional opposition. Especially, to return to our object of analysis, it would
fail to address the “regimes of truth” established by governance-driven
quantification. As we have seen above (in Part III), such regimes of truth
are precisely fabricated so that “even contesting parties are compelled to
accept [them] and to channel their dissent within specific boundaries and
on a specific plane” (Pellizoni, 2012, p. 10; see also Pellizoni & Ylönen,
2016; and the conception of deliverative inquiry in Bohman, 2004).
It follows that social criticism should give priority to building social
facts that, fairly and correctly, represent the territory of justice that the
community judges relevant to the collective objective under considera-
tion. Considering the variety of these territories for the same collective
objective, the search of the relevant levels to build these facts, the cogni-
tive categories to be used at these levels and the methodologies of
inquiry are open questions to be posed and solved. As the members of
the community possess the ultimate practical knowledge of the concrete
reality of situations, they themselves only can provide access to what
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remains inaccessible even to the smartest researcher or observer, the data
coming from their experience of the situation. Without their participa-
tion, it would be impossible to bring out—or to closely approach—the
complete internal and external relevant features of their “factual terri-
tory”. These data are not evidence reflecting reality; they are elaborated
by people through the prism of their own feelings on what is or is not
justice and injustice.
It means that access to such data is not only a question of inquiry in
the classical social sciences conception; it has to do with an “extraction”
from the people of intimate practical knowledge that they know without
knowing that they know it; which means that they should deliberate with
researchers all along in the process of inquiry. Such inquiry should be
defined as a deliberative inquiry. Its specificities are that its levels, cogni-
tive categories and methodologies, as well as its participants should be
“produced” along the processing of the data itself. There is no a priori
standard recipe, but something multifaceted (mobilizing people, reflexive
awareness, political and scientific) to invent collectively.16
Claiming for Another State
While those developing counter-quantification processes may be not fully
aware of their expectations, at the horizon of their action is the perspective
of another type of state. Let us return to the two sides of quantifica-
tion processes discussed in the first section (Part I), the “quantifiers” and
the “quantified”. Two correlated questions, political and methodological,
have to be addressed: the conception and legitimacy of the authorities
who lead the process of quantification (the “quantifiers”); and the nature
of the deliberative process that surrounds the quest for answers of quan-
tified people. In the context of a plurality of possible data buildings, what
one could call the cognitive moment appears more complex than the
simple technical administration of some questionnaire or pure imposition
from above. To what extent and how do the quantified have some voice
in the choices? How far should the cognitive moment be understood as
belonging to a deliberative process? These questions largely remain terra
incognita, and they require the possibility of a plurality of types of states.
We have already seen in above (see Part II) that the respective role of
expectations about state intervention versus collective autonomy differed
between France, Germany and the UK for the quantification of unem-
ployment and associated policies. France has the most interventionist
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top-down state, imposing the same rules to all levels. Germany is histor-
ically more open to collective autonomy and diversity at the lower levels
(Lander and cities for instance) and the UK is navigating in between.
European authorities adopted a French-type interventionist style when
they imposed the same panel of indicators to all countries for liberalizing
the labour market.
In Salais and Storper (1993, 1997),17 we tried to formalize several
types of state supported by different conventions between persons and
actors. Such conventions allowed us to understand historical examples.
Applying a conventions approach (see also Diaz-Bone, 2018; [2015];
Eymard-Duvernay, 1989; Lewis, 1969) means that these types of states
are realized, renewed and made stable through common expectations
between people and the authorities. They hold by the virtue of shared
beliefs that become deeply rooted in institutions. Such an approach helps
to define, at least,18 two types of quantification processes, depending on
the state that is object of mutual beliefs. It is worth noting that, if one
“partner” (quantified or quantifiers) moves towards another convention
of the state, political tensions and conflicts arise. A road is potentially open
to social criticism for claiming other public policies, provided it organizes
its counter-quantification around another convention of the state than the
one already implanted.
In the first convention of the state,19 evaluated people devolve to the
central authority the whole task of building the quantification process
(modalities, what and how to measure). One can imagine several ways to
legitimate such devolution: such tasks are accepted as technical, so no
need for voices to be expressed (the European conception again); or,
through their representatives, evaluated people are asked to indicate if
they agree with the choices made by the central authority. The applied
procedure is similar to the one which is used in standard representa-
tive democracy. But, for Europe at least, are we still in a democracy or
in a move towards what we call a-democracy? Such a convention seems
today being replaced by governance by numbers and a-democacy. In
such a regime of truth, objectivity is reduced to standardization (Porter,
1992).20 As we have asserted for Europe above (see Part II), in practice
evaluated people have no say on choices on the informational basis (the
set of indicators); they cannot be truly committed to take the evaluation
procedure as their practical benchmark. In a-democracy, such a question
becomes irrelevant, because the problem is no more to achieve an effective
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substantial evaluation, but only to betray current beliefs and representa-
tions by producing data apparently supporting them.21 In contrast to the
following second convention, there is no need for true deliberation in
a-democracy.
In the second convention,22 the authority and evaluated people choose
to build a part or the whole of the procedure together, including ques-
tions of what and how to measure issues. In practice, it requires that
both sides commit themselves to deliberative procedures, which are aimed
at achieving deliberate decisions. Such a conception of the state is for
us the most fitting for social criticism developing counter-quantification.
In contrast to strategic decisions obeying instrumental rationality, delib-
erate decisions are decisions that both sides have the effective intention
to afterwards apply. One will not go further, except to note the proxim-
ities with the concepts of subsidiarity23 and of deliberative democracy.24
People should have their say and be mobilized for imposing their views.
One cannot expect from central authorities that they spontaneously enter
into such a demanding coordination. In his works, John Dewey (1927)
has explored the political conditions making such frames of coordination
possible more in-depth. Dewey understands democracy as a collective
practice led by collective movements that struggle for creating what
Dewey calls publics. Publics are to be built along a process that progres-
sively gathers people together to defend a cause (a common good for
instance). But such a process is not political in its standard understanding.
Political movements mostly conceive such a process as based on ideolog-
ical or strategic arguments. For Dewey, it consists of a collective learning
process anchored in the collective search for the knowledge relevant
for implementing the cause at stake. It is, more or less, for people the
search for their “true” common world in our pragmatic meaning of the
concept. The ultimate stake for them remains not only to publicly oppose
their understandings and proposals to those of the authority they are
confronted with (which is necessary), but also basically to generate in their
community (also necessary) whatever it is, an openness towards concep-
tions, pragmatic compromises or agreements taking on board their true
common world.
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Conclusion: Implications for Research
on Quantification Processes
The development of governance-driven quantification processes creates
opportunities to have a fresh look at factors which previously were taken
for granted and not considered problematic. For they introduce to the
fields of research and social practice of quantification new concerns about
democracy, participation in collective choice, and social justice. The possi-
bility of a plurality of “data makings” for the same situation becomes now
visible, thanks to the different relationships of social cognitive practices
to politics. Where are their respective scientific and political legitimacies?
Should we consider the potentiality and even existence of a plurality of
quantification regimes? In line with Sen’s conception of informational
bases of judgement, introducing considerations of justice into quan-
tification processes should become relevant and, even more, necessary
for better efficiency. One knows how far the right coordinationbetween
people depends on their expectation to be fairly treated by others and by
institutional or regulatory frameworks that surround their activities. There
are several principles of being fairly treated, in other terms of justice. If
such an assumption of plurality is relevant, it would extend to the objec-
tivity of data. It also means that a regime of quantification can be validly
contested by another one; such contestation should be conceived as a
necessary component of any democracy. It opens the road to social crit-
icism based on the creation of alternative informational bases, all being
politically and scientifically relevant and legitimate.
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Notes
1. For instance, in his remarkable, internal and procedural analysis of the
OMC and its impact on national social policies, Zeitlin (2009) never
mentions the impact on quantification and evaluation.
2. In that respect, the USSR and the People’s Republic of China appeared as
pioneers in developing such utopia. See the contributions by Tong Lam
and Martine Mespoulet in this volume.
3. See below the subsequent section which discusses the domain called
“unemployment”. What does it mean to be “unemployed”? The official
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understanding today and everywhere make reference to the ILO defi-
nition: actively searching for a job; having no job; to be immediately
available to take a job. One will recall that, historically, and depending on
the country, to be unemployed was not clear and took time to be so for
people.
4. An example is, in France, the fact that, until the 1950s, female home-
workers, though knowing periods of no work each year, did not
produce in the population censuses answers allowing to classify them
as “unemployed”. Similarly urban craft workers did not register them as
unemployed at manpower bureaus, considering this as an insult to their
dignity.
5. Here we draw lessons from a series of researches, starting independently
from each other in the 1980s. See here in particular Phillips and White-
side (1985), Salais et al. (1986) (reprinted in 1999); Keyssar (1986),
Piore (1987), Luciani (1992), Mansfield (1992), Topalov (1994), Mans-
field et al. (1994), Whiteside (2007, 2014), Zimmermann (2001), Salais
(2011) and Latsis (2006).
6. As demonstrated by the example of craft workers who do not register in
unemployment bureaus, but have their own systems.
7. See also Storper and Salais (1997) and Salais (2015). One takes this
opportunity to rectify a misunderstanding in Thévenot’s contribution to
this volume (see note 15) who speaks of “some familiarity with orders
of worth”. The foundations for our worlds of production have not much
to do with those of orders of worth. They are centred on the product,
at the crossing of production and market, precisely two basic economic
principles (economies of scope vs economies of scale for the productive
organization; risk vs uncertainty for the market; and not on disputes).
Furthermore, the state is present as a specific convention with regards to
the common good. The only resemblance, is the use of pluralism, which
is a brand mark of the economics of convention since its beginning. We
already used it in Salais et al. (1986).
8. For one of his inventors see Telo (2002); see Kröger (2009) for to which
we intend to answer here.
9. As a statistician, my first surprise, even incredibility, was about what
the European Commission was doing with the European Employment
Strategy and the “abnormal” way it uses data and indicators (see Salais,
2004, 2006).
10. Alain Desrosières has posed and used this concept in his seminal book
(see Desrosières, 1998 [1993]; but see also Desrosières, 2008). Espeland
and Stevens (1998) speak of commensuration as the process that makes
objects and persons commensurate, i.e. reduced to the same quantitative
scale.
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11. Here I disagree with a radical Foucauldian interpretation, which is inclined
to see the paw of the monster Neoliberalism everywhere. See also the last
section of this chapter (Part IV).
12. This analysis can be found in Salais (2004) and in Salais (2006). It took
time for political scientists specialized in the European domain to under-
stand the complexities of the game. They took the EES as if it were a
purely political procedure, with virtual disregard for other factors (espe-
cially for the status and formats of numbers). Most of the studies have
focused on the wide range of actors for whose involvement the Euro-
pean texts contain provision and on the procedures laid down to organize
their complex interactions; this is the famous “multi-level governance”. In
the English literature, studies of such gaming and ranking can be found
in Bevan and Hood (2006), Hood et al. (2008) and Hood and Dixon
(2010).
13. Raveaud and Salais (2002) analysed all the problems connected to the
calculation of European Employment indicators. A more detailed draft is
available on request from the author.
14. To draw on Rawls’ famous concept, which is well suited for the issues
described here.
15. NPM defenders would also say that they are not only concerned with
efficiency, but also with effectiveness and outcomes, i.e. to what extent
performance meets the stated objectives of a policy, which can include
objectives of enhancing equality, fairness, etc. The problem, however, is
how such objectives are then made “governable”/measurable through
indicators that are quite removed from the original goals (as we have
shown before for the example of unemployment in the EU).
16. A wonderful illustration of this can be found in the contribution of Boris
Samuel to this volume. See also the experiment led by Stavo-Debauge and
Trom (2004) and the literature on statactivism (Bruno et al., 2014).
17. See Salais and Storper (1993, pp. 326–346) and Storper and Salais (1997,
pp. 207–223). For further developments see Salais (2015).
18. In practice, we define four conventions of the state (see Salais & Storper,
1993; Storper & Salais, 1997).
19. This conception corresponds to the convention of the external state.
20. For a powerful critique of the current conception of objectivity see Sen
(1993).
21. Michael Power (1997) developed the same conjecture for audits, namely
that they mostly support current beliefs.
22. Which corresponds to the conventions of the situated state.
23. The best presentation I know for the concept of subsidiarity is Millon-
Delsol’s (1992), unfortunately in French. She established that the Euro-
pean authorities confuse subsidiarity with decentralization. For more detail
see Salais (2015).
12 “LA DONNÉE N’EST PAS UN DONNÉ”: STATISTICS, QUANTIFICATION … 411
24. See Bohman (1996, 1999) and for a rather convincing heterodox
development, Besson (2003).
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CHAPTER 13
Free fromNumbers? The Politics
of Qualitative Sociology in theU.S. Since 1945
Emmanuel Didier
It has been well established now that quantification is not only a means
to produce knowledge, but also a means of power. This insight has given
rise to the famous and important body of works on social studies of quan-
tification (Daston, 1988; Desrosières, 1998 [1993]; Espeland & Sauder,
2007; Gigerenzer et al., 1989; Krüger et al., 1987; Porter, 1995), which
studied in many diverse fashions the historical conditions of the produc-
tion of numbers and their social effects, denaturalizing quantities while at
the same time re-specifying their authority. Most of these works suppose
that, first, there was a state of affairs without numbers; second, that
measures have been applied on it; and third, that the situation has finally
become quantified. Desrosières (2008), who can rightfully be taken as
the primary representative of this tradition, states this idea in a very clear
equation: “quantification = convention + measurement” (Desrosières,
2008, p. 10). The crucial insight of this proposition is that this process is
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a social one–and not a natural or straightforward one–that deserves to be
problematized and understood with the tools of the social sciences.
Yet, the contemporary excitement around “big data” makes one
wonder if the problem should not be reversed. We hear today that the
planet is increasingly populated by digital data (for example: “90% of
the data harvested since the beginning of humanity have been gener-
ated in the last two years” [Dupont, 2015]). But we know that it is
only an exaggeration in the long history of people being mesmerized with
the mechanized production of the quantitative–to which the “big data”
phenomenon belongs since it comprises many numbers, if not anything
else. One must not forget that the decades 1820–1840 already witnessed
an “avalanche of printed numbers” (Hacking, 1982). The invention of the
Hollerith machine at the end of the nineteenth century and its adoption
by bureaus of public statistics all over the world produced a “revolu-
tion in data processing” (Austrian, 1982). With the development of polls
and sample surveys, The New Deal was a period during which the U.S.
was entirely “statisticized” (Didier, 2009). Every period has had its own
quantitative revolution related to technologies of data production and to
creativity in the use of data. The fuss around big data proves only that
our current era makes no exception: it is, as it was, filled with quantities.
Thus, since society is quantitative through and through, the real
mystery might not be the amount of data that circulates and governs
but on the contrary, the existence of social spheres pretending to remain
free from numbers. If the world has already been quantified since at least
the first half of the nineteenth century, are there some spheres that could
remain exceptions, and how is this possible? What does the activity of
purifying a social sphere from numbers consist of? What are the polit-
ical endeavours associated with such a goal? Or, to put it differently, how
can we account for the political production of the border of qualitative
enclaves which exclude quantities?
To tackle these questions, I will go back to the history of what
is now called qualitative sociology . Indeed, sociology is a discipline in
which the great founders never chose between quantification and non-
quantification. In France, Emile Durkheim and Gabriel Tarde, who were
opposed in every respect, had two main points in common: first, each
was the leader of a powerful current of sociology and strove to insti-
tutionalize it according to his own definition (against the other’s), and
second, both relied on quantitative reasoning among other arguments, as
Suicide on the one hand and The Laws of Imitation on the other attest
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(Durkheim, 1986 [1897]; Tarde & Parsons, 1903). In Germany, Max
Weber, along with his definition of the longstanding “verstehen”, also
performed quantitative surveys (Brain, 2001; Pollak, 1986). Finally, in
the U.S., the Chicago School of sociology never chose between the two
(Abbott, 1999; Chapoulie, 2001). Sociology was founded as a science
commonly using quantification as one of its diverse cognitive tools and
methods. It entertained a “relaxed” relationship to quantities and qual-
ities (to use Glaser and Strauss’s (1967) expression). Thus, the branch
of U.S. sociology that came to be labelled “qualitative sociology” during
the 1970s made an astonishing move, apparently of the ascetic sort, in
defining a discipline that would be freed from quantities.1
Why would one distinguish a sub-discipline by its absence of numbers?
How did the conceptual pair “qualitative vs. quantitative” come to settle
within sociology? What were the conditions in which sociology was
produced and the publics it addressed that might explain this link? Finally,
is it even possible to eradicate quantification and stay with conceptions
encompassing qualities only?
Using the methods of the sociology of quantification, I will pay atten-
tion to both the epistemic and political forces that participated in the
production of the border between qualitative and quantitative in soci-
ology.2 I will inquire into the political worth of the qualitative. It was
within a very specific power field, ranging from the constitution of the
Welfare State after WWII to the radicalism of the 1970s and finally ending
in the liberal 1980s, that those who would ultimately defend a “qualita-
tive” sociology forged and used their epistemic arguments separated from
the quantitative. I will pay special attention to how these two aspects of
the story were intermingled.
These questions can best be understood when it is clear from the
onset that here “quantitative” has two different meanings. We will see
that “quantitative” analysis had been defined by mainstream sociologists
as one single method, that of survey sampling or polling. This is a first
definition of quantitative, the one of our “actors” or “members”. But we
can see furthermore that there have long been many other methods of
quantification, many uses of numbers, and, as has been proven by the
late Alain Desrosières, that these different methods of quantification are
consistent with different political endeavours (Desrosières, 2003).
Finally, it is worth mentioning that this paper is a sequel to the ques-
tion of the appearance and legitimization of quantitative surveys in the
American Government during the New Deal (Didier, 2009, 2020). Here,
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I follow the later fate of this method and trace how after WWII it came
to be criticized. I aim to sketch the whole social life course of a statistical
method, from its appearance to its decomposition. This paper is also an
inquiry into the relationships between sociology and politics. The position
born with surveys during the 1930s and the 1940s, of the sociologist as
an expert advising political power, is here contrasted with that of the soci-
ologist as a critic of any association with the power elites, the sociologist
as a radical, a position that fully developed after WWII and came to be
closely associated with “qualitative” methods. Finally, this paper is also a
contribution to the “sociology of quantification”. Rather than asking how
qualitative things are quantified, I reverse this question and ask how it is
possible, if ever, in a world already filled with quantities, to try and purify
portions of it in the hope of establishing a “qualitative” enclave.
My first point will consist in emphasizing the seminal role played in the
1950s by Herbert Blumer and Aaron Cicourel in the fight against Lazars-
feld’s definition of qualitative analysis. Both opposed a specific statistical
method—surveys for the first and official statistics for the other, and they
were not against quantification in general, which they in fact practiced.
They opposed a specific political use to which the statistical method was
associated. Then, we will see how their conclusions were refurbished by
the young radicals in the 1960s and 1970s as a means to fight against the
elite of the Welfare State. Finally, we will see that “qualitative sociology”
as such appeared only during the 1970s as a weird association between the
Lazarsdfeldian promoters of surveys and the neo-radicals opposed to it.
Excluding Quantities?
The two main sociologists embodying the tradition of “qualitative soci-
ology”, as far as they explicitly addressed their relationship to quantifi-
cation, were Herbert Blumer and Aaron Cicourel. I will analyse their
conception of the border between quantitative and qualitative research. I
will thus clarify their critique of numbers and the social context in which
they were expressed. Especially, I will clarify their relationship to the work
of Lazarsfeld.
C. Wright Mills, in his Sociological Imagination (Mills, 1959), had
a very influential critique of “abstracted empiricism” as a kind of soci-
ology which, while transforming itself into a gigantic bureaucracy, turned
the American public into a series of masses. Unfortunately, Mills died
too young (1962) to take part personally in what later came to be
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called “Qualitative sociology” and actually, in his writings, never used the
dichotomy qualitative/quantitative at all. So in our story, we shall treat
his work as a resource for our actors, but not as an actor by himself.
Interpretation and Determinism
Herbert Blumer is credited with the invention of Symbolic Interactionism.
This approach to human group life is deeply influenced by the philos-
ophy of George Herbert Mead and the American pragmatist tradition. It
locates the social primarily in situations of interaction between humans
and between humans and objects. It focuses on the fact that members’
action is guided and formed by a process of interpretation of the situ-
ation in which they are involved. This process of interpretation is an
active one, and not a passive submission to outside forces. In Blumer’s
own words, members’ “behavior with regard to what it notes is not a
response called forth by the presentation of what it notes but instead
is an action that arises through the interpretation made through the
process of self-indication” (Blumer, 1969, p. 14). Placing the concept of
interpretation at the heart of his concepts, Blumer has today among soci-
ologists an “image as purely qualitative” (Abbott, 1999, p. 51). Indeed,
symbolic interactionism became one of the core components of qualitative
sociology.
The history of the growth of Blumer’s opposition to quantification is
quite complex. One has to keep in mind that until WWII, Blumer was
in a very powerful situation in the American sociological field. He was
a Professor of Sociology at the University of Chicago’s Department of
Sociology, one of the most distinguished and powerful departments in the
country. From this position, he witnessed the fairly quick establishment
of the partisans of statistical surveys, especially at Columbia.
The American Soldier
Blumer’s powerful position was questioned in particular by the publica-
tion of The American Soldier edited by Samuel Stouffer and colleagues
(Social Science Research Council (U.S.), 1949), a five-volume sociolog-
ical study of the Army during the war. As Schweber (2002) shows, this
book not only encountered huge public success, but was also heralded as
the example to a new approach of social science, making important use
of statistics. It bore on trends that began in the 1930s with the growing
importance of polls on the one hand, and of the quantification of surveys
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on the other, associated with the growing power of welfare institutions,
which were the primary users of this kind of knowledge, both at the local
and the national level. The American Soldier was seen as the symbol of the
will to promote statistics as the authoritative method in sociology. And,
also problematic from the point of view of Blumer, it was associated with
Harvard, since Stouffer, who earned his PhD from Chicago, had been
hired by the University located in Cambridge, Mass., in 1946.
A panel was organized in 1949 by the American Sociological Associ-
ation to discuss the book. Blumer was invited, and apparently criticized
the book vehemently. The authors of the 5th and last volume of The
American Soldier wrote that he adopted a “rivalrous posture” stated in a
“vigorous negativism, which leads to the extreme attitude we have desig-
nated as diabolic” (Merton & Lazarsfeld, 1950, p. 227). His talk has
apparently not been published, but Howard Becker (1988) states that the
arguments were very close to his 1948 paper on polling, later re-published
as the last chapter of Symbolic Interactionism (Blumer, 1969).
In this article about polls, Blumer does not attack quantification as
such. He even states that he uses numbers himself, but in a very peculiar
way: “I shall indicate by number the [six] features to be noted” (Blumer,
1969, p. 198). It is not that common to read a text composed in six parts!
He expresses two main criticisms of polls. First, polling does not define
“public opinion”, its object . It suffices itself by applying a technique, which
indeed produces data, but it never takes time to define the concept on
which data is produced. On the contrary, it relies on the “narrow opera-
tionalist position that public opinion consists of what public opinion polls
poll” (Blumer, 1969, p. 197).
A second criticism is exposed in six points. The argument is that polling
does not respect the actual “realistic” structure of public opinion forma-
tion. In particular, there are “key people” who play an important part
in the production of public opinion. Yet, these processes through which
public opinion is expressed are not consistent with the sampling techniques
used by polls:
In my judgment the inherent deficiency of public opinion polling certainly
as currently done, is contained in its sampling procedure. Its current
sampling procedure forces the treatment of society as if society where
only an aggregation of disparate individuals. Public opinion, in turn, is
regarded as being a quantitative distribution of individual opinions. This
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way of treating society and this way of viewing public opinion must be
regarded as markedly unrealistic. (Blumer, 1969, p. 202)
Blumer admits later in his text that polls did succeed in predicting the
elections (of Roosevelt in 1936). But, “a ballot cast by one individual
has exactly the same weight as a ballot cast by another individual. In this
proper sense, and in the sense of real action, voters constitute a population
of disparate individuals” (Blumer, 1969, p. 205). In the case of elections
proper, the structure of the electorate is realistically comparable to that of
a sample. But this is not the case outside of this very rare case.
Thus, Blumer argues first that opinion polling is “logically unpardon-
able”, because it does not define its object of inquiry, and second that it
does not respect the body of knowledge derived from empirical observa-
tion and from reasonable inference that one already has about the nature
of public opinion. There is a third scandal in the eyes of Blumer, which is
kept implicit in his text. It is that, given the success that these techniques
encounter, the very key players in the formation of public opinion, to
whom he gives such an important role, seem nonetheless to adopt and
use polls in their endeavour.
He himself sees the social role of sociologists very differently. He
served as an arbitrator for the steel industry during WWII. Arbitrators,
in his view, are not “experts” advising the Government, but act as facili-
tators helping both parties finding a settlement in their dispute. As Cantril
(1939) interestingly writes (since he was one of the founders of opinion
polls), this role presupposes “objectivity” in a very different manner than
that of the expert adviser.
These criticisms from Blumer can indeed be transposed to the surveys
used in The American Soldier. An army, being strictly hierarchical, is
anything but a population of disparate individuals. The “opinion” of an
army is not defined in the book. Finally, for these very obvious reasons, it
must have appeared very strange to Blumer that the commanders of the
Army might appreciate the book. The opposition between the two kinds
of sociology became even more violent when Stoufffer’s book was used
as a weapon for a direct and nominal attack against Blumer.
The Qualitative as Propaedeutic
Quantifiers replied to Blumer. In 1951, Henry Zentner, a young assis-
tant professor at Stanford, published a paper (Zentner, 1951) in which
he unearthed a contribution of Blumer about “Morale” published during
424 E. DIDIER
the war (Blumer, 1943). He presented it as “the most careful and system-
atic conception” of morale at the time when it had been written, and
proposed “to test, against the data reported in The American Soldier, the
validity of Blumer’s conception of the generic nature of group morale”
(Zentner, 1951, p. 298). Zentner extracted information from the charts
of the book and compared them to Blumer’s analysis. He pinpointed
what he saw as many weaknesses and went on to argue that Blumer’s
conception of morale was “grossly inadequate” (Zentner, 1951, p. 306).
He concluded that morale was better defined by opinion surveys than by
Blumer’s methods.
Blumer felt compelled to comment. He wrote “why Mr. Zentner
believes that he refutes my analysis is mystifying” (Blumer, 1951, p. 308).
His own contribution was about the morale of the civilian population
when Stouffer’s book was about the army. Hence, Zentner’s paper “does
not even test my analysis much less refutes it”, since “a theory or propo-
sition is tested empirically by applying it to an instance of what the theory
or proposition logically covers, not by applying it to something that falls
outside of such a logical class” (Blumer, 1951, p. 308). There was clearly
an attack but, argues Blumer, it did not hit. As he had stated earlier
about polls, the object of inquiry is ill-defined and in this case it creates
catastrophic confusion.
It is important for our purpose to note that the question of quantifi-
cation as such is entirely absent from the debate.
The attack was bold coming from a young man such as Zentner, and
maybe too bold since he seems to have completely disappeared from the
field after the bout. But he expressed an idea that would have very impor-
tant consequences: that Blumer’s analysis was “essentially speculative and
propaedeutic” and still needed to be empirically tested to gain actual
authority (Zentner, 1951, p. 297).
This furrow is precisely the one that, since the 1940s, Paul Lazarsfeld
was digging. Lazarsfeld repeated essentially the same message: “There is a
direct line of logical continuity from qualitative classification to the most
rigorous forms of measurement” (Lerner & Lasswell, 1951, p. 155). Or,
stated slightly differently a few years later: “Not only is qualitative analysis
large in volume, but it plays important roles in the research process, by
itself and in connection with quantitative research” (Lazarsfeld & Kendall,
1982, pp. 239–240). His argument was first and foremost that qualitative
and quantitative social science existed as two extremities on a continuum
of methods. Lazarsfeld uses the pair of concepts with a frequency not
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encountered anywhere else—in particular, it must be insisted upon that
Blumer never used it. Lazarsfeld is the one who decisively introduced the
conceptual pair in sociology, and thus insisted also on the importance of
the qualitative. It is most probable that his own sources, even though
they are not explicit in the literature as far as I can tell, are in the Vienna
Circle from where he came. He brought the dichotomy with him while
emigrating to the U.S.
But it was only to subordinate qualitative research to quantitative
research. He gives a biographical explanation to this hierarchy: as an assis-
tant to Bühler in Vienna before immigrating to the U.S., he worked on
the “qualitative attributes” of categories. And after arriving in the U.S.
he discovered it would have helped him to use the “statistical methods”
found in America (Zeisel, 1950, p. xvi). But he also gave many scientific
justifications to the hierarchizing of the two kinds of research.
First of all, what he calls qualitative research is a necessary
propaedeutic. One cannot directly begin any sociological work with statis-
tics. Qualitative research is a first obligatory passage point (to use an
awfully anachronistic concept):
The operations of qualitative analysis which are raised essentially prior to
quantitative research [are]: observations which raise problems, the formu-
lations of descriptive categories, the uncovering of possible causal factors
or chains of causation for a particular piece of behavior. (Lazarsfeld &
Rosenberg, 1955, p. 267)
Thus, the qualitative steps in research are necessary for two reasons:
they help establish the categories of further quantitative analysis—and
categories must logically precede quantification. And they indicate or
suggest possibilities of further relations between factors. The uses of
“these operations [are to] stimulate and focus later quantitative research,
and they set up the dimensions and categories along the stub of the
tables, into which quantitative research may fill the actual frequencies and
measurements” (Lazarsfeld & Rosenberg, 1955, p. 267).
But at the same time, the qualitative is essentially defined by the
fact that it is “unsystematic”, “impressionistic”, not “objective” enough
(Lazarsfeld & Rosenberg, 1955, p. 166) (1951, 166), it “remains an art”
(Lazarsfeld & Rosenberg, 1955, p. 250):
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Research which has neither statistical weight nor experimental design,
research based only on qualitative descriptions of a small number of
cases, can nonetheless play the important role of suggesting possible
relationships, causes, effects, and even dynamic processes. (Lazarsfeld &
Rosenberg, 1955, p. 261)
The qualitative is defined by its essential incompleteness as regards the
scientific endeavour, which only the quantitative can fulfil. The qualita-
tive is systemically associated with the subjective, the personal, so that to
become fully scientific it has to be made quantitative, that is, indepen-
dent of any personal perspective, fully objective. As Daston (1992) put
it, numbers help to produce “aperspectival objectivity”—a “view from
nowhere”—where the places and persons are extracted from their use.
Numbers also permit “mechanical objectivity” (Porter, 1995), a set of
rules about how to make and deploy numbers that contain the discretion
and biases of those using them.
Then, in the process of quantifying the qualitative, some variables
remain what was called “qualitative” because they did not refer directly to
a quantity. For example, the sex variables (male, female), race (Caucasian,
Blacks, etc.), even modalities built from a quantitative variable (income
brackets, etc.) are said to be qualitative. These types of variables were
called qualitative but still, they allowed a statistical treatment.
Lazarsfeld became undoubtedly the star of sociology in the 1950s.
He was a professor at Columbia, and earned very important research
contracts thanks to the Bureau of Applied Social Research. He was also
advising political figures. To give an example, it could not have escaped
Blumer that Lazarsfeld had been invited to the Stanford symposium on
“policy science” financed by the Carnegie Foundation on which the 1951
book is based, and Blumer was not. The new quantitative sociology, to
use Lazarsfeld’s vocabulary, was eclipsing the old Chicagoan. The poll-
ster was stepping on the ground of the arbitrator. Blumer could not let
it happen, especially since he was weakened even in his own university
(Abbott, 1999).
Interpretation Cannot Be Overlooked
Blumer could not accept that his sociology was to be turned into a
servant of an allegedly more objective one. He replied, and chose to
name his enemy “variable analysis”. This expression indicates the aim
“to reduce human life to variables and their relations” (Blumer, 1969,
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p. 127). An independent variable is identified and the analyst aims at
measuring its effect on a dependent variable. Concretely, it implies the
use of a questionnaire and of survey methods to gather field data that is
to be transformed into variables. The variable is not necessarily quantita-
tive though, even if it is indeed most of the time. This definition of the
variable is a clear attack against the propositions of Paul F. Lazarsfeld.
Against the “application of the variable analysis to human group life”,
Blumer saw three “shortcomings” and one “crucial limit” (1969, p. 132).
The first shortcoming is that there is apparently no “limit to what may
be chosen or designated as a variable” (1969, p. 128). The sociologist
can choose anything to be a variable that acts upon another variable,
to the effect that often they do not address the real problem that is at
hand in the situation studied. The second shortcoming is that often the
variables are not generic and thus lack any abstract character. Most of
the time, variables are in fact “bound temporally, spatially, and cultur-
ally” (1969, p. 130) and thus cannot provide any theoretical grasp of the
situation. Finally, the variables rarely give the “fuller picture”, the “con-
text” in which members interact, even though for Blumer the latter is
crucial to understand their action. These are shortcomings, because they
are not necessary consequences of the variable analysis, they are simply
often observed in practice.
Much worse, there is a limit within variable analysis that was not over-
come until the publication of his paper. It does not account for the actual
process that takes place in between the action of the independent vari-
able at the beginning of any social process, and the dependent variable as
the terminal part. “The intervening process is ignored or, what amounts
to the same thing, taken for granted as something that need not be
considered” (1969, p. 133). “One is content with the conclusion that
the observed change in the dependent variable is the necessary result of
the independent variable” (1969, p. 134).
But Blumer insists that any modification of the dependent variable has
necessarily occurred through a process of interpretation. “The interpre-
tation is not determined by the variable as if the variable emanated its
own meaning. If there is anything we do know, it is that an object, event
or situation in human experience does not carry its own meaning; the
meaning is conferred on it” (1969, p. 134). The variable analysis simply
discards the very core of any social action. Blumer concedes that, some-
times, it happens that interpretations are stabilized, it “occurs and recurs”.
But this must be verified each and every time since “anything that is
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defined may be redefined” (1969, p. 135). Finally, Blumer states that
“the question of how the act of interpretation can be given the qualita-
tive constancy that is logically required in a variable has so far not been
answered” (1969, p. 136). More generally:
In the area of interpretative life, variable analysis can be an effective means
of unearthing stabilized patterns of interpretation, which are not likely to
be detected through the direct study of the experience of people. Knowl-
edge of such patterns, or rather of the relations between variables which
reflects such patterns, is of great value for understanding group life in
its “here and now” character and indeed may have significant practical
value. All of these appropriate uses give variable analysis a worthy status
in our field. In view, however, of the current tendency of variable analysis
to become the norm and model for sociological analysis, I believe it is
important to recognize its shortcomings and limitations. (Blumer, 1969,
p. 137)
Thus, the variable analysis is content in studying the part of social
life in which the interpretative process is either absent or stabilized. But
for Blumer, this seems to be obviously a very small part of life, and the
less interesting one, the part of life that is completely deterministic. He
criticizes variable analysis for its incapacity to account for interpretative
operations performed by humans, part of what has been called much later
“the creativity of action” (Joas, 1996). Now, does this criticism of vari-
able analysis mean that Blumer rejected any quantification and was purely
“qualitative”? I would like to prove the contrary.
The Quantifier Blumer
Blumer was against surveys, but he was for quantification, conceived very
differently. First, it is important to keep in mind that Blumer did not
accept the dichotomy qualitative vs quantitative that appeared in the writ-
ings of Lazarsfeld. He rarely used the word “qualitative”, and avoided
elaborating on the dichotomy itself. He chose to criticize “the variable
analysis” and not the quantitative techniques. Variables were not doomed
to be limited in scope and impetus; they were so only in the hands of
limited sociologists whose investigations are limited in scope and impetus.
These precautions were not only rhetorical. Some of Blumer’s first
publications were two books that both came out in 1933. One was Movies
and Conduct (Blumer, 1933), and the other Movies, Delinquency and
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Crime (Blumer & Hauser, 1970 [1933]). The second book was co-
authored with Philipp M. Hauser, a master in quantitative techniques
who would eventually become the Director of the Bureau of the Census
(1949), and this book was full of figures and tables! Both books asked
the question whether the movies, which in the 1930s had become one of
the most popular entertainment industries, lead youth to crime because
crime is depicted in motion-pictures, or on the contrary, whether motion-
pictures protect them from becoming criminals, because they show its
condemnation? Both books utilize data which was gathered from nearly
two thousand students through interviews, observations and students’
“motion-picture autobiographies” in which informants were asked to
write in narrative form their motion-picture experiences. In addition, a
survey questionnaire was distributed to two populations: a sample drawn
from high-school children and a sample drawn from young inmates (male
and female). The surveys are analysed only in the book with Hauser. Thus,
even though it is clearly Hauser who performed the quantitative analysis,
Blumer did publish some quantitative analysis under his name.
Apparently, Blumer did not remember it as an error of his youth, but
quite on the contrary, as twenty years later, when in 1952 he would
leave Chicago, where he had lost much of his personal influence, to join
Berkeley, he tried for several years to recruit Hauser with a “formidable
salary”. Upon Hauser’s refusal, he made comparable offers to quantita-
tivists Leo Goodman and Otis D. Duncan, who also ended up refusing
(Abbott, 1999, p. 51).
These events prove that Blumer really thought that it was possible to
produce interesting quantitative analyses, even in the case of methods
involving “variable analysis”. He fought hard to colour quantitatively
the team that he had been dreaming to build up in California. Abbott
(1999) argues rightly that this team was the result of a community of a
Midwestern habitus. Sure, but this community would have been discarded
if their sociology had been incompatible.
Even after his teamwork with Hauser was over, Blumer continued to
produce research using numbers, but of a completely different nature
than the one he addressed in his criticism of “variable analysis”. Appar-
ently, Blumer did not participate in the conduct and analysis of surveys
anymore, but in his empirical work he always listed the things that were
indicated and interpreted by the members of the interaction he observed.
And Blumer counted the elements of these lists.
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An impressive example can be taken from a posthumous book on
industrialization (Blumer, 1990). In the introduction to the book, the
editors Maines and Morrione insist on the fact that it is not possible
to determine the exact date when its content was written, because the
book comprises a collection of essays which were published at different
times. But Blumer first wrote on industrialization when he was in Brazil
in 1958 and chapter six of the book was published as an article in 1971.
Thus most of it has probably been written after Symbolic Interactionism
(Blumer, 1969) was published.
In this book, Blumer asks how to conceive “industrialization in terms
of how it operates on group life” (1990, p. 42). Strikingly, Blumer goes
on listing nine lines, or dimensions—nothing more and nothing less—
through which industrialization entered group life:
In its gross aspect, industrialization is the introduction or expansion of a
manufacturing system of production. As an agent of social life, it has to
enter into group life. This sets the very important tasks of identifying the
lines of entry, instead of merely juxtaposing the manufacturing system to
group life. […] My analysis leads me to identify nine lines of entry that are
important, common to industrialization and, I believe, reasonably compre-
hensible of what occurs in industrialization. […] The scheme brings us
out of the vagaries and confusion that encumbers scholarly conceptions
of industrialization. The scheme is definitive, it is tied to the manufac-
turing scheme of production, and it allows an empirical tracing out of
what happens socially in industrialization. (Blumer, 1990, p. 49)
Later in the book, he questions whether there could be one more
dimension, only to reject it. Thus Blumer holds on firmly to the number
9. This example is striking. Not only is it rare to insist on the number 9,
but it is not an isolated case in his writings. Very often Blumer looks for
the entities that are “taken into account” in an interaction, and actually
counts them for the sake of clear and distinct conception of the process.
It is impressive to note how often (should I count?) he uses the rhetorical
figure of numbering the elements contained in lists. See, for example,
the chapter on polls that we analysed earlier where he mentioned six
critical features, or the chapter on Mead where he counts to five the
consequences of his conception of objects (1969, p. 68), and to six
those of his theory of joint action (1969, p. 71). Blumer appears as a
canvasser of elements, all of which more or less abstract, must be “noted”,
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“taken into account”, “indicated” in an interaction for it to be inter-
preted by the members, and only secondarily by the sociologist. Blumer
had bricolaged his own specific quantitative method that was compat-
ible with interactionism: the canvass of concepts and their quantitative
identification.
Finally, we find ourselves with two opposite views. On the one hand,
there are the Lazarsfeldians coming from a positivistic model of action and
science. They conceive social actors as affected by causes, of which they
are not necessarily aware, determining their behaviour. These behaviours
once aggregated, might create social problems, as proven by the Great
Depression. The government, being on a higher level of action than the
actors, can act on these causes, using work and social projects, as during
the New Deal. The sociologist produces objective information about the
causal mechanisms at hand in using statistical survey techniques, and
advises the government thanks to this specific knowledge (Didier, 2009).
On the other hand, there are Blumer and the Symbolic Interactionists,
influenced by the American Pragmatists. Here, the actors’ main charac-
teristic is their ability to confer meaning upon their environment. Certain
entities to be found in the environment of the actors find “lines of entry”
into these actors’ lives, and the latter react to them according to how they
interpret them. Sometimes, several actors are led into conflicts of inter-
pretation, which might become actual social conflicts. In this case, an
arbitrator helps finding a settlement—which is a mode of action opposite
to that of the government in the preceding model, because the actors are
the agency, not the passive objects, of causal forces. The sociologist might
himself be an arbitrator, or might take part in the arbitration, because he
knows how to identify the pertinent entities in the context. To this aim,
he indeed might use numbers, but of a specific kind. Numbers count
pertinent social entities or lines of entry, but not humans, and they are
used as their identifiers. These two models of society both have a concep-
tion of actors, of the government, of the social role of sociology, and of
quantification, but they organize these specific “actants” in an opposite
manner (to use an expression from semiotics).3
Questioning the notion of the “variable” and “variable analysis”,
Blumer did not refer to the dichotomy between the quantitative and qual-
itative. He refrained from using the very vocabularies of enemies that he
saw becoming powerful enough to weaken his own position, epistemo-
logically as well as socially. He saw important shortcomings in the actual
practice of survey analysis and experimental design, and argued that these
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methods were limited to the restricted part of group life where inter-
pretation is stabilized so that interaction looked like a determination—an
argument which was actually on par with C. Wright Mill’s “massification”
and which remains very powerful today. Manifesting a “besieged mental-
ity” (Katz, in Emerson 2015), he fought against the pretention of the
pollsters to speak objectively about the world, and was scandalized by
the fact that so many opinion leaders would listen to pollsters, arguing
that they were in fact reducing everything to a false determinism. But his
enemy was not quantification in general, only its use by the Lazarsfeldians.
Ethnomethodology Between Accounts and Official Power
The fight against the Lazarsfeldians was not only in the hands of
the symbolic interactionists. Ethnomethodology, originally developed by
Harold Garfinkel in the mid-1950s, elaborated another criticism of statis-
tics (and also of symbolic interaction), which bears on their political
consequences. Aaron Cicourel, a pillar of this strand of sociology, is
responsible for this.
The situation of the ethnomethodologists in the 1960s was completely
different, nearly contrary, to that of the symbolic interactionists. The
ethnomethodologists had no strong institutional base; they were only a
small group of young scholars not fully united, working mainly in Cali-
fornia, and thus in universities much less powerful than Chicago or those
of the East Coast, and these scholars were striving to be recognized.
They had few allies, since symbolic interactionists varied in their opinion
towards ethnomethodology, from indifference for a strand of research
that they saw redundant to a respectful but fairly distant interest. Still,
their criticism of quantification had wide consequences and was very often
used by those identifying themselves as “qualitative sociologists” after-
wards. As we will see, first through the study of the work of Garfinkel
and then that of Cicourel, their criticism did not oppose all and every
quantification.
As demonstrated by Heritage (1984), ethnomethodology was a reac-
tion against Parsons’ model of scientific action, and bore on Alfred
Schütz’s phenomenological sociology. It is a comprehensive sociology
and, like symbolic interactionism, it converged strongly with the American
pragmatists. Ethnomethodology was interested in how actors theorize by
themselves their Lebenswelt, and in understanding how action is based on
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mundane cognition. As Heritage (1984, p. 36) put it, ethnomethodol-
ogy’s “proposal to develop a ‘generalized social system built solely from
the analysis of experience structures’ thus presented a direct attack on the
very domain which Parsons had omitted from consideration: the realm
of approximate judgments and reasonable grounds which constitutes the
common sense world”. One of the ways to know about society is obvi-
ously statistics, and thus ethnomethodologists did not take long to launch
studies of this kind of object.
Statistical Accounts
In 1954, shortly after having completed his doctoral dissertation at
Harvard, Harold Garfinkel had been hired by the sociology department
at UCLA, and he began field work in UCLA’s hospitals. Aiming to
create a sociology of the way group members produce day-to-day knowl-
edge and account for it, very early on he had the idea to study the
production of hospital statistics as a sociological object . He coined the
expression “rate producing process” as early as 1956, meaning the study
of the process through which quantitative rates are produced. Cicourel
acknowledged that “the conception of the ‘rate-producing’ processes as
socially organized activities is taken from the work of Harold Garfinkel,
and is primarily an application of what he terms the ‘praxeological rule’”
(Kitsuse & Cicourel, 1963, p. 132).
Expanding his questioning on the production of rates, Garfinkel
focused mainly on three aspects of quantification (Heritage, 1984). First,
following the work of cognitive psychologist Eleanor Rosch, he ques-
tioned the categorization performed by statistical coders (in the context
of a psychiatric institution). He observed that coders, even when a set of
rules is provided to them, tend to proceed independently of that rule,
through “ad hoc” practices so that the code chosen fits best their under-
standing of the whole situation of the case at hand. Garfinkel coins this
as “interpretative realism”, by which he means that the coders treat the
data as signifying the whole social order. This is a capital point for his
demonstration that members do indeed have a theory of the macro level
of society: they, too, are able to generalize. Second, Garfinkel became
interested in the ways in which “aggregate responses to questionnaire
items” were used, especially when they seemed contradictory. Once again,
Garfinkel highlights the fact that “the questionnaire user has to bootstrap
a way beyond the literal ‘face value’ of the response in order to see them
as evidences of a whole social arrangement” (Heritage, 1984, p. 166).
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Finally, Garfinkel addresses the problem of “official statistics”. He points
here to three levels of “anxiety” about their use. First, their insufficiency
(the fact that they might lack enough information on the cases), second,
the extent of the error, especially in sampling, that they may contain, and
third, the limited adequacy of the definitions and procedures to the topic
at hand (Garfinkel, 1967).
In these studies, Garfinkel is not “nihilistic”, to use Heritage’s (1984)
phrasing. Garfinkel does not oppose quantification nor does he advocate
“the abandonment of coding” but, on the contrary, he recognizes that
“the unavoidable gap between data and its sense is unavoidably and irre-
versibly bridged, at least in part, by a coding process having unknown
characteristics”, which deserve to be inquired into by the sociologist
(Heritage, 1984, p. 162). When aggregated responses are contradictory,
Garfinkel is “insistent that he is not criticizing, ironizing, correcting” the
data (Heritage, 1984, p. 167). Rather, he is looking for a way to under-
stand what their properties and deeper meanings are. And the observation
that official rates are “made out socially” leads him to think that “an
immense array of accounting practices and their organizational exigencies,
previously occluded from the view by the preoccupation with accuracy, are
laid open as possible avenues of investigation” (Heritage, 1984, p. 175).
Garfinkel gave several examples in two chapters of his Studies in
Ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1999 [1967]) of how he thought his anal-
ysis of statistics as a social object could be productive for the use of
statistics as a cognitive tool; how his analysis could help in using quanti-
tative tables. He also showed that studies would allow us to deepen our
understanding of the social processes through which members produce
knowledge about the society they live in:
The actors’ account – whether they take the form of questionnaire
responses or of the statistical rates produced by bureaucratic agencies –
cannot be unproblematically treated either as disembodied descriptions or
as the ‘relaxed’ or ‘loose’ versions of objective states of affairs which can
subsequently be tightened up by the judicious application of social scien-
tific methodology. On the contrary, no matter how firmly such accounts
are proposed [they] still await an analysis which situates them, with all
their exigencies and considerations, within the socially organized worlds in
which they participate as constituting and constituted elements. (Heritage,
1984, p. 178)
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Thus, Garfinkel was interested in the epistemic consequences of his
findings, but always remained suspicious about their political conse-
quences. He argued for “ethnomethodological indifference”, which
meant for him that he did not want to make any judgement on whether
“members” did say the truth or not. Yet, later, especially in the 1960s,
this was interpreted by many readers as political indifference.
Ethnomethodology has had important consequences in American
sociology, especially within conversation analysis. Douglas Maynard, in
particular, at the University of Wisconsin, built on this research approach
in analysing the conversations between interviewers and interviewees in
surveys and polls in a very inspiring and consequential manner (Maynard
et al., 2002). More generally, every scholar working in the field of soci-
ology or history of quantification listed earlier in my introduction to this
paper owes something to the seminal work of Garfinkel. And one unex-
pected consequence (to Garfinkel himself) of his work has been that it
helped shape a very strong criticism against quantification itself.
Measurement by Fiat
In the beginning of the 1960s, Aaron Cicourel prolonged Garfinkel’s
argument about statistics into an actual criticism epitomized by the
expression “measurement by fiat” (Cicourel, 1964, p. 12), even though,
interestingly enough, he took this expression from a statistics handbook.
The author of the latter explained that sometimes there was no scien-
tific knowledge on a fact or characteristic to be measured. It was thus
necessary to use an “arbitrary definition” of the fact, which led to a “mea-
surement by fiat” (the name of a legally binding command or decision
entered on the court record by the judge) (Torgerson, 1958). Cicourel
turned this practical argument into a criticism. The quantities he had in
mind were not survey data produced through questionnaires, but official
statistics produced in the course of the bureaucratic treatment of public
problems.
Among other things, he and his co-author John Kitsuse analysed offi-
cial statistics on criminality and deviance. Together, they stressed that a
difficulty arises “as a consequence of the failure to distinguish between the
social conduct which produces a unit of behavior (the behavior-producing
processes) and the organizational activity which produces a unit in the rate
of deviant behavior (the rate producing process)” (Kitsuse & Cicourel,
1963, p. 132). Kitsuse and Cicourel highlight that actors, in daily life,
account for some behaviours as being identical and others as being
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different. But there is no reason to believe that the categories used by the
official administration engaged in the “rate producing process” respect
necessarily those of the actors. On the contrary, “what such [official]
statistics do reflect, however, are the specifically organizational contingen-
cies which condition the application of specific statutes to actual conduct
through the interpretations, decisions, and actions of law enforcement
personnel” (Kitsuse & Cicourel, 1963, p. 137). Criminal categories are
imposed, as if it were by fiat, by official institutions upon social life:
In modern societies where bureaucratically organized agencies are increas-
ingly invested with social control functions, the activities of such agencies
are centrally important ‘sources and contexts’ which generate as well as
maintain definitions of deviance and produce populations of deviants. Thus
rates of deviance constructed by the use of statistics routinely issued by
these agencies are social facts par excellence. (Kitsuse & Cicourel, 1963,
p. 139)
The official rates are not a valid indication of everyday practice and the
beliefs of members, but they are facts that have been isolated from the
social setting they pretend to represent. Official statistics belong to the
arsenal of control of bureaucracies. According to Kitsuse and Cicourel
(1963), these pretend to aim for the welfare of the weakest elements
of the population, but in fact they produce by fiat the population of
deviant people, of the unemployed, of the poor, etc. Yet, despite this very
powerful, critical conclusion, Cicourel still remained interested in the use
of statistics.
The Quantitativist Cicourel
Cicourel did not reject quantification, but proposed a better use of statis-
tics. He became interested in fertility in Argentina and, being well-trained
in mathematics, launched research on the topic using a survey method—
that is, an ad hoc questionnaire that he had written himself on the topic
(Cicourel, 1974). The objective of this survey was to capture “the actor’s
theory and method of accounting for and producing his everyday social
organization” related to fertility. Cicourel established a very cautious
methodological procedure, in which respondents were interviewed several
times successively, so that the interviewer could be either changed, if he
or she did not fit to this precise family, or get acquainted with them,
and fixed-choice questions were avoided as much as possible. “The type
13 FREE FROM NUMBERS? THE POLITICS OF QUALITATIVE SOCIOLOGY … 437
of interviewing conducted was intended as an alternative strategy to
the conventional survey” (Cicourel, 1974, p. 87). The aim was to take
into account the interviewer–interviewee interaction and to capture the
accounts of day-to-day action scenes as articulated by the interviewees.
The survey would not impose its own categories onto the respondent,
but adapt to the ones of the interviewee. The result is a book with lots
of methodological statements, important analyses of direct observations
and field notes taken during the interview, and a whole load of tables
and charts analysed at length. Much later, in an interview, Cicourel made
plain that he does not oppose quantification in general, but only certain
methods of quantification: “I am not opposed to quantification or formal-
ization or modeling, but I do not want to pursue quantitative methods
that are not commensurate with the research phenomena addressed”
(Witzel & Mey, 2004). Those who, like Cicourel, really grapple with
quantification, do not reject it as a whole; they sort methods out.
Much later, Kitsuse wrote a presidential address to the Society for the
Study of Social Problems (Kitsuse, 1980) that helps qualify the political
consequences of Cicourel’s epistemological position. Kitsuse had a very
personal experience with the authoritarian tendencies that inhabit any
state, and the American one in particular, since as a second-generation
Japanese American, he was imprisoned in an American internment camp
in 1942–1943. He shows that Cicourel remains in an epistemological
scheme, first identified by Gouldner (1968), coherent to the Welfare
State, in which sociologists attribute to deviants “a vulnerability and
subordination to the moral authority of what is commonly characterized
as white, middle-class, protestant culture and society” (Kitsuse, 1980,
p. 6). This conception implies that the sociologist, like the state, sees
the deviant as “the passive ‘man-on-his-back’ seemingly incapable of
resisting or opposing the inexorable process of attribution of abnormality
and inadequacy, stigmatized as morally defective, progressively excluded
and subordinated as deviant” (Kitsuse, 1980, p. 7). The deviant remains
essentially politically passive in his treatment by both the state and the
sociologist. And I would add that this remains true even in the work
of adapting categories proposed by Cicourel when he was working in
Argentina.
The scandal inherent to the theory of “measurement by fiat” comes
from the implicit presupposition that statistical categories do in fact
succeed in formatting the deviant. The latter is supposed to have no effec-
tive means to fight back, bend the categories or destroy them. Due to the
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“official” nature of these statistical categories, they are supposed to have
enough inherent power to indeed impose themselves. Opposing such a
view, Kitsuse proposed that sociologists should notice that in the 1980s,
it became clear that deviants were “coming out all over” to “publicly
demand their rights to equal access to institutional resources” (Kitsuse,
1980, p. 3).
The actor’s first feature, for Cicourel, was his ability to produce his
own account of social reality, even of its macro-structure. Not only the
sociologists have a conception of the whole social order, but anybody
within society. The government, when it pretends to help or re-educate
those that it calls “deviants”, in fact produces the category, and subordi-
nates those that are categorized, especially through epistemic tools such as
official statistics. The role of the sociologist is to unearth the accounts of
the deviants, to help make their worldview visible and respectable. Thus,
on the one hand, he criticizes official statistics imposed on the existence
of “deviants”, and on the other, he produces, among many methods, his
own quantitative methodology provided that it remains commensurate to
the research phenomena.
Blumer’s and the ethnomethodologists’ criticisms represent the two
main strands of critique addressed to quantification by those who would
later on be associated with “qualitative research”.4 As we have seen,
these critiques take place in the wider context of developing theories of
society, accounting for the characteristics and agency of social actors, of
the government, and of the sociologist. They also comprise a definition of
the good and bad uses of quantification. Thus the criticisms are addressed
in fact to specific methods of quantification and are complemented by
alternative quantitative practices. Within sociology, these two sets of crit-
icisms were emitted from two completely opposite positions in terms of
audience and power. Symbolic interactionists were initially dominant, and
tried to prevent being overwhelmed by the new quantitativist contender;
ethnomethodologists were on the contrary minuscule and fought a battle
as bravely as they could, surfing on the recognition they were enjoying.
The sociologists in question were aware that they were not entirely
condemning quantification, but only certain methods, as can be inferred
from the fact that, in the 1950s and well into the 1960s, they did not
use the dichotomy “quantitative vs. qualitative” sociology. It belonged
to the very heralds of surveys, led by Lazarsfeld, who crafted the label
“qualitative research” as a propaedeutic to quantitative analysis. There-
fore, the next question that we have to answer is why and how symbolic
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interactionism and ethnomethodology finally ended up being considered
“qualitative”. Why is it that this label took consistency, when it initially
belonged to the enemy? The first step to answer this question is to take
into account the appearance of a new actor on the sociological scene, the
coming-of-age “young radical”, during the 1960s.
Radical Sociology, Quantification
and the Welfare State
The beginning of the emergence of the 1970’s spirit of radicalism within
American sociology can be backdated quite precisely, to the 1968 annual
meeting of the ASA, the cornerstone of sociological orthodoxy. President
Philipp Hauser, who had co-written with Blumer Movies, Delinquency,
and Crime (Blumer & Hauser, 1970 [1933]), which involved quantita-
tive materials, and who was later appointed Director of the Bureau of
the Census—and thus one of the, if not the, most prominent figure in
the use of statistics in sociology—had invited Wilbur J. Cohen, Secre-
tary of Health, Education, and Welfare, to give the keynote presentation
at this conference. This invitation demonstrates the strong association
that existed at the time between the quantitativists, who held top posi-
tions within the sociological academic world, and the political elite of the
American Welfare State. The invitation provoked a fierce opposition from
young sociology students who called themselves “radicals”. They were:
as rejecting of those who purvey sociological research on underdogs to the
overseers of the welfare state as they are of caterers to the warfare state.
To the Sociology Liberation Front, Cohen’s ‘guest of honor’ status was
an unacceptable example of what Gouldner (1968) has called the ‘blind
or unexamined alliance between sociologists and the upper bureaucracy of
the welfare state’. (Roach, 1970, p. 228)
The meeting ended up in a mess and gave rise to a schism within the
professional organization of the sociological field (Roach, 1970). This
emerging radicalism in sociology was under a paradoxical influence. On
the one hand, the new “radicals” were deeply influenced by the simple
desire to reject the templates of the past: family, state interventionism,
sobriety, war. This rejection is well embodied by Abbie Hoffman’s book
Revolution for the Hell of It (Hoffman, 1968), which does not propose
much, except the joy and amusement of destroying everything from
440 E. DIDIER
previous generations, including, as far as this paper is concerned, the
University system. It was also associated with a fierce opposition to any
alliance with the institutions of the Welfare State. This is also exemplified
by the fact that Howard Becker was wearing a T-shirt at the ASA annual
meeting depicting an unkempt, hairy, cartoon hippy saying “Hey Kids,
Let’s Fuck the State”; an ironic proposition mixing destruction and fun
(discussion with Jack Katz).
On the other hand, sociology was a discipline that could provide intel-
lectual tools to understand the system, its injustice and boredom, and
thus help either fix it or destroy it. Since institutions and “the system”
were identified as the problem, sociology seemed to be a straightforward
answer to it. Thus, sociology was at the time attracting a large number of
new students eager to change society through sociology (Turner & Turner,
1990).
So, in this conflict, how was quantification seen? How was “qual-
itative sociology” transformed in this turmoil? Behind the widespread
non-articulated contempt and suspicion towards quantification (called
“oversimplification” by the heralds of quantification Reitman, 1978),
there were in fact two quite different strands of argument. The first one
built on the post-Marxist tradition of the Frankfurt School, and here soci-
ologists tended to be influenced more by Cicourel’s arguments. The other
strand was more “Blumerian”, and stood thus more in the tradition of the
American pragmatists.
Are Quantities Fascist?
One immediate consequence—next to the creation of the highly influ-
ential journal Social Problems—of the radical sociologists’ actions was
the foundation of The Insurgent Sociologist in 1969 (which later would
become the journal Critical Sociology from 1988 onwards). Influenced
by C. Wright Mills, neo-Marxism, and radical feminism, the initial goals
of the journal were to organize the actions of the different activist
groups, among other things, to ease communication between the Western
Union and the Eastern Union of Radical Sociologists, and the Sociology
Liberation Front, and to help define what radical sociology should look
like. The first issues of the journal looked like street pamphlets with
very short, explosive papers, unsigned, and full of images and carica-
tures. In contrast to previous generations, what was exhibited here was
a completely different style of sociology. One cartoon ironizing the use
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of figures has been reproduced below (see Fig. 13.1). This caricature was
published in the second issue of the journal.
The “Mo-Jan” system depicted in Fig. 13.1 stands forMorris Janowitz,
one of the founders of military sociology. One can see that in the text
published next to the image of the rocket a certain positivist and quanti-
fied tone in sociology (“82.5%”) is mocked. The reference to the rocket
and “Camelot special” ironizes the role of the army in financing research
(as we will see below), and finally Janowitz’s book proposing an “urban
control of racialized riots” with the help of the disciplinary tools of
sociology are at the heart of the students’ exasperation.
Soon thereafter, the Insurgent Sociologist published a paper entitled
“Accidents, Scandals and Routines: Resources for Insurgent Methodol-
ogy” (Molotch & Lester, 1973) addressing the role of quantification.
Examining the news from a Garfinkelian perspective, Harvey Molotch
and Marilyn Lester argued that ethnomethodology provided methods to
suspend the belief that an objective world exists. They showed that the
news content of the mass media is the “result of practical, purposive,
and creative activities on the part of news promoters, news assemblers
and news consumers” (Molotch & Lester, 1974, p. 101). Noticeably,
the proposition that statistics measured reality “by fiat” played a key role
in their argumentation. As they wrote: “Cicourel (1964) makes an anal-
ogous argument with respect to the creation of a juvenile delinquent”
(Molotch & Lester, 1974, p. 103). Ethnomethodology was used by the
authors as a tool to criticize not simply a fabricated reality, but a politically
biased fabricated reality. According to Molotch and Lester, ethnomethod-
ology helped to avoid “be[ing] duped into accepting as reality the political
work by which events are constituted. Only by accident and scandal is
that political work transcended, allowing access to ‘other’ information”
(Molotch & Lester, 1973, p. 10). The politicization of quantities high-
lighted by Cicourel was thus ushered into a general criticism of a reality
fabricated by the ruling elite.
Interestingly enough, soon afterwards, the same journal published
a paper entitled “The New Conservatives: Ethnomethodologists,
Phenomenologists and Symbolic Interactionists” which was influenced
by neo-Marxism. Here, among other things, it was argued that
the approaches at stake—especially ethnomethodology—are inherently
conservative, and therefore not radical, for two reasons. First, they
“implicitly deny the generalizability of any theory of social change”, thus
are opposed to the notion of revolution. Second, they “picture men
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Fig. 13.1 “Breaking out of the Hothouse” (Source Insurgent Sociologist, Vol.
1, No. 2, p. 8. Reprinted with permission from Critical Sociology. Scan gratefully
provided by the University of Michigan Library [Special Collections Research
Center])
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as individual entrepreneurs, and use the language of the market-place
in extending laissez-faire individualism to contemporary social theory”
(McNall & Johnson, 1975, p. 49). Both these features are associated
with the tendency to mainly use data about individual cases and, the
authors regret, very rarely “samples and replicable measurement tech-
niques” (McNall & Johnson, 1975, p. 62). Radicalism was definitely still
the object of a conflict of definition from within, as much as the roles of
statistics in it.
But neo-Marxism was not entirely opposed to ethnomethodology.
David J. Sternberg (1977) proposed a radical rereading—as the title of his
book attests—of the concept of measurement by fiat. He deals with the
famous F-scale invented by Theodor Adorno and others (Adorno et al.,
1950). Given the huge impact of this work, it is important to explain its
role within the question of quantification. Adorno discovered the prac-
tice of statistics when he first reached the USA in 1938 and—through
Horkheimer—worked under Lazarsfeld at Columbia. He hated the expe-
rience. As he wrote, “I collided with the positivistic habits of thought”
(Adorno, 1998, p. 220). But later, in the 1940s, after having settled in
California, he began to work on a project that would eventually lead
to the book about The Authoritarian Personality (Adorno et al., 1950).
The book achieved a successful conjoining of Marxism and Freudism in
trying to identify the psychological roots of Nazism. Besides, it was a
methodological rarity, since it made large use of statistical surveys, and
of the conceptual pair qualitative vs. quantitative (the expression “qual-
itative analysis” is in the title of the 4th part of the book). This time,
Adorno deeply enjoyed the experience. He loved the atmosphere in which
he worked: “the kind of cooperation in a democratic spirit that does not
get mired in formalities […] was for me probably the most fruitful thing
I encountered in America” (Adorno, 1998, p. 232).
Likewise, he praised the scientific achievement of the research, particu-
larly because the “teamwork spirit” made possible an intelligent use of
statistics: “The aporia – that what was discovered purely by quantita-
tive means seldom reaches the genetic deep mechanisms, while qualitative
discoveries can just as easily lose their generalizability and therefore also
their objective sociological validity – we tried to overcome” (Adorno,
1998, pp. 232–233). In particular, the F-scale, a tool measuring the indi-
vidual propensity to authoritarianism, was invented in Berkeley in a “free
and relaxed environment […] in a manner that by no means coincided
with the usual image of the positivism of the social sciences” (Adorno,
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1998, p. 233). Afterwards, Adorno became generally suspicious towards
empiricism and never used statistics again. But he nonetheless did not
publish any general argument against quantification, most probably to
stay true to this happy experiment (Genel, 2013, p. 91). And, in the
1970s, he left the U.S. in an ambiguous overall stance towards statistics.
Sternberg, in his book (Sternberg, 1977), gave an example of how
the positions of the Frankfurt School could be radicalized. Discussing
Adorno’s F-scale and Cicourel’s measurement by fiat, he argued that the
F-scale was used widely by many American official bodies of administra-
tion, and he concluded: “the F scale has to do with fascism all right, but
not in the sense its designers intended it. Its findings, not the people that
it finds, are Fascist” (Sternberg, 1977, p. 43). Sternberg pushes Cicourel’s
argument to the point of arguing that statistics as a whole, even Adorno’s
F-scale, are fascist, insofar as they impose categories of social control upon
society.
Sternberg is a good example of how the criticism of quantification
made by ethnomethodology was radicalized by many scholars of the New
Left, associating surveys with state authority and concluding that they are
therefore fascist—even when discussing Adorno’s work, to whom such
a qualifier must have seemed quite strange! But the reception of Stein-
berg’s book was far from laudatory. Reviewers qualified Sternberg’s book
as involving a “simplistic approach” (for example Reitman, 1978), and the
overall judgement of this book and those alike was that such an inference
could not be taken seriously. It was stepping outside the range of the soci-
ologically admissible. It was definitely hard to call Adorno a fascist! And,
indeed, it must be said that Sternberg did not make a career in the disci-
pline of sociology. Rejecting all quantities as fascist did not hold. Symbolic
interactionists, for their part, constructed another argument about figures,
to which we will now turn.
Light Travelling: Numbers as Gleanings
Howard Becker and Louis Horowitz can be taken as representatives of
the interactionist trend in radical sociology. Becker, directly influenced
by both Blumer and ethnomethodology, had crafted “labelling theory”
which shifted the focus from the causes of peoples’ deviant behaviour to
the definition of people and behaviour as deviant. In 1972, the American
Journal of Sociology organized a remarkable symposium entitled “Varieties
of Political Expression in Sociology”, which was published as a special
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issue in June that year. The collection does not comprise any explicitly
critical or Marxist sociologists, but papers, such as the article by Merton
(1972), or the paper by Lipset and Ladd (1972) which presents an anal-
ysis of data from a comprehensive survey of 60,000 academics to explore
“the actual political views of sociologists” (Lipset & Ladd, 1972, p. 68),
and many other fascinating contributions. Also, Becker and Horowitz
were invited to this symposium and took side with radicalism: “Both
because of our own political position and for the sake of congruence
with current discussion, we will take the tack of sociologists who conceive
themselves, or like to conceive themselves, as radical sociologists” (Becker
& Horowitz, 1972, p. 59). Their argument makes perfectly clear how
they see the link between statistical methods and politics.
In their contribution to the symposium (Becker & Horowitz, 1972),
they began by claiming that radical sociology can be good sociology. They
define the latter as being “true to the world”, especially when it anal-
yses the causes of events, even in the most limited sense of the term
“cause”. Especially, and most important for our purpose, they insisted
that, in principle, all the known methods of the discipline can be useful:
“With all their faults, interviews, participant observation, questionnaires,
surveys, censuses, statistical analysis, and controlled experiments can be
used to arrive at approximate truth” (Becker & Horowitz, 1972, p. 50).
It has to be said that in his whole career, Becker never expressed rejec-
tion of quantification. In a collection of methodological papers of his, he
noticed that during fieldwork observation, “the observer will also find it
useful to collect documents and statistics (minutes of meetings, annual
reports, budgets, newspaper clipping) generated by the community or
organization” (Becker, 1970, p. 79). Thus, like the ethnomethodolo-
gists, he insists that the quantities found in the field are interesting objects
of study. And later, he highlighted that between “qualitative and quan-
titative” methods “the similarities are at least as, and probably more,
important and relevant than the differences. […] The same epistemolog-
ical arguments underlie and provide a warrant for both” (Becker, 1996,
p. 53; but see also Becker, 1958).
Thus, the specificity of radical sociology does not lie in its methods. It
lies in its “distinctive contribution to the struggle for change” (Becker,
1996, p. 53), as on the one hand it provides the knowledge to critique
inequality and lack of freedom, and on the other hand it provides the
basis for implementing radical utopias. As Becker (1996, p. 53) put it,
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“the constructive aspects are rooted in the positivist tradition, and the
critical aspects in the Marxist tradition”.
One of the core concerns in the struggle for change is the attribution
of causes to the events. All events have an infinity of causes, beginning
with the presence of air that allows the humans to breathe. Thus “the
assignment of causes to events has a political aspect”, because “when soci-
ologists link a cause to an event or a state of affairs, they at the same time
assign blame for it” (Becker, 1996, p. 58). It is the specific causes chosen
by the sociologist that make him radical. As Becker writes:
In general, radicals will judge a sociological analysis as radical when its
assignment of causes, and thus of blame, coincides with the preferred
demonology of the political group making the judgment. (Becker, 1996,
p. 59)
For the radicals, a shocking example of conservative attribution of
causes was what came to be known as the “Moynihan Report”. In 1965,
Daniel Moynihan, then Assistant Secretary of Labour in the U.S., issued a
report entitled The Negro Family: The Case for National Action. It was an
entirely statistical report dedicated to understanding the causes of poverty
in black families. In fact, the report attributed poverty to the disorgani-
zation of the black families themselves (Rainwater & Yancey, 1967). This
argument provoked a huge intellectual controversy, because implicitly it
was Blaming the Victim (Ryan, 1971). Radicals (and others) were shocked
that such an important representative of the Welfare State could produce
arguments that neglected so obviously the oppression exerted by white
people on black people, and that a self-described “liberal” could engage
in such a conservative political assault.
Having such a counter example did not help the radical in identifying
the pertinent causes of any social process, those causes that are at the
same time true to the world and belong to radical demonology. Becker
& Horowitz (1972) argue that there are three “obstacles” to a radical
sociology, three specific elements that oppose the pursuit of its objectives.
These are:
(1) The conservative influence of conventional technical procedure, (2)
Commonsense standards of credibility of explanations, and (3) The
influence of agency sponsorship. (Becker & Horowitz, 1972, p. 62)
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Let us review each of these shortcomings in turn. (1) Research means
testing the deductions made from existing theories on data suitable for
making such a test (cf. the controversy between Blumer and Zentner
mentioned above). This is done through a method, statistical or not, that
restricts the range of causes to be tested to what the researcher had in
mind when he conceived his research. As Becker and Horowitz write:
But some techniques, indeed, require sociologists to leave out things they
know might be important. Thus, it is difficult, though not altogether
impossible, to study certain kinds of power relationships and many kinds
of historical changes by the use of survey research techniques. (Becker &
Horowitz, 1972, p. 62)
Becker and Horowitz do not get more explicit. But knowing their
proximity to Blumer, it seems clear that the elements that sociologists
know that might be important for the attribution of causality are linked
to the interpretation process that Blumer highlighted. Here, Becker and
Horowitz reuse Blumer’s argument about surveys—including Blumer’s
precautions and lack of radical condemnation.
(2) Sociologists, similar to other members of society, tend to believe
more in the versions of the elite than those of other people, because the
elite runs the organizations. That is, they tend to believe “official versions
and analyses of most social problems”, and thus they “find it hard to
free [themselves] from official analysis, sufficiently to consider causes not
credited in those versions” (Becker & Horowitz, 1972, p. 63). Becker and
Horowitz here refer not only to Blumer but also to Cicourel’s argument
about the performing effect of official statistics, producing the causes of
social problems. We believe official statistics, because their “version” is
that of the elite.
(3) Finally, agency sponsorship might put conservative limits on a
radical search of causes. It is not necessarily the case that they are polit-
ically biased, but when they fund research it is to solve an operational
difficulty, so that they, too, limit the range of the answers that are worth
giving. In particular, they tend not to see their own operations as being
the cause of the problem. Although Becker and Horowitz do not discuss
this directly, but one of the main “organizations” at stake here was the
military itself. Even though the 1960s were the decade when the Army
began to lose its near exclusivity in financing public research, it remained
the main finance provider (Moore, 2008, p. 34). Again, the authors refer
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to a contribution of Blumer published in a book edited by Horowitz
entitled The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot (Horowitz, 1974) about
the amazing story of a project financed by the army to use social sciences
in the goal of predicting (and thus controlling) revolutionary upsurge in
South America (Camelot is mentioned on the caricature Mo-Jan system,
right above the Mad face on the rocket).
Thus, “the remedy for that is to travel light, to avoid acquiring the
obligations and inclinations that make large scale funds necessary” (Becker
& Horowitz, 1972, p. 64). It is obvious that, here, to “travel light”, that
is without the money of the Army, is also to renounce the surveys that
were among the most expensive research techniques of the times. But it
is not against any quantities, on the contrary. As stated above, collecting
figures on the field or using any available figures is not shocking to them
at all. In this, the 1970s radicals act towards numbers as gleaners towards
ears of corns abandoned in the field. They are not cultivated; they are
simply used when found here and there. Radical figures are gleanings.
This argument made a much bigger splash than the other one about
the fascist character of quantification. For example, Alvin Gouldner, who
was himself a core figure of radical sociology, especially since the publi-
cation of his The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology (Gouldner, 1970)
acclaimed both authors in a later comment of the special issue, writing
that “their effort to characterize radical sociology is one of the more
probing I have seen” (Gouldner, 1973, p. 1079). Articulating general
arguments against quantification did lead to contradiction or unrealism.
So, the best was simply to ignore them, or maybe be ironic or sarcastic
about them.
In conclusion, radicalism changed the relationship of sociology towards
quantification. On the one hand, there was indeed a definitive condemna-
tion of any use of quantities, bearing on Cicourel’s “measurement by fiat”
argument and expanding it to the point of calling “fascist” any process of
quantification. This was a radical rejection of quantification, but it was
paid for by an expulsion from the sociological academic field. On the
other hand, Blumer’s heirs, represented here by Becker and Horowitz,
built the “travelling light” argument. For them statistics and quantifica-
tion can be useful, and often are, both when produced by the researcher
and when collected in the field. But most of the time statistics and quan-
tification force the researcher to cope with the “demons” of power (the
Welfare State, the Army, large companies), because they require a large
infrastructure and funds. Thus, the safest, for radicals who did not want
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to compromise with these demons, was simply not to use such method-
ological tools. The argument wound up not exactly against quantification
but only without surveys. Even though not really to the taste of the most
powerful sociologists, this one could still be swallowed by the academic
field.
One question that remains is that if the radical sociologists wanted to
stay away from the liberals in charge of most of the power institutions,
for whom was their knowledge produced? As Jack Katz has argued (Katz,
2015), the public of the radical sociologists was the youth that at this
time that was flowing in the universities, and especially in the sociology
departments (Turner & Turner, 1990). Radical sociology was oriented
towards the students—and professors who saw themselves primarily as
teachers. The actual institutionalization of a “qualitative sociology”, that
as we have seen was seldom mentioned before the 1970s, came out of
this movement.
Institutionalization of a “Qualitative Sociology”
We have described the criticisms which had been expressed towards quan-
tification by sociologists. Their arguments were defensive, against the
wave of quantities that washed over their discipline. But, from the 1970s
onwards, the strategy of those opposed to surveys changed: they began
to make the category fit to their own work. We will see that they would
address themselves to the large number of students that were flocking to
sociology departments by publishing textbooks and the creation of a new
journal. Finally, we will use the Jstor database to measure the success of
the enterprise.
Common Ground
One of the very first books to use the word “qualitative” on the cover,
actually in the subtitle, was Glaser & Strauss’s, 1967 The Discovery of
Grounded Theory, Strategies for Qualitative Research (Glaser & Strauss,
1967) which immediately received a lot of attention and success world-
wide. The subtitle would have the public think that it would be a fierce
engagement against quantitative analysis. But actually, those who read it
discovered that this was not the case. The book performed splendidly as a
classic, albeit difficult, rhetorical tour de force: it consolidated the divide
between the categories of “qualitative” and “quantitative”, but only to
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show simultaneously the authors’ exceptional ability to overcome it. The
authors dug a ditch, so that everyone could see how well they were able
to jump over it.
Indeed, contrary to Blumer and the ethnomethodologists, Glaser and
Strauss accepted Stouffer and Lazarsfeld’s reading of the development of
sociology. They accepted the dichotomy between qualitative and quan-
titative and observed that, since the 1930s, quantitative research “swept
over American sociology” because quantitative methods had developed
“systematic canons and rules of evidence on such issues as sampling,
coding, reliability, validity” etc. which were much more “rigorous” than
the equivalent canons used by empirical qualitativists remaining “too
impressionistic”. And thus, “qualitative research was to provide quanti-
tative research with a few substantive categories and hypotheses” (Glaser
& Strauss, 1967, pp. 15–16). Qualitative sociology had come to be
dominated.
But they also argued that the fundamental function of sociology was
the discovery of theories based on data. Their book was supposed to
be a handbook for abstraction, and thus an attack against those logico-
deductive theorists who promoted the verification of theories through
quantitative data. The authors called this opposition “generation vs.
verification” of theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 12) and proposed
“strategies” to perform the former. In this, they were once again very
close to the American pragmatist tradition and indeed referred often to
C. Wright Mills and Blumer. In particular, they worked on the categories
established by the former and they opposed the kind of sociology that
C. Wright Mills had baptized “Grand Theory” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967,
p. 10), meaning a theory severed from any empirical ground. There is
obviously a pun between “ground” and “grand” theory.
But they also argued that, although there had been a historical connec-
tion between the quantitative and verification theories, this connection
was only contingent. There was no epistemological necessity to it. On
the contrary, abstraction could be performed on both kinds of data,
qualitative or quantitative:
Our position in this book is as follows: there is no fundamental clash
between the purposes and capacities of qualitative and quantitative
methods or data. What clash there is concerns the primacy of emphasis on
verification of generation of theory – to which heated discussions on quali-
tative versus quantitative data have been linked historically. We believe that
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each form of data is useful for both verification and generation of theory,
whatever the primacy of emphasis. […] In many instances, both forms of
data are necessary. (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 17)
According to Glaser and Strauss, both qualitative and quantitative data
constituted a common ground on the basis of which theories could be
built. With both, the researcher had to use or establish sampling methods,
move from substantive to formal theory, and proceed to comparisons
among sets of data. The main difference was simply that when using quan-
titative data for the development of theory, the researcher had to “relax
the usual rigor of quantitative analysis so as to facilitate the generation of
theory” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 187). She had to simply use “freedom
and flexibility” with her data (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 186). Any kind
of data could thus support the generation of theories, if wisely utilized.
But, if theory building could be achieved with both, why did they then
nevertheless insist on qualitative research? They argued the following:
We focus on qualitative data for a number of other reasons: because the
crucial elements of sociological theory are often found best with a quali-
tative method, that is from data on structural conditions, consequences,
deviances, norms, processes, patterns, and systems; because qualitative
research is more often than not, the end product of research within a
substantive area beyond which few research sociologists are motivated to
move; and because qualitative research is often the most “adequate” and
“efficient” way to obtain the type of information required and to contend
with the difficulties of an empirical situation. (Glaser & Strauss, 1967,
p. 18)
The argument amounts finally to a question of different emphasis,
not of opposition between the two. Glaser and Strauss accepted a
dichotomy between qualitative and quantitative research where the latter
was constructed to be dominating the former. Quantitative sociology was
supposed to be more “scientific”, more “rigorous”, more “accomplished”
than qualitative sociology. Yet, Glaser and Strauss reversed the stigma (to
use the title of one of Goffman’s books) highlighting qualitative research’s
particular suitability for the generation of theory from data. Through
their work, qualitative became “better”, even though “relaxed quantities”
could do a comparable job.
Glaser and Strauss’s book enjoyed an impressive success and partici-
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“travel light”, that is guidelines that would not involve quantification and
yet at the same time be considered scientific. The book was followed by a
series of other methodological books on qualitative methods that would
give the same argument. The very first book published under the title
Qualitative Sociology (Schwartz & Jacobs, 1979) is particularly striking. It
presents symbolic interactionism and ethnomethodology, next to quanti-
tative research, in a fourfold empty table (Schwartz & Jacobs, 1979, p. 5)
(see also Table 13.1):
But the authors don’t explore the table at all. They are interested only
in data based on natural language and the actors’ point of view, i.e. the
right hand lower cell. They don’t discuss any of the other categories, or
try to fill the cells out. This strategy is the one that would generally be
adopted by the many textbooks on qualitative sociology that would be
published in the 1970s, such as Filstead (1970), Lofland (1971), Bogdan
and Taylor (1975) or, later, Taylor and Bogdan (1984).
Another academic innovation important for the institutionalization of
“qualitative sociology” was the creation of the eponymous journal Qual-
itative Sociology. The first issue came out in May 1978. In this issue, the
journal’s title is neither explained nor justified. It is only stated on page 2,
along with the list of editorial board members, that the journal is dedi-
cated to “qualitative interpretation of social life” and that “manuscripts
dealing with the qualitative analysis of social life” are welcomed. Notice-
able is a letter to the editor where the author expresses his happiness to
witness the birth of the journal, because he feels “disenchanted with indis-
criminate number-crunching and the attending tendency for the process
to become an end in itself”. Nonetheless, “the editors discussed their own
reaction to this letter and concluded that in fact do not see [their] project
as an attack on quantitative sociology” (Qualitative Sociology, 1978, Vol.
1, No. 1, p. 163).
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References to the label “qualitative sociology” by those who ignored,
or sought to oppose, quantification became important first and fore-
most in sociological textbooks. The label was addressed primarily to the
young students flocking the university. It was intended to hawk the good
word to students and help newly hired undergraduates. It also created
a legitimate spot in a department curriculum and provided positions for
professors entering the job market.
A Bipolar Category
To measure the students and professors’ role in institutionalizing “qual-
itative sociology”, we will now use easy quantitative methods ourselves,
since, as Gabriel Tarde has argued, they can help us follow the “imitation
trends” of an innovation (Didier, 2010). Once the “tribe” of “qualitative
sociology” was knotted together, we might ask who got interested in it
and reused the label. Here, statistics are not used, as they often are, to set
up the “context” of a social event, but on the contrary to follow the social
effects of this event. To this end, JStor helps us conveniently. The inter-
face “Data for Research” makes it fairly easy to track quantitatively the
use of any expression (association of words) in JStor’s entire database.5
My searches resulted in the following. The word “qualitative”, as far
as it is related to the words “research”, “method” or “sociology”, takes
off right after the war. “Qualitative research” and “qualitative method”
raised much faster and higher than “qualitative sociology”, which actually
began to rise later, in the 1950s (see Fig. 13.2).
But sociology was not the only discipline experiencing a consolida-
tion of the dichotomy between quantitative and qualitative. A search by
disciplines shows that social work, on the one hand, and several biology
specialties (such as developmental and ecology), on the other, are among
the most important ones driving the results for “qualitative research” and
“qualitative method” presented in Fig. 13.2.
Now, let’s zoom in to study “qualitative sociology” itself. I excluded
publications before WWII, when they were mainly noise, and I cut off
my search after 1985, when many of the actors had changed, and the
publication rate had generally grown and results were hence no longer
as informative. This being done, it appears that the 20 authors that used
most often the expression “qualitative sociology” (names are followed
by the number of articles using these words) were not only those who
belonged to the “tribe” as defined by Qualitative Sociology (see Table
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13.1). On the contrary, many among them (Alexander, Duncan, Blau,
Goodman) (see Table 13.2) were scholars who were famous for their
use of statistics. In fact, it appears that Lazarsfeld’s definition of qual-
itative sociology had been as powerful as his advances in qualitative
research, so that the quantitativists participated themselves in establishing
a second school of qualitative research, as defined initially by their famous
predecessor—and thus obviously making also massive use of quantities.
What were the topics addressed by these qualitativists? The distribution
of the keywords of the papers allows the hypothesis that those who used
the expression “qualitative sociology” did so in two different contexts.
Table 13.3 below shows the first cluster of keywords, used in 800 to 1500
papers, which are words associated with the “abstracted empiricism” kind
of sociology: variable, model, population, per cent, table, class.
Used in only 380 to 400 papers, we find a different semantic group
comprising: member, field, pattern, and person (see Table 13.4). The fact
that the amount of papers using this second set of words is so different
from the amount using the first set of words leads us to think that they
Fig. 13.2 Yearly distribution of the expressions “qualitative research”, “quali-
tative method”, “qualitative sociology” and “quantitative sociology” in the Jstor
full database
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Table 13.2 Name of





Karl L. Alexander 16 John Hagan 12
Kenneth C. Land 16 Aaron M. Pallas 11
Otis Dudley Duncan 16 Glendon Schubert 11
Peter M. Blau 16 J. David Singer 11
Helen M. Robinson 15 James S. Coleman 11
Leo A. Goodman 15 Michel Vale 11
Helen K. Smith 13 Peter H. Rossi 11
Seymour Martin Lipset 13 Samuel Weintraub 11
Charles Tilly 12 David Knoke 10
David Riesman 12 David Snyder 10
Source JStor database, author’s own compilation
Table 13.3 Twenty






Variable 1559 Population 971
Theory 1353 Percent 967
Study 1305 Table 958
System 1207 School 951
Student 1154 Problem 937
Model 1136 Class 918
Behaviour 1105 Education 907
Political 1105 Change 892
Science 1078 Child 837
Analysis 1010 Family 788
Source JStor database, author’s own compilation
Table 13.4 Twenty
successive keywords




Member 446 Pattern 404
Unite 439 Empirical 401
Organizational 429 Activity 399
Field 427 Approach 398
Specie 426 Person 396
Rural 419 Power 394
Hypothesis 407 Interaction 392
Politics 407 Teaching 390
Historian 405 College 389
Number 405 Occupational 389
Source JStor database, author’s own compilation
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might also be related to two different sets of papers. If this hypothesis
were true, then the data would prove also that the “interpretative” tribe
remained less productive—probably because they were much smaller in
number.
These data about the papers listed in the JStor database let us lead
to think that the label “qualitative sociology” did indeed take shape
consequent to the conceptual innovations that we have described. But
“qualitative sociology” is a category where two sets of “good examples”
of papers are in opposition. On the one hand, there are those which
belong to the “Lazarsfeldian” cluster where qualitative and quantitative
are in a hierarchy. On the other hand, there is a set of papers pertaining
to an “interpretative” definition of the qualitative influenced by Blumer,
Cicourel and their intellectual descendants which seeks to set itself apart
from such “quantitativist” uses of qualitative information.
Conclusion
The story of “qualitative sociology” begins right after WWII in a
paradox. It was imported from German-speaking Europe, defined and
used, first and foremost, not by opponents to quantitative methods, but,
on the contrary, by Lazarsfeld in an inherent—but dominated—relation
to quantitative analysis. Qualitative analysis was for him a propaedeutic
to quantitative sociology or the use of “qualitative” statistical variables.
At the same time, many sociologists started to oppose the apparently
unstoppable rise of polls and survey analysis and expressed strong argu-
ments against these methods. Blumer raised the problem of the neglect
of members’ ability to interpret situations, and Cicourel furbished the
measurement by fiat argument. These arguments were reused and pushed
to their limit a decade later by the “radical sociologists” in their denunci-
ation of the drawbacks of the Welfare State, seen as closely associated to
quantitative surveys. But these sociologists did not explicitly ban quantifi-
cation, they simply did without surveys, they “travelled light”. And it was
only at the very end of the 1960s that the category “qualitative sociology”
became institutionalized, especially through textbooks and curricula.
What’s more, it should be remembered that the sociologists studied
here criticized a method of quantification, not the general use of quan-
tities. The social spheres that pretended to be free from numbers had
in fact been purified only from a certain method of quantification. De-
quantification is the result of an activity aiming to suppress certain kinds
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of quantities. Society is everywhere quantitative, only some spheres have
banished certain methods (of quantification). All sociologists referred to
here, still used quantities in one way or another. It is thus apparently not
possible (nor desirable) to completely wipe out quantities from an epis-
temic system. All that actors have been doing is rearranging quantities,
reorganizing them with or without one another, reshaping their relations
in new and innovative fashions. But they never completely quantified nor
qualified society; rather, they rearranged the quantities that they found
already within.
In this respect, in a 1984 special issue of Qualitative Sociology entitled
“Computer and qualitative data”, the editors insisted that “large main-
frame computers” had changed sociology since 1946, but that they were
expensive and owned by third parties who could control and influence
the research (Conrad & Reinharz, 1984). According to the editors, since
the war, computers had been in the hands of either the (Welfare) State
or big (capitalist) companies. But they also remarked that very recently,
microcomputers had appeared and had become so cheap that every single
researcher could now have his or her own. Thus they raised a new ques-
tion: “How can the personal computer aid that group of sociologists who
do not rely on mathematical analysis of data but who search their data
for patterns and meanings”? (Conrad & Reinharz, 1984, p. 4). Stated
differently, microcomputers are the material tool of knowledge making
compatible to “travelling light”, and at the same time they are dealing
with something close to mathematical analysis.
Contemporary radical sociologists might notice that the conditions
that justified the rejection of quantitative reasoning in the 1970s have
nowadays lost their relevance. Today, the baby boomers are old, the
Welfare State is weak, and everybody has a personal computer and an
internet provider through which one can access a number of fascinating
databases. A wealth of new methods independent from those “demo-
nized” by the radicals in the 1970s is available. At this point, it seems to
me that the dichotomy qualitative/quantitative barely has teeth anymore
and could diligently be forgotten. As we have argued elsewhere, today,
radical sociologists should all be also “statactivists” (Bruno et al., 2014).
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Notes
1. The opposition to quantification was in the 1930s the feature of a conserva-
tive ethos, criticizing standardization, state centralization and progressivism,
associated to numbers (Boltanski, 2014). It became clearly progressive after
WWII.
2. There were debates about quantification in other disciplines, especially in
anthropology, but here we will concentrate only on sociology.
3. It is important to keep in mind that at the time Blumer was losing ground
in sociology on two sides. On the one hand, he was much less empiri-
cist than the Lazarsfeldians. He was proposing philosophical-like arguments
against the data used by the quantitative researchers. Nonetheless, empiri-
cism was then, indeed, exciting. And, on the other hand, he was also
missing important innovations in philosophy itself—especially the devel-
opments of phenomenology showing that individuals are always embedded
in relations to others. So, even on the “qualitative” side, he was seen as
being slightly outdated.
4. Other arguments have been advanced concerning numbers, but they are
ecumenists in that they seek a wise articulation of the relationship between
the quantitative and qualitative, not an opposition. For instance, Erving
Goffman never published about the relationship between the quantitative
and qualitative. He was apparently simply not interested in the question.
5. The web address is http://dfr.jstor.org/. I want to thank warmly Erik
Gjesfjeld for introducing me to this very useful resource.
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In 1985, Anthony Hopwood remarked as follows: “A world of the seem-
ingly precise, specific and quantitative can in this way emerge out of that
of the contentious and the uncertain” (Hopwood, 1988 [1985], p. 262).
This was more than a decade before the “performative turn” in economic
sociology and several years before the academic explosion of “New Public
Management” studies. Hopwood was speaking here about accounting,
and how costs, consequences and benefits come to be divided into the
defined and the seemingly known, and the imprecise and the intangible,
and how this can give a calculative priority to the economic rather than
the social.
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But, as he and many others have shown since, and as the contributors
to this volume show, the point is more general. Numbers have acquired
an unassailable power in modern political life. Political authority and the
stewardship of people’s lives are today inseparable from the vast range of
different sorts of numbers that are deployed in the governing of advanced
liberal democratic capitalist societies. Debates about the health of “the
economy” are inconceivable without numerical measures of various kinds.
The same applies to the quantification of the social economy, whether this
be a matter of transforming poverty into the number of people claiming
benefits, public order into the crime rate, the state of family life into the
divorce rate or the governing of sexual conduct into the rate of spread
of AIDS. And, just as political decisions come to depend increasingly on
quantification, there is a simultaneous “de-politicization” of politics. The
boundaries between politics and objectivity are redrawn, by proclaiming
that political decisions are little more than automated technical mecha-
nisms that tell us what to do and when, and what to prioritize (Rose,
1991).
This much will be familiar to many readers of this volume. But even for
those well aware of such issues, the phrase “follow the science”, and its
numerical counterpart the “R” number, has attained an ascendancy that
none of us could have imagined only a few months ago.1 This affirmation
of scientific expertise is all the more remarkable, given its contrast with
the statement by Michael Gove, the then Secretary of State for Justice, in
the context of debates about Brexit in 2016, that “people in this country
have had enough of experts” (The Financial Times, 3 June 2016).
At its simplest, in an epidemic the R number—the reproduction
number—is one of the most important numbers. As almost every citizen
now knows, if the R number is below one, then that is good news. For if
it is below one, the number of new infections will fall over time. But if R
is above one, that is definitely not good news. It means that the number
of new infections is accelerating; the higher the number, the faster the
virus spreads through the population.
The R number can be used as a device for shutting schools, shops,
restaurants, hotels, gyms, factories, university campuses, international
travel and indeed most forms of social life. In the other direction, it can
also be used as a device for opening some or all such venues and interac-
tions. Two newspaper headlines illustrate this well. The first was printed
on 1 May 2020 in the Financial Times, and stated as follows: “R number:
the figure that will determine when lockdown lifts”. Describing the R
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number as the average number of new cases generated by an infected
individual, the article went on to say that politicians viewed it as a key
indicator for lifting lockdowns enough for significant social and economic
activity to resume, without allowing a resurgence of the virus. Also, and
crucially, it was viewed as a relatively simple number to convey success or
otherwise to the general public. However, it also went on to say that
unfortunately, and despite the repeated appeals to it in statements by
politicians, things are more complicated. Not only is it incredibly diffi-
cult to measure, as an aggregate number for a large geographical area it is
also potentially misleading or at least uninformative, because it does not
tell you what is happening in your local area. Further, while it is widely
described as if it were the actual number of new cases generated by an
infected individual, in most countries the R number is in fact an esti-
mate generated from mathematical models and simulations, with different
modelling teams even in the same country arriving at different results.
The second headline, printed two weeks later in The Financial Times,
was more cautious: “R numbers offer no easy answers for UK to lift
lockdown”. The starting point of this piece was the significant regional
differences in the number of officially recorded new infections per day. In
London, which previously had one of the highest number of new infec-
tions, the number of new infections was just 24 per day according to data
from Public Health England (PHE) and Cambridge University, whereas
the comparable figure in Yorkshire and North-East England was 4,320.
This was cited as evidence of the difficulty of having uniform policies
even across England. The modelling conducted by PHE and Cambridge
suggested a median R of 0.75 for England as a whole, but varying from
0.4 in London to 0.8 in the North-East and Yorkshire. Other modelling
groups, such as the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine
and Imperial College, London, gave higher figures for R in London, but
all showed the number significantly below 1 in the capital. And things
became even more difficult once differences in approach to the relax-
ation of restrictions between England and the devolved governments in
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland began to appear. In rejecting the
lockdown easing in England, all cited worries about the R number in their
regions.
But the different R number estimates only partially explain the diver-
gence in policy across the different parts of the UK. Statisticians reiterated
that the R number was extraordinary difficult to calculate, the Scottish
government’s chief statistician commenting that the official R number in
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Scotland takes 56 hours for an Edinburgh university supercomputer to
calculate. Further, he emphasized that the number, even when checked
against the numbers produced by the other models, should only be
expressed as a range, rather than a single figure, as there is a roughly
50% risk that the R level is higher than any specific point estimate.
These differences in results arising from different modelling assump-
tions, when combined with the different approaches to the relaxation
of restrictions in the devolved administrations, began to undermine the
appeal of the slogan to “follow the science”. An article in the publica-
tion Wired went as far as to adopt the headline: “Boris Johnson’s brief
love affair with science is well and truly over” (Matt Reynolds, 6 June
2020, Wired).2 Moreover, it soon became clear that, while the R number
needed to be below 1 to ease restrictions, no politician was willing to
say how far below 1 it needed to be in order to ease restrictions. In
addition, prominent scientific advisors began to distance themselves from
specific government policies. For instance, on 3 June the Chief Scien-
tific Adviser to the UK government refused to explicitly endorse the
government’s decision to impose quarantine on new arrivals to the UK
with effect from the following week (The Guardian, Andrew Sparrow,
“Evening Summary” 3 June 2020, updated 4 June 2020).
The R number is a key part of what one might call a conditional “trust
in numbers” (Porter, 1995), albeit one where the authority of the number
is tempered not only by political judgement but also by an array of
other numbers, including GDP and unemployment, together with reports
by official bodies predicting either a V-shaped or a U-shaped recovery,
a further spike in infections, and much else besides. It thus stands at
the heart of the politics of health in the twenty-first century, a perfect
“mediating instrument” (Miller & O’Leary, 2007) linking the health and
well-being of the population with the health of the economy. A calculative
assemblage that facilitates a level of intervention in the lives and activities
of citizens in advanced liberal democracies that is not only unprece-
dented but fundamentally at odds with so much that is at the heart of
our political culture. As Foucault remarked of the politics of health in
the eighteenth century, the biological characteristics of the population
become relevant factors for economic management. It becomes neces-
sary to organize around the population an apparatus that will ensure its
subjection and even its enforced idleness so as to (hopefully) increase or
at least maintain its utility as and when the pandemic subsides (Foucault,
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1980 [1976]). Epidemiology, virology and statistical science thus assume
an increasingly important place in the machinery of power.
Medico-administrative knowledge, albeit tempered by political expe-
diency, has achieved a political hold on a population at the mercy of a
virus that in just over a few months has certainly killed more than 50,000
people in the UK as of the time of writing, and may well have killed more
than 60,000. And this display of medical knowledge has taken place in the
most public manner. Daily briefings (initially), 92 in total, ending on 23
June,3 saw government ministers flanked on most occasions by their most
senior scientific advisers, and in most instances diplomatically endorsing
the actions of the government. Perhaps the most notable exception to this
being the critical comments made by the Deputy Chief Medical Officer
Jonathan Van-Tam on 30 May, when asked about the behaviour of Boris
Johnson’s most senior special adviser Dominic Cummings. As the jour-
nalist John Crace remarked, the relationship between the government
and the scientists never really recovered thereafter,4 and Van-Tam did not
appear again at the daily briefings.5
At every briefing there would be slides showing graphs of the number
of new cases, the total number of cases, the 7-day rolling average, the
number of patients on mechanical ventilators, the number of people
in hospital with COVID-19, and, most depressingly, the number of
deaths in the previous 24 hours, as well as the total number of deaths.
This unprecedented public display of medical knowledge was backed up
by various government websites that provided access to the materials
displayed, while the Office for National Statistics, the National Records
of Scotland, and the Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency
provided further data. This included three different ways of measuring
the number of deaths: those with a positive COVID-19 test result; those
where the death certificate mentions COVID-19; and the third being the
number of “excess” deaths for the time of year. As of mid-/late June,
the three numbers for the UK as a whole stood at 43,414, 53,009, and
65,138, respectively.6
The political ascendancy of the beguilingly simple R number is all
the more remarkable, as it is a relative newcomer to epidemiology. Now
regarded as arguably the most important quantity in the study and control
of epidemics (Heesterbeek, 2002), it was only clearly defined for the first
time in 1975 by the German mathematician Klaus Dietz, as follows:
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The quantity R is called the reproduction rate, since it represents the
number of secondary cases that one case can produce if introduced to
a susceptible population. (Dietz, 1975, p. 106)
Yet, despite the existence of this clear definition, it still took a number
of years for epidemiologists to fully embrace the R number. Two events
in 1982 provided the stimulus for the R number to become central to the
analysis of epidemics by epidemiologists. The first was an article published
in February that year in the journal Science, which made extensive use of
R0, calling it “the intrinsic reproduction rate” (Anderson & May, 1982a,
p. 1055). The second was an influential workshop held in the Berlin
suburb of Dahlem in March of that year (Anderson & May, 1982b),
with almost all contributors using R0 as if the concept had been used in
epidemiology for decades, which was certainly not the case (Heesterbeek,
2002, p. 200).
There had of course been earlier attempts to model the spread of
epidemics, most notably through the work of Ronald Ross (1857–1932),
a medical doctor, a colonel in the British army, a minor poet and a
self-taught mathematician, and the first Briton to be awarded a Nobel
Prize (Heesterbeek, 2002, p. 192). He led several anti-malaria campaigns,
dissected many mosquitoes, and discovered in 1898 that (bird) malaria
was transmitted by mosquitoes, rather than by “bad air” from marshes as
was previously believed. He received a Nobel Prize for this discovery in
1902.
His work in modelling epidemics started with showing that trying to
control malaria by fighting mosquitoes was a real possibility. This was
in contrast to general opinion at the time that fighting mosquitoes was
not viable because it would be impossible to kill all mosquitoes locally
and therefore impossible to stop transmission of malaria. Ross identi-
fied the main factors in malaria transmission and calculated the number
of new infections arising per month as the product of these factors. He
referred to his discovery as the “Mosquito Theorem”. His conclusion was
that instead of having to eradicate all mosquitoes in a given area, it was
sufficient to depress the ratio of mosquitoes to man below a particular
threshold. There was, he argued, a “critical density of mosquitoes” below
which the malaria parasite could not be sustained.
While the notion of a critical threshold (critical community size) was
helpful for the study and control of malaria, it was not conducive for the
development of the notion of a reproduction threshold or rate. As Ross
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himself had discovered, malaria is a vector-transmitted infection, rather
than a directly horizontally (i.e. person to person) transmitted infection.
Ross published a series of three papers (two co-authored with Hilda
Hudson) (see Ross, 1916; Ross & Hudson 1917a, 1917b) in an attempt
to develop a general theory of epidemic phenomena, a “theory of happen-
ings”. He referred to his approach as “a priori pathometry” (Heesterbeek,
2002, pp. 192–193; see also Kucharski, 2020). This led Heesterbeek
(2002, p. 193) to comment that Ross was the first to try and develop
a general theory of epidemic phenomena using prior assumptions about
mechanisms that could be acting in the spread of infections, rather than
trying to obtain insight a posteriori by studying real epidemics. Heester-
beek concluded that this work represents the first development in abstract
or modern epidemic theory, even if it did not result in the formulation of
R0.
But it was to be more than 50 years before the notion of the repro-
duction rate was to be formulated in epidemiology. This, despite Ross’s
aspiration to “establish the general law of epidemics”, and his encourage-
ment to McKendrick, a medical doctor who served in the British army
under his command in Sierra Leone in 1901 during one of the anti-
malaria campaigns, to continue his work further. As Ross remarked rather
ambitiously to McKendrick: “We shall end by establishing a new science.
But first let you and me unlock the door and then anybody can go in who
likes” (Ross, in a letter to McKendrick in 1911, cited in Heesterbeek,
2002, p. 195).
Meanwhile, in 1925, and within demography rather than epidemi-
ology, the concept of R0 or the reproduction rate was formulated in
a paper titled “On the true rate of natural increase”, published in the
Journal of the American Statistical Association (Dublin & Lotka, 1925).
One of the authors was Alfred Lotka, who worked for the Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company in New York. Lotka had started the chain of
reasoning with a short note in Science in 1907 on the “rate of natural
increase per head”, which he called r, of a population with constant birth
and death rate.
The 1925 paper was published just one year after President Coolidge
had signed into law the Immigration Act of 1924, the most stringent US
immigration policy up till then in the nation’s history. The paper began
by remarking that “The present policy of restricting immigration into the
United States lends a particular interest to inquiries into the powers of
natural increase of our population” (Dublin & Lotka, 1925, p. 305). The
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paper went on to comment that the excess of birth-rate over death rate
may appear to provide a measure of natural increase. However, that would
be misleading because it fails to take into account the age distribution of
the population. If one factors in reduced immigration, which would over
time result in a reduction of productive and reproductive members of
the population, combined with a falling birth-rate, then sooner or later
the birth-rate would become stationary or nearly so. Numerically, this
would mean that the excess of the birth-rate over the death rate would
fall from 11 per thousand per annum to 5.5 per thousand per annum,
that is, it would be reduced by one half (Dublin & Lotka, 1925, p. 307).
Having considered fecundity, mortality (i.e. a life table), together with
the age schedule for fecundity of females in the United States in 1920,
the authors conclude as follows:
The net result is that if we follow the history of 100,000 females at the
current rate of fecundity we find that throughout their life they give birth
to 116,700 daughters; or, on average, one female gives birth to 1.168
daughters in the course of her life. This, then, is the ratio of the total
births (of daughters) in two successive generations. It will be convenient
for future reference to denote this ratio by the symbol R0 . (Dublin & Lotka,
1925, p. 310, emphasis added)
This way of expressing things enabled the authors to speak of a “stan-
dardized” or “stable natural rate of increase” under specified conditions
of maternity and mortality. While our interest here is primarily in terms
of this early formulation of R0 within demography, it is difficult in our
current socio-political circumstances to avoid remarking on this linking
of the positive impact of immigration on the productive and reproductive
health of the population. Once the impact of reduced levels of immi-
gration, combined with a rapidly declining birth-rate, have had time to
manifest themselves, the authors remarked that the country would no
longer have a disproportionately high population in the productive and
reproductive age group, something that is rarely remarked on publicly in
current debates concerning the age profile of the UK (Dublin & Lotka,
1925, p. 328).
The 50-year gap between Dublin & Lotka’s formulation of R0 in
demography, and the formulation with regard to epidemics by the
German mathematician Klaus Dietz in 1975, is even more remarkable
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as Lotka worked in the fields of both demography and epidemiology.
Despite this:
It took a long time for modellers in epidemiology to realise that the
formulation in terms of reproduction potential is a much clearer and more
powerful concept for infectious diseases as well, which is moreover much
more amenable to generalization to heterogeneous populations, and can
be tied much more easily to data and hence applications. (Heesterbeek,
2002, p. 190)
Heesterbeek attributes this to the much closer link to data in the field
of demography, than was the case in the early development of epidemi-
ology. Researchers working in the field of epidemiology were “much
more interested in presenting a mathematically coherent theory” than in
engaging with data (Heesterbeek, 2002, p. 191). This was compounded,
he suggested, when a large number of mathematicians “took over” the
field of epidemiology in the early 1950s (Heesterbeek, 2002, p. 197).
Unfortunately, many of these depended on a review of the field by
Norman Bailey published in 1957, devoted entirely to the mathemat-
ical study of epidemic phenomena. It was unfortunate because, although
it opened up the subject for mathematicians, it neglected to extrapolate
from a paper by George Macdonald published in 1952 in the Tropical
Diseases Bulletin. Macdonald was the Director of the Ross Institute at the
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. He devoted his paper
entirely to malaria, but also in the appendix took a more general view
of epidemic phenomena, which included the “basic reproduction rate”.
Although Bailey had, apparently, read the paper by Macdonald, he did
not recognize the potential of the definition for a much more general
class of infections. It is no wonder, Heesterbeek remarks, that none of
the mathematicians was enticed to read the original Macdonald papers
for a number of years to come, for “mathematicians would not easily be
led to read a paper in the Tropical Diseases Bulletin unless they would
be told that it contained a mathematically interesting idea” (Heesterbeek,
2002, p. 197).
So, although the theory of epidemics blossomed for a number of years,
by the end of the nineteen-sixties the field had come no closer to defining
R0. As already noted above, it was not until 1975 that the concept was
finally formulated clearly within epidemiology, fifty years after it had been
formulated within demography, and twenty-five years after its potential
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had been registered within epidemiology, even if the symbol Z 0 rather
than R0 had been used. At last, the use of the concept R0 in examining
the spread and control of infectious diseases with epidemiological models
could start to grow.
Conclusions
The emergence of the R number in multiple and dispersed sites will be
no surprise to those sociologists of science who have long demonstrated
the non-linear nature of scientific discovery. That said, the bifurcation or
compartmentalization of demography and epidemiology in this instance
is quite remarkable, not least given the existence of key figures who
worked in both disciplines. However, it is perhaps reassuring that the
challenges of interdisciplinary work are not limited to the social sciences.
Also, it is possibly unsurprising to see the close links between a particular
calculative instrument within epidemiology and the politics of health in
the twenty-first century. As noted above, this linkage between medicine
and governing was already established in the eighteenth century, if not
before. As for the almost totemic significance of the R number, a number
which turns out in fact to be a range rather than a single number; again,
researchers studying accounting, management, macro-economics and no
doubt many other domains have demonstrated the power of the single
figure. What is somewhat unusual though, in the case of COVID-19, is
the prominence such a number has rapidly achieved in popular social and
political discourse.
The current crisis also reminds us more generally of the fraught
relationship between expertise and government, whether in the UK or
beyond. In the UK, and in the current pandemic, “Following the science”
has turned out to be more a slogan than a description of policy formu-
lation. The R number has acted here as a crucial mediating instrument,
linking the health and well-being of the population with the health of
the economy, and supporting arguments both in favour of and against
restrictions of various kinds. As this volume demonstrates, the triptych of
quantification, administrative capacity and democracy is far from harmo-
nious. For now, perhaps the best we can hope is that if and when the
pandemic finally subsides, responsibility for key decisions will be laid at
the door of those who made the decisions, rather than those medics who
sought to offer advice, however difficult that would have been in light
of the data available. Also, and even more importantly, let us hope that
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not too many more people will suffer and die, or lose their jobs, before a
vaccine is discovered for COVID-19.
Notes
1. (i.e. after “... a few months ago”): “This piece was written in July 2020,
when the pandemic was only a few months old.”
2. Matt Reynolds, 6 June 2020, Wired. Wired is a monthly magazine based in
San Francisco and focusing on emerging technologies and how they affect
culture, the economy and politics.
3. These resumed briefly on 2 July (and intermittently thereafter), to address
the issue of schools reopening in England with attendance becoming
mandatory, quite possibly in light of the low attendance until then among
those eligible to return to school. The following day the government
announced that later in the year there would be White House-style daily
televised press briefings.
4. John Crace, “A daily dose of world-beating waffle ends”, The Guardian,
24 June 2020.
5. As of the time of writing.
6. See the following link for the slides and datasets displayed in these brief-
ings: https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/slides-and-datasets-to-
accompany-coronavirus-press-conferences, accessed 14 July 2020. See
also https://www.statisticsauthority.gov.uk/news/covid-19-and-the-uk-sta
tistics-system, accessed 14 July 2020.
References
Anderson, R. M., & May, R. M. (1982a). Directly transmitted infectious diseases:
Control by vaccination. Science, 215(4536), 1053–1060.
Anderson, R. M., & May, R. M. (Eds.). (1982b, March 14–19). Population
biology of infectious diseases. Report of the Dahlem workshop on population of
infectious disease agents, Berlin. Springer-Verlag Berlin.
Dietz, K. (1975). Transmission and control of arboviruses. In D. Ludwig &
K. L. Cooke (Eds.), Epidemiology (pp. 104–121). Society for Industrial and
Applied Mathematics.
Dublin, L. I., & Lotka, A. J. (1925). On the true rate of natural increase. Journal
of the American Statistical Association, 20(151), 305–339.
Foucault, M. (1980 [1976]). The politics of health in the eighteenth century. In
C. Gordon (Ed.), Michel Foucault: Power/ knowledge—Selected interviews and
other writings 1972–1977 (pp. 166–182). Harvester Press.
Heesterbeek, J. A. P. (2002). A brief history of R0 and a recipe for its calculation.
Acta Biotheoretica, 50, 189–204.
Hopwood, A. G. (1988 [1985]). Accounting and the domain of the public:
Some observations on current developments (The Price Waterhouse Public
476 P. MILLER
Lecture on Accounting, University of Leeds, 1985). In Accounting from the
outside: The collected papers of Anthony G. Hopwood. Garland Publishing.
Kucharski, A. (2020). The rules of contagion: Why things spread and why they stop.
Profile Books Limited.
Miller, P., & O’Leary, T. (2007). Mediating instruments and making markets:
Capital budgeting, science and the economy. Accounting, Organizations and
Society, 32(7–8), 701–734.
Porter, T. M. (1995). Trust in numbers: The pursuit of objectivity in science and
public life. Princeton University Press.
Rose, N. (1991). Governing by numbers: Figuring out democracy. AccOunting,
Organizations and Society, 16(7), 673–692.
Ross, R. (1916). An application of the theory of probabilities to the study of
a priori pathometry – Part I. Proceedings of the Royal Society, London A, 42,
204–230.
Ross, R., & Hudson, H. P. (1917a). An application of the theory of probabili-
ties to the study of a priori pathometry—Part II. In Proceedings of the Royal
Society, London (pp. 212–225)
Ross, R., & Hudson, H. P. (1917b). An application of the theory of probabilities
to the study of a priori pathometry—Part III. In Proceedings of the Royal
Society, London (pp. 225–240).
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction
in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original
author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the
chapter’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line
to the material. If material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons
license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds




abstraction, 18, 152, 157, 233, 450
abstract, 15, 30, 126, 146, 147,
150, 156, 157, 171, 201, 427,
430
accessibility, 20, 261
accessible, 6, 52, 63, 207, 241





accrual, 312, 321, 323, 329
corporeal, 101, 103, 125
cost, 308, 329
entity, 31, 125, 187, 285, 308,
312, 314, 315
national, 10, 11, 57–59, 65, 181,
285, 359
private, 278, 307, 312, 314, 323,
324, 329, 340
statistics, 2, 10, 11, 30, 47–49, 51,
52, 57–59, 66, 113, 197, 285,
329, 359, 436
achievement, 194, 202, 258, 279,
386, 443
action, actor, 8–11, 21, 27, 31, 32,
34, 45, 48, 53–55, 57, 89, 100,
105, 110, 113, 123, 127, 137,
145, 153, 170, 172, 174, 181,
186, 189, 190, 200, 202, 219,
254, 255, 264–266, 268, 269,
279, 295, 297, 308, 346, 350,
369, 380, 381, 388, 390, 393,
405, 421, 423, 427, 430–432,
438, 439
actor-network theory, 102, 204,
234, 236
actor’s theory, 436
administrative capacity, 2, 7, 314
Africa, 160, 255, 256, 260, 262–264,
266, 269
agency(ies), 7, 32, 46, 78–80, 86, 90,
98, 102, 103, 113, 114, 126,
128, 142, 219, 237, 268, 269,
311, 398, 431, 434, 436, 438,
446, 447
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2022
A. Mennicken and R. Salais (eds.), The New Politics of Numbers,




agreement, 62, 102, 212, 222, 228,
263, 317, 341, 347–349, 354,
357, 361, 372, 396, 400, 402,
404
disagreement, 115, 217, 232, 294,
402
alignment, 137, 254
allocation, 21, 266, 287–289, 291,
292, 326
of resources, 21, 287, 290, 291,
294
answer, response, respondent, 18, 58,
61, 63, 90, 104, 114, 122, 125,
126, 144, 172, 176–180, 183,
186, 187, 193, 199–201, 203,
206, 212, 231, 236, 237, 293,
354, 359, 383, 384, 389, 396,
405, 409, 421, 433, 434, 436,
440, 447
anticipation, expectation, 7, 9, 10, 26,
66, 83, 89, 174, 240, 297, 361,
382, 385, 398, 405, 406, 408
arbitrage
arbitrator, 423, 426, 431
facilitator, 423
assemblage, device, 22, 277, 295, 297
assessment, 1, 3, 22, 23, 63, 122,
141, 186, 293, 297, 309, 312,
319, 350, 351, 402
audit, auditing, 57, 58, 62, 224, 232,
313, 323, 338, 340–344, 354,
356, 372, 410
austerity, 24, 309, 320, 321, 329, 330
authority, 15, 20, 24–26, 46, 61,
66, 67, 86, 152, 170, 211, 213,
228, 232, 255, 258, 264, 265,
268, 343, 344, 347, 351, 363,
364, 389, 390, 397, 398, 401,




autonomy, autonomous, 11, 14, 18,
34, 72, 88, 101, 110, 112, 119,
150, 194, 207, 208, 217, 237,
255, 264, 268, 321, 371, 387,
388, 405, 406
average, mean, 20, 25, 52–55, 59,
114, 158, 185, 256, 260, 312,




Becker, Howard, 28, 422, 440,
444–448
behaviour, 3, 11–14, 54, 72, 73,
75, 76, 79, 80, 85, 86, 88, 98,
106, 119, 148, 170, 173, 176,
182–185, 188, 190, 192, 198,
240, 360, 431, 435, 444
to behave, 63, 80
benchmark, benchmarking, 1, 14,
144, 170, 241, 253, 284, 285,
295, 308, 313, 322, 323, 395,
398, 406
binary logic, 149, 151
biography(ies), 177, 192, 384
Blumer, Herbert, 27, 420–431, 438,
439, 444, 447, 448, 450, 456,
458
body(ies), 5, 12–14, 49, 62, 63,
73, 75, 78, 97–99, 102, 104,
106, 108, 110, 120, 121, 174,
177, 186, 194, 198, 201, 212,
223–225, 232, 233, 254, 256,
270, 278, 294, 343, 344, 364,
396, 423, 444
inspecting, 317
living, 99, 104–106, 109–111, 115,
121, 123, 125, 127
Boltanski, Luc, 13, 14, 17, 19, 32,
100, 102, 107, 110, 126, 127,
176, 180, 203, 204, 207, 282,
INDEX 479
297, 314, 322, 329, 365, 370,
385, 391, 404, 458
Bourdieu, Pierre, 100, 104, 106, 123,
125, 176, 192, 202, 203, 239,
240
budget, 20, 56, 63–65, 67, 172, 254,
255, 259, 263, 266, 270, 278,
281, 286, 287, 289–291, 294,
299, 320, 323, 445
budgetary, 21, 24, 141, 259, 267,
268, 278, 281, 286, 287, 299,
309, 321
public budget, 260
bureaucracy(ies), 290, 314, 318, 330,
420, 436, 439
bureaucratic, 12, 58, 74, 145, 156,
292, 308, 346, 434, 435
C
calculation, 1, 7, 24, 25, 30, 55, 59,
67, 84, 97, 99, 105, 106, 109,
113, 121, 123, 124, 127, 276,
283, 294, 297, 298, 308, 314,
317, 320, 322–324, 338–344,
348–350, 355, 356, 358, 359,
367–369, 371, 372, 380, 410
calculative, 6, 11, 16, 30, 97,
102–104, 106, 121–123, 126,
198, 314, 318, 330, 345, 369
device, 369
self, 98, 102, 111. See also self
capability(ies), 13, 33, 34, 87, 100,
102, 104, 112, 124, 125, 127,
142, 158, 178, 187, 237, 319.
See also Sen, Amartya
capacity, 30, 33, 72, 83, 89, 103, 120,
121, 156, 181, 186, 190, 204,
238, 258, 259, 264, 266, 268,
282, 308, 342–344, 349, 381,
384, 396. See also administrative
capacity
capitalism, 51, 53, 57, 73, 83, 84,
100, 102, 104, 107, 111, 112,
115, 123, 124, 127, 128, 135,
136, 140, 141, 159, 269
immaterial, 32, 102, 106, 124, 125
new capitalism, 126, 150, 154, 161
category, 16–18, 26, 28, 55, 57,
60, 71, 77, 102, 104, 114,
140, 145, 153, 170, 173–176,
180, 184–186, 192, 193, 199,
203, 208, 210, 226, 228, 236,
237, 256–258, 324, 381–387,
396–398, 401, 404, 405, 425,
436–438, 444, 449, 450, 452,
456
categorization, 16, 59, 124, 141,
171, 192, 199, 210, 387, 388,
433. See also classification;
codification; equivalence;
nomenclature
census, 59–61, 63, 65, 67, 172, 181,
386, 387, 409, 445. See also
inquiry; panel; poll; survey
centralization, 47, 458
centralized, 14, 46, 47, 57, 279
decentralization, 82, 255, 410
certification, 18, 19, 197, 198, 200,
202, 206, 208–212, 219, 222,
223, 234, 235
chains, 47, 150, 228, 233, 236, 255,
355, 363, 365, 383
of production, 31, 383, 385
of value, 219, 220
change(s), 8, 16, 19, 22, 32, 46, 57,
58, 61, 74, 77, 108, 111, 116,
124, 127, 136, 139, 140, 146,
147, 150, 151, 160, 170, 171,
180–182, 185, 188, 191, 209,
210, 212, 213, 219, 223, 227,
236, 237, 239, 241, 254, 259,
262, 264, 269, 270, 276, 285,
287, 292, 296–298, 312, 323,
480 INDEX




China, 4, 6, 12, 71–76, 78, 81,
83–85, 87–90, 158, 408
Cicourel, Aaron, 420, 432, 433,
435–438, 440, 441, 444, 447,
448, 456
citizen, 6, 8, 9, 12, 15, 17, 20, 22,
26, 32, 62, 64, 72–77, 79, 80,
83, 84, 86–88, 90, 124, 148,
171, 237, 254, 263, 265, 267,
268, 270, 297, 328, 343, 370,
387, 389, 396–398, 400
citizenship, 2, 12, 86, 140, 148,
149, 399
civic, 24, 32, 62–64, 67, 77, 79,
203, 208, 213, 217, 220, 268,
283, 295
class(es), 33, 50, 55, 60, 75, 87, 159,
161, 174, 177, 184, 185, 188,
203, 346, 454
classification, 2, 14, 16, 31, 55, 57,
59–61, 98, 192, 199, 201, 203,
239
codification, 128, 212
code, 9, 79, 80, 199, 201, 433
coding, 201, 383, 434, 450
see also category; inquiry;
quantification; questionnaire
cognition, cognitive




cognitive tool, 151, 419, 434
collective, 8, 11, 18, 22, 26, 54, 61,
62, 74, 106, 138, 141, 153,
154, 178, 184, 185, 187–192,
200, 210, 217, 241, 282, 294,
296, 308, 338, 340–344, 346,
348, 349, 356, 367–369, 380,
382–384, 386, 387, 393, 396,
397, 400–402, 404–408
collective learning, 382, 400, 407
commensurability, 151, 308, 315,
381, 409
commensurable, 102, 381
incommensurable, 104, 105, 119
common(s)
commonality, 19, 204, 207, 209,
216, 217, 234, 237, 238
common sense, 16, 266, 433
ground, 277, 449, 451
communication, 25, 54, 82, 197–199,
201, 207, 209, 342, 362, 363,
440
community(ies), 19, 20, 107, 110,
116, 121, 148, 149, 155, 175,
188, 206, 209, 213, 223–227,
231, 241, 258, 264, 317, 385,
399, 400, 404, 407, 429, 445
comparison, 4, 15, 48, 61, 97, 119,
143, 151, 152, 154, 256, 262,
284, 295, 297, 298, 314, 316,
320, 323, 354, 355, 359, 360,
379, 403, 451
comparative, 145, 158, 160, 207,
239
comparative frame, 143
competition, competitiveness, 19, 21,
23, 25, 65, 81, 102, 120, 124,
210, 234, 238, 259, 279, 282,
283, 290, 295, 296, 308–310,
313–315, 318, 323, 329, 330,
353, 354, 356, 363, 364, 390
compromise, 33, 50, 101, 138, 142,
143, 155, 205, 206, 226, 233,
235, 327, 388, 401, 404, 407,
449
computer, computerization, 72, 83,
88, 106, 176, 178, 179, 457. See
also calculation
INDEX 481
concern, 18, 21, 23, 24, 34, 55, 118,
121, 123, 128, 178, 181, 199,
203, 207, 208, 210, 212, 226,
236, 237, 281, 288, 308, 319,
320, 322, 328, 329, 397, 402,
408, 446, 450
political, 9, 10, 22, 31, 154, 182,
200, 207, 217, 236, 446
social, 382
conditional, conditionality, 20, 268,
310, 328
conflict(s)
conflictual, 143, 352, 353
moral, 13, 99, 102, 103, 117, 119,
126
construction, deconstruction, 11, 21,
46, 48–50, 55, 57, 59, 60, 65,
66, 80, 125, 135, 153, 171,
173, 180, 188, 193, 199, 204,
217, 218, 234, 237, 240, 260,
275, 277, 285, 286, 295, 338,
380–382, 385, 395–397
context, 5, 8, 16–18, 27, 29, 46,
47, 53, 74, 77, 80, 85, 89, 91,
98, 102–104, 109, 113, 114,
123–125, 128, 137, 139, 143,
148, 160, 174–178, 180, 188,
190, 254, 256, 266, 269, 276,
286, 290–292, 295, 297, 307,
340, 351, 354, 361, 367, 371,
379, 403, 405, 420, 427, 431,
433, 438, 453, 454
(de)contextualizing, 117
contract, 20, 24, 26, 173, 190, 242,
256, 269, 309, 314–316, 321,
322, 324–326, 330, 390, 391
controversies, 16, 25, 52, 142, 280,
282, 288, 294, 339, 351, 355,
359, 361, 362, 369, 446, 447
convention
of coordination, 29, 32, 238
of equivalence, 29, 391
of measurement, 16
of the state, 32, 406, 410
theory, 237, 239, 240
cooperation, 202, 262–264, 348, 393,
443
coordination, 20, 29, 32, 33, 201,
202, 204, 205, 208, 209, 216,
234–236, 238, 264, 267, 310,




minimization of, 310, 320
credit, 13, 78–81, 83, 85, 86, 90,
148, 261
social credit, 4, 6, 12, 15, 72–74,
77–81, 84–90, 158, 234
worthiness, 78–80
criteria, 57, 65, 141, 145, 181, 202,
203, 212, 219, 225, 226, 253,
270, 284, 289, 291–293, 367,
398, 399, 403
criticism, 23, 28, 72, 84, 161, 200,
204, 206–208, 211, 212, 217,
218, 222, 223, 233, 236, 237,
240, 242, 254, 317–319, 340,
369, 400, 422, 423, 428, 429,
432, 435, 438, 441, 444, 449
social, 382, 400, 404, 406–408
critics, 84, 233, 293, 400, 420
custom, customary, 19, 158, 201,
205, 210, 213, 226–228
D
Daston, Lorraine, 2, 16, 121, 233,
417, 426
data
big data, 72, 74, 82, 87, 91, 187,
418
database, dataset, 79, 81, 83, 84,





data production, 30, 193, 384, 386,
418
data subjects, 73, 86, 88, 89
deliberation, dialogue, negotiation,
7, 19, 23, 25, 26, 29, 60, 101,
155, 174, 200, 207, 213, 217,
218, 223, 229, 232, 235–237,
240, 242, 267, 269, 280,
281, 287–289, 295, 296, 316,
338, 339, 344, 345, 347–349,
355–358, 369, 372, 397, 400,
404, 407
deliberative arena, 383, 385
democracy (managed)
a-democracy, 26, 382, 397, 399,
400, 406
and participation, 128, 148, 381,
401, 408
- rights, 153
democratization, democratic, 2, 8, 23,
25, 122, 170, 209, 213, 269,
277, 280, 297, 319, 321, 384,
386, 395–397, 399, 443
dependence, 188, 208, 266
Desrosières, Alain, 2, 8, 16, 26,
28–30, 45, 52, 54, 100, 101,
137, 159, 169–172, 174, 190,
193, 199, 239, 240, 255, 275,
276, 280, 284, 285, 298, 346,
359, 380, 381, 409, 417, 419
determinism, 171, 328, 432
Dewey, J., 218, 241, 399, 407
difference, 10, 12, 13, 19, 20, 25, 31,
33, 64, 65, 84, 85, 88–90, 101,
128, 144, 158, 160, 169, 193,
205, 207, 217, 218, 235, 260,
277, 278, 327, 339, 356, 358,
360–363, 365, 368, 369, 394,
395, 445, 451
to differ, 207
directive, guideline. See Europe,
European, Europeanization;
governance
dispersion, variability, 17, 54, 55, 105,
383
dispute, 77, 175, 204, 206, 207, 223,
225, 227, 231–233, 282, 351,
403, 409, 423. See also Boltanski,
Luc
distance, 5, 14, 15, 20, 119, 136,
137, 146, 150, 151, 153, 154,
156, 160, 200, 202, 218, 236,
241, 343, 363, 384, 385
domination
bond of, 14, 136
dominated, 61, 136, 137, 139, 150,
173, 179, 237, 238, 450, 456
subjection, 14, 136
E
economic calculation, 308, 342, 346
economics, economists, 4, 7–9,
11–13, 16, 17, 22, 28–30, 32,
33, 45, 47–51, 56–59, 61, 62,
65, 66, 71, 72, 75–78, 80, 84,
86, 87, 100–102, 104, 122,
124, 125, 127, 128, 141, 156,
160, 170, 172, 174, 176–178,
184, 188, 190, 193, 198, 199,
202, 210, 213, 223, 240, 261,
263–265, 269, 275, 283, 292,
293, 295, 297, 308, 313, 315,
320, 322, 340, 343, 345, 347,
348, 350, 353, 354, 356, 362,
364, 365, 368, 369, 372, 381,
384, 386, 387, 389, 392, 393,
396, 401, 402, 409
economics, sociology, 18, 27–29, 65,
100, 101, 123, 126, 186, 190,
192, 237, 239, 380, 419, 420,
422, 423, 426, 431, 432, 435,
INDEX 483
439–441, 444, 448, 450, 457,
458
of conventions, 7–9, 13, 16, 17,
28–30, 32, 33, 102
economic unit, 315
economies of scale vs. economies of
scope, 409
economizing, 23, 24, 78, 81, 128,
151, 159, 308–310, 319–321,
329, 330
education, 3, 20, 52, 74, 151, 152,
173, 180, 181, 183, 189, 235,
254–261, 265, 270, 279–283,
289, 290, 294, 297, 299, 308,
327
effectiveness, efficiency, 12, 13, 20,
48, 77, 79, 150, 183, 205, 210,
253, 256–259, 269, 282, 283,
295, 308, 310, 313, 324, 330,
354, 379, 380, 400, 401, 408,
410
Elias, Norbert, 104, 106, 125
elite, 12, 157, 161, 269, 343, 365,
386, 397, 420, 439, 441, 447
emotions, 97, 104, 106, 109,
111–117, 119, 121, 177, 187,
225
employment, 23, 26, 27, 76, 77, 172,
173, 177, 181, 182, 189, 192,
208, 235, 262, 283, 313, 339,
348, 382, 388–395, 398, 401
unemployment, 16, 26, 181, 199,
239, 257, 258, 261, 262,
381–383, 385–389, 395–397,
401, 405, 408–410
endowment, 194, 201. See also
capability(ies); endowment;
entitlement
engagement, 19, 22, 103, 206, 209,
213, 217, 220, 221, 224, 227,
232, 233, 238, 241, 307, 319,
327, 328, 370, 399, 449
regimes of, 19, 31, 32, 208, 209,
232, 233, 236
England, 23, 307–311, 316, 318,
320–322, 328
enterprise, firm, 76, 77, 79, 107, 141,
204, 205, 229, 242, 275, 311,
344, 368, 383, 449
entitlement, 77, 317
epistemology, epistemic, 27, 28, 107,
123, 127, 280, 295, 419, 435,
438, 457
equivalence, 197, 199, 201, 239, 280,
381. See also convention
Espeland, Wendy, 3, 4, 10, 15, 21,
22, 29, 98, 100, 119, 126, 159,
200, 239, 291, 296, 298, 308,
315, 318, 371, 409, 417
ethics, ethical, ethos, 3, 10, 72, 99,
100, 107, 117, 126, 212, 257,
260, 277, 328, 392, 458
ethnomethodology, 28, 432, 433,
435, 439, 441, 443, 444,
452. See also Becker, Howard;
Garfinkel, Harold
Europe, European, Europeanization,
2, 6, 11, 15, 26, 46, 50, 54,
58, 65, 136, 138, 139, 142,
147–149, 159, 175, 185, 235,
239, 241, 269, 277, 327, 353,
379, 382, 388, 389, 391, 393,
395, 397, 398, 401, 406, 410,
456
evaluation, valuation, value, 3, 5, 23,
32, 59, 98, 100, 103, 113, 119–
121, 124, 125, 142, 147, 161,
182, 191, 198, 199, 203–205,
208, 220, 236, 239–241, 254,
262, 281, 282, 293, 295–297,
308, 309, 319, 322–327, 338,
359, 361, 370, 384, 391, 393,
399, 401, 406–408, 428
scale evaluation, 14
484 INDEX
evidence, 8, 16–19, 27, 77, 84, 135,
139, 141, 148, 153, 156, 157,
193, 206, 217, 223–228, 231,
232, 235, 237, 285, 346, 349,
356, 370, 381, 383, 399, 401,
403, 405, 433, 450
politics of, 8, 15, 16
excellence, 279, 299, 436
experience, experiment, 18, 22, 25,
27, 28, 47, 53, 78, 99, 102, 105,
107–112, 115–117, 119, 120,
122, 138, 147, 148, 156, 176,
180, 186, 191, 193, 194, 201,
210, 222, 224, 239, 241, 255,
260, 268, 318, 319, 328, 370,
384, 386, 389, 396, 398, 401,
402, 405, 427, 429, 433, 437,
443–445
expert, expertise, 11, 20, 33, 66, 77,
107, 111, 181, 224, 235, 307,
308, 315, 324, 344, 345, 347,
356, 358, 359, 362, 365, 369,
372, 400, 420, 423
expression, 22, 48, 51, 54, 66, 115,
137, 138, 147, 149, 180, 186,
221, 232, 284, 338, 371, 396,
399, 401, 419, 426, 431, 433,
435, 443, 453, 454
F
fact, factual, 16, 30, 48, 49, 52, 64,
65, 77, 89, 145, 181, 189, 193,
261, 316, 358, 364–367, 383,
391, 403, 421, 430, 435, 437.
See also Bacon, Francis; factual
territory
factual territory, 27, 402–405
feedback loop, 72, 83, 88, 127, 190
figures, numbers, 121, 151, 153, 255
financialization, 24, 85, 308, 309,
321, 322, 329, 330
formal vs. informal, 237
form, format, formatting, 1, 3, 9,
15, 18, 19, 22, 24, 29, 31,
32, 45–49, 52, 53, 55–58, 63,
64, 66, 99, 102, 104, 108,
111, 112, 124, 125, 127, 137,
142, 143, 145–147, 150–154,
156, 161, 172, 173, 175, 178,
179, 181, 182, 186, 197–201,
204, 207–209, 212, 213, 216,
218–220, 222–228, 232, 234,
236, 238, 242, 255, 276, 278,
280, 322, 325, 329, 369, 393,
399, 403, 429, 434, 437
Foucauldian approach, 13, 31
Foucault, Michel, 7, 9, 12, 13, 29–34,
86, 87, 98–101, 104, 106, 112,
125, 126, 146–148, 159, 176,
198, 204, 235–237, 239, 298,
312
frame, framing, reframed, 23, 97,
102, 110, 120, 121, 124, 137,
144–146, 148, 152, 154, 157,
159, 227, 262, 267, 368, 381,
391, 396, 407
France, 2, 6, 7, 17, 21, 25, 26, 28,
30, 32, 148, 149, 169–174, 176,
184, 190, 193, 207, 239, 278,
281, 286, 292, 296, 298, 339,
345, 347, 350, 351, 354–356,
359, 360, 362–369, 371, 382,
385, 386, 390, 391, 393, 394,
396, 401, 405, 409, 418
fraud, 80, 210
freedom, 10, 22, 27, 33, 34, 52, 71,
84, 126, 151, 177, 186, 387,
396, 403, 445, 451
free, 14, 81, 87, 99, 115, 137, 141,
187, 190, 213, 311, 314, 395,
443
free from numbers, 103, 418, 456
INDEX 485
G
game theory, 77, 80
gaming, 3, 6, 21, 327, 330, 410
Garfinkel, Harold, 28, 432–435
generation vs. verification, 450
Germany, 4, 26, 75, 107, 239, 382,




and participation, 241, 381
by numbers, 1, 3, 4, 6, 22, 26, 152,
156, 309, 389, 406
by standards, 18, 19, 209, 210
guidance, 212, 213, 219, 354, 356,
392
instruments of, 14, 147, 148, 152,
381
levels of, 145
territorial, 147, 149. See also
directive, guideline; Europe,
European, Europeanization
government, 1, 2, 4, 10, 20–22, 24,
33, 45, 46, 62, 66, 72, 75–86,
88, 90, 101, 158, 160, 174,
177, 190, 210, 222, 224, 231,
234, 255, 258–260, 264–268,
277–279, 286, 287, 289, 292,
293, 298, 307, 311, 312, 314,
320–323, 325, 326, 329, 330,
343, 347, 371, 380, 431, 438
governmentality. See Foucault, Michel;
governance
Guadeloupe, 6, 24, 25, 337, 339–342,
344–347, 349–352, 354, 355,
359–362, 364–372
guarantee, 22, 57, 182, 198, 232,
234, 270, 340, 341, 389, 390
H
Hacking, Ian, 2, 31, 380, 418
harmonic/harmonization, 185, 192
hazard, contingencies, 210, 392, 436
hegemony, 84, 126, 190
HM Prison and Probation Service
(HMPPS), 23, 307, 310, 313,
316
Hood, Christopher, 3, 277, 278, 284,
292, 307, 310, 410
Hopwood, Anthony, 2, 6, 30, 315
horizontal vs vertical, 151
human
activities, 115, 126, 217, 291, 293,
401
humankind, 80
posthuman, 73, 88, 89
I
ideal city, 8, 9, 15
ideology, ideological, 12, 16, 73,
75–77, 161, 237, 270, 391, 407
impact, 1, 10, 23, 77, 108, 198,
205, 255, 259, 283, 286, 296,
324–327, 341, 348, 353, 385,
388, 394, 398, 408, 443
implementation, 9, 18–20, 26, 79,
84, 86, 171, 198–200, 202, 214,
222, 223, 261, 267, 275, 277,
285, 324, 338, 351, 354, 379,
393, 403
incentive, 23, 79, 80, 98, 152, 181,
240, 259, 260, 280, 281, 285,
291, 292, 327, 393
market, 313
see also market, marketization
indexes, 11, 59, 359, 369, 370, 372
indication, 21, 25, 86, 146, 172, 211,
270, 317, 365, 436
indicator(s)
biased, 270, 397
measuring, 253, 256, 279, 294,
297, 380
of performance, 3, 20–22, 119,
120, 152, 159, 241, 253, 255,
486 INDEX
257, 259, 262, 266, 270,
276–280, 283, 285–287, 291,
292, 294, 297, 380, 392, 398
quantitative, 152, 241, 255, 259,
279, 295, 297, 392
indifference, indifferent, 137, 150,
156, 157, 161, 343, 432, 435
individual, 3, 12–14, 16, 18, 19, 22,
25, 47, 52–56, 60, 61, 71–80,
86–88, 90, 99, 100, 102–104,
106, 110, 111, 113, 114, 122,
123, 125, 127, 158, 170, 171,
177, 179, 181–183, 186–191,
198, 204, 207–210, 212–214,
216–218, 222, 234, 235, 237,
238, 264, 290, 292–294, 296,
308, 318, 319, 321, 339, 355,
363–365, 370, 383–386, 389,
390, 392, 398, 422, 423, 443,
458
individualism, 72, 178
individual, 13, 14, 16, 18, 19, 22,
25, 47, 52, 53, 55, 56, 60, 61,
71–75, 77–80, 86–88, 90, 99,
100, 102–104, 106, 110, 112,
113, 122, 123, 125, 127, 158,
170, 171, 177, 179, 181–183,
187–191, 198, 204, 207–210,
212–214, 216–218, 222, 234,
235, 237, 238, 241, 257, 264,
290, 292–294, 296, 308, 318,
319, 321, 339, 355, 363–365,
370, 383–386, 389, 392, 398,
422, 423, 443, 458
behaviour, 3, 12, 54, 75, 76,





as a bond of domination, 14, 136
as a distributive difference, 14, 136
measuring, 135, 150
semantic field of, 136, 139, 155
spatialization of, 147–150, 237
information, 1, 10, 11, 14, 18, 19,
28, 31, 45, 46, 56, 57, 63, 64,
75, 77, 79, 81–85, 87, 90, 108,
144, 158, 175, 177, 179–182,
188, 191, 193, 199, 210, 212,
216, 223–225, 228, 237, 254,
260, 261, 269, 294, 312, 318,
341, 343–345, 348, 356, 364,
386, 395, 399, 402, 424, 431,
434, 441, 451, 456
informational basis of judgement in
justice (IBJJ), 143, 402, 403. See
also Sen, Amartya
infrastructure, 7, 10, 12, 17, 18, 73,
76, 78, 80, 81, 85–88, 146,
170–173, 175–191, 193, 259,
260, 265, 448
inquiry, 191, 224, 228, 233, 343,
371, 383, 386, 396, 401, 404,
405, 420, 423, 424
deliberative, 404, 405
institution(s), 6, 8, 13, 15, 31, 32,
45, 52, 60, 79, 80, 102–104,
111, 124, 127, 137, 138, 140,
148, 150, 154, 157, 173–175,
177, 180, 184, 190, 240, 255,
257, 265, 279, 290, 298, 307,
338, 347, 350, 356, 382, 386,
388, 396, 401, 406, 422, 433,
436, 440, 449





symbolic, 27, 28, 421, 422, 430,
432, 439, 452
see also Blumer, Herbert
INDEX 487
interest, 2, 3, 28, 31, 50, 83, 103,
138, 142, 178, 183, 187, 189,
204, 207, 212, 222, 232, 269,
282, 314, 315, 318, 325, 353,
400, 432
internalizing, 380
international, 47, 97, 169, 212, 219,
225, 254, 256, 259, 260, 262,
263, 266, 267, 284, 298, 330,
339–341, 359, 379, 390
experts, 20, 254
institutions, 46, 181, 256, 267
internet, 82, 83, 98, 101, 106, 108,
113, 151, 372, 457
digital, 12–14, 72, 73, 82, 85, 89,
107, 148, 234, 418
on line, 46, 145
interpret, interpretation, 16, 27, 30,
48, 52, 53, 55, 110, 121, 142,
146, 152, 155, 161, 298, 361,
362, 383, 393, 410, 421, 427,
428, 431, 432, 436, 447, 452,
456
interview, monograph, interviewee,
108, 115, 118–121, 171, 176,
178, 179, 181, 191, 220, 371,
372, 386, 437




judgment, statement, 63, 64, 90,
126, 198, 204, 206, 217, 225,
231–233, 298, 383, 391, 400,
402–404, 422, 433, 446. See also
assessment, informational basis of
judgement in justice (IBJJ)
judicial, 175, 200, 223, 231–233, 260
justice, 27, 71, 141, 145, 158, 203,
210, 260, 290, 382, 383, 386,
397, 401–403, 405, 408
and moralization, 140, 145
principle of justice, 386–388, 395,
401, 403, 404
see also informational basis of
judgement in justice (IBJJ)
justification, 30, 102, 111, 126, 139,
157, 204, 206, 209–211, 223,
235, 239, 241, 257, 267, 282,




common, 9, 201, 208, 210, 225,
238, 399, 407
general, 9, 26, 152, 172, 381, 386
practical, 19, 27, 201, 384, 404,
405
L
language(s), 11, 19, 57, 58, 66, 74,
79, 137–139, 146, 150, 154,
156, 170, 236, 258, 323, 398,
400, 443, 452
law, lawyer, 3, 11, 18, 21, 22, 25, 31,
51–53, 56, 71, 72, 79, 84, 140,
148, 160, 171, 173, 174, 184,
190, 200, 210–212, 226, 233,
234, 278, 279, 292, 293, 298,
299, 362, 363, 368, 383, 386,
387, 436
Lazarsfeld, Paul, 27, 420, 422,
424–428, 438, 443, 450, 454,
456
legitimacy, legitimizing, 4, 18, 45, 52,
57, 65, 74, 197, 200, 203, 204,
206, 209, 211, 213, 216, 232,




Mali, 6, 19, 20, 152, 254–258, 260,
261, 263, 265, 271
managerialism, 313, 314
market
economy, 78, 79, 81, 270
global, 81
marketization, 24, 72, 78, 314, 330
Marxism, Marxist, 52, 53, 55, 60, 65,
201, 202, 443, 445, 446
Mead, George Herbert, 421, 430
meaning, 10, 14–16, 26, 88, 98, 101,
123, 125–127, 135–137, 142,
146, 147, 151, 153, 154, 156,
157, 159, 160, 174, 175, 181,
191, 198, 206, 255, 263, 266,
269, 297, 384, 388, 390, 397,





of poverty, 141, 142, 144
measuring, 103, 111, 113–116,
118, 119, 135, 150, 160, 189,
279, 294, 297, 317, 329, 379,
427, 443
metrics, 3, 14, 23, 103, 106, 117,
161, 292, 309, 312
Miller, Peter, 2, 5–7, 10, 13, 15, 22,
29–33, 98, 101, 103, 109, 126,
146, 198–200, 236, 242, 285,
295, 298, 308–310, 312, 315,
318, 319, 323, 389
Mills, C. Wright, 420, 440, 450
model, 17, 18, 46–48, 59–61, 65,
66, 87, 138, 148, 170–172,
174–179, 181–190, 192, 193,
201, 203–206, 226, 263, 268,
269, 289, 292, 294, 325, 384,
389, 392, 397, 428, 431, 432,
454
monitoring, 82, 87, 108, 109, 224,
231, 241, 314, 316, 324, 372,
392
monograph, 386





negotiation, 25, 60, 174, 200,
207, 218, 229, 242, 267, 280,
281, 287–289, 295, 296, 316,
338, 339, 344, 345, 347–349,
355–358, 369, 371, 372
neoliberalism, 13, 72, 77, 87, 89, 91,
169, 171, 190, 191, 309, 400
New Public Management (NPM), 3,
4, 16, 21, 97, 277, 285, 290,
292, 307, 309, 310, 382, 388,
410
nomenclature, 16, 30, 174, 239, 383,
390
non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), 19, 20, 205, 212,
219, 220, 222, 223, 225, 226,
228–231, 233, 238
normativity, normative, 99, 125, 126,
138, 139, 145, 146, 155–157,
160, 171, 183, 198, 200, 210,
211, 227, 233, 235, 241, 295,
381, 390–392, 397
mode of, 223, 233, 242
number(s)
and abstraction, 15, 30, 126, 146,
147, 156, 157, 171, 233
and depoliticization, 156
and parsimony, 151, 160
governance by, 1, 3, 4, 6, 22, 26,
152, 156, 309, 389, 406
language of, 146, 154, 156




objective, 10, 16, 18, 19, 21, 26,
59, 66, 80, 110, 125, 151,
152, 157, 160, 172, 176, 177,
181–183, 189, 193, 197, 198,
200, 212–214, 216, 219, 220,
223, 227, 232, 233, 242, 255,
259, 260, 262, 265, 267, 276,
278, 279, 284, 286, 289, 292,
294, 317, 379–381, 389, 392,
393, 401–404, 410, 425, 426,
431, 434, 436, 441, 443, 446
objectivity
a-perspectival, 16, 27, 426
mechanical, 121, 152, 426
positional, 17
see also Daston, Lorraine; Porter,
Theodore; Sen, Amartya
object(s), 14, 15, 19, 31, 98, 105,
106, 109, 111, 113, 123, 125,
156, 161, 171, 179, 188, 189,
205, 208, 234, 236, 341, 351,
383, 384, 399, 400, 402, 404,
409, 421–424, 427, 430, 431,
433, 434, 443, 445




optimal, 26, 381, 389, 395, 400
optimization, 105, 120
to optimize, 87, 99
option, 172, 182, 198, 207, 208,
212, 214, 218, 235, 238, 297,
383
order, 10, 12, 19, 30, 32, 51,
60, 62, 71, 72, 74–82, 84,
86–88, 98, 102, 124, 127, 136,
140, 146–148, 152, 155, 202,
204–208, 210, 213, 220, 223,
235–237, 240, 282, 284, 297,
298, 318, 329, 383, 393, 409,
433, 438
organisation, 193
activities, 28, 72, 87, 240, 308,
433, 435
procedures, 19, 174, 223, 225,
232, 410, 436
outcomes, results, 20, 21, 25, 26, 31,
55–57, 60, 62, 67, 120, 122,
128, 152, 171, 173, 178, 182,
183, 186, 188, 189, 193, 223,
225, 236, 254, 255, 258, 260,
262, 265, 268, 270, 278–281,
284, 286, 295, 296, 308, 313,
325, 326, 328, 339, 351, 357,
360–362, 380, 383, 385, 391,
393, 397, 400, 410, 453
P
panel, 17, 18, 170, 175, 176,
179–183, 187–191, 193, 240. See
also census; inquiry; survey; poll
parliament, 21, 277, 278, 286, 287,
314, 353, 386
participation, 19, 26, 86, 112, 128,
174, 181, 183, 213, 219, 220,
222, 237, 283, 294, 319, 381,
382, 397, 400–402, 405, 408
to participate, 12, 241
perception, 105, 110, 141, 176, 177,
180, 217, 285, 381
performance, 3, 5, 21–23, 26, 72,
75, 110–112, 116, 119, 141,
152, 224, 255, 256, 264,
270, 277–280, 283, 285–288,
290, 291, 295–297, 307–309,
311–318, 320, 322, 324, 325,
330, 379, 382, 389, 392, 393,
395, 399, 410
indicators of, 3, 20–22, 119, 120,
152, 159, 241, 253, 255, 257,
259, 262, 266, 270, 276–279,
490 INDEX
285–287, 291, 292, 294, 297,
380, 392, 398
measurement, 1, 3, 23, 24, 98,
121, 278, 299, 312, 314, 315,
318–320
person, 32, 80, 89, 113, 114, 117,
127, 142, 143, 171, 178, 186,
187, 189, 191, 194, 234, 311,
345, 383, 384, 390, 394, 395,
454
personal, 34, 76, 85, 89, 98, 110,
111, 113, 117, 121, 127, 140,
177, 186, 188, 190, 199, 200,
203, 204, 207, 208, 218, 223,
228, 291, 318, 343, 384, 401,
426, 429, 437, 457
dossier, 12, 74, 75, 77
file, 74, 75, 90
see also individual; subject
perspective, a-perspectival, 10, 16, 17,
23, 27, 29, 45, 53, 58, 107, 115,
126, 135, 137, 139, 142, 143,
155, 161, 170, 193, 199, 202,
217, 284, 308, 309, 388, 405,
426, 441
perverse effect, 327
place, 9, 15, 54, 59, 74, 82, 136,
140, 141, 146, 148, 149, 152,
154, 159, 173, 176, 177, 179,
188, 190, 205, 206, 209, 210,
214, 218, 222, 235, 241, 254,
269, 316, 317, 426, 443
plan, planning, 6, 11, 19, 45–47,
49–52, 54, 55, 57–59, 62, 64,
66, 78–81, 84, 86, 90, 147, 181,
185, 186, 188, 209, 213, 219,
223, 224, 232, 278, 279, 282,
310, 312, 329, 354, 392




cities, 204, 395, 396, 400,
404, 405
methods of quantification, 23,
400, 408
orders, 32
worlds, 26, 32, 208, 381
politics, policy, polity, 2, 4, 5, 12, 15,
17–19, 22, 29, 32, 34, 77, 81,
87, 88, 98, 139–141, 143, 147,
148, 154, 157, 161, 182, 197,
199, 200, 207, 213, 234–239,
241, 254, 257, 258, 260, 262,
264, 267, 286, 299, 308, 325,
329, 340, 349, 352, 353, 371,
379, 381, 382, 384, 388, 392,
393, 399, 408, 410, 420, 445
and depoliticization, 155, 156, 161
political
participation, 22, 148, 399
poll, 28, 205, 418, 421–424, 430,
435, 456
Porter, Theodore, 2, 4, 16, 22,
50–52, 66, 97, 121, 233, 279,
296, 406, 417, 426
position, positional, 15, 17, 29, 47,
57, 105, 123, 128, 137, 140,
151, 153, 154, 161, 206, 238,
261, 281, 284, 290, 299, 338,
343, 344, 346, 347, 352, 353,
365, 368, 390, 399, 421, 431,
438, 439, 444, 445, 450, 453
positivism, positivist, 28, 441, 443,
446
possibility(ies), 4, 12, 13, 19, 22, 25,
27, 31, 34, 62, 87, 104, 107,
116, 118, 119, 126, 193, 198,
209, 237, 299, 318, 342, 365,
369, 371, 396, 400, 403, 405,
408, 425
poverty, 14, 15, 136, 140–146, 157,
158, 160, 352, 391, 392, 446
absolute and relative, 142, 143, 154
INDEX 491
semantics of, 138, 140, 141, 145,
158
power, 5–8, 11–15, 21–25, 32–34,
45, 57, 65, 66, 71, 73, 86,
89, 98, 99, 101, 102, 120,
126, 135, 138, 146, 150, 151,
153–157, 161, 184, 190, 201,
204, 208, 232, 234, 236–238,
266, 269, 278, 285, 289, 296,
313, 330, 338, 339, 342, 343,
347, 349–351, 354, 355, 359,
360, 369, 417, 419, 422, 438,
447–449
cognitive, 5, 136, 150, 151, 156,
161, 202
political, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 15, 18,
22, 45, 73, 74, 86, 87, 89,
136–138, 153–155, 161, 190,
237, 289, 339, 343, 350, 400,
419, 420
see also hegemony
Power, Michael, 3, 10, 224, 308, 312,
313, 315, 410
practice(s), 3, 5, 6, 8, 19, 29–31,
33, 47, 48, 54, 58, 59, 72, 74,
76, 82, 86–88, 97–101, 103,
105, 107–113, 123, 152, 169,
176, 186, 198–202, 206, 225,
226, 235, 237, 240–242, 256,
257, 262, 263, 265, 269, 270,
291, 296, 309, 310, 320, 323,
329, 339–343, 353–356, 358,
364, 365, 368–370, 379, 380,
390–392, 403, 406–408, 427,
431, 433, 434, 436, 438, 443
pragmatism, pragmatist, 28, 126, 202,
204, 205, 208, 218, 234, 241,
421, 432, 440, 450. See also
Dewey, J.
priority(ies), 56, 60, 74, 79, 172, 254,
258, 259, 262, 264, 293, 325,
379, 404
prison(s), 23, 24, 67, 150, 175, 260,
279, 307–325, 327–330. See also
HM Prison and Probation Service
(HMPPS)
privacy, private, 5, 23, 24, 76, 81, 82,
84, 116, 136, 170, 173, 175,
200, 206, 229, 232, 234, 235,
253, 259, 265, 277–279, 292,
309, 310, 312, 314, 316, 319,
321–325, 328–330, 342
privatization, 23, 76, 307–312, 314,
322, 323, 328




organizational, 19, 174, 223, 225,
232, 410, 436
political, 26, 174, 185, 211, 223,
385, 397, 399, 410
see also convention; rule
process(es), 8, 11, 16, 19, 23, 24,
26, 28, 33, 34, 53, 56, 61, 62,
64, 65, 82, 98, 99, 102, 112,
120, 123, 136, 137, 141, 146,
148, 152, 155, 157, 160, 171,
177, 178, 180, 182, 184–187,
192, 197–199, 202, 203, 205,
206, 209, 210, 213, 217,
219, 224, 232, 234, 235, 237,
239, 259, 262, 264, 268–270,
275, 277, 278, 285, 294, 295,
297, 299, 308, 309, 312, 315,
319, 321, 322, 327, 329, 330,
338, 344, 349, 381–383, 385,
391, 393, 395–397, 399, 400,
402, 405–409, 417, 421, 422,
424, 426–428, 430, 433–437,
446–448, 451, 452
profit, profitability, 24, 102, 263, 282,







management of, 172, 236, 265
research, 29, 200, 207, 237
sectoral, 267
project, 4, 12, 16, 20, 48, 64, 71, 72,
82, 91, 121, 124, 128, 209, 217,
239, 254, 270, 288, 319, 381,
385, 431, 443, 448, 452
promotion, 12, 18, 76, 176, 220, 342
promoting, 219
to promote, 72, 79, 269, 342
proof
fabricating, 381, 397, 398
procedural, 224, 225, 227, 228
quantitative, 397, 398
property, 31, 32, 183–185, 187, 210,
227, 238, 265, 283, 324, 391,
434
provider, 292, 309, 310, 312, 314,
323–327, 329, 447
public
administration, 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 21,
170, 184, 185, 259, 260, 265,
277, 278, 286, 295, 312, 342,
344, 347, 386, 398
expenditure, 259, 266
policies, 1, 3, 5, 6, 16, 18, 20, 21,
23, 26, 145, 147, 181, 182,
189, 253–255, 259, 260, 263,
264, 266, 269, 270, 278–280,
286, 297, 345, 349, 350, 379,
380, 382, 386, 392, 398, 399,
402, 406
services, 1, 3, 5, 21, 23, 97, 185,
259, 265, 266, 278, 280, 285,
286, 292, 296, 297, 309, 310,
312, 314, 321–323, 328, 342,
349
publication/publishing, 4, 21, 28,
58, 60, 90, 185, 283–285, 288,
291–296, 298, 357, 361, 364,
368, 369, 421, 428, 448, 449,
453
Q
qualitative, 4, 10, 27–29, 101,
128, 284, 297, 318, 381, 392,
418–421, 424–426, 428, 431,
438, 439, 443, 445, 449–454,
456–458
qualitative sociology, 27, 28, 208,
418–421, 440, 449–454, 456
quality
qualification, 62, 151, 153, 156,
158, 203, 204, 212, 220, 236,
239, 240, 317
qualitative, 4, 10, 27–29, 101,
128, 284, 297, 318, 381, 392,
418–420, 424–426, 428, 431,
438, 439, 443, 449–451, 456,
457
to qualify, 118, 232, 237
quantification, 1, 2, 4–11, 13–15,
17, 22–34, 47, 48, 57, 58, 65,
66, 81, 89, 97, 98, 100, 101,
103, 105, 107, 109, 116, 119,
136, 137, 140–142, 144–146,
151, 152, 154, 155, 159–161,
169–171, 191, 197, 202,
205, 208, 234–237, 239, 275,
276, 278–280, 285, 286, 294,
296–299, 308, 309, 312–315,
317–319, 321–325, 328–330,
338, 339, 343, 345, 350,
355, 357, 358, 363, 364, 369,
370, 379–382, 385, 386, 388,
389, 391, 395, 397, 400–406,
408, 417–422, 424, 425, 428,
431–438, 440, 441, 443–445,
448, 449, 452, 453, 456–458
INDEX 493
quantifiable, 16, 19, 78, 110, 197,
198, 205, 229, 313, 327
to quantify, 117, 237, 261, 278,
358, 370
quantified self (QS), 4, 13, 91, 98,
100–104, 106, 107, 109–112,
116, 117, 123–128, 234
quantifying process, 280
quantity, 10, 27, 28, 59, 135, 154,
318, 417–420, 426, 435, 441,
444, 445, 448, 449, 451, 454,
456, 457
questionnaire, 172, 176, 178, 179,
186, 191, 201, 383–385, 405,
427, 429, 433–436, 445
R




selection, 54, 55, 61
survey, 53–55, 61, 172, 185, 365
ranking, 1, 3, 4, 23, 98, 143, 151,
152, 159, 160, 204, 240, 253,
256, 257, 260, 284, 285, 293,
295, 296, 308, 309, 329, 402,
410
rate, 5, 21, 26, 28, 78, 152, 181, 255,
258, 260, 261, 270, 282–284,
315, 317, 325, 327, 328, 339,
382, 383, 386, 389–393, 398,
401, 433–436, 453
rate producing, 433, 435, 436
ratio, 59, 259, 261, 266, 281, 283,
287, 288, 291
rating, 1, 4, 23, 72, 78–80, 83,
85, 98, 151, 152, 308, 309,
312–315, 318–320, 329, 330,
398
rationale, 78, 79, 185, 280, 288, 289,
296, 308, 309, 329
rationalism
rational, 7, 80, 120, 381, 384, 389,
393, 395, 401





reason, reasonable, 30, 48, 52, 55,
72, 152, 158, 190, 206, 216,
222, 227, 258, 265, 266, 281,
314, 343, 359, 360, 403, 423,
425, 433, 436, 441, 451
recipient, 20, 125, 141, 254, 255,
260, 262–270
recognition, 33, 57, 85, 87, 148, 150,
153, 161, 180, 205, 324, 438
reference, 25, 29, 49, 53, 103, 112,
136, 143, 148, 149, 153, 157,
159, 161, 170, 176, 181, 182,
187, 193, 225, 339, 359, 360,
390, 409, 441
framework, 136, 140, 161, 254,
268, 270
to refer, 184
reform(s), 21–23, 73, 75, 91, 102,
236, 239, 254, 256, 258, 259,
265, 267, 275, 277, 285, 287,
293, 297, 307, 309, 310, 312,
318, 319, 324, 329, 330, 352,
380, 388, 399
registration, 19, 74, 90, 288
regulation, regulatory, 5–7, 24, 31,
65, 79, 138–140, 175, 198, 200,
201, 212, 223, 234, 289, 298,
314, 337, 340, 341, 344, 362,
364, 368, 383, 396, 408
reliability, reliable, 64, 85, 102, 109,
182, 198, 200, 261, 450
representation, 1, 2, 11, 25, 45–47,
54–57, 66, 106, 113, 116, 117,
126, 152, 155, 185, 203, 217,
494 INDEX
219, 220, 257, 356, 361–363,
367, 399, 402, 407
representative, 185, 220, 406
representativeness, 185
resident, 75, 76, 78, 184
responsibility, responsible, 12, 75, 76,
81, 86, 99, 138, 140, 161, 199,
210, 213, 214, 216, 234, 254,
255, 264, 268, 314, 315, 318,
324, 357, 365, 387, 388, 393
reward vs. penalty, punishment, 12,
86, 292, 295
risk, 1, 53, 77, 122, 141, 152, 269,
352, 357, 409
rule, 7, 13, 18, 19, 71, 72, 87,
160, 200–202, 217, 222, 232,
234, 259, 267, 296, 308, 309,
314, 343, 379, 383, 389, 393,





Salais, Robert, 1, 2, 4, 7–9, 13, 16,
17, 25–28, 31, 32, 34, 100, 123,
140, 157–161, 190, 199, 200,
204, 210, 238, 240, 241, 262,
276, 295, 297, 319, 327, 328,
330, 385, 387, 388, 399, 403,
406, 409, 410, 457
sample, 54–56, 61, 64, 65, 157, 173,
182, 193, 326, 361, 363, 418,
423, 429, 443
random, 54, 55, 61, 172, 178, 185,
326
stratified sample, 55
see also model; selection
science, scientific, 2, 5, 11, 17, 29,
31, 45–52, 58, 59, 66, 74, 81,
84, 85, 97, 98, 110, 140, 141,
145, 152, 153, 156, 157, 180,
182, 186, 202, 233, 256, 288,
291, 293, 298, 380, 405, 408,
419, 425, 426, 431, 435, 443,
451, 452
score, 13, 15, 72, 84–87, 115,
119, 253, 258, 260, 389,








observation, 14, 98, 106, 109
optimization, 104, 123
producing, 381, 399
quantification, 4, 13, 31, 97–105,
107–109, 111, 115, 123–125,
127, 128, 234, 237
technology of the, 13, 98, 100,
104, 106
selfishness, 80
semantic(s), 136, 146–148, 151, 157,
169, 454
semantic field, 136, 139, 155, 160
semantic shift, 14, 136, 137, 139,
140, 237
Sen, Amartya, 15, 17, 27, 33, 34,
142–144, 154, 158, 160, 178,
187, 193, 194, 383, 397,
402–404, 408, 410
Sennett, Richard, 102, 124, 137, 150,
161
separation(s), 11, 15, 29, 136, 145,
147, 149, 150
settlement, 225, 423, 431. See also
agreement; deliberation, dialogue,
negotiation
sharing, exchanging, 79, 81, 98, 110,
111, 153, 220, 358
INDEX 495
situation, situated, 14, 25, 27, 32–34,
50, 56, 61, 114, 119, 122,
137, 153, 170, 173, 176–179,
182, 183, 185, 186, 188,
189, 192, 206, 222, 228, 233,
238, 266, 269, 287, 299, 341,
342, 345, 348, 350, 352, 358,
363, 367, 369, 371, 384, 385,
387–391, 396–398, 402–405,
410, 417, 421, 427, 432, 433,
451, 456. See also action, actor;
coordination; state
social
belonging, 82, 105, 177, 184, 185,
187, 387
conduct, 12, 13, 27, 61, 63, 83,
86, 87, 342, 435
coordination, 13, 201, 234, 382,
407, 408
engineering, 12, 72, 125
protection, 81, 138, 148, 263, 264,
390
reform, 11, 138, 263, 275, 276,
324, 388, 399
statistics, 2, 6, 7, 10, 11, 17, 26,
28, 45–53, 56, 59, 60, 62–64,
101, 159, 173, 174, 185, 190,
199, 201, 239, 292, 299, 381,
382, 385–387, 389, 421, 433,
434, 443, 444, 453
studies, 7, 29, 33, 89, 113, 178,
233, 242, 275, 363, 417, 433,
434
social contract, 264
social impact bonds (SIBs), 24, 309,
321, 325–330
socialism, 57, 58, 81
post, 73, 76, 80, 85, 87
socialist, 6, 10, 11, 46–50, 52, 53,
56, 60, 65, 66, 75, 76, 78, 81,
87, 90
social media, 82, 116
sociology
comprehensive, 192, 432, 445
phenomenological, 432
qualitative, 27–29, 208, 418–421,
424, 425, 428, 438, 440,
449–454, 456–458
quantitative, 27–29, 208, 240,
418–421, 426–429, 433, 438,
439, 445, 450–453, 456–458
radical, 420, 439, 440, 444–446,
448, 449
solidarity, 100, 210, 217, 264, 269,
282, 292
Soviet Union, 57, 74, 138, 239. See
also USSR
space
open, 14, 19, 149, 200, 216, 217,
219, 221, 222, 224, 265
spatial, 15, 136, 146–148, 150
spatialization, 146–149
see also place; power; situation,
situated; territory
stakeholder, 207, 212, 229, 233, 241,
322, 397
standard, 18, 19, 57, 58, 65, 79,
141, 142, 145, 155, 172,
188, 198, 200, 201, 205, 206,
208–213, 219, 222–225, 227,
228, 231–233, 235, 241, 242,
257, 307, 311, 317, 384, 389,
390, 398, 405–407, 446
standardization, 16, 31, 151, 205,
206, 212, 234, 235, 406, 458
to standardize, 18, 115, 201, 205,
279
statactivism, 7, 23, 24, 160, 369, 410
statactivist, 338, 345, 369, 457
state
building, 11, 45, 74, 387, 405, 406
convention of the, 406, 410
government, 2, 6, 20, 30, 45, 46,
66, 71, 72, 74–77, 82–86, 88,
496 INDEX
190, 234, 253, 263–265, 268,
278, 309, 314, 321, 347, 380
statistics
official, 58–60, 175, 176, 184, 351,
352, 364, 369, 420, 434–436,
438, 447
statistical apparatus, 11
status, 26, 49, 51, 55, 66, 106, 148,
173, 181, 184, 192, 256, 257,
293, 296, 299, 381, 403, 410,
428, 439
subject, 17, 31, 52, 54, 60, 62–64,
76, 82, 88, 90, 112–114, 122,
140, 152, 155, 156, 170, 184,
185, 189, 191, 349, 369, 395.
See also individual; person
subjective, subjectivity, 16, 17, 31, 86,
101, 103, 109, 113, 124–127,
152, 156, 177, 178, 180, 186,
192, 193, 318, 328, 426. See also
objective; objectivity
subordination, 14, 101, 437
Supiot, Alain, 3, 4, 15, 17, 19,
22, 138, 156, 160, 161, 170,
184–187, 194, 253, 276, 292,
296–298, 309, 312, 318, 327,
329, 389
surveillance, 12, 14, 72–78, 82–85,
87, 88, 90, 100, 109, 148, 353,
364, 367
survey, 27, 28, 49, 52–56, 61,
63–65, 67, 107, 157, 160, 170,
172–177, 182, 185, 191–193,
199, 208, 219, 234, 319, 351,
352, 357, 365, 418–421, 423,
424, 427–429, 431, 435–438,
443–445, 447–449, 456
longitudinal, 175, 181, 182, 193
representative, 17, 170, 174, 176,
179, 181, 182, 184–186, 189,
190, 360, 444
see also inquiry; panel; poll
sustainability, 198, 211, 222, 226
T
target, targeting, 3, 4, 20, 26, 56, 99,
176, 179, 182, 253, 257, 260,
262, 278, 280, 285, 308, 311,
313–317, 325–327, 388, 389
taxonomy, 13, 31, 97, 99, 103, 104,
107, 110, 124, 125, 127
technocracy, technocratic, 262, 263,
280
technology of government, 7, 8
territory, 15, 55, 146, 148–150, 219,
227, 228, 232, 266, 341, 361,
362, 367, 404
factual, 27, 402, 403, 405
theoretical, 7, 16, 17, 31, 51–53, 60,
100, 138, 176, 180, 188, 189,
201, 217, 356, 358, 398, 403,
427
game theory, 77, 80
theory, 11, 30, 46, 49–51, 58, 59,
65, 66, 161, 180, 181, 256,
292, 296, 372, 393, 424, 430,
433, 437, 450, 451
Thévenot, Laurent, 2, 4, 7, 8, 13, 14,
16–19, 29–32, 100–102, 123,
126, 128, 155, 160, 161, 170,
174, 176, 193, 199–204, 207,
208, 210, 215, 216, 219, 221,
222, 225, 229, 230, 233, 234,
237, 239–242, 276, 278, 282,
297, 314, 322, 329, 330, 385,
391, 404, 409
third term, 143, 154, 155
Third World, 254, 262, 268
threshold(s), 15, 119, 136, 137, 141,
143–146, 326, 347–349
trade union, 24, 62, 257, 293, 341,
342, 346, 347, 358, 369, 371,
387
INDEX 497
transparency, 30, 84, 211, 330, 340,
342, 364
treasury, 280, 281, 283–285, 287
trust, 4, 63, 77, 79, 84, 97, 109, 121,
209, 278, 279, 292, 310, 318
distrust, 5, 278, 292
trustworthiness, 5, 12, 77, 78
truth, 4, 15, 50, 123, 180, 264, 364,




uncertainty, 5, 13, 32, 54, 55, 104,
117, 122–124, 126, 210, 236,
343, 349, 388, 409. See also
Knight, Frank; probability; risk
United Kingdom (UK), 2–6, 30, 217,
239, 263, 277, 279, 297, 310,
329, 382, 385, 387, 388, 390,
391, 393, 394, 396, 405, 406
United States (US), 3, 4, 17, 27, 65,
72, 149, 159, 161, 172, 207,
217, 241, 256, 263, 269, 277,
279, 379
US-American, North-American, 29
university(ies), 21, 23, 275–277, 280,
282–284, 287–296, 299, 426,
432, 440, 449, 453
USSR, 6, 46, 49, 54, 55, 58, 60, 61,
63, 65, 66, 239, 408. See also
Soviet Union
utopia, 8–10, 14, 17, 125, 156, 389,
408, 445
V
variables, 8, 17, 18, 31, 78, 105, 109,
173, 176, 178–180, 182–184,
186, 187, 189, 192, 193, 206,
264, 383, 426–428, 431, 454,
456
verifiability, verifiable, 313
voice, 9, 18, 19, 22, 32, 33, 144,
152, 160, 200, 204, 207, 213,




Weber, Max, 105, 161, 204, 419
welfare, 15, 136, 138–141, 143, 145,
148, 151, 157, 158, 160, 208,
329, 422, 436
welfare state, 138, 140, 208, 235,
292, 420, 437, 439, 440, 446,
448, 456, 457
well-being, 45, 65, 111, 117, 177,
193, 318
world(s), 3, 6, 7, 9, 11, 15, 16, 26,
29, 32, 45, 54, 56, 72, 73, 78,
82, 87, 103, 105, 108, 110, 112,
119, 122–124, 127, 147–149,
170, 173, 176, 185, 197, 198,
200, 202, 205, 208, 209, 217,
219, 223, 226, 232, 234, 237,
238, 263, 268, 269, 282–284,
298, 309, 313, 323, 379–381,
384, 398, 407, 409, 418, 420,
432, 434, 439, 441, 446
plurality of, 26, 32, 198, 208, 381
worth, 19, 30, 32, 99, 100, 104, 124,
125, 127, 154, 203–208, 210,
213, 214, 217, 235–237, 240,
298, 391, 406, 409, 419
economics of, 19, 32
